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Summary
This study investigates the behaviour of private interest groups towards monetary 
policy and central banks. It explores the extent to which interest groups seek to 
influence monetary policy and their motivations for doing so – or for refraining from 
doing so. Where evidence for interest group activity with respect to monetary 
decisions can be found, it aims to identify the ways in which groups communicate with 
policy makers. 
To that end, a micro-behavioural approach is applied with the aim of investigating the 
basic incentives for individuals and interest groups in the private sector to take 
political action on monetary questions or to refrain from doing so. The decision 
whether to take political action or not is presented as a cost-benefit analysis, weighing 
the expected benefits of identifying, aggregating and mediating individual and group 
interests against the potential costs. The determinants of costs and benefits are 
analysed with respect to the issue, institutional, and group contexts in which they 
originate.
Based on a set of theoretically derived propositions, the behaviour of interest groups in 
the area of monetary policymaking is investigated by means of an empirical case study 
of the relations between interest groups and the Deutsche Bundesbank in Germany as 
well as the potential impact of introduction of the single European currency and 
establishment of the ECB. The case study encompasses a literature-based analysis of 
the institutional, issue, and group contexts in Germany and at EU level, complemented 
by qualitative interviews with a total of 58 decision makers and experts at peak, 
sectoral, and regional interest groups, as well as at the Bundesbank and the ECB.
The case study on Germany yields four broad conclusions:
– Institutional accessibility is one of two major explanatory variables for low 
interest-group activity. Political independence and ample endowment with 
material resources and expertise in its field of policymaking contribute 
substantially to the fact that the Bundesbank does not need to rely on political 
support or information from the private sector, effectively insulating the bank from 
external influence. This is recognised by interest group representatives and enters 
their cost-benefit analysis on political action in this policy field.
– The second major explanatory variable is the coincidence of major policy 
objectives between the private sector, on the one hand, and the Bundesbank and 
ECB on the other, coupled with a broad measure of agreement with the policies of 
the monetary authorities in general. Most of the time, monetary policy thus 
becomes a non-issue in the perception of trade and industry associations. Even 
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when monetary and exchange rate developments become more urgent across 
economic cycles, their direct and indirect impact – where at all identifiable – is 
regarded as very low compared with that of other economic policies. As a 
consequence, preferences with respect to monetary and exchange rate policies are 
comparatively un-intensive. Despite the considerable impact of monetary policy 
on the economy as a whole, it is not a priority issue on the political agenda of 
business associations. 
– The heterogeneity of interests does not play as great a role in inhibiting interest 
group activity on monetary affairs as suggested by theory. Preferences are 
perceived in a general manner and in most cases are not necessarily considered to 
be contradictory. 
– Interest groups do not seem to lobby monetary policy makers in the way they 
approach decision makers in other conventional policy areas. The style of 
communication is rather un-political, factual, and non-prescriptive. Rather, 
communication takes the form of an informed, expertise-oriented dialogue geared 
towards the general good – at least at a declaratory level. The preferred channels 
of communication with the Bundesbank are direct in nature, with the Advisory 
Boards and economists’ roundtable as the formal and semi-formal forums 
respectively. Communication via the media is an important tool, but it is used with 
caution to avoid the public perception that business associations interfere with the 
monetary authorities’ policies and independence.
Introduction of the single European currency in 1999 marks an important caesura for 
the communication of interests, changing the way in which interests in the private 
sector with regard to monetary policy are aggregated and communicated to the 
relevant decision makers. 
– Monetary policy has become a European policy issue falling within the remit of 
EU-level business associations. The major cross-sectoral interest associations have 
responded to this new issue by strengthening their work on broad macroeconomic 
developments and policies and by devoting additional resources to generating 
monetary policy-related expertise and information. This process of adjustment is 
not particularly forceful, with the insignificance of the policy issue and overall 
agreement with monetary policy as the most important arguments raised among 
EU-level representatives themselves, as well as by their member associations at 
national level, for not devoting greater energy to monetary affairs. 
– At the same time, the chances of influencing monetary decision making by the 
ECB, were such influence actually sought, are highly limited – even more limited 
than was the case with the Bundesbank. The ECB enjoys an unequalled degree of 
political autonomy, and has recourse to substantial resources, within its own 
19
institution as well as in the Eurosystem's national central banks. The probability 
that the private sector can make original contributions to the policy debate is 
consequently very low. 
– Patterns of communication are still evolving. EU business associations have not 
yet arrived at a final conclusion on how to deal with monetary issues and the ECB. 
In parallel, national associations continue to communicate with central banks at 
national level, even though the individual marginal impact on monetary decisions 
has fallen dramatically with the assumption of responsibility by the ECB. 
– Perceptions at EU level are similar to those in Germany, most importantly with 
respect to the broad objectives of monetary policy and the channels through which 
to address policy makers. Marked differences exist in the style of communication 
in particular. 
Overall, interest groups are not dealing with a policy issue sui generis – the framework 
conditions for interest group activity are not specific in a qualitative respect. 
Nonetheless, monetary policy represents an exceptional policy issue for interest 
groups, combining a number of institutional, issue, and group related specificities. 
These include the high degree of institutional autonomy, the broad measure of 
agreement between the private sector and policy makers on policy objectives, and the 
profound appreciation for central banks as competence centres in their sphere of 
responsibility. In as far as these properties contribute to a comparatively successful 
long-range policy outcome and to an interplay of private and public stakeholders 
deemed by both sides to be effective and satisfactory, the policy area lends itself to 
further research and to investigation of its applicability in other policy fields.
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Samenvatting
Deze studie onderzoekt het gedrag van private belangengroepen tegenover monetair 
beleid en centrale banken. Het verkent de mate waarin belangengroepen invloed 
zoeken in het monetair beleid en hun motivaties om te beïnvloeden – of het laten 
ervan. Waar bewijs kan worden gevonden voor belangengroepactiviteit met betrekking 
tot monetaire besluiten, is het doel van dit onderzoek de manieren waarop 
belangengroepen communiceren met beleidsmakers te identificeren.
Hiervoor is een microgedrag aanpak toegepast met als doel het onderzoeken van de 
basis stimulansen voor individuen en belangengroepen in de private sector om 
politieke actie te ondernemen in monetaire vraagstukken of hiervan af te zien. De 
beslissing om wel of niet politieke actie te ondernemen wordt gepresenteerd als kosten 
en baten analyse. Hierbij wordt rekening gehouden met de verwachte baten van het 
identificeren, verzamelen en bemiddelen van individuele- en groepsbelangen tegen de 
potentiële kosten. De beslissende factoren van kosten en baten worden geanalyseerd 
met betrekking tot de kwestie, insitutionele- en groepscontexten van waaruit ze 
voorkomen.
Gebaseerd op een set van voorstellen die afstammen van theorie wordt het gedrag van 
belangengroepen op het gebied van monetaire beleidsvoering onderzocht door middel 
van een empirische case study over de relaties tussen belangengroepen en de Deutsche 
Bundesbank in Duitsland, evenals de potentiële impact van de invoering van de 
Europese munt en de oprichting van de ECB. De case study omvat een op literatuur 
gebaseerde analyse van de institutionele, kwestie en groepscontexten in Duitsland en
op EU-niveau, aangevuld door kwalitatieve interviews met in totaal 58 besluitvormers 
en experts van top, sectorale en regionale belangengroepen, evenals bij de Bundesbank 
en de ECB.
De case study over Duitsland brengt vier brede conclusies:
– Institutionele toegang is een van de twee belangrijkste toelichtende variabelen 
voor lage belangengroepactiviteit. Politieke verbondenheid en ruime bedeling met 
materiële middelen en expertise in de velden van beleidsvorming dragen 
substantieel bij aan het feit dat de Bundesbank niet afhankelijk is van politieke 
ondersteuning of informatie van de private sector, en isoleert de bank op een 
effectieve manier van invloed van buitenaf. Dit wordt erkend door 
vertegenwoordigers van belangengroepen en betreedt hun kosten en baten analyse 
op het gebied van politieke actie in dit beleidsveld.
– De tweede belangrijke toelichtende variabele is de gelijktijdigheid van belangrijke 
beleidsdoelen van de private sector aan de ene kant, en de Bundesbank en de ECB 
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aan de andere kant, gekoppeld aan een hoge graad van overeenstemming met het 
beleid van de monetaire autoriteiten in het algemeen. Meestal wordt monmetair 
beleid dan een non-issue in de perceptie van handels- en industriële verenigingen. 
Zelfs wanneer monetair en wisselkoers ontwikkelingen dringender worden in 
economische kringlopen, wordt hun directe en indirecte impacten – zo ver als die 
identificeerbaar zijn – als zeer laag gezien vergeleken met dat van ander 
economisch beleid. Als gevolg hiervan, zijn voorkeuren met betrekking tot 
monetair en wisselkoers beleid relatief gezien niet intensief. Ondanks de 
aanzienlijke impact van monetair beleid op de economie in haar geheel, is het geen 
prioritaire kwestie op de politieke agenda van zakelijke verenigingen.
– De rol van heterogene belangen bij het betrekken van belangengroepen activiteiten 
op monetaire zaken, is minder belangrijk dan de theorie impliceert. Voorkeuren 
worden nagestreefd op een meer algemene manier en zijn in de meeste gevallen 
niet noodzakelijkerwijs tegenstrijdig.
– Belangengroepen lijken op het gebied van monetair beleid niet op dezelfde manier 
te lobbyen als dat zij dat doen in andere meer conventionele beleidsvelden. De 
communicatiestijl is nauwelijks politiek, gaat weinig uit van feiten en is over het 
algemeen niet prescriptief. Liever neemt communicatie de vorm aan van een 
geïnformeerd expertise-georiënteerd dialoog dat zich richt op het algemeen 
belang, op zijn minst op een verklarend niveau. De communicatiekanalen die de 
voorkeur hebben bij communicatie met de Bundesbank hebben een directe natuur, 
met de Advisory Boards en de economen roundtable als de formele en semi-
formele forums. Communicatie via de media is een belangrijk hulpmiddel, maar 
wordt met zorg gebruikt om te vermijden dat het publiek de indruk krijgt dat het 
bedrijfsleven zich mengt in het monetaire beleid en hiermee de onafhankelijkheid 
van de bank aantast.
De introductie van de Euro in 1999 markeert een belangrijke cesuur voor de 
communicatie van belangen. Er heeft een verandering plaatsgevonden in de manier 
waarop belangen in de private sector met betrekking tot monetair beleid worden 
samengebracht en gecommuniceerd naar de relevante beleidsmakers.
– Monetair beleid is een Europees beleid geworden dat valt in het gebied van de 
Business Associations op Europees niveau. De grote cross-sectionele 
belangenorganisaties hebben hierop gereageerd door hun werk op brede 
macroeconomische ontwikkelingen en regels aan te sterken en door extra 
middelen in te zetten voor het realiseren van monetair beleid dat gerelateerd is aan 
expertise en informatie. Dit proces van toewijzing is niet echt krachtig. Als 
belangrijkste redenen hiervoor worden onder vertegenwoordigers op EU-level, de 
onbelangrijkheid van dit beleidsonderwerp en de algemene overeenstemming over 
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monetair beleid genoemd. Ook het feit dat de leden op nationaal niveau niet veel 
energie in monetaire zaken steken word als argument naar voren gebracht.
– Tegelijkertijd zijn de kansen, als deze al gezocht worden, om het beleid van de 
ECB te beïnvloeden zeer beperkt. Zelfs meer beperkt dat in het geval van de 
Bundesbank. The ECB kent een onevenredig niveau van politiek autonomie en 
heeft toegang tot substantiële bronnen, zowel binnen in de eigen institutie als in de 
nationale centrale banken in het Eurosysteem. De mogelijkheden voor de private 
sector om substantiële bijdragen aan het beleidsdebat te leveren is structureel erg 
laag.
– Patronen van communicatie ontwikkelen zich nog steeds. EU business 
associations hebben nog geen antwoord gevonden op de vraag hoe het beste kan 
worden omgegaan met monetaire vraagstukken en de ECB. Parallel hieraan vindt 
er op nationaal niveau nog steeds communicatie plaats tussen de nationale 
business associations en de centrale banken, ondanks het feit dat de marginale 
individuele impact op monetair beleid dramatisch is gedaald na de toewijzing van 
de verantwoordelijkheden aan de ECB.
– Percepties op EU-level zijn vrijwel gelijk aan de percepties in Duitsland, vooral op 
het gebied van monetair beleid en de kanalen die gebruikt worden om contact te 
leggen met beleidsmakers. Verschillen komen vooral naar voren in de manier 
waarop deze kanalen worden gebruikt.
Over het algemeen concentreren belangengroepen zich niet op een beleidsissue sui 
generis- de condities voor belangengroepen binnen het framework zijn niet specifiek 
vanuit een kwalitatief oogpunt. Desalniettemin is monetair beleid een ongewoon 
beleidsissue voor belangengroepen, dat gepaard gaat met verschillende institutionele-, 
issue- en groep gerelateerde specifieke kenmerken; onder andere de hoge mate van 
institutionele autonomie, de hoge mate van overeenstemming tussen private sector en 
beleidsmakers over de doelstellingen van beleid en de algemene waardering voor 
centrale banken als dragers van competenties en grote verantwoordelijkheden. Zolang
deze eigenschappen bijdragen aan een relatief succesvolle long-run beleids outcome en 
een interactie tussen private en publieke belangengroepen die van beide kanten wordt 
gekarakteriseerd als effectief en bevredigend, leent dit beleidsveld zich voor verder 
onderzoek en nasporing van de transferabiliteit naar andere beleidsvelden. 
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Introduction
Topic and motivation
This study investigates the behaviour of private interest groups towards monetary 
policy and central banks. It explores the extent to which interest groups seek to 
influence monetary policy and their motivations for doing so – or for refraining from 
doing so. Where evidence for interest group activity with respect to monetary 
decisions can be found, it aims to identify the ways in which groups communicate with 
policy makers. 
Precisely why one should be particularly concerned with interest-group behaviour 
towards monetary policymaking may not be evident at first sight. Monetary policy 
decisions are rarely spectacular for observers not involved in economic and financial 
affairs. Monetary policy makers generally prefer to pursue their policies in a cautious, 
subtle manner in small steps – incremental interest-rate changes, for example, whose 
immediate impact on people’s lives may appear negligible. In addition, monetary 
policy is decided outside the familiar arena of political battle through parliamentary 
debate, between government and opposition or among competing political parties. 
Monetary decisions are taken by central banks – administrative institutions whose staff 
is composed of experts in their field, taking decisions directed by their concern for the 
general welfare of the public. Why then should interest groups be concerned with this 
issue?
A second look at the topic seems to confirm such objections. Among the countless 
works – be they academic, political or journalistic in origin – on the functioning of 
monetary policy and its determinants, reference to private interest groups articulating 
their specific views on the monetary state of the economy is rare. Even less evidence 
exists on attempts to mediate private sector interests systematically, let alone on any 
significant impact of such interests on the formulation of monetary policy. 
As clear as the evidence may be, the situation is nonetheless puzzling, considering the 
relevance of monetary policy for the private sector. It would clearly be wrong to argue 
that monetary policy has an insignificant impact on the economy. Central banks 
control the circulation of money in their economies and thereby preside over a 
resource that has become a central determinant of overall economic activity. Central 
banks set important interest rates. Their monetary policy stance heavily influences the 
rate of inflation as well as exchange rates. High real interest rates can significantly 
increase the costs of borrowing; low real interest rates, on the other hand, reduce the 
returns on savings. Even low rates of inflation can lead to a substantial erosion of 
income and wealth over time. Exchange rate movements, be they critical or secular, 
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change the value of an economy’s wealth as well as the competitive position of its 
industries by international comparison. 
Despite the fact that objectives, channels, and economic impact are fundamentally 
different, a comparison of monetary policy with fiscal policy measures can be helpful 
in accentuating the question: The medium-term impact on real GDP of an increase in 
short-term interest rates by the central bank might be expected to be at least the same 
in quantitative terms as that of an equivalent rise in value added tax. Yet, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the responses of economic interest groups, such as industry 
associations, employer organisations, and trade unions, to an increase in value added 
tax tend to be rather pronounced, while comparable increases in interest rates are noted 
by and large without great comment. 
Central bank policymaking continuously and significantly affects the real income and 
wealth of all actors in the economy, be they private individuals, companies, or public 
entities, savers or creditors, exporters or importers. At the same time, there are 
important indicators strongly suggesting that market participants are far from 
indifferent with respect to monetary and exchange rate developments in their day-to-
day operations. Thus, substantial resources are devoted by financial institutions, and 
also by large individual enterprises, to analysing and forecasting monetary and 
exchange rate developments. In addition, a large and increasing number of enterprises 
insure themselves against interest and exchange rate movements by means of financial 
market hedging.
At the same time, monetary policy remains subject to constant debate in financial 
markets, but also among politicians and the public at large. Such debate, including 
extensive forecasting activities, bears witness to the fact that despite institutional 
independence and limited discretionary scope monetary policy is a subject of social 
choice. Thus, it is widely acknowledged that monetary policy is not a mechanistic or 
even deterministic process. The direction and optimal size and timing of policy 
measures continue to stimulate professional and academic debate alike. What is more, 
monetary policy measures carry re-distributive implications since different economic 
actors are affected in different ways. Thus, a reduction in interest rates may be 
welcomed by net debtors, but possibly not by creditors. Similarly, monetary policy 
measures affecting the exchange rate may be perceived quite differently by private 
interests engaged in external trade, depending for example on the currencies affected 
and their position as exporters or importers. 
As a consequence, the public interest represents a complex and fast-changing 
environment for policy makers, including those concerned with monetary affairs. 
Without prejudice to their institutional and personal independence, obtaining and 
processing information on the likely effects of their policies on the private sector 
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therefore represents a natural and inherent concern. In fact, no central bank official 
would claim to be operating in complete isolation. Indeed, they recognise the high 
degree of mutual interdependence between monetary authorities and the private sector 
in economic terms. Successful monetary policy crucially depends on the actions of 
economic actors and their reactions to the monetary stance itself. With price stability 
as their most important objective, central banks are in control of important economic 
variables and can give decisive signals and incentives to market participants. 
Ultimately, however, prices and wages are determined by those market participants, 
leaving monetary policy makers at the sidelines to some extent, observing whether 
their measures are bearing fruit. The potential benefits of contacts with the private 
sector are reflected in the institutional arrangements of a number of central banks that 
take recourse to advisory councils staffed with experts from the private sector. 
However, the role of such advisory bodies and their impact on monetary policy 
decisions have remained limited. 
All in all, the discrepancy between the significant impact of monetary policy on the 
private sector and the apparently hesitant approach of interest groups in this respect is 
the driving force of this study. It is motivated by and will explicitly deal with the 
following core questions:
– Do interest groups seek to influence monetary policy decision making?
– What are the factors contributing to the decision whether to express interests with 
respect to monetary policy, and to what extent? 
– If influence on monetary decisions is sought, how are interests articulated by the 
relevant groups?
Scope, limitations, and definitions
Given the multitude of political and economic, institutional and behavioural, 
theoretical and practical facets of interest groups’ attitudes towards monetary policy, 
there are certain aspects that go beyond the scope and intention of this analysis and 
will consequently have to be left un-addressed.
Most importantly, this study will not try to measure in any systematic way the extent 
to which interest-group activity actually influences monetary policy decisions in 
practice. To be realistic, it must be recognised that the probability of finding 
conclusive evidence on this issue is rather low. Although extensive, academic research 
on the quantitative effects of influence from electoral politics, e.g. by looking at the 
correlation between monetary policy decisions and election dates and political 
constellations before ballots, has so far remained inconclusive. Against this 
background, evidence of a significant link between the activities of interest groups and 
monetary policy decisions is highly unlikely to be found. The few attempts at doing so 
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confirm this conclusion. Qualitative techniques, such as interviewing policy makers, 
are not likely to yield authoritative results either, since definitive answers to this 
question from policy makers and stakeholders cannot be expected out of consideration 
for sensitive current issues and long-term credibility aspects. 
Similarly, this study does not seek to give answers to an important normative question 
that may be raised in this context. We may wonder whether interest groups should, or 
should be allowed to seek to influence monetary policy decisions, in particular those 
by politically independent central banks. Political independence is provided for 
monetary authorities in order to shield them as far as possible from external influence, 
especially from attempts at a short-term stimulation of economic growth, which may 
result in inflationary tendencies. In most monetary systems, this protection refers to the 
influence sought by elected politicians, who are perceived as particularly sensitive to 
inflationary tendencies, especially prior to elections. The question naturally arises as to 
whether enterprises and their stakeholders also fall victim to this temptation, and the 
evidence presented below contains a number of interesting suggestions in this regard. 
However, it is realistic to assume that private interests are likely to be articulated 
irrespective of whether their addressees are entitled to let themselves be influenced by 
these interests or not. In so far, it is more relevant to ask whether interest groups seek 
to influence monetary policy, and how they go about articulating these interests. 
Whether such influence is desirable or not presupposes a detailed enquiry into the 
motivations behind interest-group activity in this field of policymaking, which is 
beyond the scope of the current study.
Finally, the analysis does not explicitly address the positioning of interest groups with 
respect to the overall set-up of the monetary and exchange rate system, but focuses on 
the operation of monetary and exchange rate policy within these systems. This 
limitation primarily refers to the project of establishing Economic and Monetary 
Union in the EU (EMU) in the 1990s, but also to the earlier discussions, e.g. on the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). 
Although closely related and immensely important for the policy process, these 
structural caesuras represent singular events. Discussions in these contexts are not 
therefore necessarily typical of stakeholders’ views on how monetary and exchange 
rate policy as such should be shaped in day-to-day operation. Further, structural 
questions are not immediately subject to the same inherent incentive problems 
characterising monetary policy, most importantly that of time inconsistency. Where 
appropriate, recourse will be taken below to the wealth of literature available on 
structural issues such as the EMS and EMU and the behaviour of the various 
stakeholders in these contexts.
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Rather, this study looks at day-to-day monetary policy as a policy issue as viewed by 
interest groups and investigates the determinants of interest-group behaviour against 
the background of the issue itself, institutional factors, and interest-group dynamics. In 
doing so, it is exclusively concerned with the political dimension of the activities of 
interest groups and their members, i.e. with the aggregation and articulation of 
interests. The economic interdependence of the relevant interest groups and their 
members with monetary authorities, i.e. the impact of monetary policy on the private 
sector as well as the latter’s influence on the success of the operations of monetary 
authorities, is not an object of this study in its own right and will only be touched upon 
in as far as it influences and shapes political communication. In the same vein, the 
analysis does not seek to make an original contribution to the body of related theories 
used therein, e.g. those taken from public affairs management, political 
communication, and interest group theory. Given the purpose of investigating interest-
group behaviour in the specific policy context of monetary decision making, this study 
focuses on applying existing, well-established suitable theoretical elements. 
In this context, the term interest group shall refer to organised and institutionalised, 
privately operated bodies whose predominant task is to promote and further the 
common interests of their members within the political system, as formulated by 
Truman1. Interest groups pursue a great multitude of concerns2, many of them not 
necessarily related to economic issues and, more specifically, monetary affairs. The 
focus here is on economic interest groups, i.e. those groups with the explicit mandate 
to represent the economic interests of their members. Groups working on non-
economic concerns, i.e. so-called promotional groups3, will not be dealt with 
explicitly. 
More specifically, the focus of this study is narrowed down to business interests in the 
sectors of industry4 and trade5. Given the wide variety of interests potentially 
1 Truman (1993), pp. 39-43.
2 Following Salisbury (1975), p. 175, the term interest shall be used below to refer to "objects toward 
which attitudes are directed", where "objects" means "acts of governmental authorities". The word 
influence is defined as the effect that one person or entity’s activity has on another. Most 
frequently, it will be used in the context of interest groups seeking influence, or synonymously 
"taking political action", on a policy process or political institution. It is worth noting that the 
definitions for interest and interest group selected here are only one option when approaching the 
issue. Baumgartner, Leech (1998) have documented the widespread disagreement in academic 
literature on the appropriate definitions (on interest see pp. 22-25, on interest group see pp. 25-30). 
Throughout this study, the term interest association will generally be used interchangeably with 
interest group, as is the practice especially among American scholars (e.g. Baumgartner, Leech 
(1998), pp. 25-30), notwithstanding the fact that the term association is also used to refer 
specifically to formal unions of interest groups, e.g. in the form of umbrella organisations. 
3 Von Beyme (1974), pp. 27-38.
4 Commonly defined as a group of productive enterprises or organisations that produce or supply 
goods, services, or sources of income. In economics, industries are customarily classified as the 
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represented even among economic interest groups, it is necessary to limit the number 
and kinds of interests under scrutiny in order to obtain detailed results on the 
perceptions and motivations of stakeholders in the field of monetary policy. The 
selection made here is based on four considerations. First, the sample of interest 
groups should be representative of the private sector economy at large in terms of the 
exposure to monetary developments and the related policy decisions. As enterprises in 
trade and industry represent a large section of the private sector, their interest 
associations are an important object for analysis. In the same vein, the sample should 
not reflect highly specific interests. First, agriculture will not be addressed explicitly, 
as this sector – with a share of only 1% to 5% in most industrial economies – today 
represents only a very small and specific segment of the economy. More importantly, 
however, firms in the financial sector are not covered in this study. In addition to their 
own corporate refinancing and investment concerns, it is the very purpose of financial 
enterprises to deal with financial-market developments and the associated risks. 
Monetary policy can have decisive influence on market developments. In addition, 
central banks often fulfil functions in the area of financial and prudential supervision 
complementary to and separate from monetary policy related responsibilities. 
Supervisory activities naturally condition relations with enterprises subject to central 
bank oversight, i.e. banks and other financial services providers, promoting compliant 
behaviour vis-à-vis the supervisory authority. The possibility cannot be excluded of 
such behavioural patterns, resulting from the central bank's role as a financial 
supervisor, spilling over into the behaviour of enterprises and their interest groups vis-
à-vis the central bank in respect of monetary policy, thus blurring the behaviour 
otherwise likely to be observed. Financial enterprises will therefore presumably have 
very specific preferences in this policy field, making them a very important 
stakeholder in the political arena, but also limiting the suitability of the sector as an 
object for analysis in the present context. 
Second, interest groups in this analysis should be exposed to monetary or exchange 
rate developments in a significant way. Such exposure is likely to be highest for 
capital-intensive and trade-oriented sectors, again highlighting the importance of 
industry and trade as the most suitable objects for analysis. For this very reason, 
specifically service-oriented sub-sectors are not covered.
primary – forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying, and the extraction of minerals –, secondary –
manufacturing, energy-producing, and construction industries –, and tertiary sectors – service 
industries not producing tangible goods. The term tertiary sector is commonly used interchangeably 
with the term trade.
5 Commonly defined as the sector in the economy that, while producing no tangible goods, provides 
services or intangible gains or generates wealth. Economic science commonly differentiates 
between domestic and international trade activities.
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Third, the interest groups addressed in the present context should be sufficiently 
resourced to actually have sufficient means for conveying their interests to policy 
makers, provided such interests exist and are deemed worthy of pursuit, a criterion that 
business associations in trade and industry again fulfil. 
Finally, the interest groups analysed here were selected so as to exhibit some degree of 
homogeneity in purpose, exposure, and interests with a view to making the underlying 
motivations and activities with regard to monetary affairs directly comparable. 
Business associations in trade and industry were thus viewed in isolation, leaving out 
other economic interest groups such as employer and employee organisations, whose 
objectives and exposure with respect to monetary policy are likely to be quite different 
from those of the selected associations. 
The term monetary policy shall refer to the entirety of measures and processes that 
exist in an economy with respect to the supply of money and credit, the quantity of 
money, the rate of interest and the exchange rate, especially actions taken by central 
banks – as the most important monetary policy authority – to affect monetary and 
other financial conditions in pursuit of certain broad economic objectives6. The 
objectives of monetary policy are generally defined by the relevant policy makers and 
pertain to sustainable growth of real output, high employment or price stability, or a 
combination of these three. In order to achieve these objectives, monetary authorities 
can act in a completely discretionary manner or select explicit targets, which they try 
to achieve by using the instruments at their disposal. Targets usually refer to either 
money-supply, interest-rate, inflation or exchange rate targets. Monetary instruments 
are applied to influence the money market and include the supply of central bank 
money or the imposition of interest rates on the latter. 
The term central bank will be used, together with monetary authority, to refer to the 
state institution endowed with the authority to formulate, conduct, and implement 
monetary policy in a specified political and geographical territory. Central banks are 
usually defined in functional terms. Contemporary central banks are characterised by 
three functions: First, they are entrusted with the issuance of fiat money, over which 
they enjoy a constitutionally or legally conferred monopoly. Second, they serve as a 
bank-of-banks, especially as a lender of last resort to the domestic credit sector. Third, 
they are responsible for that part of macroeconomic policy derived from its function as 
the issuer of money7. A fourth function some central banks historically used to serve, 
namely that of banker to the state, has been diminishing as financing operations with 
the state are prohibited in an increasing number of countries. 
6 Büschgen (1997), p. 525, Bannock, Baxter, Davis (1992), p. 290, and Lindsey, Wallich (1992), 
pp. 740-748.
7 Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 223-232.
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Central banks in many countries serve functions directly related to the conduct of 
monetary policy beyond those enumerated here. Most importantly, many monetary 
authorities are assigned supervisory functions in the banking and financial services 
sectors or are responsible for the operation of national payment systems and their 
infrastructure. Such functions represent activities interest groups may also seek to 
influence, but which by the above definition are not directly related to monetary 
policy. For the sake of clarity, these additional tasks do not form part of the current 
analysis.
As a further conceptual delineation, the analysis is concerned exclusively with central 
banks as autonomous institutional entities separate from government and executive 
agencies and endowed with a certain degree of independence, granted either 
constitutionally, legally, or by convention. The degree of institutional independence 
has been identified as a decisive determinant of central bank behaviour within their 
political environment. Consequently, it is safe to assume that it will also be an 
important explanatory variable when investigating the behaviour of interest groups 
towards a monetary institution.
Finally, the empirical part of this study focuses on recent perceptions and practices of 
interest groups in Germany and at EU level8. Analysis of the relations between central 
banks and interest groups in Europe is complicated principally by the institutional 
caesura of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the single 
European currency in 1999. Since then, monetary decisions for the euro area have 
been taken by the ECB. The latter, therefore, intuitively represents the most interesting 
object of analysis in the present context. However, patterns of communication on the 
part of interest groups at national and EU level are still adjusting to the new monetary 
regime, so that evidence from the EU level only may not be sufficiently stable to allow 
for strong conclusions on the behaviour of interest groups in this policy field. 
In order to obtain a firm picture, it is therefore useful to base the analysis of relations 
between interest groups and central banks on experience at the level of the member 
states and to examine the impact of EMU on these relations as a separate, subsequent 
event. For the present purpose, Germany and the relations between German interest 
groups and the Deutsche Bundesbank were selected as the focus of analysis. The latter 
has been regarded an important institutional predecessor of the European Central 
Bank, providing a wealth of experience on the interaction between policy makers and 
8 References to the institutional framework at EU level in this study are based on the legal provisions 
as laid down in the Treaty of Nice. Potential changes resulting from the Treaty revision in the 
context of the 2004 intergovernmental conference, and to be manifested in the forthcoming EU 
Constitution, are not included, as the latter had not been finally adopted at EU level by the time this 
study was finalised. The draft text of the Constitution at that time, however, did not foresee any 
material changes to the provision relating to EMU, the ESCB, or the ECB.
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the private sector over more than four decades while maintaining a focus on recent 
perceptions and practices. 
Related literature
The behaviour of interest groups towards monetary policy and central banks has not 
attracted much attention in scholarly literature so far. A large and important body of 
literature, especially in economic science, is concerned with external influences on 
monetary policy from politics and politicians. On the basis of game-theory and 
econometric approaches the most notable and widely recognised conclusion of this 
strand of literature is that elected politicians have an inherent incentive to inflate the 
economy and that central banks enjoying a relatively high degree of independence 
from electoral politics in general produce lower levels of inflation. Since inflation 
reduces public welfare, monetary policy should ceteris paribus be pursued by 
independent central banks in order to maximise general welfare. Verifying this central 
postulate has been the focus of a large number of studies, comparing the degrees of 
central bank independence and the output of monetary decision making over time and 
across countries.
Even though the influence on monetary policy from within the political system will 
not be discussed here, the literature does provide an important background in 
economic, political, and legal terms in as far as central bank independence may carry 
implications not just for communication between central banks and politicians, but 
also with private sector individuals or groups, whose motivations and objectives may 
differ substantially from those of elected politicians.
Interest groups as sources of influence on monetary policy have attracted 
comparatively less attention. Two strands of analysis can be identified. First, selective 
comments on relations with private interests can be found in political and historical 
accounts of specific central banks. Most prominently, Kettl9 gives a comprehensive 
picture of the political context of US Federal Reserve policymaking, in which contacts 
between leading central bank officials and private sector participants are recorded. 
Similarly, Mayer10 in his analysis of the Fed refers to relations with the financial 
sector. Second, there are a limited number of quantitative economic studies touching 
upon central bank-interest group relations. Most importantly, Havrilesky11
systematically investigates the influences on US monetary policy, including those 
from the private sector, especially the financial industry. For this he takes a 
9 Kettl (1986).
10 Mayer (2001).
11 Havrilesky (1990), (1992).
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quantitative approach. Following up on Havrilesky's work, Maier12 applies a similar 
approach to potential influences on the Bundesbank. 
These studies have inspired the present analysis insofar as they implicitly provoke the 
question that, if there is relatively little evidence of private sector influence on central 
banks, what factors may be behind the rather hesitant approach of private interest 
groups in respect of monetary affairs? Notwithstanding this difference in focus, 
reference will be made to the results of the work where appropriate. At the same time, 
these studies aim to establish how much influence interest groups actually exert on 
monetary policy makers, measured by certain indicators of interest-group activity. 
Beyond their scope is the question whether, and how much, influence is actually 
sought by interest groups, and how interests are articulated. In other words, what 
remains to be analysed is the reasons for interest-group activity on monetary issues –
or rather their inactivity – as well as the channels by means of which they seek to 
influence monetary decision making. In this sense, the present study is complementary 
to existing findings, adding insights on the motivations and techniques of interest-
group activity to the existing evidence on the impact of their work.
In so doing, the present study draws on a number of advances in the realm of 
economic and interest-group research. First of all, recourse is taken to basic insights on 
interest-group behaviour from those strands of political science concerned with the 
aims and objectives of interest groups and the determinants of their activities. In 
particular, theories on the origins and aggregation of interests are employed. Further, 
conceptualisations established in the literature on public-affairs and issue management 
serve as a valuable component for devising a framework for analysis. Second, the 
analysis builds on the vast economic literature on monetary policy. Monetary policy is 
a specific and complex policy issue. In order to explore the incentives for interest 
groups to deal with it, it is useful to examine the objectives, instruments and behaviour
of policy makers. Understanding the channels through which monetary policy 
decisions impact the private sector, and in how far different actors are affected to 
different degrees, can deliver important indications of the factors behind interest-group 
behaviour. The analysis will also be concerned with the institutional environment in 
which interest groups need to operate when dealing with monetary policy issues. 
Political, economic, legal, and historical accounts of the positions of central banks 
within the political systems, as well as internal structures and decision-making 
processes, will therefore be consulted where appropriate. Finally, in the empirical 
section, historical accounts of central bank policymaking in the EU are taken as a basis 
for relating application of the findings of the theoretical section to the practice of 
monetary policy in EMU. 
12 Maier (2002). 
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Approach and structure
To decide whether and to what extent interest groups seek to influence monetary 
decision making, the following analysis addresses the perceptions of monetary policy 
as a policy issue by interest groups. Issue perception is increasingly recognised in 
political literature as the single most important determinant of group activity, 
suggesting that interest groups and their members make a rational choice of the issues 
they address, given the large number of policy issues on the overall political agendas 
of contemporary economies13. 
The analysis is divided into three parts. Part I outlines the analytical approach this 
study takes, identifying institutional, issue, and interest group-related framework 
conditions as the most important determinants of interest group activity on a 
theoretical basis. Part II provides an initial analysis of these framework conditions by 
reviewing the relevant legal, institutional and historical properties of the environment 
in which interest groups operate with respect to monetary issues in Germany and at the 
EU level. Part III presents an empirical analysis of the perception by interest-group 
and central bank representatives in Germany and at the EU level of the importance of 
monetary issues and the interaction between interest-group representatives and central 
banks.
In more detail, chapters I.1 and I.2 provide a framework for analysing interest-group 
perceptions of monetary policy. The analysis begins by presenting a basic model of 
interest groups’ maximisation behaviour, depicting the decision whether, and how 
much, political action to take. This is followed by a theoretical enquiry into the 
possible determinants of the costs and benefits of influencing a policy process as well 
as into the resources at interest groups’ disposal. These determinants are primarily 
derived from the theories of interest aggregation and interest-group formation and 
organisation as well as from public affairs and issue management. Together, the model 
and determinants serve as the analytical framework for breaking down the factors 
behind interest-group activity in the realm of monetary policy.
This framework is applied to the specific contexts in which interest group-central bank 
relations are set. First, monetary policy is analysed in terms of the institutional setting 
within which it is conducted, most importantly the purpose and mandate of central 
banks, their internal organisation, and potential points of access for communication 
with the private sector. Further criteria are their role as administrative units, their 
resources, and the implications of institutional independence. This is followed by 
consideration of the characteristics of the policy issue with special reference to the 
perspective of the private sector. Finally, the focus is shifted to interest groups and 
13 Van Schendelen (2002), p. 118.
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their resources in order to examine the potential contribution they can make in the 
specific context. The approach adopted in these sections is an interdisciplinary one, 
drawing on theoretical elements from political science, notably research on 
governmental theory and interest-group behaviour, from economics, notably monetary 
and institutional economics, as well as constitutional science in the context of the legal 
position of central banks within the political system.
From the analysis in chapter I.1, a list of propositions on the behaviour of interest 
groups with respect to monetary policy is derived, tracing the difficulties in 
establishing communication between interest groups and monetary policy makers back 
to the complexity of the effects of monetary measures on private individuals and the 
resulting difficulties in aggregating interests effectively, the institutional strength of 
central banks in terms of functional independence and resources, as well as the lack of 
resources in terms of original and exclusive information on the part of interest groups. 
Part II presents the policy contexts within which interest groups in Germany operate 
with regard to monetary policymaking, reviewing the basic institutional, issue, and 
group settings in which interest-group behaviour is formed. It also introduces the basic 
policy-related and institutional changes resulting from the introduction of the single 
European currency in 1999 and the establishment of the European Central Bank. 
The analysis of the attitude and behaviour of interest groups in Germany towards 
monetary affairs is presented in chapter III.2, following a brief outline of the research 
methodology in chapter III.1 In this chapter, the data from qualitative surveys among 
policy makers and interest-group representatives is presented and analysed to find out 
whether the forces identified in the theoretical part are actually at work in practice. 
Following analysis of the monetary policy context in Germany, and against the 
background of the fundamental changes in the overall policy context as a result of 
introduction of the single European currency and the shift of monetary decision-
making powers to the ECB, chapter III.3 enquires into the effects of EMU on the 
behaviour of interest groups in Germany as well as the way in which associations at 
EU level cover monetary affairs. 
A concluding chapter summarises the major findings, derives implications for related 
fields of study and suggests points of departure for further research. 
The annex provides a detailed description of the research methodology as well as 
summary tables of the statistical results presented in the course of the study.
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Part I Analytical approach
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I.1 Theoretical framework
Monetary policy is but one issue interest groups may deal with. Large sectional 
interest groups and top associations in particular are occupied with a multitude of 
issues at any given moment in time. Such issues can pertain to a broad variety of 
subjects, ranging from wage negotiations and government tax policies to social and 
environmental legislation. In addition to existing issues, groups and their members are 
constantly confronted with new developments in their immediate operational 
environment, on the political stage, and in the wider societal sphere. As a result, new 
strategies to defend the interests of group members have to be formulated, 
implemented, and evaluated. In doing so, interest groups must communicate with a 
wide range of contacts relevant for their operations. Directions and feedback need to 
be collected from group members, potential allies sought for the groups’ political 
activities and the relevant institutions in the political system and their representatives 
identified and contacted. 
With the complexity of their operations in the background, investigating whether and 
to what extent interest groups are concerned with a fundamental issue like monetary 
policy implies asking at least equally fundamental questions about the behaviour of 
interest groups in general. Namely, what are the factors driving selection of the policy 
issues to be addressed; and what are the determinants of the selection process itself as 
well as of the effort interest groups have to make to succeed? 
After presenting some basic assumptions on the decision making behaviour of interest 
groups, the determinants of interest-group behaviour thus established will be reviewed 
as a policy issue in the light of the specificities of monetary policy, with the aim of 
identifying factors encouraging or discouraging systematic activities on the part of 
interest groups in this field of policymaking. Further, the properties of central banks as 
the primary addressees of such activities will be analysed, as well as the resources 
interest groups have at their disposal in dealing with them. The chapter will conclude 
with formulation of the central propositions on the perception of monetary affairs as a 
policy issue resulting from the theoretical analysis.
I.1.1 Basic assumptions
The question as to how interest groups handle monetary affairs, and why they deal 
with the issue the way they do, essentially means enquiring into the behaviour of 
interest groups in a specific field of policymaking. This enquiry is composed of two 
elements. First, some fundamental assumptions will be made about the behaviour of 
interest groups in general terms. More specifically, it is necessary for the present 
analysis to identify how interest groups decide in principle whether to take political 
action on a given policy issue, and to what extent they pursue that issue. To that end, 
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this section first presents some fundamental principles of interest-group decision 
making in this regard, which serve as the basic micro-behavioural assumptions on 
which the following analysis of interest-group activities in the field of monetary affairs 
rests. As argued below, we examine how interest groups arrive at the decision whether 
to act on a specific issue or not with reference to a basic analysis of the benefits and 
costs expected to accrue from political activity on that issue. Consequently, a second 
question to be answered is what the basic determinants of the expected costs and 
benefits of interest-group activity are. These determinants will form the second focus 
of this section. 
The stylised facts outlined in the introductory chapter suggest that despite the 
potentially large impact of monetary decisions, interest groups have comparatively 
little regard for this field of policymaking. If this observation is correct, then the 
question arises as to why this is so. In other words, we must ask when interest groups 
actually become active on a given policy issue, and what factors contribute to this 
decision. A first step towards answering these questions is to look into the fundamental 
rationale of interest-group decision making in general. 
This basic rationale has been formulated by Bartlett14, employing a model in the 
tradition of public-choice theory15, which is concerned with the formalisation of 
decision-making processes in the context of public-private interaction at large. 
Focusing on the economic self-interest of private sector agents, this literature has 
added a number of powerful models of the interaction of private interest groups and 
political decision making in democratic societies. Its analytical strength rests on the 
concept of methodological individualism16 according to which individual behaviour of 
rational actors is the basis of economic and political decision-making.17
14 Bartlett (1973), pp. 143-149. Bartlett was the first to address the question of how much political 
action should be taken in rigorous economic terms. His objective was to specify the alternative 
forms of political action and how and why they are chosen by decision makers seeking political 
influence. He did so by presenting a model with discrete functions for influence and costs, 
maximising the "profit or the net increase in [the producer’s] real income from political activity". 
The model was developed further by Märtz (1990), pp. 75-79. Märtz presents this model "on the 
determination of the group-efficient level of production of political influence" in an explicit rent-
seeking context. It serves as a basis for analysing the dynamics of the rent-seeking process in a
competitive environment where the number of groups competing for political influence is larger 
than one. Compared to Bartlett (1973), the innovation lies in the incorporation of a production 
function of political influence, which in earlier treatments was taken as exogenous.
15 For comprehensive overviews of the public choice approach see Mueller (1979) and (1997). 
Overviews of the literature focusing on rent-seeking can be found in Tollison (1982), Rowley, 
Tollison, Tullock (1988), and Märtz (1990).
16 Märtz (1990), pp. 6-7. For treatment of the concept of individualism in social choice see Buchanan, 
Tullock (1999), pp. 11-15 and pp. 31-39.
17 A systematic overview of the possible ways of modelling interest-group behaviour is presented by 
Potters (1992), pp. 7-24. He distinguishes between models with an influence function, models with 
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Assuming rational, utility-maximising behaviour on the part of decision makers18, the 
model starts out from the observation that the decision to take political action rests on 
the same economic principles as any investment decision. Individual actors or interest
groups weigh the expected benefits against the costs of seeking political influence and 
decide to what extent a deployment of resources for the purpose of exerting or 
intensifying political influence can be expected to generate marginal benefits. For the 
sake of simplicity, the model abstracts from differential preference within interest 
groups and assumes a uniform utility function in order to make it applicable to both 
individual and composite actors. 
The decision process is based on three functional relationships. First, gross income 
from political influence (I) – including all material and immaterial benefits from 
political activity – depends on the amount of political pressure (p) – including all 
forms and qualities of influence on a decision at political level – that is exerted19. It is 
a vote function and campaign contributions, and models with a composite utility function. The 
model chosen here belongs to the first category. Compared to the other types of models, influence-
function-based models treat interest groups as independent and competitive players in the market 
for economic rents. They yield clear comparative static insights regarding the amount of pressure 
produced by interest groups. For the purposes of this paper such models are consequently better 
suited to illustrate the group-specific decision-making processes.
18 This assumption is warranted on two grounds. First, the objects of the present study are private 
households and firms, and the interest groups they are represented by, whose operational behaviour 
– in a market setting – is determined by rational profit maximisation. The central question in the 
present context is what the determinants are of the decision by these individuals to launch political 
activities with respect to monetary policy, aimed at maintaining or improving their economic 
position or welfare. It is useful to answer this question on the same basic premises as those on 
which the analysis of the underlying economic activities is customarily based. Second, there is no 
ex ante reason to believe that households and firms, or their interest representatives, behave 
irrationally or systematically differently from the way they act in their underlying operations. 
Irrational behaviour, i.e. behaviour which is not based on the intellectual faculty by which 
conclusions are drawn from premises, may be observed in practice but is unlikely to be of 
significant magnitude. Where such behaviour enters the analysis, explicit reference will be made.
19 The rationale behind the influence function can be spelt out more explicitly. Political decisions are 
relevant for an interest group because they may affect its own welfare or that of its members. 
Assuming that an interest group likely to be affected by a certain policy measure decides to remain 
passive and not to support or oppose the measure, the costs or benefits to the group resulting from 
that measure are given exogenously and will alter the group’s welfare as an externality. Thus, the 
size of the expected impact of a policy measure, and therefore also the expected size of the benefits 
from political action, influences the intensity with which such benefits are sought (Mitchell, 
Munger (1991), p. 525)
The expected net impact of the policy measure on the group’s income, Me, is part of the group’s 
cost-benefit analysis of whether to take political action on the policy measure. If the group decides 
to support or oppose the measure, this is likely to change the overall impact of Me on the group’s 
income function. The net effect of Me therefore depends on the exogenously given potential impact 
of the policy measure and the degree of pressure the group is able to exert in the course of the 
policy process. Without changing the overall dynamics of the model, the group’s influence function 
can therefore be interpreted in the following way:
Influence function: I = i (pe, Me)
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reasonable to assume diminishing returns to scale, i.e. that the marginal increase in 
income from political influence will diminish with each extra unit of pressure. 
– Income function
I = I(p), subject to dI/dp > 0 and d²I/dp² < 0
Further, the amount of pressure depends on the resources (R) – including all forms of 
material or immaterial means mobilised by the group – that are deployed by an interest 
group to influence the policy-making process. The production function is also subject 
to declining marginal returns.
– Production function
p = p(R), subject to dp/dR > 0 and d²p/dR² < 0
The resources deployed to influence the policy-making process also determine the 
costs of the political activities (C), which are assumed to increase with the resources 
deployed.
– Cost function
C = C(R), subject to dC/dR > 0 and d²C/dR² > 0
The rational individual maximises the gains (G) from influencing the policy-making 
process:
– Maximisation of gains
Max [G = I[p(R)] – C(R)], subject to dG/dR = dI/dP · dp/dR – dC/dR = 0
In other words, the resources spent on influencing the policy process are optimally 
employed when the marginal returns of political influence are equal to the marginal 
costs. The basic insight of this simple model is therefore that, assuming a rational, 
utility-maximising approach by the individual, political action with respect to a certain 
policy issue will only be taken if the expected income from such action exceeds 
expected costs. Both expected income and expected costs depend on the resources the 
individual has at his disposal, or is willing to devote to such activity, and on the rate at 
which deploying these resources can be transformed by the interest group into a 
marginal increase in income, i.e. on productivity.20
Policy impact function: Me = m (pe), subject to dMe/dpe > 0 and d²Me/d(pe)² < 0
20 This framework can be extended to include uncertainty about future developments and competition 
among interest groups. First, monetary policy has a strong forward-looking slant. As a result, 
expectations on the part of policy makers and economic individuals about future economic and 
monetary developments, and therefore also about each other’s behaviour, play a vital role in the 
policy-making process, as will be discussed in more detail below. Expectations and uncertainty 
about the course of major decision variables also influence the conception and pursuit of political 
action. Investment decisions in general, and those concerning investment in political influence in 
42
Given the basic insight that the decision whether to take political action on a certain 
policy issue is determined by the assessment of expected costs and benefits of such 
action, the question arising next pertains to the determinants of these expected costs 
and benefits. Costs and benefits can take a number of forms, making categorisation 
useful in the current context. The range of factors determining private sector influence 
on political issues is very broad, owing to the complexity of modern societal systems 
based on democracy and free markets. One categorisation of determinants of political 
activity by interest groups has been suggested by Mucciaroni21 who differentiates 
between the institutional, issue, and group contexts within which private political 
activity evolves, drawing on the three most influential theoretical traditions in the 
literature on the subject, namely institutionalism, issue analysis, and stakeholder 
analysis22. To start with, political action is by definition targeted at persons or 
institutions endowed with political decision-making power. Successful investment in 
political influence depends heavily on how far this institutional environment promotes 
the mediation of private interests vis-à-vis policy makers and offers easy accessibility 
to the latter. Second, the policy issue under consideration greatly influences the 
particular, are constrained by uncertainties with respect to the future development of the variables 
influencing the decision. The outcome of a policy process is difficult to account for. The policy 
decision itself is likely to be the outcome of a complex bargaining process. There may be a 
multitude of forces driving the decision, and of interests competing for influence. Consequently, it 
is sensible to assume that the future returns of influencing a given policy process as well as the 
associated costs cannot be quantified precisely before entering the political arena. It is useful for 
the current purpose to note that the independent and dependent variables used in the model are to 
be seen as expected variables. As a consequence, the shape and position of the functions, and 
therefore also the results the model yields with respect to the optimal amount of political influence, 
can be expected to change over time. In a dynamic setting, the resulting uncertainty over the 
potential costs and benefits and the overall pay-off of political action can be expected to increase 
the overall costs of political action. The general results of the model, however, remain the same in 
principle.
Second, interest groups rarely work in isolation, but usually compete with other interests for 
political influence. Competition is likely to alter the expected income of each individual group 
seeking political influence. Ceteris paribus, income falls as a result of intensified competition, and 
vice versa. In a dynamic setting, higher competition can also be expected to influence the costs of 
political action owing to the fact that, over time, achieving a given amount of political influence 
will become more expensive at the margins. As a result, the income and cost functions of the model 
cannot be taken as constant, but shift in amplitude and slope with the intensity of competition. 
Again, in principle the results of the present model remain valid after allowing for competition (see 
e.g. see Buholzer (1998), pp. 116-117, and Potters (1992), p. 9). A comprehensive overview over 
the effects of competition among interest groups is given by Daumann (1999), pp. 168-178. See 
also Buholzer (1998), pp. 113-117 and Märtz (1990), pp. 89-138. Formal treatments of competition 
among interest groups, such as Becker (1983) and Becker (1985) have focused on political 
influence for economic rents in return for votes and material resources needed in election 
campaigns. Potters (1992), pp. 7-24. See also Mitchell, Munger (1991) pp. 531-536.
21 Mucciaroni (1995), pp. 8-25 and pp. 166-180.
22 For a concise summary of the issue and stakeholder analysis strands in the academic literature see 
e.g. Schendelen (2002), pp. 132-135.
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expected profitability of seeking political action. It defines the impact of a policy 
measure, be it in a negative or a positive direction, on the individual or the group and 
thereby also influences the expected benefits and costs of influencing political 
decisions. Finally, costs and benefits also depend on the way in which interests in a 
specific issue can be aggregated and organised. The ability to do so has been found to 
vary dramatically between countries, sectors and policy issues, suggesting that the 
interest-group context requires explicit treatment.
I.1.2 Institutional context
As to the institutional context, the behaviour and the accessibility of political decision 
makers represents an important determinant of interest groups’ ability to influence 
political decision making. If interest groups want to change the monetary policy 
stance, they need to influence the behaviour of the policy makers to whom the relevant 
decisions are delegated. Influencing policy makers necessitates expenditure on 
material and human resources by interest groups. These up-front expenses will, 
however, yield returns if, and only if, policy makers are accessible, i.e. if channels 
exist through which they can be approached, and if they are receptive to external 
information or pressure, e.g. from interest groups23. 
The interaction between interest groups and political institutions has a long tradition in 
scientific research on interest group behaviour, both in theoretical and empirical terms. 
A great part of the literature, including this analysis, is concerned with the role groups 
play in the policy process24 and suggests that their relations with political institutions 
can be very close, if not symbiotic25. At the same time, there is broad agreement 
23 On the importance of accessibility of policy makers to interest groups see Ainsworth (2002), 
pp. 131-132 and pp. 216-217. On access as an interest-group objective see Truman (1993), pp. 264-
265.
24 Truman, who formulates the overarching question as being "[...] engaged in an effort to develop a 
conception of the political process [...] that will account adequately for the role of groups, 
particularly interest groups [...]", summarises the connection between groups and politics by stating 
that "[g]roups are a part of [...] politics [...] and they have always constituted an aspect of politics. 
In addition, they are so intimately related to the daily functioning of those constitutionalized groups 
– legislature, chief executives, administrative agencies, and even courts – that make up the 
institution of government that the latter cannot adequately be described if these relationships are 
not recognized as the weft of the fabric", (Truman (1993), pp. 46-47). For an overview of the 
research in this field see Baumgartner, Leech (1998), especially pp. 100-146.
25 Thus, an important strand of literature argues that interest groups and political institutions can form 
so-called policy sub-systems on the basis of quasi symbiotic relationships based on the mutual 
benefits of frequent and intensive interaction. Rather than exerting pressure as an external force, 
such interest groups attempt to insulate the policy sub-system so as to hinder interference from 
other groups. The less rigid concept of policy networks treats the relations between groups and 
policy makers as open and concludes that the structures of interaction are dynamic to such an 
extent that the dividing line between the policy network and its political environment remains 
rather unclear. This view has been advocated most notably by Heclo (1978). Both paradigms stand 
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among the authors that not only do interest groups shape the political process, but also 
that politics and political institutions shape the activities of interest groups26. 
In selecting the appropriate way of influencing a policy process, it is necessary for 
interest groups to identify the locus of decision-making power and to assess the 
decision maker’s accessibility. As to the locus of decision making, interest groups 
have an inherent incentive to target the institution or institutions within the political 
system endowed with the power to take the relevant political decisions27. If decision-
making powers are shared among more than one institution, it may be conducive to 
address political activities to all the institutions involved28. The more instances that are 
involved in formulating policy, the more access points the group has, but also the more 
resources it may feel obliged to invest in order to exhaust all possibilities of mediating 
its views. Similarly, if, for whatever reasons, the chances of influencing the policy 
process via a certain relevant institution are low, then an interest group might choose 
to work through different, more accessible bodies. Either way, the importance of an 
institution has to be assessed on the basis of its effective role in the policy process, 
which may differ from its constitutionally, legally or statutorily assigned mandate 
because of the political practicalities involved29. 
From the perspective of the group’s maximisation problem, it does make a difference 
which and how many institutions need to be addressed in order to realise its interests. 
Both on theoretical and empirical grounds, interest groups are likely to approach 
different political institutions in different ways30. The most important analytical divide 
runs between the institutions that make up the political system. Comparable as the 
in contrast to the often adversarial nature of interest group-government relations (Wilson (1990), 
p. 27). 
26 E.g. Baumgartner, Leech (1998), pp. 137-140, and Daumann (1999), pp. 99-117, Mucciaroni 
(1995), pp. 8-9, 167.
27 Von Beyme (1974), p. 87.
28 This becomes most visible in the context of the stages of the legislative process which may 
originate from different political institutions. These include the pre-legislative stages of proposing 
and drafting a piece of legislation. Depending on the constitutional provisions, legislation may for 
example be proposed by the government, parliament or via plebiscites. Drafting legislation may 
involve government and other executive officials, but also parliamentarians. During the legislative 
stage, addressees of private concerns will primarily be parliamentarians, but they can also include 
extra-parliamentary party officials, for instance. Once passed, the implementation of a piece of 
legislation may be influenced at the administrative level. Ultima ratio legislation and its 
implementation can be influenced at the judicial level by means of judicial review. Accordingly, 
the complexity of the policy-making process in most political systems requires interest groups to 
direct their political activities at more than one addressee. Von Beyme (1974), p. 90.
29 Mucciaroni (1995), pp. 18-23.
30 Daumann (1999), pp. 103-130, Mény (1993), pp. 147-149.
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criteria may be in many respects31, institutional accessibility differs considerably 
across the different types of political institutions. Thus, the accessibility of members of 
the legislature differs significantly from that of the executive, the bureaucracy, and the 
judiciary32. Accordingly, the costs and benefits of interest-group action are likely to 
differ with the type and number of institutions addressed by a group.
For this reason, it is useful to narrow down the focus to the type of institution that is 
likely to be most influential in a specific policy area. In the case of monetary policy, 
decision-making power rests to a large extent with independent bureaucracies33. Given 
that the most important central banks enjoy a great degree of political autonomy within 
their respective political systems, their institutional status is of particular relevance in 
the current context. In general, bureaucracies have become increasingly important as 
addressees for political pressure groups in modern welfare states34. Their growing 
importance as targets of interest-group activity has been associated with the 
transformation of their role in the policy process, moving from a range of activities 
centred around the application and implementation of rules laid down by the 
legislature to ever greater discretion in making rules by themselves, either on the basis 
of acts of framework legislation with broad scope for interpretation in implementation 
or by means of explicit delegation of specified acts of regulation and rule making35. 
The emergence of independent central banks is among the most important instances of 
this process. The greater the policy-making discretion of a bureaucracy, the more 
important it is likely to become as a point of access for private interests. Effective 
political independence – defined as an authority's freedom to pursue its objectives 
without being subject to formal or informal political instructions from other entities 
31 Truman (1993), p. 437. He emphasises that the characteristics of different political institutions in 
terms of their openness to external forces are not so much similar as interdependent, since 
organisational structure and points of control across political institutions reflect and reinforce each 
other.
32 Most importantly Truman (1993), pp. 321-498.
33 Throughout the analysis, the terms public administration, agency and bureaucracy will, for the 
sake of simplicity, be used interchangeably and refer to structures of government whose primary 
function is to apply general rules and convert them into specific decisions for individual cases 
(Peters (1995), p. 2). It is recognised that, at a higher level of analytical differentiation, certain 
semantic and content-related differences between these terms do exist (Peters (1995), pp. 2-3). A 
definition of the term bureaucracy on the basis of welfare-economical principles can be found in 
Niskanen (1994), p. 15. Niskanen also presents a comparison of various types of definitions 
(pp. 21-23). 
34 Von Beyme (1973), p. 116.
35 Von Beyme (1973), p. 116. The dividing line between framework legislation and delegation of 
specified policy areas to be administered by bureaucracies often remains unclear. In practice, 
legislative delegation generally involves the establishment of agencies separate from the 
governmental bureaucracy in the narrow sense. Central banks as well as regulatory and supervisory 
agencies are the most important examples. 
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within the political system36 – clearly amplifies a central bank’s powers in fulfilling its 
mandate.
The accessibility of such an administrative institution from an interest group’s 
perspective is determined first by its internal structure and processes. More precisely, 
exerting influence on policy decisions presupposes an understanding of the decision 
makers inside the institution, their position within it and how their views are 
aggregated in the course of the decision-making process37. 
Access for private interest groups to decision-making processes within administrations 
can be of a formal or informal nature. Formal avenues are granted by many institutions 
in the form of advisory or consultative committees or expert hearings38. At an informal 
level, interest groups can seek to influence policy makers by means of personal 
contacts with decision makers or through the dissemination of information in line with 
their objectives39. In both cases, formal and informal access, policy makers’ 
willingness to consult with private interests is motivated by the potential benefits this 
can confer in terms of better information on the object of policymaking and political 
support40. As to the former, the existence of an information asymmetry between policy 
makers on the one hand and the private sector on the other hand is widely recognised. 
36 As initially defined by Grilli et al (1991) and presented by Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 184. 
Alternative definitions of central banks’ political independence have been presented in literature. 
For a critical discussion see Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 183-185.
37 A detailed account of the relevance of institutional and procedural structures can be found in 
Truman (1993), pp. 328-332.
38 Truman (1993), p. 457, differentiates between advisory committees and administration by groups 
in formal interaction with external bodies. With the former, decision makers acknowledge the 
importance of consulting the individuals and groups in society likely to be affected by a policy 
measure. Advisory committees or other consultative bodies are a formal device inasmuch as they 
are established by law or by executive action. The same applies to the process of administration by 
groups, which in principle represents an extension of the process of delegation by means of which 
government agencies are endowed with political discretion. Within well-defined limits, interest 
groups are granted self-governance under the rules laid down by law or executive acts. Further, 
Truman cites "administrative propaganda" as a third formal means of interaction with external 
bodies, referring to publicity activities by the administration aimed at associating certain external 
interests with it in order to secure its operations, especially in cases where the "adjustment", i.e. the 
support, of the interests involved was not obtained at the legislative stage. For a detailed analysis of 
formal participation through committees, councils and hearings see von Beyme (1974), pp. 170-
192.
39 Daumann (1999), pp. 158-160. Alternative methods of mediating interests are discussed by von 
Beyme (1974), pp. 160-169.
40 Thus, Peters (1995), p. 181, notes that "[...] [pressure groups and bureaucrats] need each other to be 
successful. Administrators need the political support and influence of pressure groups in their 
external relationships with other political institutions, and they also need information supplied by 
pressure groups for making and defending policies. Likewise, the pressure groups need access to 
the political process and influence over decisions that are taken. This mutual need, given the 
fragmentation of decision making in modern governments, is the basic dynamic explaining the 
frequent cooperation between public bureaucracies and pressure groups."
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For one thing, the private sector may possess important information about the nature of 
the problem and the implications of a legal or administrative act that may not 
otherwise be available to policy makers41. Further, the success of such acts may 
depend on the private sector’s action and reaction to the act itself. The greater the 
amount of information on the prospective response by private decision makers, the 
better picture decision makers will have of the viability and effectiveness of their 
measures42. 
Closely related to this latter point is the benefit from communication with the private 
sector in terms of political support. Handling a controversial policy measure, 
politicians and administrators can underpin their own position vis-à-vis the public as 
well as other public decision makers involved by drawing on the support of private 
interests. In doing so, they can enhance the publicly perceived legitimacy of their 
measure and create political momentum for pushing the measure ahead in the 
legislative or administrative process43. For both motives, information and political 
support, private interest groups are likely to find easier access to the relevant policy 
maker the less the latter possesses his own expertise44 on a given policy issue or the 
more he has to rely on external political or public support on a controversial policy 
measure45. 
Finally, in addition to aspects related to the role and the needs of a public institution 
itself, accessibility is frequently associated with behavioural patterns of individuals 
serving the administration. Some public servants may be more open to external 
influence than others, depending on their own views as to the role they play within the 
executive in general and their administrative unit in particular. Also, such behavioural 
patterns are likely to influence public officials’ preferences for the means by which 
they choose to communicate with the public, most importantly whether formal and 
institutionalised or informal and personal sources of information are used. Insofar as 
public servants possess room for manoeuvre in proposing policy measures to political 
decision makers and in implementing policies, they enjoy political influence. How 
administrators use this influence depends on what they deem to be consistent with 
41 Truman (1993), p. 333, sees policy makers "[...] in continuous need of current information because 
[they are] at the mercy of changes as they occur. [...] The penalty for numerous or conspicuous 
decisions made in ignorance or in neglect of relevant available knowledge is disturbance in the 
politician’s established relationships." 
42 Truman (1993), pp. 334-335, makes a distinction between technical knowledge, which private 
interests can provide on the content of a policy issue, and political knowledge, i.e. the information 
of private sector interests on the strength of competing claims and the consequences of alternative 
decisions on a policy issue.
43 Truman (1993), pp. 333-334.
44 Peters (1995), pp. 225-226.
45 Peters (1995), pp. 226-227.
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good government and proper administration. As a consequence, the political culture of 
public administrations and their members, their ethos and identification with their 
unit46 is likely to have an impact on their attitude towards private interest groups and 
the extent to which private interest groups can address them47. 
I.1.3 Issue context
As to the issue context, the nature of a policy issue48 plays a decisive role when it 
comes to assessing the prospective success of influencing policy decisions. The case 
for a systematic analysis of policy issues is made most explicitly by Mucciaroni, who 
states that
"[v]ariations in policies [...] over time and across policy areas are not 
random outcomes. Rather, they reflect a predictable logic that emerges from 
analysis of two broad categories, or contexts, of policymaking: the kinds of 
issues that become salient in the political arena and how those issues are 
defined, and the capacities, incentives, and behaviour of key institutional 
actors in government."49
Nevertheless, contributions to the traditional literature on interest groups have dealt 
with the topic mainly implicitly50. Most importantly, the significance of political issues 
has entered scholarly debate via the classification of interest groups. The most 
common typologies are based on interest content51 and therefore relate directly to the 
issues a group is concerned with, an insight that holds true irrespective of whether 
further categorisation is pursued along socio-economic, sectoral or policy domain 
46 Von Beyme (1974), p. 119.
47 On identification and loyalty of administrative officials with their institutions, see von Beyme 
(1974), pp. 118-120, Peters (1995), pp. 45-134, Truman (1993), pp. 446-457.
48 A policy issue has been defined as a concern, problem, or debate that centres on political or social 
cleavages and has a public character. Issues on which, as a rule, different parties take conflicting 
positions addressed to a counterpart perceived as responsible are in principle of a controversial 
nature. Issues are usually characterised, first, by the fact that they always relate to one or a group of 
events. Second, developments related to such events, including media coverage and interpretation, 
become part of the issue itself, so that the issue is a conceptually broader term than, for example, 
the term event. Third, an issue relates not only to one single individual, but is associated with at 
least an entire sub-system of society. See Liebl (1996), p. 8. Baumgartner, Leech (1998), p. 38, use 
the term issue as synonymous with the term policy conflict. 
49 Mucciaroni (1995), pp. 8-9. Looking exclusively at producer groups in the US, Mucciaroni takes a 
largely qualitative approach to examining the policy issues of tax expenditures, anti-competitive 
regulation, trade protection, and agricultural subsidies. He concludes that "[...] both issues and 
institutions are crucial in their own right, and any analysis that omits either one is likely to be 
inadequate." (Mucciaroni (1995), p. 167).
50 Richardson, Jordan (1979), p. 77, argue that questions relating to the emergence of issues have 
been relatively ignored.
51 Salisbury (1975), p. 182.
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lines52. Similarly, the relevance of policy issues is also documented by the literature on 
the origin of interest groups where common interest, and therefore the joint work on 
specified policy issues, are the basic motivation behind collective action within an 
interest group53. The systematic analysis of policy issues, in turn, has largely been 
dominated by the literature on public affairs and issue management. The focus of these 
writings lies on the implications of inter-temporal issue development for the formation 
of interest group strategies54, most importantly dissecting the life cycle of an issue and 
the implications of the discrete phases of issue evolution for the behaviour of the 
stakeholders involved55. 
The analysis of monetary policy as a policy issue is a useful step on the way to a 
comprehensive picture of the incentives for private interests to influence monetary 
policy decisions. Theory and evidence point to an important relationship between the 
nature and characteristics of a policy issue on the one hand and the inclination of 
interest groups to include the issue on their political agenda on the other56. According 
to these findings, the decision whether to take up a certain policy issue is significantly 
influenced by a number of criteria, which can be split up into factors pertaining to the 
properties of an issue, subsumed under the heading of issue salience, and to the 
political environment under the heading of issue sponsorship57. 
With respect to issue salience, the impact of the issue on the individual has been 
identified as the most important determinant. This strongly supports the results yielded 
in the theoretical discussion above. Second, urgency and immediacy have a significant 
positive impact on the standing of an issue on the political agenda. At the same time, a 
high level of complexity58 can discourage individuals and groups from dealing with an 
52 For a list of typologies see von Beyme (1974), pp. 27-32. Also Truman (1993), pp. 63-65, 
Salisbury (1975), pp. 182-189, and Bamgartner, Leech (1998) pp. 25-36.
53 E.g. Truman (1993), p. 33: "[...] "[I]nterest group" refers to any group that, on the basis of one or 
more shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups in the society [...].", or Olson 
(1965), p. 5: "One purpose that is nonetheless characteristic of most organizations, and surely of 
particularly all organizations with an important economic aspect, is the furtherance of the interests 
of their members."
54 For comprehensive introductions see e.g. Liebl (1996), Wheelen, Hunger (1998), Köppl (2000) and 
Mack (1997). Schendelen (2002), pp. 132-135, provides an evolutionary account of the 
contribution of issue analysis and issue management to the theory of interest-group behaviour, 
presenting the insights of this strand of literature as an important predecessor to the approach of 
arena analysis.
55 Schendelen (2002), p. 133.
56 Most importantly, Mucciaroni (1995). For a summary of theoretical arguments see pp. 166-170 in 
particular.
57 Liebl (1996), pp. 91-92.
58 By analogy, general and abstract formulation of a policy issue has been found to support it in the 
agenda-building process (Liebl (1996), p. 92).
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issue, since this may reduce the ability to mediate associated interests59. The salience 
and urgency of policy issues in particular are subject to variation over time. Thus, 
issues exhibit life cycles, which have been found to be of major importance for their 
management by the players involved. Their genesis commences when singular, 
superficially unrelated events are publicly placed in a common context by an interested 
party. With growing support from other sympathisers, the initial effect of publicity is 
amplified. Assuming sufficient public pressure, the addressee feels compelled to deal 
with the issue. Once this peak is reached, public interest is set to diminish until the 
issue has disappeared from the public agenda. The decisive aspect of the life cycle 
from an interest group perspective is that groups’ room for manoeuvre and, 
consequently, their political influence depends on the public’s perception of the issue 
and the timing of political action60. 
The category of issue sponsorship refers to the competitive environment in which 
interest groups seek to promote a specific issue and mediate their particular interests. 
For each given issue, there is likely to be more than one interest group claiming the 
interests of its members, competing with each other for maximum impact on the 
outcome of the political decision-making process. Next to other groups, an interest 
group is likely to find itself competing with vested interests articulated, for example, 
by policy makers themselves, political institutions, administrations, or voters and the 
public at large61. Whether and to what extent an interest group is able to operate 
successfully in this competitive environment depends on its involvement with the issue 
as well as its political clout and resources62, as will be discussed in further detail 
below. The same, in turn, holds true for the other interested parties with which it 
competes for influence. The higher the resistance of other interested individuals, 
groups or entities to a specific interest is, and the greater their political weight, the 
59 Liebl (1996), p. 91.
60 Liebl (1996), pp. 8-9. Analysis of policy issues in the light of their life cycles can involve 
substantial challenges, as Baumgartner and Leech argue (1998), p. 38. Thus, "[...] there is no clear 
way to determine when an issue or a policy conflict has begun or ended. Three fundamental 
research problems flow from this simple fact. First, there can be no universe of issues from which 
to sample. Second, there is no single definition of an issue when issues are easily aggregated into 
large and interrelated groups or broken down into minute clauses, as constantly occurs in the policy 
process. Third, issues rise and fall on the political agenda over time, being transformed and 
redefined in the process. There are no apparent solutions to the difficulties created by the fluid 
nature of issues in the political process."
61 For detailed descriptions of the competitive environment of interest groups see Liebl (1996), 
pp. 125-127, Köppl (2000), pp. 37-42, and Wheelen, Hunger (1998), pp. 9-11.
62 Liebl (1996), p. 92.
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smaller the expected benefits of promoting it and mutatis mutandis the greater the cost 
will be63.
Competition does not, however, start at the point when an issue is already discussed by 
policy makers or the public. In fact, interest groups already compete with each other to 
put an issue onto the policy agenda. Assuming that policy makers’ capacity to deal 
with policy issues is limited, an interest group needs to bring the relevant issue to their 
attention or into the public domain before it can actually promote a specific interest. 
Consequently, there is negative correlation between the number and diversity of issues 
already on the individual and public political agendas and the chances for a new issue 
to arise64. 
Diagnosis of the issue context along these lines enters the income as well as the 
expense side of a group’s or individual’s cost-benefit analysis. The higher the expected 
positive or negative impact of an issue, the greater the expected benefit is likely to be 
from taking political action, be it in order to promote or discourage a certain policy 
measure, and vice versa. Other factors such as urgency, complexity or promoter 
influence will enter the analysis via their indirect impacts on benefits and costs. For 
example, instant action on an urgent issue will produce a higher income than delayed 
action. The higher the level of complexity of an issue, the more costly it will be to 
convince potential allies and the policy makers targeted of the benefits of joining 
forces or taking the desired political decision. A powerful existing political influence 
can reduce a group’s marginal costs of pursuing one more incremental issue. 
I.1.4 Interest-group context
Next to the nature of the policy issue and the policy maker’s institutional and 
behavioural characteristics, the ability to influence political decisions depends on the 
interest-group context in which private interests are embedded65. According to the 
basic behavioural assumptions made above, income from and costs of political 
influence are both a function of the resources an interest group is able and willing to 
devote to such activities. As a partial-analysis model, it treats resources as given 
exogenously, and identifies the maximum net benefit from influencing a specific 
policy process. Following the preceding analysis of the determinants of the 
maximisation process, i.e. of the costs and benefits expected to play a role in a group’s 
decision to influence a policy process, the question arises as to which resources 
interest groups have at their disposal in pursuit of their activities.
63 Richardson, Jordan (1979), p. 79, Daumann (1999), p. 177. Daumann also provides an overview of 
the existing models of interest-group behaviour under competition (pp. 158-174).
64 Liebl (1996), p. 91.
65 Von Beyme (1974), pp. 49-52.
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In the context of interest groups exerting influence on decisions in public 
policymaking, the various types of resources potentially available66 have been 
subsumed under four headings, categorised according to their functional use67: 
financing potential, information potential, collective action in the political arena, 
collective action in the market arena. 
First, organised interest groups’ financing potential originates from membership fees, 
donations and other fund-raising activities68. In as far as revenues exceed the 
operational costs of running the interest group, group representatives can draw on 
these funds to finance their activities at the political level, i.e. to advertise a group’s 
interests among policy makers, other influential persons and entities or the public at 
large69. 
Second, interest groups possess extensive information about their members, which in 
the sphere of economic interest groups generally encompasses information on the 
conditions relevant for their economic activities, the extent, relevance and importance 
of their operations, and their economic and strategic behaviour. As a result, interest 
groups generally enjoy detailed knowledge of their members’ needs and objectives and 
their potential response to changes in their operational environment, enabling them to 
assess and judge public policy measures on these grounds70. The supply of information 
interest groups command in principle matches the information needs of political 
decision makers already observed above71. The degree to which interest groups are 
able to use their information edge in exchange for political influence depends ceteris 
paribus on the quantitative and qualitative size of the informational asymmetry72. 
66 For an overview see Daumann (1999), pp. 118-119.
67 Daumann (1999), pp. 120-124.
68 Daumann (1999), p. 121. Other fund-raising activities include entrepreneurial activities and asset 
management (von Beyme (1974), pp. 58-59).
69 Von Beyme (1974), p. 58.
70 Daumann (1999), pp. 121-122.
71 Interest groups have an incentive to pass on information to policy makers on a selective basis in 
order to make the messages contained in and associated with the information compatible with their 
own policy objectives. This selective approach also includes decisions to withhold information. 
Daumann (1999), p. 160.
72 Daumann (1999), pp. 159-161. Daumann also analyses the means by which the groups’ 
information lead can be exploited. Apart from the instrumental role information plays for groups in 
the pursuit of their interests, the provision of valuable information services is frequently quoted as 
furthering, if not indeed constituting, the welfare-enhancing character of interest group activities. 
According to this view, potential distortions of the market and continued exploitation of consumers 
and taxpayers due to interest group activity are compensated or even outweighed by the net welfare 
gain from providing efficiency-enhancing information that would not otherwise have been 
available to policy makers. In this interpretation, the formation of interest organisations is merely 
the most efficient means of ensuring that all interests in an issue are voiced. See also Mitchell, 
Munger (1991), p. 528.
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In contrast to finance and information, which can be regarded as direct elements in 
interest group action given that interest group representatives themselves have 
immediate access to these resources, collective action73 is a resource which an interest 
group can dispose of only in an indirect manner. Collective action emanates from the 
members of a group, and therefore requires prior information, consultation, and 
organisation among group representatives and members74. It can be exerted in a 
political as well as a market setting. Collective action in the political sphere aims at 
influencing policy makers by exerting pressure on their position within the political 
context. Most prominently, elected politicians can be targeted by group representatives 
recommending a certain voting behaviour to their members. In this case, interest 
groups can be interpreted as organised, well-defined pools of voters75. Since the 
current analysis of monetary policymaking will be primarily concerned with politically 
independent administrators and less with elected politicians, collective action in this 
sense is likely to play a minor role.
Collective action in a market context refers to common patterns in the behaviour of 
interest group members in the markets on which they operate, including product, 
financial, and factor markets76. The effects of behavioural patterns in this sense can 
influence policy makers to the extent that the latter are either reminded of the 
economic potential behind a certain group or that the impact of a given policy measure 
on the economy is brought to their attention in an ex ante or ex post manner. Actions 
such as lay-offs in response to cuts in industrial subsidies or tax evasion following an 
increase in levies usually serve both purposes, demonstrating market power and 
existing or potential policy impacts. Insofar as individual market behaviour in 
anticipation of or response to a policy measure follows directly from the pursuit of a 
private actor’s inherent objectives, e.g. profit-maximising behaviour in the case of 
business firms, the desired results in terms of influencing political decision makers can 
be achieved without prior activities in the form of planning and co-ordination by an 
interest group. Thus, tax evasion generally occurs as a result of individual optimisation 
behaviour, requiring no separate incentives from interest groups for collective action, 
and can be interpreted by policy makers as a signal with respect to the effectiveness of 
taxation. 
73 The term collective action in this context refers to collective activities among interest group 
members beyond group membership itself. Its use here, as introduced by Daumann, (1999), 
pp. 121-124, therefore differs from the traditional application of the term, namely in the context of 
interest group formation, as initially stipulated by Olson (1965).
74 Daumann (1999), p. 123.
75 Further means of political collective action include strikes, demonstrations, and illegal activities 
(Daumann (1999), p. 123).
76 Daumann (1999), pp. 123-124, Mény (1993), p. 129.
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Financial means, informational lead and collective political and market action 
represent the sources and means of interest groups’ influence on political decision 
makers. Interest groups, however, differ considerably in the extent to which they 
command these means, giving rise to differences in the amount of influence they are 
able and likely to exert77. Consequently, it is useful for the current analysis briefly to 
recapture the resource elements behind the means of influence categorised above. 
Following von Beyme78, there are five factors determining the degree to which interest 
groups can utilise the above means of influence: ideology, organisation, the quality of 
group leadership, representativeness, and sources of finance.
Ideology is used as a broad concept, referring to the objectives, values and self-image 
an interest group cultivates79. It derives its importance from, and aims at integrating, 
group members whose interests cannot be taken as entirely identical, and at promoting 
a group’s cause with the public by underlining the importance of the group’s specific 
interest for other groups and public welfare in general. Ideology will be relevant for 
the current analysis primarily in as far as interest group values may contain specific 
reference to the desired conduct of monetary policy in general, or to the code of 
conduct with respect to contacts with policy makers. 
The relevance of interest groups’ internal organisation for their ability to influence 
political processes is not uncontroversial. On the one hand, von Beyme rejects the idea 
of a causal relation between a group’s internal organisation and its ability to assert 
itself at the political level, pointing to the theoretically substantiated importance of 
various other factors and the weak empirical evidence for such a relation80. Others, 
however, have argued that the group’s effectiveness in activating indirect sources of 
influence in particular – i.e. pressure on politics and markets by means of collective 
action – depends on a number of organisational factors, first of all the group’s ability 
to provide incentives to join in the common cause81. The more efficiently such 
incentives are provided, the easier it will be to motivate group members for activities 
beyond group membership itself, and the more likely the chances to correct subjective 
77 Mitchell, Munger (1991), p. 525.
78 Von Beyme (1974), p. 39.
79 Von Beyme (1974), pp. 39-40.
80 Von Beyme (1974), pp. 50-52.
81 Daumann (1999), p. 124. Baumgartner, Leech (1998), p. 163, refer to a number of studies 
supporting the argument that group resources and organisational structure are important influences 
on political strategies and the choice of tactic. Nevertheless, they conclude that the similarities 
among groups are more striking than the differences and that most data sets do not allow for 
quantitative testing. 
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perspectives, i.e. to emphasise the importance of individual contributions to certain 
activities and prevent free-riding behaviour82. 
At the centre of Daumann’s argument lies the observation that a fundamental problem 
usually associated with the formation of interest groups, namely that of individual 
free-riding, may in principle continue to prevail as a structural factor inside existing 
interest groups beyond the formative stage. Free-riding was identified as a structural 
impediment to group formation by Olson83. His argument can be summarised as 
follows: 
"[I]nsofar as an interest group is organised in order to bring influence to 
bear on government [...] or in any other way to make claims upon other 
groups, no rational self-interested person will join unless he must or unless 
he is persuaded to join for some other reason. The reason is simple. If 
influence is achieved and the group secures its claims against others, the 
individual who shares the interest involved will benefit fully without 
joining. In rational-choice theory and analysis this is the free-rider problem. 
[...] Therefore interest groups will not be successfully formed unless one of 
three conditions obtains. One is philanthropy, [...]. A second is compulsion, 
[...]. The third and most common is the use of selective benefits, those 
benefits offered only to members of the organisation and not available to 
others who may share the group attitudes but do not formally belong."84
Olson’s logic plays an important part in the analysis of interest-group activity on 
monetary policy in two respects. First, the theory suggests that interest groups in the 
sense of formal interest groups will be formed only if one of the above criteria is 
fulfilled so that, in general, there will be an initial threshold that individuals need to 
overcome before they succeed in forming a formal interest group. With respect to 
monetary policy, the question arises whether interest groups have managed to form 
whose only or primary concern is the pursuit of their interests with respect to monetary 
policy. Such interest groups would fall under the category of cause or promotional 
groups85 organised to express a particular policy objective. Theoretically, one could 
think of groups exclusively promoting an anti-inflationary policy, low interest rates, or 
an exchange rate policy or regime conducive to the interests of the group members. 
Since these objectives exhibit a strong public-good character, incentives to form such 
82 Daumann (1999), p. 124.
83 Olson’s argument applies only to political action for rents with a public-good character (Mitchell, 
Munger (1991), p. 515), i.e. goods for which the economic criteria of non-rivalry, non-
excludability and non-rejectability in consumption apply (Ng (1992), pp. 187-189). Applicability in 
the current context is given since, as argued below, monetary policy and its policy outcomes can 
also be subsumed in the category of public goods.
84 As quoted in Salisbury (1975), p. 192. 
85 For different categorisations see Salisbury (1975), p. 182.
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groups are, in line with Olson’s postulates, likely to come up against strong counter-
incentives motivated by free-riding. Consequently, the establishment of promotional 
groups with a focus on monetary policy would require marked compensatory 
conditions in the form of idealism, compulsion, or selective benefits86. 
More relevant in practice, and indeed the focus of this analysis, is the case where 
individuals do not decide to form interest groups exclusively for the purpose of 
promoting their views on monetary policy, but where existing interest groups are 
employed to articulate such interests, be they general or specific in nature. The 
analytical focus in this case rests on groups based on socio-economic factors87 usually 
concerned with a large and varied issue portfolio. Using such sectional groups, e.g. 
business and labour organisations, as a vehicle for mediating specific interests carries a 
number of advantages. First and most importantly, it enables individuals largely to 
evade the problems associated with the formation of a group solely designed for the 
pursuit of interest representation on monetary policy. Second, individuals can benefit 
from the infrastructure of the existing group, including its organisational facilities, 
contacts, reputation, and expertise and can thereby avoid incurring additional costs. 
Closely related to that, sectional groups usually comprise a large number of members, 
so that pooled resources and the combined economic and political weight of such a 
group can be expected to outweigh the overall potential of a newly formed 
promotional group.
These advantages notwithstanding, channelling a specific interest through large 
sectional groups may be accompanied by problems of its own. Once an interest group 
is established, the process of selecting issues, and of aggregating and organising 
interests becomes a problem internal to the group. As a result, free-riding problems 
may prevail to some extent within an interest group. Second, the larger the sectional 
group, the more likely its members are to exhibit heterogeneous preferences with 
respect to specific policy issues. Where this is the case, aggregating interests becomes 
increasingly difficult the higher the degree of heterogeneity of preferences is88. 
86 There is evidence that the viability of selective benefits is limited. First, non-material benefits, such 
as appeals to solidarity or idealism, are restricted in their effectiveness if the actors are motivated 
primarily by material interests (Moe (1981), p. 536). Second, the higher the number of members of 
a group and the lower the frequency of group interaction, the more important material benefits 
become for initiating and constituting collective action (Olson (1965), p. 59). Third, the costs of 
enjoying the selective material benefits from membership in a formal interest group need to be 
lower than the costs of obtaining the same benefits by other means, e.g. on the open market. 
Consequently, the higher the competition on goods and factor markets, the lower the effectiveness 
of selective material benefits (Daumann (1999), p. 49).
87 Salisbury (1975), p. 182.
88 Truman (1993), pp. 63-65, p. 167. Enumerating the sources of conflicts within interest groups, 
Truman considers the problem of overlapping group membership the most important (pp. 167-168). 
According to this view, being a member of or identifying with more than one interest group may 
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Against the background of these intra-group problems, the influence of individual 
group members on the outcome of the group-internal process of interest aggregation 
depends on their market power and their organisational power89. Market power refers 
to the size and possible alternative use of a member’s resources and depends on the 
significance of internal and external barriers to group exit. The higher a member’s 
input into the group and the easier it is for him to leave the group and devote his 
resource profitably to other activities, the stronger his market power inside the group 
will be, and vice versa. Organisational power, in turn, refers to the constitution of the 
group and the extent to which individual members can influence a group’s activities 
through its internal decision making structures90. All else being equal, individual 
members will find it more difficult to influence group strategy and get their objectives 
onto the agenda of the group as a whole, the weaker their market and organisational 
influence is within the group.
Closely related to the potential heterogeneity of interests within a group is the third 
element of resources, namely group leadership. The quality of group leadership has 
been found to correlate positively with interest groups’ success in influencing policy 
makers91. Group leaders find themselves at a critical position between securing and 
promoting the internal cohesion of their group, devising appropriate strategies for 
group activity in order to satisfy members’ expectations, and communicating in an 
effective way with policy makers92. The more capable group leaders and group 
representatives are of fulfilling these tasks, the more effective a group will be in 
ensuring that its members’ interests are represented adequately. However, relations 
between group members on the one hand and leaders and representatives on the other 
are inherently characterised by a principal-agent problem, as a consequence of which 
the preferences of the latter may differ from those of the former93. Thus, the benefits of 
create conflicting allegiances, thereby weakening the outright support given to each single interest 
group and hence the internal cohesion of that group (pp. 157-159). As the analysis below will be 
concerned with interest groups for which either overlapping membership cannot be expected or 
whose interests can largely be regarded as consistent so that such membership structures are 
unlikely to lead to the conflicts described by Truman, problems deriving from overlapping 
membership will not be dealt with in detail below. 
89 For a detailed description of the terminology see Daumann (1999), pp. 57-58.
90 Daumann (1999), pp. 57-58. 
91 Von Beyme (1974), p. 59.
92 Truman (1993), pp. 188-193, von Beyme (1974), pp. 59-61. Daumann (1999), pp. 78-98 gives a 
detailed analysis of group representatives’ discretionary room for manoeuvre within the constraints 
of the objectives of the group at large and its members. For techniques of group leadership see 
Truman (1993), pp. 193-210.
93 Contrary to the frequent assumption that the objectives of a group are exclusively a function of the 
preferences of its members, group representatives do not necessarily throw up a precise mirror 
image of aggregate interests. This follows directly from their position as agents of the group 
members who collectively fulfil the role of a principal delegating the tasks of interest 
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institutionalised interest representation inevitably entail adding a further, albeit less 
severe, potential source of incoherence.
Adding up the problems related to interest groups’ internal coherence owing to 
heterogeneous group member preferences and the differing objectives of their 
representatives, it would appear that interest groups’ ability to operate as single unitary 
actors is limited. Against this background, the assumption of unity implicit in most 
models of interest-group behaviour, including the one employed above, is very 
stylised. However, this does not necessarily impair their validity in principle. In the 
present context, for example, differences in member preferences are a central part of 
the analysis and will therefore be adequately accounted for. In contrast, problems 
related to the principal-agent relationship between members and representatives will 
not be covered explicitly. This is warranted for two reasons. First, it is legitimate to 
assume that the effects of this phenomenon are limited, since in the long run the ability 
of group representatives to pursue their own objectives depends by and large on their 
ability to perform in accordance with the interests and preferences of the group 
members94. Second, it is a potential problem of general significance and not specific to 
the current topic. To keep the analysis focused, issues pertaining to group leadership 
will therefore be taken as exogenous unless stated otherwise. 
The degree of representativeness is the fourth element determining the ability of 
interest groups to exert their means of influence as identified by von Beyme. 
Representativeness is defined, first, by the absolute number of members of a group 
and, second, by the degree of organisation as measured by the number of group 
members relative to the size of the quasi-group, i.e. the overall number of individuals 
sharing the interests of the group, including both de facto and potential group 
members. The higher the number of group members and the higher the degree of 
organisation, the more successful a group is likely to be in bringing its full political 
representation to the executives of the group. Neutral representation of member interests by the 
agents can only be achieved if their interests on a specific issue are identical and the agents do not 
have agendas of their own (Daumann (1999), pp. 56-59). Since neither of these two conditions can 
safely be assumed (Daumann (1999), p. 56), the delegation of competencies by group members to 
group representatives follows the logic of a principal-agent relationship in which, given the 
difficulties in devising interest-compatible incentive mechanisms, the political pressure exerted by 
the agents is not necessarily entirely compatible with the aggregate interests of the principal. 
Possible short-term objectives of group leaders and representatives include preserving and 
enhancing their position and material benefits and increasing the institutional size of the group as 
well as its membership and financial resources (Daumann (1999), pp. 78-81).
94 It follows directly from the difficulties related to collective action that individual group members 
whose demands on group membership are not sufficiently catered for have a strong incentive to 
take corrective action, either by means of working towards a change in group regime or by exiting 
the group altogether. Both options would be opposed to the interests of group representatives. 
Failing to perform in accordance with the objectives of the principal would consequently be self-
defeating for the agents (Dunleavy (1991), pp. 16-19, Daumann (1999), pp. 83-84).
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potential to bear in the policy-making process. This holds true for both the direct and 
indirect elements of group activity. 95 An interest group’s ability to attract members 
and attain a high degree of organisation again ultimately depends on the homogeneity 
of interests within the domain of potential members96 and the group’s ability to 
overcome free-riding incentives by efficiently providing selective benefits from 
membership.
Fifth, potential group influence is determined by an interest group’s financial 
resources. As already argued, aggregating interests and forming an interest group can 
incur substantial costs. The same holds true for an interest group’s everyday 
operations. Exerting influence involves functional processes similar to those in other 
services sectors, such as planning, organisation, structuring, communication, co-
ordination, resource planning, implementation, and budgeting97. Carrying out these 
functional tasks requires expenditure on mobile and immobile factors as well as 
personnel. The wider the financial room for manoeuvre is for an interest group, ceteris 
paribus the easier it will find the performance of its operational tasks. The size of the 
financial margin depends on the number of members, their ability and willingness to 
contribute to the group by means of membership fees or allowances, and the group’s 
ability to employ financial resources efficiently98. 
I.1.5 Interim conclusions
Overall, the preceding analysis of the determinants of interest-group activity shows 
that, given reasonable behavioural assumptions, interest groups take decisions as to 
whether to address a certain policy issue, and how much activity to unfold, by 
assessing the institutional, issue and group contexts within which activity on a certain 
issue will be placed. Either formally or informally, interest groups and their members 
have to weigh the expected benefits against the expected costs of such activity on the 
basis of this assessment. Consequently, interaction of the determinants summarised in 
table 1 below represents the basis for any interest-group activity.
Thus, communication between interest groups and policy makers requires the 
simultaneous existence of an economic rationale for seeking to influence a policy 
process, institutional access points for communication and the availability of resources 
on the part of the group. As the determinants of this decision-making process differ 
over time and from issue to issue, the extent of interest-group activity on a given 
policy issue becomes a matter of individual issue analysis, taking into consideration a 
95 Daumann (1999), p. 124.
96 Von Beyme (1974), p. 57, Daumann (1999), p. 124.
97 Köppl (2000), p. 33.
98 Von Beyme (1974), pp. 58-59. 
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large number of potential factors contributing to the overall analysis of expected costs 
and benefits of political action.
Determinants of interest-group activity – summary table
Table 1
– Number of institutions involved in political decision making
– Kind of institution involved in decision making
– Institutional discretion in decision making
– Complexity of decision-making process
– Legal restrictions on external influence
– Accessibility through formal channels
– Accessibility through informal channels
– Dependence on external information
– Dependence on political support
– Openness to external influence
– Impact
– Complexity
– Urgency
– Issue attachment 
– Group resources
– Competitive environment
– Number of issues on the political agenda
– Diversity of issues on the political agenda
– Financing potential
– Information potential
– Political resources
Issue salience
Issue sponsorship
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Behavioural patterns
Institutional mandate
Institutional accessibility
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I.2 Monetary policy context in theory 
Given the importance of the institutional, issue, and group environments for an interest 
group’s decision whether and how to take political action on a policy issue, the 
question arises as to how far monetary policy differs from other policy fields in these 
respects – and to what extent certain specificities may condition policy responses by 
the interest groups under scrutiny here. 
This chapter approaches these questions from a theoretical angle, investigating the 
underlying rationale and functioning of monetary policy and the implications for the 
policy contexts in which interest groups operate. The aim of this review is, first, to 
present an initial theoretical overview of the fundamental issue properties of monetary 
policy. Second, given the broad range of items relevant to the calculation of potential 
costs and benefits of political action on monetary policy, many of which may not be 
specific to political action on monetary policy, it is useful to highlight those factors 
which are likely to be particularly relevant in this field of policymaking. 
As to the first aim, the following section outlines the basic logic of monetary policy, 
identifying institutional and issue characteristics specific to this area of policymaking. 
Subsequently, these properties will be discussed in the light of the broad determinants 
of interest-group decision making with respect to the institutional, issue, and group 
contexts. Finally, a set of propositions on the specific conditions in which interest 
groups take their decisions on political action with respect to monetary affairs is 
deduced and then investigated in the empirical part of this study. 
I.2.1 Economic relevance and sources of public controversy
Monetary policy encompasses all measures and processes that exist in an economy 
with respect to the supply of money and credit, the quantity of money, the rate of 
interest and the exchange rate99. As a result, it is a policy field in which contemporary 
states exert enormous influence on the economic performance and welfare of the 
private sector. This influence rests on two factors. First, it is determined by the 
economic importance of the resource which monetary policy commands, namely 
money. Second, it depends on the system by means of which the circulation of money 
is controlled. 
Concerning the first factor, the importance of monetary policy for the private sector 
derives from the fundamental role money plays in modern economies characterised by 
99 Büschgen (1997), p. 525, Bannock, Baxter, Davis (1992), p. 290, and Lindsey, Wallich (1992), 
pp. 740-748.
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a high degree of division of labour. By combining the properties100 of being a 
generally accepted medium of exchange or means of payment101, a store of value102, 
and a unit of account103, money has become an indispensable precondition for the 
development of complex market economies104, in the absence of which the costs of 
gathering information about the relative prices of goods, assets and services would 
curtail, if not completely eliminate, the benefits of exchanging goods, services, capital, 
and labour. Market-based economic activity therefore de facto105 largely depends on 
the existence of an asset that properly fulfils these functions. 
The establishment, operation, and maintenance of money and the monetary system in 
contemporary economies are tasks assumed by the state106. So-called fiat money 
100 According to John Hicks, "Money is what money does. Money is defined by its functions." (John 
Hicks as quoted in Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 460). Accordingly, economic theory generally defines 
money in functional terms. Assets are money if, and only if, they fulfil the monetary functions of 
serving as a medium of exchange or means of payment, as a store of value, and as a unit of account 
(Jarchow (1990), pp. 15-18, Issing (1993a), pp. 1-2, Goodhart (1989), pp. 24-50). Alternative 
theories of the existence of money are based on an historical approach, arguing that the use of 
money emanates from convention based on an implicit or explicit social contract (Issing (1993a), 
p. 1, White (1999), pp. 1-14). An historical account of the importance of money and its functions 
with specific reference to the development in Western Europe can be found in Kindleberger (1993), 
pp. 19-36.
101 For the current purpose of illustrating the importance of money and monetary policy for the private 
sector it is legitimate to use the terms "medium of exchange" and "means of payment" 
interchangeably. Strictly speaking, however, the concept of "medium of exchange" is a broader 
than that of "means of payment", since only the latter allows the final settlement of transactions 
(Goodhart (1989), pp. 26-27, Issing (1993a), p. 1). For a detailed account of the importance and 
implications of this function, see Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 460-462.
102 For a detailed account of the importance and implications of the store-of-value function, see 
Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 462-463.
103 For a detailed account of the importance and implications of the unit-of-account function, see 
Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 463-464.
104 Issing (1993a), pp. 1-2. 
105 This qualification applies since money may not play a role at all under certain hypothetical 
conditions. It has been argued, e.g. by Goodhart and Meltzer, that in a world of certainty, perfect 
foresight, absence of transaction costs, and an infinite time horizon all exchange activity can 
theoretically be maintained without an asset fulfilling the three central functions of money. In such 
a world, all relative prices are known by everyone from the very beginning so that present and 
future markets are clear and the whole time path of the economy is determined from the very 
outset. With all economic activity falling into the initial period, there is no need for a medium of 
exchange, means of payment, unit of account or store of value (Goodhart (1989), pp. 25-29).
106 The historical transition to state-controlled public monetary institutions, which in most countries 
was undertaken between the late eighteenth and the early twentieth centuries, followed quite 
different paths across the industrialised countries. The most important cross-country comparison in 
academic literature is an early contribution by Vera C. Smith, published in 1935 (Smith (1990)). A 
thorough discussion of the micro-foundations of public monetary authorities can be found in 
Goodhart (1988).
63
regimes107 are based on the legal monopoly of state-appointed monetary institutions to 
issue money and to control the quantity of money in circulation, i.e. to conduct 
monetary policy108. Unlike commodity-money regimes, such as e.g. the gold standard 
until the early twentieth century, in which gold or other specie serves as money whose 
supply is ultimately determined by their natural availability109, fiat money regimes 
define as money paper notes and metal coin with very little inherent value. 
Redemption at par is guaranteed by the monetary authority and backed by reserves in 
commodities or securities, which often constitute only a small fraction of the nominal 
value of currency in circulation110. In as far as the existence of an asset serving as 
money can be seen as a vital precondition for the development of complex market 
economies, providing money and securing its proper functioning represents an 
eminently important economic activity. Since this economic activity is assumed by 
institutions of, or authorised by, the state and does not emanate from within the private 
sector, monetary policy is the object of economic interaction and the related 
communication between the responsible state authorities and the private sector.
Changing the amount of money in circulation affects a number of economic variables, 
either directly or indirectly. The overall relationship between the supply of money and 
economic activity is commonly illustrated by means of the quantity equation of money 
as rooted in classical economic theory111, according to which real income and the price 
level on the one hand and the supply of money and the velocity of circulation of 
money on the other are directly linked112. Precisely how these variables are related to 
one another remains controversial, on both theoretical and empirical grounds113. 
107 Fiat money regimes fundamentally differ from commodity-based regimes inasmuch as they allow 
discretionary adjustment of the money stock to overall economic conditions, irrespective of the 
natural scarcity of a commodity (see Issing (1993a), pp. 5-6). In contrast to commodity-money 
regimes, in which the amount of money is ultimately determined by nature and, even in the long 
run, is largely exogenous and beyond the scope of human intervention, monetary policy in fiat-
monetary regimes can set the amount of money in circulation exogenously and freely, subject only 
to the objectives it is required to fulfil.
108 For a discussion of the importance of the state in assigning and legitimising currencies see 
Goodhart (1989), pp. 34-38; also Issing (1993a), pp. 5-6.
109 For a detailed account of the properties of commodity-money regimes see White (1999), pp. 9-11 
and pp. 26-52.
110 Issing (1993a), pp. 5-6, White (1999), pp. 18-25.
111 Irving Fisher’s quantity theory of money rests on the accounting identity between the product of 
money supply (M) and its velocity of circulation (VT) on the one hand and the product of the price 
level (P) and the volume of transactions (T) on the other (M · VT  P · T). Overviews of the theory 
and its main critics can be found in Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 473-491, Issing (1993a), pp. 132-
147, Jarchow (1990), pp. 192-208.
112 For an adaptation of Fisher’s equation to real income see Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 473-474.
113 The various theoretical interpretations of the causal links between money, income and inflation 
have been categorised into three strands of literature, the classical quantity theory (for an outline 
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Consequently, the quantity equation by itself does not allow for judgements about the 
line of causation between the variables involved114. 
The controversy over the relation between monetary and real variables is the result of 
fundamental disagreement over the behavioural properties of basic economic variables 
such as the demand for money, as well as the nature of markets, namely whether and 
to what extent market clearing can be assumed115. Despite this controversy there is 
widespread agreement116 that monetary policy does in practice affect both the price 
level and real economic activity, leaving open questions concerning the speed with 
which monetary impulses are translated into changes in both variables as well as their 
interdependence117.
The connection between output and changes in the price level results from the 
interplay between demand and supply in goods, labour and capital markets in an 
economy. As described above, altering the availability of money implies a change in 
the relative prices and in the demand and supply of alternative financial assets, and, 
ceteris paribus, of goods and labour118. If monetary policy is inadequate to influence 
see e.g. Issing (1993a), p. 135), the Keynesian tradition (for an outline see e.g. Issing (1993a), 
pp. 135-136, Levai, Rebmann (1991), p. 52), and the neo-classical, neo-quantity or monetarist
theory (as e.g. outlined in Issing (1993a), p. 138). 
114 Issing (1993a), p. 135.
115 For a comparative account of the controversies between Keynesian and neo-classical economic 
theory see Levai, Rebmann (1991). A comprehensive up-date on the evolution of Keynesian 
interpretations of the viability of monetary policy is presented by Clarida, Gali, Gertler (1999).
116 This view is shared by most writers in the classical tradition, who would agree that the strict 
Walrasian assumptions of instantaneous market clearing underlying the classical model do not 
correspond entirely to the comparatively slow market adjustments observed in practice.
117 An instantaneous adjustment of the price level to changes in monetary variables, as suggested by 
the orthodox interpretation of the classical approach, has been dismissed as applying only under 
highly stylised conditions (Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 552).
118 Burda, Wyplosz (1993), pp. 236-255. One of the central relationships in this context has been 
depicted by the Phillips curve, which indirectly suggests a systematic relationship between price 
developments and income, by depicting a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. 
Originally based on empirical evidence in the UK between 1861 and 1957 (for historical accounts 
of the relationship between inflation and unemployment, see e.g. Dawson (1992); evidence on the 
relationship in Germany is provided by Smith (1994), pp. 254-311, and Weimer (1998), pp. 282-
316, pp. 381-385, pp. 463-468.), the Phillips curve showed a relatively robust negative correlation 
between inflation and unemployment. This led many economists to believe that policy makers 
could choose between the two and reduce unemployment by, for example, relaxing the monetary 
stance, increasing output and lowering unemployment at the cost of a somewhat higher price level 
(Burda, Wyplosz (1993), pp. 236-242). Contemporary interpretations of the Phillips curve are more 
differentiated and take into account the dynamic adjustment of prices and wages occurring in 
practice. Dawson (1992), pp. 163-175, pp. 188-194, summarises the controversies over 
interpretation and application of the Phillips curve in contemporary scholarly writing. Accordingly, 
a direct trade-off between inflation and unemployment is believed to exist only for each given level 
of core inflation, i.e. the rate of expected inflation as assumed in the course of the price and wage 
negotiation process, considering both backward- and forward-looking elements. The long-term 
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real economic output in the long run, then the question arises as to how great its short-
term potential to stimulate real output is, and how long such a stimulus can be 
expected to prevail until price and wage adjustments bring the economy back to its 
initial path. Given that an inherent tendency exists in competitive markets to pass on 
monetary stimuli through higher prices, over time it can be concluded that the more 
efficient markets are in translating changes in relative prices and the demand or supply 
of goods, capital or labour into changes in their respective prices, the faster the 
adjustment of overall prices, and the less pronounced the effects on output are likely to 
be. 
– One category of factors inhibiting such quick adjustment is temporary price 
rigidities in goods, capital and especially labour markets. In practice, prices and 
wages cannot adjust instantaneously and continuously to changes in market 
conditions119 due to price fixing on a trans-temporal basis120, i.e. due to contractual 
arrangements that do not allow for inter-temporal price adjustment121. 
– Second, the size and duration of real economic adjustment to monetary policy 
changes crucially depend on expectations within the private sector regarding the 
future development in major economic variables, most notably inflation. In order 
to achieve optimal decisions, individual actors therefore have to anticipate future 
result of this process is that actual inflation reaches a higher level, while real income and 
unemployment remain unchanged (Burda, Wyplosz (1993), p. 249). For policy makers this implies 
that stimulating the real economy by means of monetary policy measures can only have short-term 
effects, which in the long run will lead back to the initial level of output and employment, while 
actual inflation is elevated to a higher level. Since core inflation rises as well, future attempts at 
exploiting the short-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment will take place in an 
altogether less favourable, because more inflation-prone, environment (Burda, Wyplosz (1993), 
pp. 250-253).
119 In classical and neo-classical thinking transaction costs associated with price and wage rigidities 
are assumed not to exist, leading to the conclusion of instantaneous and continuous market clearing 
(Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 566).
120 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 566.
121 Most importantly, wages are frequently fixed at a nominal level over time horizons of half a year or 
more. Second, producers of goods and services frequently do not adjust the prices of their products 
continually to changes in demand or supply, even without a contractual basis. Finally, rent and 
leasing contracts provide for prices fixed over long periods, often without the possibility of interim 
price adjustments. 
Despite the costs of price rigidities from the angle of monetary policy efficiency, fixed contractual 
arrangements can be justified on economic grounds inasmuch as they help to minimise the 
transaction costs associated with changing price arrangements. Thus, fixing wage contracts on a 
trans-temporal basis serves to reduce negotiation costs and facilitate accounting and planning for 
firms. Staggered price setting by producers can reduce the costs associated with changing pricing in 
lists and catalogues, i.e. so-called menu costs, and helps bypass the uncertainty originating from 
difficulties in separating transitory from permanent shifts in demand (Bofinger et al. (1996), 
p. 567).
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developments as accurately as possible, giving expectations a pivotal role in 
assessment of the viability of monetary policy measures122.
Summing up the preceding theoretical insights in the light of the relations between the 
private sector and monetary policy makers yields four important insights. 
– First, monetary policy measures influence private-sector decision making in a 
wide range of ways as they change the terms of use of money and its near 
substitutes, i.e. the very basis of contemporary complex market economies, as well 
as ultima ratio those of all other assets that are held by private and public entities 
at any given point in time. 
– Second, changes in private saving, investment, consumption, and production 
behaviour in response to monetary policy measures aggregate up to variations in 
economic output, making the potential force of monetary policy directly visible to 
the private sector. However, the real effect of monetary policy is likely to be of a 
temporary nature only, as changes in aggregate supply and demand in the 
economy will eventually feed through to alterations in the price level. 
– Third, due to its impact on economic development, monetary policy is a matter of 
social choice. Monetary policy makers can and have to make decisions on how 
intensively and over what time horizon they will seek to influence the 
development of major economic variables, including the welfare and redistributive 
effects these can have. Depending on how much monetary policy decisions 
diverge from what is deemed necessary by the private sector, monetary policy 
therefore has the potential to become a highly political issue. 
– Finally, monetary policy makers and private-sector individuals are highly 
interdependent in their decision making. Not only do monetary policy actions 
influence private-sector behaviour; in turn, effectiveness in achieving monetary 
policy objectives depends on the decisions taken in the private sector, namely on 
price and wage setting, the speed with which this is achieved and the swiftness 
with which policy signals are properly translated into private-sector decision 
makers’ expectations.
122 Issing (1993a), p. 227. Economic theory distinguishes between three forms of expectations 
formation – extrapolative, adaptive, and rational. The more accurately expectations are capable of 
capturing future developments, the less pronounced the impact of monetary policy measures on real 
output are likely to be, since the private sector will anticipate that the effects of such policy 
measures will ultimately lead to changes in the price level only, leaving real economic activity 
untouched in the long run. In practice, this implies that the more and better information private-
sector participants gather on monetary policy, and the better they are able to transpose information 
into expectations, the less effective monetary policy measures become in real terms. Ironically, 
there is indeed empirical evidence that private individuals systematically underestimate the real 
effects of monetary policy, implying that the formation of expectations in reality may not entirely 
correspond to the rational-expectations paradigm (Ball, Croushore (1995).
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This gives rise to the question what the objectives of monetary policy are, because the 
private sector will seek to bring influence to bear on a policy process only if the 
objectives, and the actions derived from such objectives, differ from the private 
sector’s own preferences. As discussed above, the importance of monetary policy for 
the private sector essentially derives from the central role money plays in 
contemporary economies as a means of payment, store of value, and unit of account. It 
is the guarantee of proper fulfilment of these functions that monetary policy makers 
have in mind when declaring price stability the sole or primary objective of their 
actions123. Price stability means that the prices of the different goods and services 
produced and consumed in an economy remain constant on average. Whenever the 
overall price level rises, the purchasing power of money, i.e. the goods and services a 
given unit of money buys, declines124. The process of an increase in the price level 
over time, measured by means of an index of the prices observed in the economy125, is 
referred to as inflation126. The more inflationary tendencies erode the purchasing 
power of a currency, the less efficiently it is able to fulfil its functions127. 
Pursuing a policy of price stability has been justified on the grounds that the welfare 
costs associated with the loss of functional viability of money are greater than the 
expected benefits of inflationary tendencies. Most importantly for the present analysis, 
by and large the costs of inflation have to be borne by the private sector, while the 
benefits accrue directly to the state, leading to a disproportionately high burden from 
inflation for the private sector. These costs are the consequence of a combination of 
sub-optimal holdings of real balances, menu costs, and taxation-related effects or of a 
lack of price and wage adjustment as well as increased uncertainty, depending on 
whether private individuals anticipate a rise in inflation or not128.
123 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 77.
124 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 12.
125 For a detailed analysis of the various methods of measuring the overall price level as well as the 
quantitative and qualitative problems associated with measurement see Bofinger et al. (1996), 
pp. 12-15.
126 The opposite process, falling prices over time, is referred to as deflation (Bofinger et al. (1996), 
p. 12).
127 Deflation, in contrast, leads to an increase in the purchasing power of money which, at first sight, 
may seem beneficial to money holders. However, by distorting the relative prices of goods, 
services and assets it eventually proves as damaging to economic welfare as inflation. Owing to the 
fact that it has been of little empirical relevance – the performance of the Japanese economy since 
the early 1990s has arguably been one major exception – in the post-war era, academic and public 
interest in deflation and the costs and benefits associated with it has been rather low (Issing 
(1993a), p. 185, Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 141). 
128 Issing (1993a), p. 235. Comprehensive overviews of the costs and benefits of price stability can be 
found in Issing (1993a), pp. 203-235 or Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 22-96. A detailed econometric 
account of the welfare aspects can be found in Fischer (1981).
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Even in the stylised case of correctly anticipated inflation, i.e. when all economic 
actors are able to predict exactly the rate of inflation for a given period at any moment 
in time, inflation will cause welfare losses to the economy. 
– First, inflation will cause the opportunity costs of holding money, as a non-interest 
bearing asset, to rise vis-à-vis other, interest bearing assets, leading to a reduction 
in real balance holdings in the private sector129. 
– Second, anticipated inflation generates menu costs, i.e. all the costs resulting from 
the continuous adjustment of nominally fixed prices and wages in order to avoid 
real effects from inflation130. 
– Third, the negative effects of inflation are frequently amplified via the tax system. 
Progressive tax rates, and maximum and allowances thresholds are usually fixed in 
nominal terms, so that delayed adjustment to the development in the price level 
generally leads to an increase in the average tax burden as tax payers grow into 
higher tax brackets in response to higher wage settlements131. 
129 Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 77-80. The welfare costs of inflation are part of the welfare costs of sub-
optimal real balance holdings, which ceteris paribus requires consumers to spend more time on 
making the same real transactions with lower money balances. As a consequence, consumers will 
attempt to shorten the length of time between earning and spending their income, either by 
investing more time in spending their income, or by investing unused money in alternative assets, 
or by reducing their inventories. In times of high inflation, this can lead to a substitution of money 
as a means of payment, either by means of natural barter or by means of currency substitution, i.e. 
the use of non-domestic currency (Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 81-82)). 
As the purchasing power of money declines, the consumer surplus from holding money, i.e. the 
difference between the marginal utility a consumer derives from holding each incremental unit of 
money and the costs of doing so, falls. The associated net welfare loss for society inevitably comes 
at the expense of private consumers, while the producers of money may even be in a position to 
raise their producer surplus in the event that their additional revenues from higher nominal interest 
rates exceed the losses from lower real money demand (Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 80). This 
evaluation of the welfare costs of inflation rests on the partial analysis model of the demand for real 
balances and assumes, besides correct anticipation of inflation, that inflation has no impact on 
output and that at least one alternative form of taxation exists which does not by itself cause 
negative welfare effects, e.g. a lump-sum tax. Otherwise, the welfare losses from inflation may be 
countered by lower opportunity costs from refraining from employing other, potentially more 
distortionary forms of taxation.).
130 Menu costs even arise in the stylised case of a perfectly anticipating and fully indexed economy, 
because nominal prices and wages need to be adjusted as long as money is being used for payment 
purposes (Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 87). Assuming that the adjustment of price lists or re-
negotiation of wages incurs fixed costs, private individuals generally have an incentive to reduce 
the frequency of adjustment. In the presence of inflation, it pays off to adjust prices and wages 
more frequently, leading to an overall positive correlation between menu costs and inflation 
(Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 88).
131 Detailed accounts of the process of "cold progression" can be found in Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 88, 
and Issing (1993a), pp. 234-235. Even if tax rates are adjusted appropriately, the time lags between 
assessment periods, tax payment, and tax repayment may lead to inflation-induced distortions. In 
addition, interest and dividend income taxation generally applies to capital income, irrespective of 
that fraction which merely compensates for the rate of inflation. Further, rules on the treatment of 
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The costs of inflation enumerated so far materialise even if changes in the price level 
are anticipated correctly by the private sector. Further costs arise after relaxing this 
stylised assumption and allowing for incorrect inflationary expectations in current and 
future pricing decisions and wage negotiations. 
– Incorrect anticipation of inflation implies that nominal prices and wages, but also 
market interest rates or pensions, are bound to adjust insufficiently to the monetary 
environment, triggering distortions in the respective markets132. 
– The private sector also has to contend with the redistributive effects of 
unanticipated inflation on incomes and wealth.
– Unanticipated inflation heightens uncertainty among economic decision makers. 
Investment133, savings, and spending134 decisions by firms and consumers are 
made at higher risk, leading to a higher probability of misallocation of resources in 
the event that inflationary expectations are proven wrong ex post, or to higher 
costs of insuring against the risk of unexpected economic developments. 
– Higher resource and transaction costs arise if prices and wages are adjusted more 
frequently in order to avoid real economic distortions. 
– Private sector participants will find it difficult under non-predictable inflation to 
assess whether changes in prices are to be understood as changes in relative prices 
or in the overall price level, eroding the viability of the monetary system135.
Given the negative effects of inflation, price stability is an important objective of 
monetary policy. Failing to adopt price stability as the sole or primary objective could 
asset depreciation in corporate accounting regulations frequently do not allow for appropriate 
measurement of the decline in value of corporate assets as a result of inflation, leading to an 
overstatement of profits and a higher tax burden. As a result of these effects, inflation has an 
additional negative impact on the private sector via distortions in accounting, saving, investment, 
and refinancing decisions of corporations (Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 88-90, also Issing (1993a), 
pp. 234-235).
132 The effects of a distortion in relative prices become most visible in the context of corporate 
financial decisions, where changes in the value of investment projects, capital-budgeting decisions 
and the costs of funds can be thrown into substantial disarray, as documented in extenso by Agmon, 
Horesh (1988).
133 The description of the impacts of inflation on the private sector significantly abstracts from the 
complexity of the effects, especially with respect to firms. In particular, inflation has significant 
implications for the matching of corporate sources and uses of funds. In the case of stochastic 
shocks to the overall price level, managers need to set up financial planning with specific regard to 
inflationary effects in order to avoid continual revisions in the firm’s financial policies or real 
investment plans. More precisely, the firm’s debt ratio is the key determinant of its vulnerability to 
inflationary tendencies. An overview of these issues can be found in Lewellen, Kracaw (1987). 
134 Holtham, Kato (1986) give a comprehensive overview of the interaction between inflation and 
consumption and present rich empirical date on wealth effects in the OECD. 
135 Issing (1993a), p. 221.
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only be explained if inflation also had positive effects, which could compensate for its 
disadvantages. Positive effects are felt by the issuer of money, i.e. the state. The 
potential producer surplus results from the revenues from issuing money, namely 
"seigniorage"136, and the erosion of the real value of nominal assets, namely the 
inflation tax137. Both effects represent a transfer of purchasing power from the private 
sector to the state, while the costs of generating these forms of revenue have to be 
borne by society as a whole138. 
Whether and to what extent this form of taxation is beneficial from the perspective of 
the aggregate welfare of society depends on the availability and efficiency of 
alternative forms of taxation. If government activity could be financed by means of 
non-distortionary taxes, i.e. lump-sum taxation only, then inflation-induced revenue 
would be a strictly inferior solution. Since state activity is in practice very difficult to 
finance by means of lump-sum taxation only139, the marginal costs of employing 
inflation and alternative means of taxation have to be compared140. However, the 
comparatively well developed tax systems of contemporary economies are 
characterised by relatively low marginal costs of taxation. As a consequence, 
government finance by inflationary policies, especially the substantial risks of losing 
136 Seigniorage is defined as the revenues from issuing money. On the one hand, seigniorage can be 
generated when the state borrows money from the central bank as the issuer of money either 
directly, by drawing a cheque on the central bank, or indirectly, by selling debt securities to the 
central bank, thereby creating additional base money. On the other hand, seigniorage is created in 
the course of money issuance within the banking system as a result of which the central bank 
disposes of interest-bearing assets. The revenues from holding and investing these assets can be 
transferred to the state, representing an additional source of government revenue. For detailed 
accounts on the theoretical foundations and empirical significance of seigniorage see Görgens, 
Ruckriegel, Seitz (2001), pp. 298-308, Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 47-76, or Burda, Wyplosz (1993), 
pp. 200-201.
137 Inflation is one form of taxation as it implies a transfer of purchasing power from money holders to 
the state. In effect, by issuing money the state secures goods and services from money holders. 
Inflation reduces the real value of money balances and thus the purchasing power of money. As the 
state’s two most important liabilities, the monetary base and the public debt, are fixed in nominal 
terms, it benefits from the erosion of the value of real balances (Levai, Rebmann (1991), pp. 396-
397, Burda, Wyplosz (1993), pp. 200-201, Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 58-60).
138 Levai, Rebmann (1991), p. 397. The revenue from seigniorage and the inflation tax cannot be 
raised at will by increasing the supply of money and the rate of inflation, i.e. the tax rate, since this 
by definition lowers the amount of real balances in the private sector, i.e. the tax base, so that 
beyond a certain rate of growth in the supply of money the state’s net revenue from inflation 
declines. The maximum amount of revenue is a Cournot equilibrium on a Laffer curve whose shape 
essentially depends on the characteristics of money demand (Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 61-76).
139 Lump-sum taxation is generally considered to be of limited applicability due to the fact that it 
represents a relatively higher burden to lower wealth and income brackets than to more affluent 
households. 
140 Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 71-74.
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control over accelerating inflation, has been rejected in most industrialised economies 
over the past decades141. 
What follows is that owing to the multitude and weight of the undesirable effects of 
inflation, maintenance of price stability has become the preferred – albeit not always 
primary – objective of monetary policy in both theory and practice142. 
However, it does not necessarily follow from the general consensus on the benefits of 
price stability as the objective of monetary policy that all individuals in society agree 
with how monetary policy is conducted at every point in time. Diverging views on the 
appropriateness of the monetary stance may emerge from three sources:
– Price stability is a broad concept, leaving wide room for interpretation as to how it 
can be defined in practice. There is no generally accepted definition of price 
stability. Absolute price stability, i.e. a constant price level or zero inflation, as the 
strictest interpretation of the concept, has been rejected on practical grounds. 
Measuring price developments is accompanied by a number of technical 
difficulties, as a result of which inflation figures are statistically overstated143. 
Consequently, adhering to a zero-inflation target could lead to deflationary 
tendencies. In contrast, relative price stability permits slightly positive growth 
rates in the price level up to the extent that inflation is not incorporated into the 
141 Barro (1972), p. 978, concludes that "[...] Because inflation leads to higher transaction costs [...] 
there is a net social cost attached to inflationary finance. The [Barro’s] model implies that marginal 
collection costs of inflationary finance exceed 50 percent for all positive rates of inflation – hence, 
alternative means of raising revenue should be socially preferable [...]". Also Bofinger et al. (1996), 
p. 76.
142 The major alternative monetary objective is the stabilisation of nominal income around its potential 
growth path. Purely income-oriented monetary policy would attempt to restore the equilibrium 
level of income or economic growth at the expense of a jump in the price level, running the risk of 
accelerating core and actual inflation. Purely price-stability-oriented monetary policy would aim at 
bringing the price level back to its equilibrium position by means of monetary contraction, 
depressing economic activity even further. Nominal-income targeting, in contrast, represents an 
interim solution in as far as it shares the burden of the initial shock between the two objectives of 
price and income stabilisation by allowing the rate of inflation to rise by precisely the amount by 
which income falls in response to the intermediate monetary stance. However, income-oriented 
monetary policies are accompanied by enormous difficulties in predicting, measuring, and targeting 
national income movements as well as the still largely unpredictable interaction between monetary 
policy measures and national income due to the complex channels of policy transmission and 
variable time lags. More fundamentally, income-orientation requires policy makers to tolerate rates 
of inflation that in certain circumstances will be above those tolerated under a price-stability 
objective. For extensive discussions see Burda, Wyplosz (1993), pp. 115-136, Bofinger et al. 
(1996), pp. 100-105.
143 The statistical distortions have been calculated at 0.2% to 2% (Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 19, also 
Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 148-149).
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private sector’s relevant decisions144. In practice, this interpretation has been 
adopted throughout the industrialised world145.
– The objective of price stability is difficult to translate into precise policy rules146, 
i.e. precise quantitative inflation, price-level, or exchange rate targets. Policy rules 
are defined as pre-determined commitments for monetary policy makers147, 
codified at a constitutional, legal or statutory level. The aim of such rules is to give 
monetary policy makers stricter guidelines on how to pursue their policies on a 
day-to-day basis. Given that monetary policy objectives are generally formulated 
in rather general terms, rules are also used to narrow down the scope of policy-
making discretion within the limits of the policy objectives. Rules refer to and 
define monetary policy targets, trying to overcome the problems associated with 
operationalising the broad policy objectives, i.e. first, the fact that monetary policy 
can only provide stimuli to the behaviour of private- sector actors rather than 
having an immediate impact on goods and factor markets; second, that the 
variables monetary policy objectives refer to are determined by a wide range of 
factors, of which monetary policy is but one; and finally, that as a result there is no 
clearly defined link between policy objectives and the instruments available to 
monetary policy makers148. How wide that room for manoeuvre for monetary 
authorities is, depends primarily on the margins for objectives and targets which 
policy makers define as the guidelines for day-to-day policymaking. 
144 Görgens et al. (2001), p. 149.
145 In most industrialised countries inflation rates of between 2% and 3% would be tolerated (Bofinger 
et al. (1996), p. 21).
146 The term "policy rule" as used here refers directly to the concept of rules familiar from the "rules v. 
discretion" debate in monetary theory. For a detailed exposition see Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 119-
178.
147 Pre-determined commitments can be decreed exogenously by the constitutional institutions 
establishing the monetary authority, representing the strictest application of the idea of rule-based 
monetary policy systems, as it must be adhered to and cannot be altered by the monetary authority 
itself. Alternatively, and in the absence of an exogenously set rule, the monetary authority can 
make an autonomous commitment to a policy objective or target.
148 In order to fulfil their purpose, monetary policy targets need to satisfy four conditions. First, the 
targets need to lie within the sphere of influence of monetary policy, i.e. they must allow for a high 
degree of autonomous decision-making power on the part of the monetary authority. Second, the 
link between the target and monetary impulses must be such that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy measures in terms of their direction and intensity is observable earlier and more correctly 
than it is between the relevant policy objective and monetary impulses. Third, the target variable 
has to respond swiftly to monetary policy measures in order to enable timely evaluation and, if 
necessary, correction of the monetary stance. Finally, the target variable needs to allow for precise 
measurement of the degree of target fulfilment (Büschgen (1997), pp. 526-527). A detailed account 
of the various forms of monetary policy targets can be found in Bofinger et al. (1996). For money-
supply targeting see pp. 248-300; for exchange rate targeting see pp. 300-326; for interest-rate 
targeting see pp. 327-349; for nominal-income targeting see pp. 349-365. The more recent strategy 
of direct inflation targeting is discussed on pp. 365-380.
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– The time horizons of monetary policy makers and individuals in the private sector 
may differ, to the extent that private individuals may be ready to make sacrifices 
with respect to price stability and favour short-term improvements in income 
instead. Given the potentially damaging impact of myopic and discretionary 
behaviour on monetary decisions149, monetary authorities are equipped with long-
term, stability-oriented objectives and independence from day-to-day electoral 
politics on a statutory basis. Individuals in the private sector are free from such 
statutory constraints and may favour short-term gains over long-term objectives.
As a result, monetary policy is a matter of social choice – and therefore inviting to 
interest groups. Price stability has been identified as the most important objective of 
monetary policy. Its pursuit helps minimise the social costs of inflation and stabilise 
the economic environment in which the private sector operates. Accordingly, and 
viewed from a long-term perspective, price stability has frequently been characterised 
as a vital precondition rather than a contradiction to alternative social objectives such 
as income, growth, and employment. In the short run, however, these latter objectives 
may influence the preferences of policy makers in the wider sense as well as private 
sector individuals, making controversies over the pursuit of appropriate monetary 
policies likely. 
Besides its purpose and objectives, a third source of importance and potential public 
controversy over monetary policy lies in the way it is transmitted into the economy 
and its economic impact on individuals and groups in the private sector. The 
149 The fundamental insight in the literature on time inconsistency has been that even under rational 
expectations and a social welfare function that policy makers and private individuals have in 
common, the former will choose a combination of inflation and unemployment inferior to the result 
that could be achieved if monetary policy were obliged to stick to a zero-inflation rule. According 
to the model developed by Kydland and Prescott, in which policy makers optimise monetary policy 
by means of a social welfare function incorporating inflation and unemployment and a constraint 
given by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve, policy makers will depart from the optimal 
equilibrium of zero inflation and unemployment at its natural rate because they can achieve a 
higher level of social welfare by inflating the economy slightly and thereby reducing 
unemployment such that the marginal costs and benefits of doing so are just identical. Once this 
policy decision is taken, it turns out that the resulting rate of inflation is inconsistent with the 
private sector’s initial expectations. Given rational expectations, the private sector will adjust their 
expectations, causing the feasible trade-off between inflation and unemployment to deteriorate. 
This adjustment of expectations brings the economy to a state where inflation is even higher than 
caused by the policy decision itself and where unemployment is in fact above (under the specific 
constraints applied by Goodhart (1989), pp. 363-366) the initial social optimum. As a result, the 
time-consistent equilibrium is strictly inferior in terms of achieving the objectives of society, i.e. 
low inflation and low unemployment as defined in the social welfare function, to the policy 
solution under a price stability-oriented monetary policy rule (Kydland and Prescott 
(1977), p. 480). For a complete account see Kydland and Prescott (1977), pp. 477-481. For the 
possibility of a "consistent" equilibrium see Goodhart (1989), pp. 363-366. The results of the 
model also hold true if alternative forms of taxation are explicitly excluded from the model (Calvo 
(1978), pp. 1411-1428).
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transmission process of monetary impulses has remained inscrutable in many respects 
and is characterised by a high degree of complexity, which may affect the way 
monetary policy is perceived by interest groups. 
When a central bank takes monetary decisions it assumes that by influencing certain 
monetary variables it will ultimately steer real variables, such as consumption, 
investment, employment, production and price developments, in accordance with its 
objectives and targets150. Transmission is best used to describe the impact of monetary 
impulses on certain real or nominal economic variables151, and can be broken down 
into two stages152. 
– At the first stage, monetary impulses from changes in the policy interest rate or in 
base money lead to changes in financial market conditions, as reflected in market 
interest rates, asset prices, the exchange rate and general liquidity and credit 
conditions in the economy153. 
– At the second stage, the changes in financial market conditions lead to changes in 
nominal spending on goods and services by households and firms154. 
These two stages can be observed across a range of channels through which monetary 
impulses are transmitted. Starting from the initial monetary impulse, the literature 
differentiates between four broad channels of transmission: the effects of monetary 
measures on interest rates, the credit channel, balance sheets, and the exchange rate 
channel155.
150 Görgens et al. (2001), p. 233.
151 Effects in the opposite direction have been referred to as monetary policy feedback (Görgens et al. 
(2001), p. 233).
152 See e.g. ECB (2000) and Bank of England (2000). Berk suggests differentiation in three stages: 
First, the influence of changes in the instrument variables on the cost of finance, second, the 
influence of changes in the cost of finance on expenditure decisions of private-sector agents, i.e. on 
non-financial activity, and, third, the pass-through of changes in non-financial activity to output 
and inflation (Berk (1997), p. 8). This sequence differs from the one employed here in two respects. 
First, it takes a more restrictive approach to the first stage, focusing on financing conditions, while 
the present approach includes variables not strictly related to financing conditions, such as 
exchange rates. Second, it treats the transition from effects on non-financial activity to changes in 
output and inflation as separate steps, while the present analysis brackets these effects into one 
stage. These two aspects, while reflecting different forms of illustrating the process, do not result in 
different conclusions in the following analysis.
153 European Central Bank (2004), p. 45, Berk (1997), p. 8, Görgens et al. (2001), p. 235.
154 European Central Bank (2004), p. 45. Also Bank of England (2000), pp. 6-8. 
155 Excellent overviews of the transmission mechanism are Berk (1997) and de Bondt (1998). The 
present discussion largely follows the categorisation applied by Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 237-261. 
Similar discussion can be found in European Central Bank (2000a) and Bank of England (2000). 
Transmission via expectations is frequently treated as a separated channel of transmission, as 
argued below. Further, reference is made to a so-called cost channel of transmission, pertaining to 
the short-term effects of a monetary impulse on the ability of firms and households to meet their 
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– First, monetary policy operations influence economic activity through the interest-
rate channel. The initial monetary impulse156 is set by the monetary authority’s use 
of its instruments157. By using their short-term instruments, monetary authorities 
can determine the terms on which financial institutions158 can refinance their 
activities if they are unwilling or unable to satisfy their liquidity requirements in 
the inter-bank money market159. By setting reference interest rates, monetary 
authorities influence inter-bank lending conditions rather closely, and thereby the 
overall refinancing conditions of the credit sector160. The impulse feeds through to 
non-banks, since the banks will meet changes in their refinancing conditions by 
adjusting their interest rates on deposits and lending vis-à-vis their non-bank 
clients. Subsequently, there is pressure on the prices of capital-market instruments 
such as securities – government and corporate bonds – as well as shares to adjust 
financial obligations with respect to the factors employed in production processes against the 
background of changes in their liquidity position. However, this approach has not been regarded as 
significant either in theoretical or empirical terns. For a discussion, see Barth et al. (2000). 
156 The initial impulse is sent out to the market for central bank money, i.e. the money market in the 
strict sense. Participants in this market are the monetary authority, commercial banks, and in 
exceptional cases selected large enterprises. For a detailed account of the alternative ways of 
steering the money market see Goodhart (1995), pp. 263-302, and Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 386-
417. For details on the strategic implications of operating on the market see Görgens et al. (2001), 
pp. 216-231. For details on rate setting by the Bank of England, see Bank of England (2000), p. 5.
157 Monetary authorities operate in the financial markets by means of open-market operations, 
standing facilities and minimum reserve requirements. An overview of these instruments can be 
found in Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 175-202, Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 393-412, and Issing 
(1993b), pp. 63-142. By requiring banks to hold a certain fraction of their liabilities as minimum 
reserves in the form of deposits, monetary authorities can artificially stimulate the demand for 
central bank money and stabilise money-market interest rates (Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 175-176, 
Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 412-417). Beyond these traditional instruments, communication with 
financial markets by means of moral suasion (Issing (1993b), pp. 127-130) and influencing 
international capital flows (Issing (1993b), pp. 131-140) have been identified as possible 
instruments of monetary policy. 
158 Not all banks are necessarily directly involved in the operations of central banks. The liquidity in 
the inter-bank money market suffices smaller credit institutions in particular. Thus, end-2000 there 
were 7,500 credit institutions subject to the ECB’s minimum reserve requirements, of which only 
3,600 used the deposit facility and 3,000 the marginal lending facility. Only 2,500 financial 
institutions were involved in the ECB’s main refinancing operations, while a mere 200 were 
eligible to participate in its fine-tuning operations (Görgens et al. (2001), p. 175).
159 The impact of monetary policy measures on the participants in the inter-bank money market is not 
homogenous. Following a monetary contraction, the banking system as a whole attracts additional 
funds from foreign banks. Whereas small savings banks and co-operative banks do not seem to 
access the inter-bank market themselves directly, they do so indirectly through the head institutions 
of their sectors. The inter-bank flows within these two sectors allow small banks to access funds 
that might help them keep their loan portfolios relatively unaffected by monetary policy measures 
(Ehrmann et al. (2001a) and (2001b)). 
160 Bank of England (2000), p. 4.
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to the developments in the money market161. From the perspective of the private 
sector, the changes in market interest rates described have an important impact on 
the cost of finance, the return and allocation of investments, and income and 
wealth162. In addition, monetary policy has potential indirect effects in the form of 
substitution163 and income and wealth effects164. 
– Second, monetary impulses are transmitted via the supply of credit on the part of 
commercial banks165. In contrast to the mere pass-through of money-market 
interest rate changes to firms and households by banks, the bank-lending and 
balance-sheet channels of monetary transmission refer to credit-market 
imperfection as a result of informational asymmetries166 which might give rise to 
an amplification of the interest-rate effect and even credit rationing167. 
161 The size and speed of this adjustment process throughout the financial market crucially depend on 
the degree to which investors and lenders regard the various financial instruments as substitutable 
(Görgens et al. (2001), p. 241). The determinants of the substitutability of assets are discussed by 
Goodhart (1989), pp. 238-241. On the implications of asset substitutability for the transmission 
process see Meltzer (1999), pp. 3-5. Comprehensive accounts of the interaction of short- and long-
term interest rates can be found in Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 562-565, and Görgens et al. (2001), 
pp. 237-244. For a summary see Bank of England (2000), p. 4. A theoretical discussion of the 
interaction of monetary policy measures and the term structure of interest rates is offered by 
Goodhart (1989), pp. 238-262.
162 The immediate impact of monetary impulses on equities is discussed in Mishkin (1996), pp. 6-8. 
Bank of England (2000), p. 4. Mishkin (1996), p. 8 and Favero et al. (1999a) and (1999b), pp. 9-11, 
emphasise the importance of effects on other, non-financial assets in addition to those on equities. 
The cost-of-capital effect arises because a change in central bank interest rates ultimately affects 
the conditions at which lending from banks as well as directly from the capital market is available 
to firms and private individuals (see also Görgens et al. (2001), p. 244).
163 Substitution effects can be observed because of portfolio adjustments in response to monetary 
policy measures (Görgens et al. (2001), p. 247).
164 Income and wealth effects arise due to the redistribution of cash-flow following changes in 
monetary policy. Changes in the interest-rate structure alter creditors’ present and future interest 
income and debtors’ interest expenses (Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 248-249). 
165 Enquiries into the specific role of banks in the transmission mechanism have been conducted in 
response to the observation that the traditional neo-classical and Keynesian interpretations lack 
explanatory power with regard to empirically observed movements in investment and output. The 
interest elasticity of investment in particular was found to be too low to explain the high volatility 
in investment in capital goods by firms (Küppers (2000), pp. 76-82). For a detailed critique of the 
interest-rate channel as the sole explanatory variable in monetary transmission see Hubbard (1994), 
pp. 2-6. Also Bernanke et al. (1995) pp. 1-4. However, Bernanke et al. (1995) note that it may not 
be warranted to regard the credit channel as a distinct, free-standing alternative to the traditional 
monetary transmission mechanism, but rather as a set of factors that amplify and propagate 
conventional interest-rate effects, reducing the credit channel to an enhancement mechanism, not 
an independent or parallel channel (see pp. 2-3). 
166 The traditional analysis of the transmission mechanism largely rests on the assumption of perfect 
and complete markets. According to this view, banks pass on changes in their refinancing 
conditions passively to their clients. The credit channel explicitly rejects this view and takes into 
account informational asymmetries as the source of market imperfections, giving banks an explicit 
and active role in the determination of lending rates. A detailed analysis of informational 
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– The balance-sheet channel relates to the effects of monetary policy on the balance 
sheet and cash flow of firms and households168. If monetary policy becomes more 
restrictive, the subsequent hike in interest rates and decline in financial asset prices 
leads to an increase in interest payments on the part of lenders as well as to higher 
financing requirements in response to the diminishing cash flow. In the case of 
extreme monetary policy tightening accompanied by a fall in the overall price 
level, the debt burden of lenders might even rise while the value of real assets 
would decline. Faced with a deterioration in the financial condition169, banks have 
an incentive to compensate the associated risks by adding a risk premium to the 
interest rate such firms are charged, or by refusing to hand out credit altogether. 
Failure to gain access to alternative forms of external finance will aggravate the 
problem for firms and households. As in the case of the bank-lending channel170, 
asymmetries and their implications for the behaviour of financial intermediaries in general and 
banks in particular in the banking sector can be found in Küppers (2000), pp. 13-69.
167 According to Bernanke et al. (1995), p. 22, the empirical significance of the credit channel, and that 
of the bank-lending channel in particular, has declined over time owing to financial innovation and 
the subsequent increase in the substitutability of bank credit. For a historical analysis of the size of 
the credit channel see Miron et al. (1993). 
168 For a detailed description of the channel see Bernanke et al. (1995), pp. 11-18. Mishkin (1996) 
formally differentiates between the channels working through firms and those working through 
individual households, putting different emphasis on expenditure on capital goods and investment 
on the one hand and housing and consumer durables on the other (see pp. 14-16). 
169 The net worth of a debtor plays a central role in the balance-sheet channel as it determines the 
amount and value of collateral the debtor can offer the bank. In the case of a decline in the value of 
collateral following the logic of the balance-sheet channel, moral hazard on the part of the debtor 
and adverse selection on the part of the creditor can induce the latter to ration the supply of credit 
(e.g. Hubbard (1994), pp. 6-9, and Küppers (2000), pp. 89-90).
170 In the US numerous studies find that small and young enterprises are significantly and 
comparatively strongly affected by credit rationing in response to monetary tightening. Kashyap et 
al. (1997) offer an extensive overview. Most importantly, Kashyap et al. (1997) and Kashyap et al. 
(2000) present extensive evidence in support of the bank-lending channel and the hypothesis that 
the channel is the more forceful the less liquid bank balance sheets are. See also Ramey (1993). 
These findings are supported by the fact that the statistical basis for analysis of monetary 
transmission via the banking system is very strong, benefiting from the detailed reporting 
requirements on firms and banks in the United States, which yield a rich source of official data. In 
addition, research into the credit channel has a strong tradition among American economists 
(Küppers (2000), pp. 120-124 and pp. 203-206). For contrasting results see Romer et al. (1990). 
Research into the credit channel in European economies has yielded less unambiguous results, with 
significant variations across countries. Favero at al. (1999a) do not find evidence of a significant 
response by bank loans to monetary tightening in either France, Germany, Italy or Spain, where 
bank balance sheets were investigated. Rather than rationing credit, small banks are found to use 
excess liquidity to maintain existing levels of lending, while larger banks use the strength of their 
balance sheets to insulate loans from monetary policy fluctuations. In recent studies, the 
Bundesbank (2001) and Chatelain (2001) also conclude that the relevance of the credit channel is 
as yet unclear. Ehrmann (2000), in contrast, finds supporting evidence for the hypothesis that small 
firms, for which information costs can be expected to be higher and access to alternative forms of 
finance is more difficult, are significantly and disproportionately affected by the balance-sheet and 
bank-lending channels. Large firms are found to suffer more from exchange rate effects. 
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credit rationing as a result of this mechanism is likely to hit small enterprises and 
private households in particular171. 
– Third, monetary impulses reach the private sector via exchange rate effects. 
Monetary policy measures influence exchange rates by altering domestic returns 
on assets and therefore the incentive for foreign investors to channel funds into or 
away from the domestic economy172. 
Ehrmann et al. (2001b) find that monetary policy alters the supply of bank loans, but unlike the US, 
the size of banks does not generally explain their lending reactions. Küppers (2000) differentiates 
along the various categories of banks – savings, co-operative and large private credit institutions –
and finds that only the latter adjust their credit portfolios significantly, but emphasises that this 
does not necessarily contradict the central hypothesis of the bank-lending channel. Small banks 
with very close relations to their clients are simply better positioned in inter-bank competition and 
enjoy better access to information about their clients. Kashyap et al. (1997) reach similar 
conclusions, referring to the lower liquidity of small credit institutions. Following detailed study of 
the correlation of monetary policy changes and private consumption, de Bondt (1999) concludes 
that there is a significant accelerator effect via the banking system in Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, while in France, the UK, and Belgium no significant acceleration could be found. For 
the euro area as a whole, Peersman et al. (2002) conclude that neither the interest-rate channel nor a 
broadly construed financial channel emerges as clearly and exclusively dominant.
A recent study into the balance-sheet channel in Germany suggests this to be a significant, albeit 
secondary, path of monetary transmission (Kalckreuth (2001)).
For theoretical arguments supporting the credit-channel hypothesis see Mishkin (1996), pp. 19-20.
171 Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 257-258.
172 The cross-border capital flows associated with such investments influence the development of 
exchange rates, which, in turn, influences the price of exports from and imports to the domestic 
economy, the domestic price level, and the domestic private sector’s income and wealth. More 
specifically, ceteris paribus an appreciation of the exchange rate associated with a hike in central 
bank interest rates reduces the international competitiveness of domestic goods and services. 
Simultaneously, imports become cheaper for domestic residents, stimulating demand for goods and 
services produced abroad. Both effects help reduce inflationary pressures but lead to a reduction in 
aggregate demand and production at home, hurting domestic producers. Private-sector income and 
wealth will be affected by exchange rate movements insofar as private firms and households 
receive income or hold assets denominated in foreign currencies. Recipients of foreign-
denominated income will lose purchasing power because of rising exchange rates. Domestic 
investors holding assets denominated in foreign currency are confronted with a reduction in the 
value of such assets. In contrast, lenders holding debt denominated in foreign currency see their 
debt burden reduced by an exchange rate appreciation and benefit from a lower debt servicing 
burden. A rise in central bank interest rates leads ceteris paribus to higher capital-market interest 
rates and lower prices for securities and stocks, making investments in domestic assets more 
attractive for foreign investors. With investment capital flowing into the domestic market, demand 
for the domestic currency increases, causing exchange rate appreciation. As a disclaimer, it should 
be noted that this chain of causation does not necessarily hold true in all circumstances. Thus, 
should the initial interest-rate hike be met by market participants with expectations of a substantial 
weakening in domestic growth prospects, the subsequent capital flows may in fact go in the 
opposite direction, causing a drop in the exchange rate (Görgens et al. (2001), p. 252). For a 
detailed account of the mechanics of the exchange rate channel see Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 252-
253, Bank of England (2000), pp. 4-5, Favero et al. (1999b), pp. 9-11, and European Central Bank 
(2000a), pp. 54-56.
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At the end of the transmission process stands a change in present or future income or 
wealth for private-sector individuals, independent of the channel through which the 
monetary impulses take effect. These changes are likely to alter investment and 
consumption behaviour by firms and households, leading to changes in aggregate 
demand and from there to changes in production, prices, wages and the general price 
level, as discussed in the context of the rationale of monetary policy173. Second-round 
effects can be expected to arise from the direct effects of monetary policy on financing 
and investment decisions and aggregate demand and production, touching even on 
those firms or individuals that might not have been significantly affected by the initial 
monetary measure. Thus, a company initially unaffected might face monetary 
repercussions only after aggregate demand in general, and demand for its specific 
products in particular, falls. Ultimately, the households and companies most directly 
affected by changes in monetary policy may not necessarily be those most seriously 
affected by their repercussions174. 
As a result, private-sector firms and households are affected by monetary policy 
measures in rather complex and in many respects diffuse ways, as illustrated in chart 1. 
Exactly how great the impact is, largely depends on where they stand along the general 
divides between lenders and borrowers and importers and exporters, but also on the 
instruments with which they are indebted or the assets in which their savings are 
invested, as well as the currencies in which their liabilities or assets are denominated. 
Even if an individual’s position along these broad cleavages can be determined, the 
precise impact is difficult to assess due to uncertainties about the exact and constantly 
changing mechanics involved, the complex interdependence of economic variables, 
the time lags at play and the uncertainties associated with expectations formation175. 
173 European Central Bank (2001a), p. 44, and Bank of England (2000), pp. 8-9.
174 Bank of England (2000), pp. 8-9.
175 In addition to the uncertainties arising from the complexity of the transmission process inasmuch as 
it has been explored so far, further uncertainties as to the way monetary policy affects the real 
sector result from a still imperfect understanding of the precise working of transmission (e.g. 
European Central Bank (2001a), pp. 44-45). First, important economic developments influencing 
the progress of central banks’ objective and target variables lie outside their influence such that the 
line of causation between certain developments in the objective and target variables and monetary 
policy actions remains blurred. In addition, conceptualisation of the transmission mechanism is still 
incomplete. Even though the broad channels through which monetary impulses reach the real 
economy have been captured, operationalisation of these theoretical insights is complicated by the 
increasing multitude and variety of financial market instruments that investors and borrowers on 
financial markets and the real economy use as substitutes or complements to the instruments the 
monetary authority can influence most immediately. At the same time, the channels already 
identified are in many respects interdependent, an aspect that in various instances has not yet 
entered the realm of theoretical analysis. Further, modelling the precise functioning of the 
transmission of monetary impulses is hampered by the difficulties in incorporating market 
participants’ expectations. In practice, expectations are frequently treated as a fourth, separate 
channel of monetary transmission, underlining their importance (see e.g. Bank of England (2000), 
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Monetary transmission process – simplified illustration
Chart 1
Sources: ECB (2004), p. 45, Görgens et al. (2001), p. 236
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p. 4, Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 262-266, Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 565-578. As a result of 
incomplete knowledge of the components and reach of the transmission process it is also 
impossible to judge with complete certainty which economic developments in the aftermath of a 
policy change can legitimately be traced back to it. By analogy, it is also impossible to predict with 
certainty what effects a policy measure is likely to have at which time in the future, leading to 
substantial uncertainties about the time lags involved in the transmission process. For theoretical 
arguments see Bank of England (2000), p. 9. Empirical evidence on the time lag of monetary 
policy impulses is presented by the Bank for International Settlements (1995), and Kieler et al. 
(1998). For a differentiated picture of the time lags in different economic variables following 
monetary tightening see Bernanke et al. (1995), p. 9. For a comprehensive cross-country 
comparison of time lags in the EU see Mojon et al. (2001). Finally, the practical relevance of the 
various transmission channels and their empirical weight is still disputed. While the interest rate 
channel is historically established in academic literature and empirically well documented, the 
importance of the more recently conceptualised credit channel has not yet been proved 
unambiguously. (For an excellent review of the literature on the empirical significance of the 
various channels of monetary policy transmission see de Bondt (1998), pp. 13-22. Also Angeloni et 
al. (2002), Favero et al. (1999b), pp. 13-18, Clements et al. (2001), and Kieler et al. (1998), pp. 4-
12. Recent analyses show a solid interest-rate channel for Germany (e.g. von Kalckreuth (2001), 
Chatelain et al. (2001)), and other EU member states (Mojon (2000b). For aggregate euro area 
results see Peersman (2001). On the interdependence of the interest-rate channel and the structure 
of the financial system, see in particular the detailed analysis by Cecchetti (1999). In cross-country 
analyses in Europe, this impact has been found to be positive (Britton et al. (1997), De 
Nederlandsche Bank (2000) and Mojon (2000a). For a contrasting view see Mishkin (1996), 
pp. 18-20. On the impact of asymmetries in the structure of output, see Clausen (2001). Sgherri 
(2000) presents an empirical evaluation of the transmission mechanism in the UK.) Similarly, the 
practical relevance of the exchange rate channel for the impact of monetary policy actions on the 
private sector has remained unclear (for a survey of empirical evidence see Smets et al (1999)).
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I.2.2 Institutional context: objectives and tasks of central banks
Within a given monetary area, the central bank is the key institution for monetary 
affairs. Even though the legal mandates underlying their establishment and operations 
are individually designed and can differ substantially, the role of central banks is 
similar across different monetary areas in one essential respect: Charged with 
operation and maintenance of the monetary system, they decide on how to pursue the 
objectives they are assigned in their mandate, which of the instruments at their 
disposal they use to that end, and the use to which they put them. The effect resulting 
from institutional separation of the conduct of monetary policy from other policy areas 
is reinforced by the institutional autonomy, or independence, that the central banks 
considered in the present context enjoy. Owing to the incentive problems identified in 
the above discussion on the objectives of monetary policy, elected politicians have 
come to be regarded as inadequate to the consistent pursuit of a monetary policy 
guaranteeing price stability. In order to avoid policy decisions aimed at the short-term 
stimulation of economic activity along electoral cycles, monetary policy is not only 
separated from policy processes involving elected parliamentarians and government 
officials; beyond this, contemporary central bank designs seek to establish extensive 
independence from all external political pressures for central banks and the policy 
makers in them. 
Central bank independence as defined above176 is generally manifested in five 
provisions. 
– Most importantly, central bank laws provide for institutional independence. 
Accordingly, central banks are established as separate legal entities, which, in 
contrast to other agencies or bureaux, are not subordinated to the executive branch 
in any legal or political sense, including the explicit prohibition of orders from any 
political body or person to that institution. 
– Second, the independence of central bank executive personnel is generally sought 
by devising a pluralistic selection process, long terms of office, and restrictive 
impeachment procedures. 
– Third, central banks are granted functional autonomy, making them the sole bearer 
of responsibility over monetary policy. 
– Fourth, they are given instrumental independence, leaving them the choice of how 
to pursue their objectives within the possible confines established by law. 
– Finally, central banks can be made financially independent so as to avoid material 
dependence on external sources.
176 See p. 45.
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The extent to which central banks are endowed with these various forms of 
independence differs in practice. Despite their national differences, however, the 
central banks in most industrial countries are characterised by a unique position within 
their respective constitutional and political systems, laying one of the most important 
instruments of economic policymaking in the hands of institutions which are beyond
the direct control – and in important respects even the indirect control – of the 
sovereign authority or its democratically elected representatives. 
For all the wide-ranging discretion and autonomy they enjoy in pursuing their policies, 
there is still some interdependence between central banks and other constitutional 
organs and political institutions. The direct interdependence emanates from the fact 
that the central bank’s very existence and the key rule governing its operations are 
given by the state’s constitutional or legislative power. As a result, the legal basis of a 
central bank can in principle be amended or abandoned at any time if the law-issuing 
entity finds that the monetary authority no longer fulfils the tasks it is allotted. Such 
changes can in principle be aimed at the status of the institution in general, but also at 
specific aspects of its operations, its organisation or at the individual position of key 
policy makers, depending on the provisions of the central bank law, as discussed in 
more detail below. In principle, attempts from the political level aimed at a potential 
amendment to or abolition of the central bank law, or announcements to that effect, 
may ultimately influence the decisions of policy makers in that institution. 
How credible and important this mechanism is in practice crucially depends on two 
broad considerations. First, it depends on how easy or difficult it is in practice to 
amend the existing central bank law. If the law enjoys legal status and can be changed 
by a parliamentary majority, the hurdle is much lower than if it is constitutional in 
nature, requiring an amendment of the constitutional basis of the polity. It follows that 
the higher the status of the central bank’s legal basis in a polity’s legal order, the more 
difficult it will be ceteris paribus to achieve a legal amendment, and the less likely it 
becomes for a corresponding threat to actually exert pressure on monetary policy 
makers. Second, amending a central bank’s legal basis for the purpose of influencing 
monetary policy decisions is likely to impair or even destroy the credibility of the 
existing institutional set-up as well as that of any future arrangement, giving rise to the 
concern that such amendments may be repeated by the legislature any time it deems 
expedient with market participants. 
Alternatively, the central bank’s legal basis is subject to constitutional review on the 
part of the judiciary. The central bank law and individual provisions thereof can, on 
the initiative of eligible plaintiffs such as the main constitutional organs and possibly 
also any natural or legal public or private person, be investigated by high courts, e.g. 
the constitutional court and possibly also supreme administrative courts, as to their 
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constitutionality. In a similar vein, but subject to the specific constitutional and legal 
provisions, it is also conceivable for a central bank to be sued for breach of its 
obligations under the constitution or the central bank law, e.g. in the event a plaintiff 
holds that the bank has failed to meet its legally defined monetary policy objectives. 
As with the case of legislative amendment governing the operations of the central 
bank, so judicial review represents an ultima ratio instrument for ensuring that the 
institution and its operations are consistent with socially desired priorities as 
manifested in the constitution. Rather than being a viable means for influencing 
monetary decision making on a regular basis, judicial review would be expected to be 
an option for recourse on the central bank only in exceptional circumstances.
Along with the integrity of their mandates, central banks also interact with surrounding 
political institutions in limited areas of their operational business. Most importantly, 
most central banks do not have an exclusive mandate with respect to exchange rate 
policies. In most cases, selection of the exchange rate system with respect to foreign 
currencies and the conduct of policies related to these systems are outside the scope of 
a central bank’s mandate, being the prerogative of the legislative or executive branches 
of the state. In this case, central banks have to operate within the confines imposed by 
the exchange rate regime and participate in related decisions only on a consultative or 
coordinating basis. 
Second, central banks are frequently held accountable to the legislature in order to 
secure an ex post review of monetary decisions with the aim of partially compensating 
for the lack of ex ante control over central bank activities. Even though regular
hearings of central bank officials or written reports to parliament serve as a source of 
information for non-central bank policy makers and force central bank officials 
publicly to defend their policies on an ex post basis, the recommendations or 
conclusions of such sessions are generally non-binding and do not commit central 
bankers to any response in terms of future policies. 
Similarly, regular or sporadic participation in committees, co-ordinating bodies and 
other political forums within the polity in which central bank officials meet other 
policy makers have no legally binding impact on the former and are generally 
designed to serve informational purposes. 
As a result, interest groups effectively deal with a largely self-sufficient system, 
dominated by the central bank as the sole and independent institution in monetary 
affairs, as illustrated graphically in chart 2. Under normal conditions, i.e. unless 
exceptional economic and political crises are taken into consideration, neither the 
legislature nor the executive nor the judiciary have legally manifested means at their 
disposal to instruct, sanction or otherwise influence the central bank in its monetary 
policy decisions. Instruments such as legal amendment or judicial review are, 
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essentially, of a last-resort nature and have, in practice and with respect to the banks’ 
capacity as the monetary authority, not been invoked in recent history. The role of 
coordinating and consultative committees is highly limited due to the weight of the 
postulate of central bank independence, which keeps them at considerable distance 
from the decision-making process inside the central bank. The position of central 
banks may therefore alleviate the work of interest groups in as far as it provides clear 
policy responsibilities. Central bank independence, however, also has negative 
implications when it comes to the accessibility of the institution.
Institutional framework of monetary policy
Chart 2
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Within this institutional framework, the scope central banks enjoy in pursuing their 
objectives is staked out by their institutional mandate, as defined in the underlying 
legal basis of the bank. In general, this mandate provides that central banks have a 
monopoly position with respect to the operation and maintenance of the monetary 
system and, consequently, over the conduct of monetary policy and, in this regard, do 
not share responsibility with other bodies. To the extent that they do not share this 
responsibility with other bodies and do not need to co-ordinate their policy measures 
with third parties, central banks enjoy considerable freedom of action. This freedom 
may be limited in two respects:
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– Central banks may be subject to mandatory restrictions concerning exchange rate 
policies, as policies related to exchange rate systems vis-à-vis foreign currencies 
frequently fall outside the legally drawn sphere of central bank competence177. 
– Central banks’ freedom of action is limited by the definitions of objectives and 
targets legislators can impose. With respect to policy objectives, the legal set-up 
can range from the overall absence of an identifiable objective to a detailed 
description of what direction central bank operations should take178. 
The decision-making processes governing monetary policy can, compared with 
primary and secondary legislative processes, generally be characterised as simple. 
Once the authority over monetary policy has been delegated to a central bank, 
177 System-related and operational policy decisions usually have to be coordinated with the monetary 
authority, but final decisions rest with parliament or government. In as far as they limit the options 
of monetary policy, exchange rate systems can significantly curtail the framework of action for 
central banks. Types of systems range from freely floating rates through managed floating systems, 
target zones, fixed exchange rate regimes with target corridors and target rates, to completely fixed 
exchange rates, currency boards and ultimately replacement of the domestic currency with a 
foreign denomination. The more closely the domestic currency is tied to a foreign currency, the 
more limited is the scope for domestic monetary policy, as the latter has to maintain the exchange 
rate within the agreed range or even at the agreed level, ranging from no systematic restrictions 
under floating exchange rates via decreasing scope for action under managed exchange rates to the 
complete loss of monetary policy options under fixed exchange rates and the outright surrender of 
an autonomous domestic monetary policy, mostly including abolition of the domestic central bank, 
under currency boards and currency substitution. 
Depending on the exchange rate regime decided at the political level, monetary policy makers’ 
discretion can be highly limited as a result, irrespective of the degree of independence of the central 
bank. This crucially implies that the focus of interest-group activity on monetary policy may have 
to concentrate increasingly on the political institutions in charge of choosing a country’s exchange 
rate regime rather than on the central bank, the tighter the exchange rate system is. In the present 
context, especially in the subsequent empirical analysis, limitations on the discretion of monetary 
policy as a result of exchange rate commitments do not, however, play a central role, given that the 
D-Mark had – save for the rules within the EMS – been floating freely since 1973, as has the euro 
since its inception in 1999.
178 In practice, most contemporary central banks are equipped with a general qualitative objective 
pertaining e.g. to price stability, growth, employment, exchange rate stability or support for the 
general economic objectives of the state. Which and to what extent any of these objectives is 
defined or given priority can already curtail the operations of a central bank in a general way, as 
discussed in detail above. Thus, monetary authorities obliged to pursue the objective of price 
stability are bound to steer a tight monetary course and may establish clear targets e.g. for inflation, 
money supply growth or interest rates to that end. If growth or employment, for instance, are 
defined as secondary objectives, the central bank might exhaust its potential room for manoeuvre 
within the limits of the primary objective of price stability to support these secondary objectives, 
provided the monetary conditions permit. The scope for interpretation and discretionary monetary 
policy on the part of the central bank may widen considerably, the less clearly the monetary 
objective is defined, or the more open it is for alternative ends such as the wider economic 
conditions. How narrowly monetary objectives have to be interpreted by the central bank, however, 
depends on its own standing within the political system, i.e. first of all on its status as an 
independent institution, as well as on the types and combinations of objectives given by the 
legislator and the spirit in which they are defined in each individual case.
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decisions concerning operation of the monetary system in general and monetary policy 
in particular within that institution are taken at one level by the top decision-making 
body of the central bank, i.e. its council or board. The rules governing the voting 
behaviour on monetary policy decisions within the central bank council are generally 
determined internally and mostly require a broad consensus among its members. 
Composition of the council is determined by the central bank’s legal basis and, 
together with its organisational structure, may entail quasi-federal elements, with 
representatives of lower-level, mostly regional, central banks. 
The second specific characteristic of the decision process in monetary policy lies in its 
periodicity. Unlike most other issues and policy processes, monetary policy is 
governed by a periodic, quasi-continuous policy- and decision-making process. 
Central bank councils convene regularly, mostly at weekly or bi-weekly intervals, and 
can if necessary gather to take decisions at any time outside the regular meetings. As a 
result, monetary decisions rarely lead to critical changes in the policy variables; most 
of the time they follow a steady path, characterised by small, incremental policy 
measures whose overall impact over time strongly depends on their aggregate size. 
Third, monetary policy makers can exhibit a strong degree of personal independence. 
Monetary decisions are generally taken by the central bank's top-level policy makers, 
who are selected by the national government or parliament or, in the case of federal-
style systems, by sub-national, state-level governments or parliaments. The selection 
process consequently represents one of the few occasions on which elected politicians 
can take influence by choosing a candidate who promises subsequently to support 
monetary decisions within the central bank’s council that may be conducive to the 
objectives of the political sponsors. This is one indicator of the general outlook a 
future policy maker has on the policy issue. In the case of central banks, policy makers 
are frequently assessed by market participants in terms of their potential allegiance to 
orthodox, tight, stability-oriented monetary policy preferences or to a liberal, growth-
oriented approach. Alternatively, central bankers may have political allegiances, which 
may constitute an incentive to favour monetary policy measures intended to support or 
run counter to the economic policies of a given government, thus influencing the 
chances for the latter’s re-election. Further, policy makers may have professional 
allegiances with respect to employers or sectors in which they held positions prior to 
joining the central bank. Finally, local allegiances may induce central bankers in 
federal-type systems to support monetary policies conducive to the economic 
performance of a certain region within the monetary area the central bank governs. 
Such personal allegiances may, in turn, influence the individual accessibility of central 
bank policy makers, i.e. their propensity to allow or forbid certain interest group 
representatives to present their concerns. As investigated in different contexts, for 
example the selection of supreme court judges, this logic does not necessarily apply to 
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all policy makers selected and not at all times following their selection. It is generally 
hoped to minimise individual susceptibility to past and present external stimuli by, 
first, granting monetary policy makers long terms of office; second, by limiting the 
possibilities of impeachment by elected politicians; and third, by limiting the option of 
re-appointment. These instruments can significantly diminish individual policy 
makers’ accessibility. 
Finally, central banks can enjoy a high degree of material independence. In making 
their decisions, central bank policy makers can take recourse to substantial resources 
in the form of the expertise and information generated within their institutions. In 
contrast to other fields of policymaking, monetary policy is a rather technical process 
in which econometric modelling and large-scale statistical calculations form the 
foundations of eventual monetary decisions. Detailed aggregate statistical data on the 
national accounts and detailed figures on the savings, investment, consumption and 
trade behaviour of economic agents serve as the basis for assessing optimal monetary 
policy measures as well as for forecasting future responses by the economy to these 
measures. Collecting and processing these data requires substantial resources in terms 
of capital and human expertise. 
One indicator for central banks’ strong material endowment can be obtained from 
comparing their revenues from monetary operations with their operating expenses. 
While the capital resources of central banks are usually held by the state, most central 
banks have the right to retain all or a large part of the revenue from money issuance, 
i.e. seigniorage, as well as the income from re-investing their assets, most importantly 
central bank reserves, on the international capital markets as well as from other 
ancillary operations. The net gains from these operations have historically been 
substantial, as indicated by table 2, which compares the seigniorage across industrial 
countries with central bank operating expenses. The financial resources originating 
from these operations allow central banks to purchase the technical equipment and the 
personnel needed to collect and process the statistical information required to prepare 
monetary policy decisions. 
Besides sufficient financial resources, central banks can also draw on statistical 
sources from the legal reporting requirements imposed on the private sector. To obtain 
the data needed, central banks are generally granted the right to draw on data from 
legally imposed reporting requirements. Where such data are not collected, they can 
ask the legislator to impose new requirements if deemed necessary. In addition, they 
can take recourse to data collected by third parties, most importantly national 
statistical offices.
Overall, this general review of the institutional framework conditions in which 
monetary decisions are taken suggests that monetary policy represents a comparatively 
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secluded and self-sufficient policy process. Once issued with a mandate and the 
relevant resources needed to fulfil their legally defined objectives, central banks 
possess substantial scope for action and the means to take policy decisions largely 
independently of external political pressure or input in the form of expertise and 
information.
Financial resources of central banks: seigniorage and central bank expenses
Table 2
Seigniorage Central bank operating expenses
Country in % of GDP, 1994 in % of GDP, 1994
BE 0.44 0.17
CD 0.31 0.03
CH 0.45 0.05
DE 0.52 0.07
FR 0.28 0.13
IT 0.65 0.06
JP 0.42 0.06
NL 0.46 0.06
SE 0.48 0.04
UK 0.28 0.03
US 0.43 0.03
Source: Bank for International Settlements (1996)
For the analysis of interest-group behaviour towards central banks, this suggests that 
the accessibility of central banks and their policy makers may be particularly limited 
from the point of view of interest groups:
– Central banks’ political independence, as common practice in many legal systems 
including those of the EU member states, enables and obliges them to take 
monetary decisions in a highly autonomous manner – irrespective of political or 
other partial interests in society. Central banks have been committed to exclusive 
pursuit of the objectives established in their mandates, and only with respect to the 
economic area within their remit as a whole. In addition, monetary policy makers 
are not subject to electoral cycles, owing to the appointment and employment 
arrangements generally provided for central bank staff. This puts them in a 
position to take decisions, including unpopular and controversial policy measures, 
without being immediately concerned with the potential effects on support from 
other policy makers, political parties, interest groups or the wider public. In as far 
as this political independence narrows monetary decision makers’ responsiveness 
to the views articulated by interest groups, it represents an obstacle for private 
interests seeking to mediate their concerns to central banks. 
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– Monetary authorities are unlikely to depend directly on political support from 
external sources. In contrast to decisions taken, say, in a parliamentary context, 
where political backing from policy makers, interest groups or the wider public 
can be of essential value in generating political majorities for a certain decision, 
monetary policy makers do not, as a rule, depend on such political support in their 
operations. Ultima ratio instruments for challenging central bank decisions, such 
as judicial review or the amendment of a bank's legal basis, can only be applied in 
a credible manner in highly exceptional circumstances. Consequently, external 
political pressure is difficult to apply to monetary policy makers under normal 
conditions. 
– Demand by central banks for information and expertise from external sources may 
be low compared to that observed in other fields of policymaking. Given their 
command of substantial financial, legal and human resources, central banks are 
regarded as highly specialised bureaucracies with a high level of expertise in their 
policy area. Their dependence on information, e.g. concerning economic 
developments or the potential impact of specific policy measures on certain sectors 
or the economy as a whole, can therefore be hypothesised to be extraordinarily 
low. In as far as used by interest groups as an instrument for mediating their 
interests to policy makers, the provision of sector or group-specific information 
and policy positions may therefore not be an effective instrument in the area of 
monetary policymaking. 
– The institutional framework conditions are also likely to reflect on the behaviour 
of policy makers towards interest groups and their representatives. Considering the 
strong political, material, expertise-related and human resources, monetary policy 
makers may not only be largely independent of input from external sources; 
theoretically, this eminent position may also induce them to reject far-reaching 
contacts with external sources in their day-to-day work. As a result, monetary 
policy makers may not only be independent from the views of private-sector 
interest groups on monetary affairs, but may actually not be interested in these 
views. 
All told, central banks and their policy makers are likely to be perceived as relatively 
inaccessible by interest groups and their representatives, rendering the mediation of 
interests difficult. This may, in their view, diminish the potential benefits from 
formulating and articulating policy positions vis-à-vis policy makers. Whether and to 
what extent the propositions identified here are observed in practice is examined in 
part III below.
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I.2.3 Issue context: monetary and exchange rate policy 
In addition to these potential institutional obstacles, the issue context of monetary 
policy also contains a number of elements impacting negatively on the pursuit of 
political action in this policy area. Potential obstacles to interest-group activity can be 
identified both with respect to issue salience and issue sponsorship. 
Most importantly, monetary policy is likely to be a policy issue with a low degree of 
urgency and issue involvement as perceived by individual enterprises or their business 
associations. Given the theoretical insights and empirical evidence economic science 
has produced on the benefits of pursuing price stability as the primary objective of 
monetary policy, economic actors may, in practice, find themselves in strong 
agreement with the overall purpose of monetary policy as defined by law, as well as 
the policy decisions taken by central banks in pursuit of their objectives in general. 
Assuming that the central banks under consideration in this study do in fact pursue 
their policies in line with the primary objective of maintaining stable prices, the 
question needs to be settled empirically as to how far private-sector enterprises and 
their interest representatives take a long-term view on monetary issues and favour a 
stable monetary environment, or whether they deem discretionary policies in pursuit of 
short-term objectives other than price stability, such as the stimulation of growth by 
means of loosening monetary conditions, as acceptable or indeed desirable.
Conversely, it may be asked whether interest groups reminded central banks of their 
obligation to maintain price stability in cases where the latter were perceived as failing 
to do so, or whether they sanctioned or even supported a relaxation of monetary 
conditions. Given the proposition that enterprises and their interest representatives 
generally support the overall objectives of central banks and the policy decisions 
derived therefrom, a second question to be answered empirically is whether instances 
arise in which interest groups disagree with the course of monetary policy. 
Second, monetary policy may not be perceived as having a substantial economic 
impact on enterprises. On the one hand, monetary policy can have considerable effects 
on aggregate economic development. This observation is substantiated in a number of 
economic studies. Thus, in a summary of the state of knowledge by the Bank for 
International Settlements, Smets179 reported the impact of a one per cent increase in 
central bank interest rates over a two-year period as producing a decline in real GDP 
of up to 2.09% in the case of the US, 1.23% in Japan, 0.37% in Germany, 0.36% in 
France, and 0.18% in the Netherlands within the five years following the initial policy 
measure, as depicted in chart 3. In the case of Germany, these figures compare with an 
estimated reaction in real GDP of a mere –0.3% in the first year, +0.1% in the second 
179 Smets (1995).
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and 0.0% in the third year following a one per cent rise in value added tax180, 
suggesting that in both absolute and comparative terms the immediate impact of 
monetary policy measures is likely to bear significantly on the economic performance 
of the private sector. Of particular relevance for enterprises in trade and industry is that 
the contraction in GDP in response to interest rate hikes results, among other factors, 
from a substantial decline in private investment and exports, as shown in charts 4 and 
5. At the same time, the one percentage point rise in central bank interest rates 
simulated in Smet's study also reduces the overall price level, as illustrated in chart 6. 
Impact of monetary policy measures on real economic activity and inflation
Chart 3 Chart 4
–
Data source: Smets (1995), p. 248
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On the other hand, there is a number of factors which may diminish the perception of 
this impact as viewed from individual enterprises, thus weakening in practice the sense 
of urgency of monetary developments on the part of private sector stakeholders. Most 
importantly, monetary policy is transmitted to the economy in a rather diffuse and 
indirect manner, as discussed above. Furthermore, these changes are likely to be 
180 For a detailed analysis see Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Essen (1997).
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difficult to discern from other factors, such as, most importantly, changes in overall 
market conditions. In addition, the time lags encountered in the transmission of 
monetary impulses complicate identification of monetary policy as the source of 
changes in the business environment for enterprises. As a consequence, the effects of 
monetary policy may, in practice, be very difficult to identify and quantify, and may 
thus not be perceived by enterprises to have a significant effect on their operations.
Against this background, individual companies and the representatives of their 
interests may find it difficult to form strong preferences with regard to the day-to-day 
conduct of monetary policy. In this respect, the general diffusion of the economic 
effects of monetary conditions on individual enterprises is reinforced by the 
differential exposure to these effects. Thus, a company can assume debtor and creditor 
positions at the same time, or be exposed to both exports and imports, so that 
economic effects may, in practice, cancel each other out to a greater or lesser extent. In 
addition, even within individual firms contradicting conclusions can be drawn from the 
impact of monetary impulses via the different channels of transmission, e.g. in the case 
of enterprises heavily exposed to both external finance as well as imports, with the 
former implying a preference for a low and the latter for a high level of domestic 
interest rates. The heterogeneity of interests potentially resulting from such differential 
exposures is likely to be continued, if not amplified, when aggregating preferences 
across firms within an interest association. At interest-group level, therefore, the 
heterogeneity of exposures and interests may lead to substantial difficulties in interest 
aggregation and the formulation of a strong common policy position on monetary 
issues. Given the potential diversity of interests, a policy position at the lowest 
common denominator or even a median position may still be weak compared to other, 
less ambiguous policy issues.
Even after a joint policy position has been reached, it may still not be strong enough to 
compete against other policy issues on the political agenda of broadly based business 
associations. The fate of single issues critically depends on the number, diversity and 
strength of other issues on the political agenda in general. The higher the number of 
issues actively debated by decision makers and the more diverse they are, the easier it 
is generally regarded to place further issues on the agenda. If, however, existing issues 
dominate the agenda such that they largely absorb the resources and attention of the 
decision makers involved, placing a new issue and promoting it will be more rather 
than less difficult. In the present context, the competitive situation on the political 
agenda may also be significant, but in less straightforward ways than in the case of 
conventional policy issues, owing to the multitude of institutions and policy makers 
influencing the policy process.
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One specific and important instance of the general interdependence of monetary policy 
with other issues is the relationship between differing views on monetary policy on the 
one hand and the call for central bank independence on the other. As discussed in more 
detail below, the independence of central banks and the policy makers in them has 
become regarded as an important prop for stability-oriented monetary policy, enabling 
central bankers to take policy decisions largely in isolation from elected politicians, 
who, being dependent on popular votes, are deemed susceptible to inflationary 
policies. Criticism by elected politicians or interest groups of the policy decisions by 
an independent central bank can be interpreted as an attempt at violating the 
independence of such an institution: Were interested parties not hoping to be able to 
influence the conduct of monetary policy, it would ceteris paribus be irrational for 
them to comment on it in the first place. 
Consequently, if criticism or the expression of interests with regard to monetary policy 
decisions are met by counter-criticism that this violates the independent status of the 
central bank181, that may discourage attempts at placing monetary policy-related 
interests onto the political agenda in the first place, since few people would in fact 
want to call into question or even challenge the benefits of an independent central 
bank182. Inasmuch as the conduct of monetary policy and the independence of central 
banks and their policy makers can be treated as two separate policy issues183, this logic 
may imply the existence of a systematic bias against bringing the former onto the 
political agenda – especially not into the arena of public debate – in order to prevent 
the latter from entering the political agenda, too. 
181 The mere threat of invoking that criticism may in fact suffice to discourage interested parties from 
commenting negatively on monetary policy.
182 In principle, the question is whether external criticism, interests or suggestions on the conduct of 
monetary policy imply calling into question the independence of monetary policy makers. One 
argument is that the mere expression of criticism may exert pressure on the decision makers, and if 
the principle of central bank independence were to be taken seriously then such pressure should not 
be applied in the first place. On the other hand, it may be argued that total independence is 
unfeasible both theoretically and in practice and that the degree of independence that de facto exists 
is not necessarily damaged by a call for a change in policy. Only if the latter were linked with a 
credible direct or indirect threat of curtailing the independence of the institution and its policy 
makers, and if policy makers were to submit to such a threat, would independence be violated. A 
final answer to this question, though, still needs to be found. 
183 The conduct of monetary policy and the independence of central banks have to be treated as one 
and the same issue if one assumes that the content of policymaking and the institutional structures 
by means of which and within which they are decided upon are inseparable concepts and require 
inseparable processes. 
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I.2.4 Interest-group context: interest heterogeneity and resource 
constraints
The analysis of the issue and institutional contexts suggests that interest-group action 
on monetary policy is likely to be difficult to organise and represent vis-à-vis the target 
institution, i.e. the central bank. With the potential costs of political action reaching 
comparably high levels by implication, the necessity for interest groups to mobilise 
substantial resources for their work on monetary policy is likely to be strong if 
effective representation of group interests is indeed intended. As the focus of this study 
lies with major interest associations from trade and industry, a sample that, in 
principle, secures significant material resources to address general economic policy 
issues, it is therefore being assumed that the groups examined below command 
sufficient resources to pursue their members’ interests with respect to monetary policy, 
and to compete effectively with other interest groups. 
However, given the specific institutional and issue properties of monetary policy, two 
group-related aspects become particularly relevant in the present context, influencing 
interest groups’ information potential. First, as the empirical analysis below is 
concerned with large industry associations, the information basis is likely to be broad, 
representing a large number of market participants, which may give the information 
aggregated at the group level specific weight. 
Second, the ability of interest groups to supply information can be of particular 
importance in the context of monetary policies with respect to the pivotal role of 
expectations of households, firms and the central bank concerning each others’ actions 
in the context of price and wage formation, asset allocation and other indicators of 
economic behaviour. Theoretically, interest groups can be regarded as mediators of 
their members’ expectations, increasing market transparency, reducing the 
impediments to market efficiency originating from asymmetric and incomplete 
information and promoting the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
However, two potential obstacles hampering the provision of such information can be 
identified on the supply side. First, as a consequence of the size of major business 
associations, preferences within each group may turn out to be heterogeneous, along 
the lines of the above arguments on the complexity of the policy issue. Owing to the 
differential exposure to monetary measures, interest-group members may have 
diverging views on the preferred policy measures, complicating the collection, 
aggregation and analysis of information at the group level. In view of these 
countervailing forces – representativeness versus heterogeneity – it can be 
hypothesised that the formulation of a coherent common position on monetary policy 
measures at the interest-group level may not be possible at all times. 
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Further, expectations with respect to prices and wages as well as the development of 
monetary and financial variables may be regarded by individual firms as confidential 
information if considered part of corporate strategy. Especially for firms in the 
financial services industry, but also for industrial companies with substantial financial 
market exposure, sharing information with potential competitors within one and the 
same interest group may be perceived as disclosing vital internal information, creating 
an open flank in their competitive position in the market. In that case, firms may be 
reluctant to pass such information on to the group level, hampering the establishment 
of a common position on the relevant policy issues. 
Next to these supply-side related arguments, the impediments to the viability of 
information as an instrument for expressing interest-group preferences on the demand 
side have already been pointed out in the institutional context above. Accordingly, 
central banks may be far less dependent on the provision of information by interest 
groups or other external sources than other policy makers. Even market expectations, 
which may not be directly captured by such historical accounts, can be quantified by 
central banks without taking recourse to the inside information of interest groups or 
individual households or firms. Owing to the growth of forward financial instruments 
and markets, data concerning the expectations of the major financial-market 
participants on the future development of decisive variables such as inflation, interest 
rates, exchange rates and growth can be extracted from market prices on spot and 
futures exchanges. 
Not only do central banks possess substantial information in their field of 
policymaking, they may also have only limited demand for the kind of original 
information interest groups are able to contribute. Given their strong focus on pursuing 
the general good rather than particular interests, central banks may not be at all 
inclined to use industry-specific or otherwise selective information for forming their 
policies. In addition, should monetary policy makers use selective – in the sense of not 
nationally aggregated – information, they are likely to take recourse to their own 
ample supplies of differentiated data, rather than consulting the private sector.
As a result, the material and political resources at interest groups’ disposal in the area 
of trade and industry may not be sufficient to bring effective influence to bear on 
monetary policy makers. As great as these resources are in general terms, their utility 
is limited in the specific context of monetary affairs by the fact that the sector or 
group-specific information, by itself, is of secondary importance for the analysis of 
monetary conditions and the formulation of monetary policy by the authorities. 
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I.2.5 Interim conclusions and summary propositions for empirical 
analysis
Recalling the puzzle motivating this study, namely the stylised fact that political 
activity by interest groups in trade and industry with respect to the policy field of 
monetary affairs was low despite the potentially substantial impact of monetary 
decisions on the economy, the preceding theoretical considerations have produced a 
number of important potential explanatory variables. 
In order to explain the puzzle, a micro-behavioural approach has been suggested with 
the aim of investigating the basic incentives for individuals and interest groups in the 
private sector to take political action on monetary questions or to abstain from doing 
so. The decision whether to take political action or not has been presented as a cost-
benefit analysis, weighing the expected benefits of identifying, aggregating and 
mediating individual and group interests against the potential costs. The determinants 
of costs and benefits have been analysed with respect to the issue, institutional and 
group contexts in which they originate.
The major findings with respect to monetary policy as a policy issue can be 
summarised in the form of the following core propositions, which are used in part III 
as the central criteria along which the activities of interest groups are analysed, both 
with respect to monetary policy in isolation as well as compared to other policy issues.
General context
Proposition 1
In general, interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy are not
communicated very intensively to the relevant decision makers.
Proposition 2
In general, communication of interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate
policy is significantly lower than in other policy fields.
Proposition 3
Mediating interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy does not yield
sufficient benefits relative to the associated costs.
97
Institutional context
Proposition 4
Central banks are perceived as inaccessible to interests from the private sector,
compared to other political bodies.
Proposition 5
Political independence is an obstacle for private interests in mediating their interests
to the central bank.
Proposition 6
Given their institutional, material, and expertise-based resources, central banks are
not dependent on external political support in order to fulfil their tasks in the field of
monetary or exchange rate policy.
Proposition 7
Given their focus on aggregated economic indicators and their access to the relevant
statistical resources, central banks are not dependent on external information with
respect to monetary or exchange rate conditions and developments in order to fulfil
their tasks in the field of monetary or exchange rate policy.
Proposition 8
Given the independence of central banks in terms of political, material, and
expertise-related resources as well as their focus on aggregated economic indicators,
central bank policy makers are not interested in the views of private-sector interest
groups on monetary or exchange rate policy.
Issue context
Proposition 9
Individual firms or interest associations agree with the objectives and the overall
conduct of monetary or exchange rate policy.
Proposition 10
Interest groups rarely disagree with the monetary or exchange rate policy decisions
of the central bank.
Proposition 11
Monetary or exchange rate policy is not perceived to have a significant effect on
individual firms or interest associations.
Proposition 12
The magnitude of the impact of monetary or exchange rate policy on individual
firms or interest associations is difficult to determine.
Proposition 13
Owing to the comparatively low and varied impact of monetary or exchange rate
policy on individual enterprises, interest associations find it difficult to form strong
preferences with respect to the day-to-day conduct of monetary or exchange rate
policy.
Proposition 14
Given the low perceived impact of monetary or exchange rate developments and the
importance of other policy fields, monetary or exchange rate policy is not perceived
by interest groups as a priority issue on the economic policy agenda.
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Group context
Proposition 15 Heterogeneity of interests related to monetary or exchange rate affairs within
existing interest groups weakens the formation of strong policy positions in the
business sector.
Proposition 16 Interest associations and their members do not possess means of exerting economic
or political pressure on the central bank.
Proposition 17 Individual firms or interest associations do not possess relevant information
exclusively available to them alone, which they can contribute to the discourse with
the central bank.
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Part II Policy contexts in practice
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II.1 Monetary policymaking in Germany
The following sections investigate the setting within which interest formation and 
communication occur with respect to monetary policy in Germany. The analysis 
commences with the institutional context, an exposition of the constitutional and 
institutional properties of the Deutsche Bundesbank arguing that the Bundesbank, as 
an independent monetary authority, provides limited access to interest representation. 
It subsequently turns to the issue context and reviews the major relevant monetary 
developments in the past decades, suggesting that monetary policy in Germany has, in 
general, been characterised by stability and continuity such that the risks and costs to 
trade and industry have, on average and in comparison to other cost factors, been 
rather small. The third section provides an overview of the existing interest-group 
infrastructure in Germany and the financial, informational and collective-action-
related resources it musters, showing that with respect to information and collective 
action industry and trade associations do indeed have very limited resources at their 
disposal to use in the context of political action vis-à-vis the central bank.
II.1.1 Institutional context: the Deutsche Bundesbank
As discussed in the previous chapter, theory suggests that the institutions interest 
groups seek to approach and the institutional environment in which groups operate can 
affect the costs and benefits associated with lobbying activities. In this section, the 
institutional context in which monetary decisions are taken in Germany is analysed 
with respect to its potential implications for interest-group activities. 
The present study was conducted and concluded during a period of profound change in 
the institutional setting of European and German monetary policy. With entry into 
EMU in 1999, authority over monetary policy in the relevant member states of the EU 
– including Germany – was transferred to the ECB. The influence of the Bundesbank 
on the course of monetary policy affecting Germany was thus substantially narrowed. 
Membership of EMU also gave rise to considerable pressure to reorganise and 
streamline the operations and institutional structures of the monetary authorities in the 
relevant EU member states, including those of the Deutsche Bundesbank. As a 
consequence, the Bundesbank underwent significant reform in 2002.
The breaks in the decision-making and operational structures of the Bundesbank 
resulting from these events can also be expected to change the shape of 
communication by the private sector. To analyse this, both present and past structures 
must therefore be taken into consideration. The present study focuses on the 
communication practices as they have been established within the structures given 
over the past decades. In institutional terms, this implies that the situation prior to 
entering EMU is the most relevant and important and is to the fore. Assuming that 
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communication practices may take some time to adjust to the new institutional 
framework and a new equilibrium may not yet have been reached since the EMU-
related amendments, such institutional developments will be analysed primarily with 
the aim of formulating expectations as to the potential future evolution of 
communication practices. 
After a brief overview of the history of the institutional set-up governing monetary 
policy in Germany, the structures and processes will be investigated on the basis of the 
categories identified in the theoretical considerations, starting with a review of 
Deutsche Bundesbank’s mandate, followed by an analysis of its accessibility from the 
perspective of interest groups and concluding with an examination of the behavioural 
aspects involved. 
II.1.1.1 Historical background
The history of the monetary system of the Federal Republic of Germany can be 
divided into three phases. In the first phase, monetary policy lay in the hands of the 
Bank deutscher Länder, which operated from 1948 to 1957. The second phase 
commenced with creation of the Deutsche Bundesbank in 1957 and ended with 
Germany's entry into EMU in 1999. Membership of EMU also marked the beginning 
of the third phase, in which monetary decision-making was delegated in 1999 from the 
monetary authorities in the relevant member states to the ECB.
Germany's monetary system as it existed until entry into EMU had its origins in the 
far-reaching reforms of the country's political and economic structures after the end of 
World War II, which were initiated and implemented by the British, French and US 
Allied governments184. Regional central banks, so-called Landeszentralbanken, were 
established in the course of 1946 and 1947. Owned by the individual states185 in 
Germany, their task was to oversee the circulation of money and the payment systems 
and to serve as a state bank in each respective state (Land). However, regional central 
184 The starting point for reform of the monetary system was the decision by the United States to give 
Germany a largely decentralised governance structure. As a result, the Deutsche Reichsbank, the 
central bank from 1876 to 1945, was dismantled and replaced by regional central banks in the 
western parts of the country. These regional central banks were referred to as Landeszentralbanken, 
operating under the auspices of the respective Allied governments. In the American and French 
zones, the Landeszentralbanken were established by Länder acts upon order by the respective 
Allied command and in the British zone directly by Allied decree. Regulation of the 
Landeszentralbanken was unified across the three zones by the Allied command as of April 15, 
1949. Between 1945 and 1948, various forms of monetary governance were discussed by the 
Allies. In the end, a decentralised approach was adopted with legally independent regional central 
banks as the operating units and the Bank deutscher Länder as the bank of the 
Landeszentralbanken. An overview of the early history of Germany's post-war monetary system 
can be found in Buchheim (1998). A legal analysis is provided by Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 14-17.
185 The term state refers to the Länder as the basic governance units existing in Germany at that time.
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banks did not have the right to issue money, so that they were not central banks in the 
strict sense. This gap186 was closed by the establishment of the Bank deutscher Länder 
on March 1, 1948, which, in principle, was charged with issuing money, overseeing 
the circulation of money and serving as the bank of the Landeszentralbanken187. The 
act governing the Bank deutscher Länder provided for its independence from 
instructions by political entities other than the Allied Bank Commission188. This 
institutional, two-tier infrastructure with the Bank deutscher Länder and the 
Landeszentralbanken as separate entities with individual legal personalities was 
maintained until the establishment of the Deutsche Bundesbank almost ten years 
later189.
Creation of the institutional framework was followed by the second important element 
of the recent monetary regime in Germany, introduction of the Deutsche Mark as the 
country's currency. This was achieved upon entry into force of the Issuance and 
Currency190 and the Changeover191 Acts on June 20 and June 27, 1948 respectively, 
which regulated the issuance as well as the distribution and exchange modalities of the 
new currency192. 
This first phase ended in 1957 when, after eight years of negotiations, the act 
establishing the Deutsche Bundesbank entered into force. According to the 1949 
German Basic Law, the Federal Republic would establish a federal bank which was to 
186 In the interim period between the establishment of the Landeszentralbanken and the Bank 
deutscher Länder, issues pertaining to the issuance of money and coordination of the work of the 
Landeszentralbanken were treated separately in the Allied zones. In the American zone a Bank 
Council was instituted, in the French zone a Coordination Council was established, while in the 
British zone the Reichsbankstelle was retained and charged with the relevant tasks. For details see 
Buchheim (1998), pp. 103-111.
187 The Bank deutscher Länder and its monetary policy were controlled by the Allied Bank 
Commission until 1951, when monetary sovereignty was transferred to the Federal Republic of 
Germany founded in 1949 (Buchheim (1998), p. 112. For details on the transition of monetary 
sovereignty from the Allied Bank Commission to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1951 see 
Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 16-17). The capital of the Bank deutscher Länder was held by the 
Landeszentralbanken. 
188 An attempt by the first German government at making the Bank deutscher Länder subject to 
governmental oversight in 1951 was successfully countered by the Allied Bank Commission and 
the Bank deutscher Länder (Buchheim (1998), p. 114). For details on the legal aspects of the 
independence of the Landeszentralbanken see Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 15-17.
189 Despite the highly decentralised, two-tier structure the system was, in practice, operated like a 
unitary system in order to enable the conduct of a single monetary policy in a single economic area 
(Buchheim (1998), p. 117).
190 Emissions- und Währungsgesetz.
191 Umstellungsgesetz.
192 For details on the 1948 currency reform see Bickerich (1998), pp. 108-133, and Weimer (1998), 
pp. 31-48.
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succeed the arrangements made in the immediate post-war period193. In this federal 
bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank, a number of key features of the monetary constitution 
in the first phase were kept and further developed. Thus, a federal, decentralised 
institutional and decision-making structure was retained, albeit less pronounced than 
that of the Bank deutscher Länder and the Landeszentralbanken prior to 1957. Further, 
institutional independence from politics was maintained and strengthened. Finally, the 
monetary authority's objective of ensuring stable prices was reinforced. Following 
German reunification in 1990, the Bundesbank was reformed in 1992 to the extent that 
the new federal states were included in the bank's existing institutional structure and a 
number of old and new Landeszentralbanken were merged in order to maintain a 
manageable number of constituent regional central banks, while leaving the overall 
operational structure unchanged194. 
As with the first phase, the operations of the Deutsche Bundesbank until abolition of 
the Bretton Woods exchange rate arrangements were shaped by the need to maintain a 
fixed exchange rate target vis-à-vis the US dollar195. The resulting constraints on 
monetary policymaking only disappeared with the advent of freely floating exchange 
rates to the US dollar on March 19, 1973196. At the same time, forms of exchange rate 
management were introduced at the European level, first in the form of the snake-in-
the-tunnel arrangement of 1972197 and later by means of the Exchange Rate 
193 German Basic Law, Article 88.
194 Streit (1998) offers a concise account of the political debate on the post-unification reform of the 
Bundesbank as well as the resulting changes to the bank's structure.
195 Issing (1993b), pp. 257-260. From the perspective of analysing interest-group behaviour, the period 
of completely fixed exchange rates is of lesser interest, as political controversies concentrated 
either on how to meet the exchange rate target, which in most cases remained a technical rather 
than a political controversy, or on whether the respective exchange rate target was deemed 
appropriate, in which case the final addressee was the Federal Government as the relevant decision 
maker. In the latter case, the Bundesbank may have served as an important and influential 
intermediary target for interest groups trying to influence federal exchange rate policies. 
Ultimately, however, the central bank has no decision-making authority in exchange rate related 
questions.
196 Tensions within the Bretton Woods system had occurred early on, leading to the dollar crisis of 
1971, when a number of countries, including Germany, suspended their fixed exchange rate to the 
US dollar and let their currencies float freely. These countries temporarily returned to exchange 
rate fixing after agreement on widening the corridor between the US dollar and the participating 
currencies from +/- 1% to +/- 2.25% was reached at Washington in December 1971. This was 
known as the Smithsonian Agreement. Following further subsequent tensions, resulting mainly 
from the rise in oil prices, European countries eventually ceased defending their currencies against 
the US dollar in March 1973. An historical overview of this decisive phase in European monetary 
integration can be found in Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), pp. 96-100. Walsh (2000), pp. 25-45, 
carefully documents the negotiations and negotiating positions of the countries involved during that 
period. Szász (1999), pp. 30-50, provides an inside view of the negotiations.
197 In principle, the system provided for flexible exchange rates, in which autonomous control of the 
national supply of money by the Bundesbank was possible. For details see Baltensperger (1998), 
p. 475, Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 602-605, and Szász (1999), pp. 30-50. 
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Mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1979198. In contrast to the Bretton 
Woods arrangements, however, autonomy of monetary decisions was largely 
maintained under the ERM, as the Deutsche Mark served as the anchor currency in 
this system199.
The third phase in the history of monetary systems in Germany was ushered in by the 
plan to establish an economic and monetary union in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
The final stage of that plan was reached in 1999, when the ECB took over monetary 
decision-making from the participating national central banks, which became integral 
parts of the Eurosystem and the ESCB and their decision-making structures200. Since 
the start of this third phase the Deutsche Bundesbank has no longer pursued its own 
autonomous monetary policy; instead, it participates in the ECB's policymaking as one 
of initially eleven and now twelve national central banks. Besides its participation in 
the ESCB and the Eurosystem, the Bundesbank plays a particular role in the EMU 
monetary setting insofar as a number of important Bundesbank characteristics have 
influenced the design of the EMU infrastructure. Thus, the high degree of 
independence from politics, the decentralised structure and the formulation of 
monetary objectives and tasks of the ESCB bear close resemblance to the Bundesbank 
equivalents. In response to the new monetary framework at EU level, the Bundesbank 
itself was subjected to an extensive institutional overhaul. As a result, the Bundesbank 
Act was amended in May 2002, providing for a streamlined decision-making body and 
distinct centralisation of its organisation.
Historical development reveals, on the one hand, that the monetary system in Germany 
has experienced considerable systemic breaks over time, which included substantial 
changes to both the institutional setting and monetary policy targets. On the other 
hand, institutional change has been achieved with a high degree of continuity in the 
most important characteristics of the monetary system, notably with respect to 
independence from politics as well as to the authority's policy objectives. The purpose 
of the following sections is to identify and assess the institutional properties of the 
Bundesbank of relevance to interest-group activity. 
198 For an overview, see Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), pp. 96-100. An economic analysis is provided 
by Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 602-605, and Issing (1993b), pp. 257-260.
199 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 607.
200 The historical run-up to EMU has been documented in a number of important publications. The 
major historical accounts include Szász (1999), Waigel (1997), and Marshall (1999). The 
discussions in the early nineties are covered by Nölling (1993). Specific national perspectives on 
European monetary integration are analysed by Walsh (2000) for Great Britain, France, and Italy. 
The German view has been presented by Stark (1997). Institutional aspects of the history of EMU 
are covered by Görgens et al. (2001), Simmert et al. (1999) and Junius et al. (2002).
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II.1.1.2 Institutional mandate: The Deutsche Bundesbank 
One of the most important questions an interest group has to answer when shaping a 
strategy with respect to a certain policy issue is who takes the relevant decisions on 
that policy issue. The institution in charge is likely to be the primary focus of interest-
group activity. Clearly, the question of responsibility is an important one and may not 
always be easy to answer. For one thing, responsibilities within a state may not be 
defined in an unambiguous manner, making it more difficult to focus interest-group 
work. Second, decision-making authority may be divided among more than one entity, 
the most important example being legislation in bicameral parliamentary systems. As 
discussed above in theoretical terms, dealing with one clearly identified decision-
making entity is, in principle, easier for an interest group than dealing with a greater 
number of decision makers, especially if their responsibilities are difficult to 
distinguish.
In the case of monetary policy, the allocation of responsibilities has been unambiguous 
and ample, as the definition of the bank's objectives, powers, the scope of its business 
and the endowment of instruments demonstrates. Between 1957 and 1999, the 
Deutsche Bundesbank was the central monetary decision-making organ of the Federal 
Republic201. The Bundesbank's authority rested on the constitutional provisions of 
Article 88 of Germany's Basic Law, which provides for the establishment of a federal 
bank that should function as a note-issuing and currency bank202. Further provisions 
governing the Bundesbank are laid down in the Bundesbank Act203.
The Bundesbank Act defines the duties of the bank as follows: 
"The Deutsche Bundesbank shall regulate the amount of money in 
circulation and of credit supplied to the economy, using the monetary 
powers conferred on it by this Act, with the aim of safeguarding the 
201 Samm (1967), pp. 54-62. Currency, money, and coinage are exclusive legislative powers of the 
Federation according to Article 73 No. 4, Basic Law. Legislation relating to banking is subject to 
concurrent legislative powers of the Federation and the Länder, pursuant to Article 74 No. 11 of the 
Basic Law. Legal experts have pointed out that Articles 88, 73 No. 4, and 74 No. 11 of the Basic 
Law, separately or jointly, do not explicitly provide for a monopoly position on the part of the 
Bundesbank with respect to monetary affairs. In addition, Article 109 Paragraph 2 of the Basic Law 
obliges the Federation and the Länder to take due account in their budgetary planning of the 
requirements of overall economic equilibrium, the latter of which may include monetary questions. 
However, a substantial shift of the relevant activities to institutions or bodies other than the 
Bundesbank is generally deemed unconstitutional (Stern (1998), p. 142).
202 "The Federation shall establish a note-issuing and currency bank as the Federal Bank.", German 
Basic Law, Article 88.
203 Deutsche Bundesbank (1998a), pp. 8-55, provides the original version of the Bundesbank Act as 
effective until December 31, 1998 and a juxtaposition with the Act as effective from January 1, 
1999, including the adjustments necessary for entering EMU.
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currency, and shall arrange for the execution of domestic and international 
payments."204
Interpreting the scope of the Bundesbank's authority, however, was not left to this 
general definition of the bank's objectives. The Act, as effective until end-1998, also 
identified in detail the monetary powers of the bank, which consisted of the following 
elements:205
– Note issue: The Bundesbank had the sole right to issue banknotes, which alone 
were legal tender. 
– Discount, lending and open market policies: In order to influence the amount of 
money in circulation and the amount of credit granted, the Bundesbank set the 
interest and discount rates to be used in its transactions and defined the principles 
governing its lending and open market operations.
– Minimum reserve policy: In order to influence the amount of money in circulation 
and the amount of credit granted, the Bundesbank had the power to require credit 
institutions to hold certain percentages of defined categories of their liabilities in 
the form of balances on giro accounts with it, i.e. as minimum reserves.
– Collection of statistics: The Bundesbank was entitled to order and collect statistics 
in the fields of banking and the monetary system from all credit institutions.206
In addition, the Act, as effective until end-1998, made detailed provisions defining and 
limiting the scope of the business of the Bundesbank in the following areas:207
– Transactions with credit institutions
– Transactions with public authorities208
– Open market operations
– Transactions with the general public
– Certification of cheques
– Lending against and purchase of equalisation claims
204 Deutsche Bundesbank (1998a). Quotation refers to the act as effective until December 31, 1998.
205 Part IV, Bundesbank Act. Summary refers to the act as effective until December 31, 1998.
206 A concise description and early appreciation of the objectives, tasks, functions and instruments of 
the Bundesbank can be found in Bank for International Settlements (1963), pp. 54-96. The Bank 
for International Settlements also provides a direct comparison with statutory arrangements and 
monetary practices of the Banque Nationale de Belgique, the Bank of England, the Banque de 
France, the Banca d'Italia, De Nederlandsche Bank, the Schweizerische Nationalbank and the 
Sveriges Riksbank, based on data and evidence up to the early 1960s. 
207 Part V, Bundesbank Act. Summary refers to the act as effective until December 31, 1998.
107
– Other transactions were allowed only for the purpose of carrying out and 
completing authorised transactions, or for its own operations, or for its staff.209
The definition of the Bundesbank's mandate shows that the bank's responsibilities210
were far-reaching and institutionally focused with respect to the essential elements of 
monetary policy in a strict as well as a broad definition of that issue. In the realm of 
monetary affairs the Bundesbank was endowed with supreme responsibilities and was 
therefore, in principle, the natural and sole interlocutor for interest groups on the 
relevant matters. The Basic Law and Bundesbank Act together placed the whole of the 
monetary area within the realm of central bank policy and thereby in the hands of the 
Bundesbank. Its activity was not limited to putting into circulation the notes required 
as legal tender for payment transactions, on the basis of its note-issuing privilege. Its 
task was the far wider one of regulating the entire supply of money to the economy, 
including credit institutions' deposit liabilities, and of influencing the bank's credit 
granting in line with the requirements of monetary and fiscal policy211. 
In addition, the Bundesbank's mandate to safeguard the currency encompassed both 
the internal and external aspects of stability212. Administering Germany's foreign 
exchange reserves, the Bundesbank had to deal with the closely interdependent 
domestic money markets and the foreign exchange markets, as any change in the 
amount of the country's foreign exchange reserves automatically alters supply of the 
domestic currency213. As a result, the Bundesbank also enjoyed the power to intervene 
in money and foreign exchange markets with the aim of stabilising the external value 
of the Deutsche Mark. 
Beyond the tasks identified by the Bundesbank Act, the bank was also charged with 
additional responsibilities not immediately related to monetary policy. Most 
208 After the repeal of Paragraph 20 Indent 20 No.1 and Paragraph 17, the Bundesbank’s functions as 
the bank of the Federation have been substantially curtailed (Stern (1998), p. 164).
209 The Basic Law does not prohibit the adoption of acts that confer additional tasks on the 
Bundesbank related to its role as a central bank. This has been observed in practice in a number of 
instances, such as banking supervision and management of the balance of payments and capital 
controls. In accordance with Article 88 Basic Law, however, such tasks must not impair the 
Bundesbank in the fulfilment of its assignment as the central bank (Stern (1998), p. 146).
210 A detailed description of the Bundesbank's responsibilities, tasks and functions as well as a legal 
evaluation is provided by Stern (1998), pp. 162-178.
211 Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 60.
212 Stern (1998), p. 170, Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 60. Smits (1997) points out that 
the question whether the objective of safeguarding the currency also encompassed the external 
stability of the Deutsche Mark was subject to controversy, observing that, in practice, the term was 
mainly understood to refer to the internal stability of the currency only (Smits (1997), p. 184).
213 Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 82.
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importantly, this included the bank's participation in supervision of the banking 
sector214. 
Finally, the Bundesbank was given a broad range of instruments enabling it to pursue 
its policy objectives. These instruments comprised the entire array of tools 
theoretically and practically necessary to steer monetary policy.
A second aspect of the institutional mandate of relevance to interest-group activities, 
besides its breadth and institutional focus, is the discretion an institution enjoys in 
discharging the tasks conferred upon it. As observed above, discretion in fulfilling a 
task is a vital factor making a decision-making body worthwhile targeting from the 
perspective of interest politics. A body whose room for manoeuvre is tightly limited by 
law, such that it is not in a position to take certain actions even if it were willing to do 
so, may not be a useful addressee for interest groups. 
The breadth of the Bundesbank mandate as well as the broad range of instruments at 
its disposal are two elements indicating that the Bundesbank had wide room for 
manoeuvre in pursuit of its objectives. More importantly, however, extensive 
discretion derived from the broad definition of the bank's policy objectives. In stating 
that the bank should 
– pursue the aim of safeguarding the currency,
– regulate the amount of money in circulation and the amount of credit supplied to 
the economy, and
– arrange for the execution of domestic and international payments
the legislator, at the same time, refrained from defining exactly 
– how the currency should be safeguarded, which criteria and measures should be 
applied to the currency's stability, and which – qualitative or quantitative – goal or 
stabilisation standard was to be targeted by the Bundesbank, either for the internal 
or external value one of the currency,
– what the appropriate amount of money and credit was deemed to be, other than 
that it had to be in accordance with the overarching objective of safeguarding the 
currency, and
– how payments were expected to be executed other than that execution had to be in
accordance with the overarching objective of safeguarding the currency.215
214 For a detailed description of the Bundesbank's role in banking supervision see Stern (1998), 
pp. 172-174. As noted earlier, banking supervision and other accidental tasks of the Bundesbank 
fall outside the scope of the present analysis.
215 Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 60.
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As a result, the Deutsche Bundesbank was endowed by the legislator with the freedom 
to define by itself how to safeguard the currency, when stability of the currency –
internally as well as externally – was achieved and when it deviated from the self-
defined benchmark of stability. 
Despite the breadth of the Bundesbank's mandate and the wide scope of discretion in 
its policymaking, the bank also faced statutory limits which constrained its business in 
two respects. First, the Basic Law and the Bundesbank Act define the scope of the 
bank's mandate in both positive and negative terms. The pursuit of activities not 
explicitly mentioned in the bank's legal basis or conferred upon the institution by 
federal law lies outside the scope of its mandate and is, consequently, prohibited. Most 
importantly, this includes policies with respect to exchange rate arrangements. While 
the bank was put in charge of the external stability of the currency as well as of 
administering the country's foreign currency reserves, its activities in this respect were 
subordinated to bilateral or multilateral agreements by the Federation on exchange 
rates and their management216. As a result, monetary policy had to accommodate and 
support the exchange rate arrangements of the Bretton Woods system, the snake-in-
the-tunnel and the ERM of the European Monetary System217.
Second, the bank's legal framework suggests that the central bank does not and should 
not operate in isolation and that the conduct of monetary policy should not be detached 
from general economic policy. Accordingly, Paragraph 12 of the Bundesbank Act 
states that 
216 Exchange rate policy was an area of concurring powers between the Federal Government and the 
Bundesbank. The conclusion of international agreements in the area of exchange rate policy was 
reserved for the Federal Government as a rule. The rights and obligations resulting from these 
agreements, however, were transferred from the government to the Bundesbank by way of internal 
administrative acts. In the case of the agreements related to Bretton Woods and the ERM, the 
amendment of parities was also subject to governmental decision-making, while the Bundesbank 
was responsible for implementing these decisions. For details on the allocation of tasks as well as 
on the implications of concurring powers in cases of conflicts of objectives and interests see Stern 
(1998), pp. 185-189. Also Issing (1993b), pp. 257-260.
217 Especially with respect to the snake-in-the-tunnel and the ERM, the role of the Deutsche Mark as 
the anchor currency and the implications of this role for the Bundesbank’s policy-making were 
controversial. With the Deutsche Mark as the de facto anchor currency of these systems, the 
Bundesbank was in a position to determine its monetary policy autonomously, while the 
participating countries had to maintain their exchange rate obligations within the exchange rate 
system. The question, in theory as well as in practice, arose as to what extent the Bundesbank was 
obliged to support the overall system and the participating currencies. The critical role of the 
Bundesbank within the ERM has been documented by Szász (1999), pp. 46-85 and pp. 98-108.
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"Without prejudice to the performance of its duties, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank is required to support the general economic policy of the 
Federal Cabinet."218.
The requirement to support the general economic policy of the Federation carries a 
number of important connotations. First, it implies that the Bundesbank keep itself 
informed about the economic policies of the government. Second, it suggests that, in 
doing so, the Bundesbank should not limit itself to information on economic policies 
of immediate relevance for its own activities, but rather that it should be aware of the 
government’s overall economic policy stance. At the same time, the reference to 
general economic policy also implies that the Bundesbank is absolved from supporting 
specific government measures. Finally and most importantly, the provision grants clear 
precedence to pursuit of the Bundesbank's institutional duties, namely first and 
foremost safeguarding the currency.219
In addition to the Bundesbank Act, the Federal Act to Promote Economic Stability and 
Growth of 1967 defined the components of a general economic equilibrium for the 
Federation as comprising price stability, a high level of employment, a sound balance 
of payments and a stable and appropriate rate of growth220. The Bundesbank 
understood this act to confirm that its own primary objective was to secure price 
stability. Yet it cannot ignore general economic equilibrium because of these 
provisions. However, and in line with the priorities of the equivalent passage in the 
Bundesbank Act, the remaining objectives of federal economic policy may only play a 
role in the Bundesbank's policy decisions in as far as they relate to and are in 
accordance with the bank's primary objective. To this latter objective, general 
economic considerations are secondary. The relevant provisions in the 1967 Stability 
Act were therefore interpreted as being in the nature of a recommendation outweighed 
by the specific assignment of tasks in the Bundesbank Act. In summary, therefore, the 
Bundesbank's obligation to support general economic policies of the Federation, as 
manifested in the Bundesbank Act and the Stability Act, remained ambiguous insofar 
as no clear criteria were provided for the co-ordination of monetary and general 
economic policies. The weight the Bundesbank attached to the latter ultimately had to 
be defined in everyday practice. The latter suggests that the Bundesbank consistently 
218 Paragraph 12 Sentence 1, Bundesbank Act. Quotation refers to the act as effective until December 
31, 1998. The latest version of the Act reads: "As far as is possible without prejudice to its tasks as 
part of the European System of Central Banks, it shall support the general economic policy of the 
Federal Government." Paragraph 12 Sentence 2, Bundesbank Act, as effective from March 28, 
2002.
219 A detailed discussion of the legal implications of Paragraph 12 Sentence 1, Bundesbank Act, can 
be found in Uhlenbruck (1986), pp. 53-63.
220 Stern (1998), pp. 163-164. 
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gave priority to its specific monetary duties221 and thereby largely exhausted the scope 
of discretion granted by law.
The third factor alongside the institutional mandate and discretion in policymaking is 
the kind of institution with which interest groups are dealing. As discussed in the 
theoretical context, the openness of an institution to external interests is related to the 
kind of institution it is and its position within the political arena. Parliaments, 
governments, courts and bureaucracies naturally differ in the extent and way in which 
they depend on their environment and how they communicate with it. 
In this context, the Deutsche Bundesbank can best be characterised as a special part of 
the executive branch of the German Federation, entrusted with the responsibility for 
monetary and credit policy as its own particular function222. Starting from this general 
characterisation it can be concluded that, for the purposes of interest politics, the 
Bundesbank very much resembles the properties of a bureaucracy under the executive 
branch. Such a bureaucracy plays an essential part in planning and drafting policy 
measures and, once they have been signed off at the political level, in their 
implementation. From the point of view of interest politics, such bodies are vital as 
points of contact when bringing influence to bear on a policy measure at the 
conceptual stage and on the strategy applied to its practical implementation. The 
policy measure itself is adopted at the political level so that, in order to secure the 
desired outcome, interest groups may also be active – if not, indeed, particularly active 
– during political negotiations on the policy measure. 
This characterisation, however, would not be appropriate for an analysis of the 
Bundesbank. Rather, the Bundesbank enjoys a particular status, which is derived from 
two major institutional elements. This particular status shapes the bank's openness and 
accessibility. First, the Bundesbank has a particular legal status, which clearly detaches 
it from the executive branch and its conventional bureaucracy. The bank is a separate 
legal entity under public law223. It does not come under government supervision224, 
and its management bodies are on par with the highest federal authorities and are not 
221 Stern (1998), p. 164.
222 Bank for International Settlements (1963), pp. 56-57. The description refers to the bank's status as 
effective until December 31, 1998. For details on the legal status of the Bundesbank see Eun 
(1994), pp. 57-201, Stern (1998), pp. 179-183.
223 Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 56. The Federation has therefore afforded the 
Bundesbank an exclusive form of legal personality previously unknown in the German legal 
system. Due to its uniqueness, the legal nature of the Bundesbank has been open to wide 
interpretation. Detailed discussions of the problem are provided by Stern (1998), pp. 151-152, Eun 
(1994), pp. 162-168 and pp. 177-200, and Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 40-42.
224 This includes the fact that the Bundesbank is not subject to full supervision by the Federal Court of 
Auditors. The Court of Auditors reviews the Bundesbank's annual report but has not been given the 
means of sanctioning in cases of objection (Bank for International Settlements (1963), pp. 41-42). 
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subject to instructions from the Federal Government or from any other authority225. 
Governed by public law, the Bundesbank carries sovereign responsibilities without 
formal transfer226. Its capital is owned by the Federal Republic227. Giving the 
Bundesbank an independent legal personality without direct control by the government 
was deemed appropriate for the kind of duties the central bank was to carry out –
policy formulation in, and administration of, a narrow, clearly defined policy area –
and considered superior to integration of the institution into the governmental structure 
as a dependent organisational complex228. The specific status of the Bundesbank was 
accentuated by the fact that, unlike the federal ministries and like other high-profile 
federal bodies, the Bundesbank was not headquartered at the seat of the Federal 
Government. Instead, it has its registered office in Frankfurt, the country's financial 
centre229. 
Second and closely related to its particular legal status, the Bundesbank enjoys an 
extraordinary degree of political independence230. This is rooted in the Basic Law as 
well as in the Bundesbank Act. The constitutional character of the Bundesbank's 
autonomy was subject to debate for some time. In the original wording of Article 88 of 
the Basic Law, independence was not explicitly mentioned as a property of the central 
bank's blueprint231. Some commentators deduced from this that the Bundesbank's 
independence had no constitutional basis but was established only by the Bundesbank 
225 Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 56. Given this special status, the Bundesbank does not 
form a fourth power in addition to the executive, legislative and judiciary powers within the 
meaning of the public-law theory of the separation of powers. As pointed out above, its position 
can best be described as forming a special part of the executive branch.
226 A formal transfer would have been necessary had the Bundesbank been established under private 
law (Stern (1998), p. 151).
227 Bank for International Settlements (1963), p. 55.
228 Stern (1998), p. 152.
229 In principle, the Bundesbank Act provided that Frankfurt/Main was to be a temporary solution 
while the country was divided during the Cold War. Once unification was achieved, the 
Bundesbank was to be relocated to Berlin. When unification did eventually come about, this 
original plan was not pursued and the bank's seat in Frankfurt/Main was legally confirmed (Bank 
for International Settlements (1993), p. 56 and Stern (1998), p. 154). For a detailed analysis of the 
monetary transformation process in the wake of German unification see Streit (1998).
230 Political independence primarily refers to the bank's functional independence with regard to the 
duties conferred upon it by the Basic Law and the Bundesbank Act. It does not extend to other 
tasks delegated to the bank by law. Also, independence primarily refers to the bank's relations to 
the Federal Government and subordinate authorities. In contrast, the Bundesbank is subject to 
federal legislation in as far as this does not affect its constitutional status, as discussed below. Also, 
the bank is subject to judicial review (Stern (1998), p. 185).
231 "The Federation shall establish a note-issuing and currency bank as the Federal Bank.", German 
Basic Law, Article 88.
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Act232. Others interpreted the wording of Article 88, its intention as well as the 
historical background of the Basic Law233, as implying that independence was a 
necessary precondition for the bank to fulfil its duties and that the bank's autonomy 
therefore had constitutional status234. The answer to this question could have had far-
reaching implications for the Bundesbank, not merely of a legal theoretical, but also of 
a practical nature. In the event of an insurmountable difference with the government or 
other constitutional organs, policy makers could have decided to amend the 
Bundesbank's legal basis, or abolish or replace the bank altogether. Had the bank's 
autonomy been rooted in the constitution, such a decision would have required a 
constitutional majority in both chambers of the German parliament. Otherwise, a 
simple act by the lower chamber would have sufficed235. In practice, a confrontation 
with the Bundesbank necessitating a final resolution of this question236 never 
occurred237. Instead, the ambiguity itself has been eliminated in the meantime. In a 
1992 amendment of the Basic Law, a provision was been inserted into Article 88 
reading
"Within the framework of the European Union, [the Bundesbank's] 
responsibilities and powers may be transferred to the European Central 
232 "In exercising the powers conferred on it by this Act, the Bank is independent of instructions from 
the Federal Cabinet.", Paragraph 12, Sentence 2, Bundesbank Act. The quotation refers to the act as 
effective until December 31, 1998. This position was most prominently taken by the Federal 
Administrative Court, which considered that political autonomy was consistent with, but not 
necessarily guaranteed by, the wording of Article 88, Basic Law (Stern (1998), p. 180). For a 
review of the coverage of central bank independence in German case law see Eun (1994), pp. 166-
167.
233 In this context, it was argued that in the pre-constitutional context – referring to the history of 
central banking in Germany in the form of the Reichsbank, with the exception of the Nazi era – a 
heritage of central bank independence had been established that the Basic Law was intended to 
continue (Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 28-29, Stern (1998), pp. 180-181). A systematic review of the 
potential constitutional sources of the Bundesbank's independence is provided by Eun (1994), 
pp. 57-176, and by Samm (1967), pp. 148-191.
234 For a presentation of the arguments in favour of and against such an interpretation see Uhlenbruck 
(1968), pp. 17-18 and pp. 24-32, Samm (1967), pp. 17-27 and Eun (1994), pp. 57-167. This line of 
interpretation was also adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court, which identified a 
"constitutionally independent status" in a 1989 decision (Stern (1998), p. 181).
235 Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 27-28.
236 Other than the question as to how a dispute between the central bank and other state organs could 
ultimately be resolved, the status and degree of independence gives rise to a number of further vital 
questions. Most importantly, it can be asked how such an independent institution can be 
rationalised in social systems governed by democratic structures and processes. This question has 
been discussed in depth by Samm (1967), pp. 76-121.
237 The sources, substance, and legal implications of a confrontation between the Bundesbank and 
other state organs are discussed by Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 67-72 and Samm (1967), pp. 208-216.
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Bank that is independent and committed to the overriding goal of assuring 
price stability."238.
The reference to the ECB, its independence and goals, has generally been interpreted 
as reflecting directly on the Bundesbank. Accordingly, Article 88 is today interpreted 
as guaranteeing autonomy for the Bundesbank at a constitutional level239. 
From the perspective of interest-group activity, it is noteworthy that – before and after 
entry into EMU – the bank's political independence was narrowly defined, prohibiting 
the bank from taking instructions from government. This implies that 
– while giving or taking instructions is prohibited, it is legitimate – at least from a 
legal angle – for third parties to present views and express opinions on 
Bundesbank policies, and 
– the primary addressees of this provision are the Federal Government and 
subordinate public authorities240. Political activities in the private sector are not 
subject to this rule.
From a legal perspective the political independence of the Bundesbank thus has no 
immediate effect on enterprises and interest groups in the private sector. Political and 
moral consistency may, nevertheless, work as incentives on the private sector not to 
address the Bundesbank explicitly. 
The primacy of the Bundesbank’s general political independence has been underscored 
in the Bundesbank Act by emphasising the bank's institutional and personal 
independence. In institutional terms, the bank has been granted a special status in the 
constitutional order, as already observed. The Act has refrained from giving the 
Bundesbank one of the conventional legal forms241 and applies an auxiliary method by 
giving it a legal personality of its own. In doing so, the Act places the bank on an equal 
footing with government, which the latter cannot outvote242. The bank was deliberately 
created as an institutum sui generis in the German legal order in order to avoid any 
form of institutional influence on it, as would necessarily have been the case if 
conventional legal forms had been applied243.
238 Article 88, Sentence 2, Basic Law.
239 Stern (1998), p. 181.
240 Independence refers primarily to the bank's relations with the Federal Government and subordinate 
authorities. In contrast, the Bundesbank is subject to federal legislation in as far as this does not 
affect its constitutional status (Stern (1998), p. 185).
241 Usually, organisations under public law take the form of either institutions ("Anstalt"), corporations 
("Körperschaft") or foundations ("Stiftung") (Uhlenbruck (1963), p. 40).
242 Uhlenbruck (1963), p. 40.
243 Uhlenbruck (1963), pp. 40-41.
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Second, general political independence is supported by a number of elements which 
can promote the personal independence of decision-making Bundesbank personnel. 
From 1957 to 1998, the Bundesbank's supreme decision-making body was the Central 
Bank Council, which determined the bank’s monetary policy. It was composed of the 
Bundesbank Directorate, including the president and the vice president of the 
Bundesbank, as well as the presidents of the Landeszentralbanken. The internal 
structure and decision-making processes will be scrutinised in more detail at a later 
stage. What is important at this stage is that all members of the bank's governing 
bodies were political nominees:
– The members of the Directorate, including the president and the vice president of 
the bank, were nominated by the Federal Cabinet and appointed by the president 
of the Federal Republic244.
– The presidents of the Landeszentralbanken were nominated by the Bundesrat245
and appointed by the president of the Federal Republic246.
In essence, therefore, the process of nomination and appointment entailed the danger 
of politicising the members of the bank’s governing bodies. In principle, the process 
permitted the cabinet and Bundesrat to nominate candidates affiliated with certain 
political parties and espousing certain economic or monetary schools of thought or 
general personal attachments. With respect to potential reappointment, political 
appointees may have had incentives to remain beholden to the body that had initially 
nominated them247. Such political dependencies could influence decision making 
during the tenure of office at the central bank. From the perspective of interest groups 
seeking to promote a certain political party, certain economic or monetary schools of 
244 "The president, vice-president and other members of the Directorate are nominated by the Federal 
Cabinet and appointed by the President of the Federal Republic. Before making such nominations, 
the Federal Cabinet shall consult the Central Bank Council. Members of the Directorate are 
appointed for eight years, or in exceptional cases for a shorter term of office, but not for less than 
five years. Appointments and retirements shall be published in the Federal Gazette 
(Bundesanzeiger).", Paragraph 6 (3), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
245 The Bundesrat is the chamber of Parliament representing the federal states. In practice, the 
nominations come from the government of the state or states in which the respective 
Landeszentalbank is located and are subsequently passed on to the federal president by the 
Bundesrat.
246 "Presidents of Landeszentralbanken are nominated by the Bundesrat and appointed by the president 
of the Federal Republic. The Bundesrat submits its nomination based on a proposal by the authority 
appropriate under the laws of the Land or Länder concerned, and after having consulted the Central 
Bank Council. Vice-presidents and other members of Executive Boards are nominated by the 
Central Bank Council and appointed by the president of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Members of 
Executive Boards are appointed for eight years, or in exceptional cases for a shorter term of office, 
but not for less than five years. Appointments and retirements shall be published in the Federal 
Gazette.", Paragraph 8 (4), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
247 Uhlenbruck (1968), p. 44.
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thought or certain persons, the political nomination process could, in turn, theoretically 
serve as an avenue for applying political pressure. 
However, there are features of the nomination and appointment process that in 
principle serve to discourage political dependencies. For one thing, it has been argued 
that political appointments were discouraged by the fact that both the cabinet and the 
Bundesrat were obliged by law to consult the Central Bank Council before submitting 
their nominations248. Assuming that the Central Bank Council itself behaves in a non-
partisan manner, this would promote the selection of competent nominees. This logic 
would apply in particular if we consider that the members of the Council were required 
by the Bundesbank Act to command special professional qualifications249. Given these 
qualifications, Council members should be in a privileged position to make suitable 
suggestions to fill forthcoming vacancies on the Council. Nominating or appointing a 
person against opposition from the Council was deemed difficult for the cabinet or the 
Bundesrat to communicate to the public. As a result, the obligation to consult the 
Council before new nominations has been seen as limiting the scope for political 
appointments250.
Further, the final appointment rests with the president of the Federal Republic. For 
this, the president is not bound by the nomination presented by the cabinet or the 
Bundesrat. He has the right and the duty to review the nominations in the context of 
the relevant legal requirements – most importantly, the position of the Central Bank 
Council and the professional suitability of the nominee – and to take care that the 
constitution and law are duly observed. If the latter is not the case, he has the right and 
duty to reject a nomination. The president's role has therefore been regarded as an 
important safeguard against any potential erosion of the Bundesbank’s political 
independence251.
An additional element working against the politicisation of high-ranking Bundesbank 
officials has been identified in the condition established in the Bundesbank Act that 
Directorate members and Landeszentralbank presidents had to command special 
professional qualifications252, as already indicated above. But whether this provision 
has, in practice, promoted non-political appointments must be called into question on 
248 Paragraph 8 (4), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
249 See Paragraph 7 (2) and Paragraph 8 (3), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998. 
Whether the assumption of non-partisan preferences of the Council in the nomination process is 
justified has remained open to empirical testing.
250 For details on the role of the Central Bank Council in the nomination and appointment process, see 
Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 45-46.
251 Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 46-47.
252 See Paragraph 7 (2) and Paragraph 8 (3), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
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purely theoretical grounds. The term 'special professional qualifications' is rather broad 
and, as such, does not prohibit political nominations253. 
Also, it has been argued that the plurality of the nominating, advisory and appointing 
bodies involved in staffing the Central Bank Council served to reduce the risk of the 
Council’s being systematically politicised, or at least of its overall composition being 
politically lopsided. Given the number of bodies involved in making appointments to
the Council and the fact that some of those bodies were themselves likely to be 
characterised by a certain degree of internal heterogeneity in terms of their political 
alignments – as in the case of the Bundesrat and the Central Bank Council –, the 
probability of a sequence of one-sided personnel decisions was judged to be limited, 
especially over time254. 
Finally, an important element in reducing the risk of politicisation of Central Bank 
Council appointments was the type and duration of employment contracts with the 
members of the Central Bank Council, granting Bundesbank decision makers a 
considerable degree of contractual independence. Thus, the members of the 
Directorate and the presidents of the Landeszentralbanken were appointed for a period 
of eight years255, i.e. over two legislative periods in the lower chamber of parliament. 
The length of the term of office for Central Bank Council members is generally 
interpreted as giving them the opportunity to become detached from potential political 
ties256. In addition, personal independence was strengthened by allowing the 
Bundesbank to conclude employment contracts with the members of the decision-
making organs which are not bound by general public-sector wage agreements. As a 
result, comparatively generous remuneration can be arranged for members of the 
decision-making bodies257. Finally, the contracts concluded with the members of the 
Central Bank Council cannot be terminated on political grounds. A dismissal of 
Central Bank Council members is, in general, possible only in cases of grave 
253 Uhlenbruck (1968), p. 47.
254 Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 47-48.
255 In exceptional cases, a term of office of less than eight years, but no less than five years, was 
allowed by the Bundesbank Act (Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 48-49, see also Paragraph 7 (3) and 
Paragraph 8 (4), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.).
256 Most Council members have served their full eight-year term. Unless a political decision to the 
contrary was taken by the relevant nominating bodies, the terms of office were generally renewed. 
Members of the Directorate in most cases stayed on until their retirement (Marsh (1992), pp. 90-95, 
also Uhlenbruck (1968), pp. 48-49).
257 This at least applies to the members of the Central Bank Council. Ordinary Bundesbank employees 
are said to earn salaries comparable to those of other public servants, but significantly lower than 
those awarded in the neighbouring private banking sector. The most detailed insight into 
Bundesbank salary structures and employment conditions has been provided by Marsh (1992), 
pp. 116-120, who reports that – at the time – Central Bank Council members earned well above the 
level observed for equivalent federal civil servants. See also Uhlenbruck (1968), p. 49.
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misconduct or inability to hold office258. By way of illustration, the appointment 
procedure as valid between 1957 and 2002 is depicted in chart 7.
Overview Bundesbank appointment procedures between 1957 and 2002
Chart 7
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A comprehensive view of the appointment processes and employment conditions of 
the relevant decision makers at the Bundesbank therefore suggests that Central Bank 
Council members enjoy a considerable degree of personal independence, giving them 
the freedom fully to devote their attention to the tasks and objectives associated with 
their office259 without fearing intervention from the political sphere. At the same time, 
it has to be noted that in practice nominations have been far from un-political. Thus, 
Landeszentralbank presidents were often members of the party in government in the 
respective state which nominated them. Many of them continued to maintain close ties 
with the political establishment even after assuming office at the Bundesbank260. To 
what extent the nomination process has created political dependencies or promoted 
258 For details see Uhlenbruck (1968), p. 49.
259 Marsh (1992), p. 95.
260 Marsh (1992), pp. 90-91. Marsh also provides an overview of the political affiliations of the 
relevant decision makers at the time.
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certain behavioural patterns with respect to monetary policy has remained 
controversial and will be analysed in greater detail in the context of the behavioural 
patterns of policy makers below.
In contrast to institutional and personal independence, it must be said that the legislator 
refrained from granting the Bundesbank any form of financial independence. The 
Bundesbank's initial capital is held by the Federation261. The bank's net profits are 
transferred to the Federal Government after allowing for reserves and provisions as 
specified in the Bundesbank Act262. However, the Federation's capital ownership has 
not been regarded as an obstacle to the political autonomy of the bank. On the 
contrary, specific safeguards in this respect were not regarded as necessary, because 
influence on the bank emanating from capital ownership as such was deemed highly 
unlikely, if not ruled out entirely263.
The basic properties of the institutional set-up under which monetary policy is 
conducted in Germany have been retained since the adoption of the Bundesbank Act in 
1957. As already indicated, however, legal and institutional adjustments have recently 
been made in response to the establishment of monetary union at EU level. Substantial 
in parts, these adjustments are likely to affect the relations between monetary policy 
makers and interest groups. These changes extend to the mandate of the Bundesbank 
as well as other to institutional provisions. 
Most importantly, with effect from January 1, 1999 the Deutsche Bundesbank lost its 
mandate as the body within the German political structure responsible for the conduct 
of monetary policy. As the ESCB took charge of the single monetary policy in the 
participating member states, i.e. in the euro area, the Bundesbank, although retaining 
its position as the central bank of Germany, lost its foremost assignment and, instead, 
became part of the ESCB. Consequently, the bank now participates in performance of 
the ESCB's tasks264. As a result, the Bundesbank is no longer in charge of safeguarding 
261 See Paragraph 2, Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
262 "The net profit shall be distributed in the following order: 1. twenty per cent of the profit or twenty 
million Deutsche Mark, whichever is the higher, shall be transferred to the legal reserves until they 
reach five per cent of the total amount of banknotes in circulation; the legal reserves may be used 
only to offset falls in value and to cover other losses; the fact that other reserves are available for 
this purpose does not preclude their use; 2. up to ten per cent of the remaining net profit may be 
used to form other reserves; the total amount of such reserves may not exceed the Bank's capital; 3. 
forty million Deutsche Mark, and from the financial year 1980 onwards thirty million Deutsche 
Mark, shall be transferred to the Fund for the Purchase of Equalisation Claims set up under the Act 
on the Redemption of Equalisation Claims until that Fund's dissolution; 4. the balance shall be paid 
over to the Federal Government." Paragraph 27, Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 
1998.
263 See Stern (1998), p. 184 and Uhlenbruck (1968), p. 53.
264 "The Deutsche Bundesbank, being the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany, is an 
integral part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It shall participate in the 
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the German currency, but is one of currently twelve central banks in the participating 
EU member states which together with the ECB form the Eurosystem, with the ECB 
carrying out the tasks of the ESCB within the euro area265. The ESCB and, by 
implication, the Eurosystem are governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB, 
most importantly the Governing Board of the ECB, which is responsible for defining 
the Eurosystem's monetary policy and which comprises the members of the ECB's 
Executive Board and the presidents of the Eurosystem's national central banks266. 
For interest-group politics, this institutional change carries two major implications. 
First, the addressee of interest-group activities in the field of monetary affairs has 
changed – the ECB, an entirely new institution founded in 1998 – so that the 
Bundesbank is no longer the only interlocutor for the communication of private-sector 
interests. Second, from the perspective of interest groups in the member states, 
political influence on monetary decisions has diffused. The Bundesbank – still in 
existence and an integral part of the ESCB and the Eurosystem – is now only one of 
twelve national central banks participating, on equal terms, in the formulation of 
monetary policy for the entire euro area together with the ECB's Executive Board. The 
first implication suggests that interest groups will be faced with additional costs 
associated with the adjustment of their activities to the new institutional structures. 
The second implication is that, given the existence of particular interests with respect 
to monetary policy, mediating these interests is ceteris paribus likely to become more 
difficult as the number of potential addressees has increased. Moreover, the number of 
potentially competing interests may also have increased, as it is no longer merely 
German interest groups looking at monetary policy in Germany; instead, the entirety 
of interest groups in the twelve member states participating in the Eurosystem 
determine the relevant political arena in respect of the ECB's monetary policy. In 
addition, not only may the arena of competing interests grow larger, but also the 
breadth of interests and their intensity may increase as a result of the wider policy 
arena ensuing from EMU. This will be discussed in greater detail below. 
performance of the ESCB's tasks with the primary objective of maintaining price stability, shall 
hold and manage the foreign reserves of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall arrange for the 
execution of domestic and cross-border payments and shall contribute to the stability of payment 
and clearing systems. In addition, it shall fulfil the tasks assigned to it under this Act or other 
legislation.", Paragraph 3, Bundesbank Act, as effective from January 1, 1999.
265 Objectives and tasks related to the conduct of monetary policy in the euro area are formulated with 
respect to the ESCB rather than to the Eurosystem, since they were drawn up on the premise that 
eventually all EU member states would adopt the euro. The term euro area refers to the area 
comprising those EU member states which have adopted the euro. See European Central Bank 
(2001a), p. 9.
266 European Central Bank (2001a), pp. 9-11. See also Articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, Protocol (No 3) on the 
Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank.
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Second, the aims and objectives of monetary policy have, from a German viewpoint, 
largely remained the same. Like the rules that governed the activities of the 
Bundesbank before 1999, the ESCB's objective is to maintain price stability and –
without prejudice to this primary objective – to support the general economic policies 
in the European Community, with a view to contributing to the achievement of 
Community objectives267. As a result, there is substantial continuity in definition of the 
mandate that the Bundesbank, as part of the ESCB, discharges under the new regime. 
This objective has been re-confirmed in the latest version of the Bundesbank Act268. 
Similarly, the tasks and functions of the ESCB are, in essence, congruent with those 
that the Bundesbank previously exercised. This also applies to responsibilities in the 
context of management of foreign-exchange reserves and exchange rates. Decisions on 
foreign-exchange policy are a shared responsibility of the Council of Economics and 
Finance Ministers and the ECB. The implementation of exchange rate policies and the 
conduct of exchange rate management are prerogatives of the ECB269. 
Third, the primacy of political independence has been maintained and strengthened in 
the course of transition to EMU. Instead of referring to independence from 
government, as in the case of the original Bundesbank Act, the legal framework of the 
ESCB, which is also binding upon the member states and their central banks, provides 
that 
267 See Article 105 EC Treaty: "1. The primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price 
stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general 
economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the 
objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of 
resources, and in compliance with the principles set out in Article 4. 2. The basic tasks to be carried 
out through the ESCB shall be: to define and implement the monetary policy of the Community, to 
conduct foreign-exchange operations consistent with the provisions of Article 111, to hold and 
manage the official foreign reserves of the Member States, to promote the smooth operation of 
payment systems.", and Article 2, Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank.: "In accordance with Article 105(1) of this Treaty, the 
primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the 
objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a 
view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 
2 of this Treaty. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of an open market economy 
with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance with the 
principles set out in Article 3a of this Treaty." See also European Central Bank (2001a), pp. 9-10.
268 "The Deutsche Bundesbank, being the central bank of the Federal Republic of Germany, is an 
integral part of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). It shall participate in the 
performance of the ESCB's tasks with the primary objective of maintaining price stability, shall 
hold and manage the foreign reserves of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall arrange for the 
execution of domestic and cross-border payments and shall contribute to the stability of payment 
and clearing systems. In addition, it shall fulfil the tasks assigned to it under this Act or other 
legislation." Paragraph 3, Bundesbank Act, as effective from April 30, 2002.
269 The Treaty also emphasises that exchange rate policy must be fully consistent with the primary 
objective of the single monetary policy. European Central Bank (2001a), p. 12.
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"[w]hen exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties 
conferred upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the 
ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making 
bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or 
bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body. 
The Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member 
States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the 
members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national 
central banks in the performance of their tasks."270
Independence therefore now extends to any political organ, irrespective of whether it 
is part of the constitutional order of the EU or of one of the member states. In addition, 
political independence has been anchored at constitutional level in the EC Treaty, 
reflecting on the Bundesbank's own legal status in Germany's constitutional order, as 
already pointed out. 
Fourth, in the wake of monetary union the Bundesbank Act was amended with the aim 
of adjusting the central bank to its new function within the ESCB. In particular, the 
latest reform271, which entered into force on April 30, 2002, aimed at reducing the 
number of decision-making organs inside the Bundesbank, which was no longer 
deemed appropriate given that the Bundesbank no longer possesses its own monetary 
decision-making responsibilities272. As a result, the Bundesbank is now governed by 
one single body, the Governing Board, which is composed of eight members273. 
Following the argument that a pluralism of nominating institutions can promote 
institutional and personal independence, the sharing of nominating powers has been 
retained. Thus, the president of the Bundesbank, the vice president and two further 
members of the board are now nominated by the federal cabinet, while the remaining 
four members of the board are put forward by the Bundesrat274. The new appointment 
procedure is depicted in chart 8 below. Otherwise, the appointment process has 
remained unchanged, maintaining the elements contributing to the personal 
independence of the members of the bank's decision-making body, such as obligatory 
consultation of the board, appointment by the federal president, the length of office, 
the applicability of public law and the need to have relevant professional qualification 
270 Article 108 EC Treaty.
271 For a complete review of the changes made to the Bundesbank Act in the course of the Seventh Act 
amending the Bundesbank Act, which became effective from April 30, 2002, see Deutsche 
Bundesbank (2002a), pp. 5-18.
272 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 6.
273 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 9. See also Paragraph 7, Bundesbank Act as effective from 
April 30, 2002.
274 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 9. Paragraph 7, Bundesbank Act as effective from April 30, 
2002.
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and experience275. In the same vein, federal elements in the decision-making process 
have been abolished. The Landeszentralbanken have been removed and replaced by 
regional offices headed by a president appointed by, and directly responsible to, the 
Governing Board276. With this structural alteration the legislator intended to streamline 
the Bundesbank's organisational procedures and make them more efficient277.
Overview Bundesbank appointment procedures from 2002
Chart 8
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In conclusion, the institutional framework of monetary policy in Germany can, for the 
present purpose, be summarised as characterised by 
– clear assignment of the tasks related to the conduct of monetary policy to one 
single institution, the Deutsche Bundesbank until 1998, and the ECB as from 
1999,
– clear assignment of the conclusion of international agreements pertaining to the 
management of exchange rates to the Federal Government, and since 1999 to the 
European Council and the ECB,
275 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 10. See also Paragraph 7, Bundesbank Act as effective from 
April 30, 2002.
276 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), pp. 11-12. See also Paragraph 8, Bundesbank Act as effective from 
April 30, 2002.
277 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 12. 
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– clear assignment of the tasks related to management of the exchange rate and 
foreign-exchange reserves to the Bundesbank, and to the ECB since 1999, and 
thereby to highly specialised bureaucracies institutionally detached from 
government and other political bodies,
– a broadly defined single objective formulated in qualitative terms, namely 
safeguarding internal and external price stability,
– far-reaching discretion on the part of the Bundesbank, and the ECB since 1999, 
with regard to interpretation of the objective of safeguarding internal and external 
price stability as well as to the strategy, tactics and instruments applied in pursuing 
that objective,
– a high degree of independence from outside political influence, especially with 
regard to the Federal Government, designed to allow the Bundesbank and its 
decision makers to fulfil their tasks without politically motivated interference 
running counter to the bank's objectives, and which is underscored in institutional 
and personal respects. The regime of political independence has been reinforced in 
the context of EMU and implementation of the institutional provisions on the 
ESCB.
As suggested by theory, these institutional properties will influence the costs and 
benefits associated with mediating interests on monetary policy. In principle, the 
institutional setting in which monetary policy is determined and conducted contains a 
number of elements potentially affecting the activities of interest groups.
– With monetary policy tasks clearly defined and assigned to one, autonomous 
decision-making body, interest groups can focus their activities on this one body 
and do not need to target a number of concurrently responsible or otherwise 
involved institutions. At the same time, mediating interests can be impeded if the 
single responsible institution shuts itself off from external influence.
– The latter scenario is accentuated by the fact that the Bundesbank is an institution 
enjoying a great deal of political independence. This independent status pertains 
primarily vis-à-vis the government, but also versus other political entities. 
Exerting influence on the conduct of monetary policy via the government or other 
institutions and bodies in Germany's political system is therefore blocked to a 
great extent. 
– The primacy of political independence of the Bundesbank does not, however, 
prevent private-sector interest groups from expressing their preferences. In 
principle, groups can communicate their interests, but the question is to what 
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extent the Bundesbank takes such interests into consideration. In any case, there is 
practically no way of applying political pressure on the Bundesbank278.
– Given the definition of the Bundesbank's objectives, partial and particular interests 
in the economy with regard to monetary policy are of little relevance to the 
Bundesbank, if not indeed completely irrelevant. The bank is obliged to safeguard 
price stability for the monetary area as a whole. Regional, sectoral or otherwise 
motivated partial interests play no role in the definition of its tasks and are not 
relevant unless their fulfilment contributes to achievement of the bank's primary 
objective. This considerably limits the prospects of success for political action by 
interest groups and hence the potential benefits of such action. 
– Since the launch of EMU, the political arena for private interests has changed 
enormously. In mediating their interests, interest groups have to deal with a newly 
established institution and compete with a greater number and broader range of 
interests. This complicates interest-group policymaking.
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank enjoys a considerable margin of discretion in 
interpreting and pursuing its objective. In as far as this discretion implies room for 
manoeuvre in the bank's policy decisions, interest groups can attempt to influence the 
bank's monetary stance as they deem appropriate. 
II.1.1.3 Institutional accessibility: structures and policy processes 
The preceding analysis of the Bundesbank's mandate and institutional properties 
shows that, on the whole, accessibility of the monetary decision-making process in 
general and of the Bundesbank in particular is highly limited. However, the analysis 
also shows that these institutional restrictions do not, in principle, prevent interest 
groups from mediating their interests in this policy field. This section therefore 
examines the second set of factors in the institutional context, namely those pertaining 
to the accessibility of the decision-making process. After a brief outline of the policy 
process, this section investigates the major restrictions on external influence, the 
formal and informal access points within the monetary decision process, and the 
dependencies policy makers face in the process.
The process of monetary decision making comprises two distinct stages: definition of 
the monetary decision-making framework and monetary policy decision making as 
278 Theoretically, political pressure can be applied in two ways: first, by threatening to change the 
Bundesbank Act and, second, by threatening to take the Bundesbank to court on the grounds of 
failure to comply with its constitutional and legal obligations. The first option is highly unrealistic 
since the Bundesbank’s position in the political system as well as its tasks and functions are 
essentially defined by the EU and EC Treaties. Any amendment of the Bundesbank Act in key 
parts would therefore necessitate amendment of the Treaties as well as the Basic Law. The second 
option has not been invoked so far.
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such279. The preceding section suggests that the monetary decision-making framework 
chosen in Germany, and subsequently at the EU level, anticipates two major rules on 
the conduct of monetary policymaking, namely that the primary policy objective is to 
safeguard internal and external price stability and that monetary policy decisions may 
be subject to commitments established as a result of exchange rate arrangements 
concluded at the political level. Other than that, the Bundesbank, and now the ESCB, 
have enjoyed a considerable degree of discretion. Most importantly, this involves
– the discretion to interpret price stability and to establish qualitative and 
quantitative targets for fulfilling the primary objective,
– the discretion to choose the strategy, tactics and instruments by means of which 
the primary objective is fulfilled.
The decision-making processes by means of which this room for manoeuvre has been 
exercised have changed over time, again owing to the systemic break necessitated by 
the realisation of monetary union. From its establishment until 1998, the Bundesbank's 
monetary policy was determined by the Central Bank Council. Composed of the up to 
eight members of the bank's Directorate and the presidents of the nine280
Landeszentralbanken, the Central Bank Council 
– determined the monetary policy of the bank, 
– drew up general guidelines governing the conduct of business and administration, 
and 
279 This duality coincides with the economic analysis of policy rules in contrast to discretion, as 
presented in the theoretical section. Establishing a policy rule may encompass the assignment of 
tasks to a body, the definition of goals, and the modalities of operation and can theoretically go as 
far as defining policy targets in a qualitative or even a quantitative manner. The latter can 
theoretically include percentage growth targets or corridors for monetary variables such as 
inflation, the money supply or exchange rates, laid down by law. The more narrowly policy targets 
are defined at the rule – or decision-making framework – level, the less discretion the body tasked 
with monetary policymaking has. Taken to the extreme – e.g. by implementing a monetary rule as 
proposed by Milton Friedman according to which nominal central bank interest rates are fixed at 
zero – this task can be reduced to purely technical implementation. 
280 As from October 22, 1992, there have been nine Landeszentralbanken, located in the following 
areas: the Land Baden-Württemberg; the Free State of Bavaria; the Länder Berlin and 
Brandenburg; the Free Hanseatic City of Bremen and the Länder Lower Saxony and Saxony-
Anhalt; the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg and the Länder Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 
and Schleswig-Holstein; the Land Hesse; the Land North Rhine-Westphalia; the Länder Rhineland-
Palatinate and Saarland; the Free States of Saxony and Thuringia. The regional structure has been 
retained in the Seventh Act amending the Bundesbank Act of 2002. However, the bank has since 
referred to its Regional Offices by the cities in which they are located, i.e. the Regional Offices in 
Stuttgart, Munich, Berlin, Hanover, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Mainz, and Leipzig 
respectively. The latter nomenclature is generally used in this study. The Regional Offices are 
abbreviated by the first three letters of the city of location.
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– defined the responsibilities of the Directorate and the Executive Boards of the 
Landeszentralbanken.281
As to the Council's operating procedures, the Bundesbank Act stipulated that it should 
deliberate under the chairmanship of the president or vice president of the bank, and 
that it should take its decisions by a simple majority of votes282. As a rule, the Council 
convened every two weeks283. Under the Act, the members of the federal cabinet were 
entitled to attend Council meetings284. They had no right to vote, but were allowed to 
propose motions285. In addition, monetary decisions had to be postponed for up to two 
weeks at the request of the Federal Government286. The relevant Council decisions 
were published at press conferences or in press communiqués, but the details of the 
deliberations, including particulars on voting by the individual Council members, were 
not disclosed287. Council meetings customarily began with an introductory report by 
the president or the vice president on the monetary and economic conditions in 
Germany, followed by comments from the other members of the Directorate on their 
respective areas of competence288 and a discussion among the Council members. For 
the most part, the president and vice president submitted a joint recommendation on 
how to proceed with policymaking, which was outvoted only on very rare 
281 In specific cases it also issued instructions to the Directorate and the Executive Boards of the 
Landeszentralbanken. See Paragraph 6 (1), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
282 Further conditions for taking decisions were governed by the Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(Bundesanzeiger 1959 No. 7).
283 The president could convene additional meetings in the case of extraordinary events. Further, 
meetings could be convened at the request of at least three of the Council's members (Paragraph 1, 
Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank).
284 Paragraph 13 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998. The statute of the bank 
specified that the ministers for economic affairs and finance had to be invited to each Council 
meeting. Other members of the federal cabinet could be invited if deemed appropriate by the 
Council (Paragraph 3 (1), Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 
1998).
285 Paragraph 13 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
286 Stern (1998), pp. 186-187. Officially, the right to postponement was never invoked. However, the 
Bundesbank occasionally took the government's interests into consideration and delayed decisions 
(Marsh (1992), p. 99).
287 Minutes of Council meetings and related documents are confidential and classified for at least 
eighteen years.
288 The Bundesbank was organised in functional divisions, headed by the responsible member of the 
Directorate. Most importantly, the internal structure comprised divisions on economics and 
statistics, communication, international relations, banking and financial supervision, and payment 
services as well as other departments responsible for the bank's internal organisation. 
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occasions289. Preparatory work by the bank's economics department is understood to 
have had a decisive influence on the course of discussions on monetary policy290.
In terms of the organisation of the Bundesbank, the members of the Directorate, 
including the president and vice president of the bank, ran the headquarters of the bank 
in Frankfurt. The head office was organised into functional divisions, headed by the 
responsible member of the Directorate. Most importantly, the internal structure 
comprised central office departments on economics and statistics, communications, 
international relations, banking and financial supervision, financial markets, and 
payment services as well as departments responsible for the bank's internal 
organisation291. The Bundesbank Act further entitled the bank to order and collect the 
statistical evidence it needed from the banking sector, making it essentially self-
sufficient with respect to the information required to fulfil its tasks292.
The presidents of the nine293 Landeszentralbanken, on the other hand, presided over 
organisationally separate bodies, whose primary responsibility was to undertake 
transactions with the respective Land governments and authorities and transactions 
with credit institutions in the respective region for which they were responsible294. 
Formally, these tasks were carried out by the Executive Board at each 
Landeszentralbank, which consisted of the Landeszentralbank president, the vice 
president and, in exceptional cases, one or two further members295. Especially with 
regard to the presidents' function in the Central Bank Council, each Executive Board 
was, in practice, supported by specialist divisions, including separate economics 
departments which prepared the presidents for the two-weekly council meetings in 
Frankfurt.
Finally, the organisational structure of Bundesbank decision making with respect to 
monetary policy prior to 1998 also included Advisory Boards located at the 
289 Marsh (1992), pp. 100-101.
290 For a descriptive account of the meetings of the Central Bank Council see Marsh (1992), pp. 95-99. 
On the importance of the economics department, see pp. 109-110.
291 Marsh (1992) provides an in-depth description of the internal organisation and procedures at the 
Bundesbank headquarters. See pp. 106-120.
292 Collection of statistics: “In order to discharge its duties, the Deutsche Bundesbank is entitled to 
order and collect statistics in the fields of banking and the monetary system from all credit 
institutions. […] The Deutsche Bundesbank may publish these statistics for general purposes. 
Figures relating to individual institutions may not be disclosed in such publications. […]”, 
Paragraph 18, Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998. The provision was not 
amended by the 2002 Bundesbank reform. 
293 The number of Landeszentralbanken had been reduced from eleven to nine in the aftermath of 
German monetary union in 1992.
294 Paragraph 8 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998. 
295 Paragraph 8 (3), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998. Details were provided in 
Paragraphs 12 to 15, Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 1998.
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Landeszentralbanken, which deserve particular attention in the present context. Under 
the Bundesbank Act, each Landeszentralbank had an Advisory Board that served to 
confer with the president of the Landeszentralbank on questions of monetary policy 
and with the Executive Board of the Landeszentralbank on the performance of that 
board's duties in its area296. Each board was composed of up to fourteen members, who 
were supposed to have special banking expertise. Composition of the boards reflected 
the broad economic interests in society297. The members of the Advisory Boards were 
nominated by the respective Land governments and, after consultation with the 
Executive Board of the Landeszentralbank, appointed by the President of the 
Bundesbank for a term of three years298. Meetings of the Advisory Boards were 
generally held four times a year. The ministers of economics and finance of the 
respective Land governments had to be invited to the meetings299. 
Overall, monetary decision making prior to 1998 therefore took the form of regular 
meetings of the decision-making body composed, on the one hand, of the members of 
the Directorate, who, by virtue of their central position, played an important role in 
formulating the bank's monetary stance300, and, on the other, of the presidents of the 
Landeszentralbanken, who together represented the majority of votes on the Council. 
In their activities, the decision makers were supported by central and regional staff –
amounting end-1998 to 2,606 employees at the Directorate's offices and a total of 
13,285 employees in the Landeszentralbanken and their branches. A small fraction of 
these, mainly experts in economics, monetary economics and statistics, were indirectly 
involved in formulation of the bank's monetary policy. Landeszentralbank presidents 
additionally conferred with the private sector via their respective Advisory Boards.
After an interim period extending from the beginning of 1999 to mid-2002, during 
which the original structure of the Bundesbank was preserved while monetary decision 
making was already being carried out by the ECB Governing Council, the Bundesbank 
reform of April 2002 significantly altered the bank's internal organisation and 
processes. As already pointed out, since Germany joined EMU in 1999 the only person 
directly involved in monetary decision making has been the president of the 
Bundesbank, who has an ex officio seat on the ECB's Governing Council. 
296 Paragraph 9 (1), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
297 Paragraph 9 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
298 Paragraph 9 (3), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
299 Paragraph 16, Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 1998.
300 Marsh (1992) emphasises that the members of the Directorate benefited from the fact that, working 
together in Frankfurt and meeting once a week for internal sessions, they found it easier to reach 
common positions on monetary policy and to represent these decisions inside the Central Bank 
Council. In contrast, the presidents of the Landeszentralbanken met at worst only every two weeks 
and were then confronted with a joint position by the Directorate (pp. 95-96). 
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The Executive Board of the Bundesbank, which has replaced the Central Bank 
Council, does not play a formal role in formulation of the bank's position with respect 
to monetary policy, unlike its predecessor. It rather 
– governs and manages the bank, and 
– passes the organisational statutes allocating the responsibilities of the members of 
the Executive Board and the tasks delegated to the regional offices.
With respect to monetary policy, the members of the Executive Board merely advise 
the president of the Bundesbank in his capacity as a member of the Governing Council 
of the ECB301. Other than that, the tasks of the members of the Executive Board, with 
the exception of the bank's president himself, are mainly operational in nature and 
concerned with the bank’s internal organisation. Below the Executive Board level, the 
organisational structure of the bank's central office departments has essentially 
remained unchanged. Members of the Federal Government are no longer entitled to 
observe the meetings of the bank's highest decision-making body, but may still be 
invited. The right to delay decisions has been repealed302.
As to the Landeszentralbanken, we have already noted that the federal structure of the 
Bundesbank has formally been abolished. The Landeszentralbanken have been 
transformed into Regional Offices of the Bundesbank. Their presidents are no longer 
political appointees, being selected by the Executive Board, and are no longer formally 
involved in formulation of the bank's position with respect to monetary policy. 
Landeszentralbank offices formerly directly involved in the president's preparation for 
Central Bank Council meetings, i.e. most importantly the regional economics 
departments, have been abolished. In contrast to the members of the Executive Board, 
regional office presidents are not formally involved in advisory functions with respect 
to the bank's position on monetary matters303. 
In the course of the 2002 Bundesbank reform the Landeszentralbank Advisory Boards 
were retained as advisory bodies to the Regional Offices304. However, whereas the 
Advisory Boards previously conferred mainly with the presidents of the 
Landeszentralbanken on questions of monetary policy, all they now discuss with the 
presidents of the Regional Offices is handling of the tasks falling to that area. In other 
301 Article 1 (2), Organisational Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as adopted on May 8, 2002.
302 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002), p. 11.
303 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), pp. 11-12.
304 Paragraph 9, Bundesbank Act, as effective from April 30, 2002. The Bundesbank itself had made 
two alternative proposals on how to reform the bank. Neither of the options explicitly involved 
maintenance of the Advisory Boards. One model, however, included the option of retaining the 
boards in order to promote the dialogue on the ECB's monetary policy in the regions and with the 
representatives of the private sector. Deutsche Bundesbank (1999a), p. 13.
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words, the Advisory Boards no longer have a formal advisory function with respect to 
monetary policy305. They now meet only twice a year306. 
The extent to which the decision-making and advisory processes for monetary 
policymaking in Germany were streamlined with adoption of the Seventh Act 
amending the Bundesbank Act of April 2002 is evident in the comparison of the work 
flows in charts 9 and 10 below. Federal, pluralistic structures have been replaced by a 
unitary advisory and decision-making process. The presidents of the Bundesbank 
Regional Offices and the members of the federal cabinet and the Advisory Boards 
have no longer been part of the formal policy-shaping process since May 2002, and the 
process of opinion-building on monetary issues has been concentrated within the 
Bundesbank's central offices.
Organisation of monetary policy decision making – Bundesbank 1957-1998
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Irrespective of these procedural changes, the Bundesbank's decision-making processes 
have been characterised throughout by the bank's autonomous status. Once decision-
making staff have been appointed, the bank is, for all intents and purposes, self-
sufficient in the fulfilment of its tasks. Outside interests do not participate in decision 
making in the strict sense. Prior to 2002, members of the federal cabinet were entitled 
305 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 12.
306 Paragraph 9 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective from April 30, 2002.
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to take part in the Council's meetings and even enjoyed postponement powers with 
respect to monetary decisions. But the overriding status of independence released the 
Council from any form of intervention by the government and from taking government 
preferences into consideration when deciding on its policy. Today, invitations to the 
government to participate in Board meetings are no longer mandatory. In fact, the 
government itself abandoned the practice of obligatory invitations in its draft of the 
2002 law amending the Bundesbank Act307, suggesting that it was not particularly 
interested in attending Board meetings. Even in the presence of a representative of the 
Federal Government and in cognisance of the preferences expressed by the 
government, the bank is bound only by its objective of maintaining price stability. 
Organisation of monetary policy decision making – Bundesbank since 2002
Chart 10
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In addition to its decision-making autonomy, the Bundesbank has also been highly 
self-sufficient in terms of the funding and information-related resources needed to 
fulfil its mandate. As to material resources, the bank was initially endowed by the 
Federal Government with capital of DEM 290 m, which was increased to DEM 5 bn or 
EUR 2.5 bn in 1999. As illustrated in chart 11, the bank has usually generated 
substantial profits from its activities, which, as already pointed out, are transferred to 
the government after allowing for reserves and provisions. As to information, its right 
to collect the statistical information necessary for the conduct of monetary policy has 
enabled the bank to build up a formidable statistical base, maintained and interpreted 
307 See Seventh Act amending the Bundesbank Act, Cabinet Draft.
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by the well-staffed and highly reputed departments for statistics and economics308. The 
Bundesbank has therefore been regarded as a well-informed institution in respect of 
monetary, financial-market and general economic analysis, and its expertise is valued 
internationally by central banks, international monetary institutions and academic 
circles. As a result, the Bundesbank’s dependence on resources and information from 
external sources to support policy makers in their work and provide them with 
sufficient data and arguments to prevail in political discourse – as frequently observed 
in the context of parliamentary politics, for example – is extraordinarily low. In 
practice and as a rule, it is the government, other policy makers and the private sector 
that tend to receive expertise and information from the Bundesbank, rather than vice 
versa.
Bundesbank financial and staff resources
Chart 11 Chart 12
– Bundesbank profits, EUR bn
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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The logic of Bundesbank independence vis-à-vis the government, being enshrined in 
law, also reflects on other interest groups, including those from the private sector, 
which are not referred to in the bank's legal provisions. Their partial concerns are 
likewise formally irrelevant to monetary decisions. In the light of this, private interests 
carry much more limited weight in formation of the monetary policy stance on an ex 
ante basis than in other policy fields, where the differential impact on individual 
sectors or other groups of economic agents represents an explicit element in the 
formulation of policy objectives and their implementation, as for instance in tax policy 
or market regulation. Preferences expressed by interest groups or information passed 
on by them may therefore only enter the policy formation process inasmuch as they 
308 Marsh (1992), pp. 109-110. The total headcount of the Bundesbank amounted to 15,834 end-2002. 
This included 8,614 employees and 753 workers. However, the staff involved in work most closely 
associated with monetary policy are the 1,059 civil servants at the bank's central offices in 
Frankfurt. An overview of the bank's staff structure is provided in chart 12 on page 133.
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contain intelligence helping the Board to assess economic and monetary conditions in 
the economy and to meet its objectives.
This general approach naturally limits the extent to which formal or informal points of 
access to the overall decision-making process can be used by private-sector interest 
groups to communicate their preferences with respect to monetary policy on an ex ante 
basis. 
With respect to institutional accessibility by formal means, the Bundesbank provides 
one direct channel of communication between the bank and the private sector in the 
form of the Advisory Boards at the bank's Regional Offices. As already pointed out, 
the boards – chaired by the respective Landeszentralbank presidents or their deputies –
served to confer with the presidents of the Landeszentralbanken on questions of 
monetary policy309. In consequence, the boards featured close contact with the 
Landeszentralbank presidents, each of whom was represented on the Central Bank 
Council and who, together, commanded a majority of votes on the Council in respect 
of monetary decisions. In addition, the boards provided a forum for meeting the 
economics or finance ministers of the respective Land governments, who had to be 
invited to the board meetings under the Bundesbank Act310. Furthermore, the chairmen 
of the boards – the respective Landeszentralbank presidents or their deputies – were 
entitled to invite expert witnesses to join board sessions311. 
Meetings were generally held four times a year312. The frequency of these periodic 
meetings allowed the members to comment on medium- and long-term monetary 
developments. Quarterly meetings, however, did not allow for reaction to short-term 
developments, unless by coincidence they immediately preceded important Central 
Bank Council meetings. To allow for urgent meetings, the bank's statute provided for 
additional sessions to be convened by the presidents of the Landeszentralbanken or at 
the request of at least three of a board's members313.
As to the composition of the Advisory Boards, each is limited to fourteen members314, 
nominated by the respective Land governments and appointed by the President of the 
Bundesbank for a term of three years following consultation with the Executive Board 
309 The Boards also conferred with the Executive Board of the Landeszentralbanken on the 
performance of that board's duties in its area (Paragraph 9 (1), Bundesbank Act, as effective until 
December 31, 1998).
310 Paragraph 16, Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 1998.
311 Paragraph 18, Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 1998.
312 Paragraph 16 (1), Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 1998.
313 Paragraph 16 (1), Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as effective until December 31, 1998.
314 Each member has a deputy, appointed in the same way, who attends board meetings in the absence 
of the ordinary member. 
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of the Landeszentralbank315. The three-year term is renewable. Owing to the regional 
structure of the boards and the nomination and appointment procedures, which were 
retained after the 2002 Bundesbank reform, they are staffed with members with a 
regional or local focus. The bank's nine Advisory Boards comprised a total of 122 
members at end-2003, 59 of whom (48%) were representatives of local or regional 
interest associations or the local or regional sections of federal associations. 60 
members (49%) were representatives from individual private or public corporations, 
mainly with a regional or local focus or from regional or local subsidiaries of large 
corporations, and three (2%) were private individuals316. As a result, the structure of 
neither the Advisory Boards nor their membership promote the formulation or 
communication of nationally aggregated positions on monetary policy317. Rather, the 
structures favour a regional perspective on monetary affairs318. 
In addition, the great majority of board members over the past three decades have been 
re-appointed, often several times, so that the overall composition of the Advisory 
Boards has undergone only gradual change over time319. The fact that board members 
have a term of as long as three years, coupled with the bank's re-appointment practices, 
suggests considerable continuity in the expertise represented on the Advisory Boards.
In terms of representativeness, the boards reflect a broad range of economic interests, 
with emphasis on the financial sector. A maximum of half the board members can be 
chosen from the various areas of banking, while the other members are selected from 
trade and industry, distribution, the insurance sector, the professions, agriculture, and 
from among the ranks of wage and salary earners320. The boards’ sectoral composition 
315 Paragraph 9 (3), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
316 The names and functions of the members of the Advisory Boards are published on the Deutsche 
Bundesbank's internet homepage. The three private individuals comprise one university professor 
and two representatives from the agricultural sector.
317 In the negotiations on the Bundesbank Act of 1957, the establishment of a central Advisory Board 
located at the bank's central offices in Frankfurt and advising the Central Bank Council was 
rejected both by the Federal Government and the Bundestag Committee on Money and Credit. At 
the time, it was considered that such a central body would be too large and inoperable. Initially, the 
Federal Government even intended to abolish the Advisory Boards – which had already existed and 
advised the Landeszentralbanken at the Bank deutscher Länder. The Bundestag Committee on 
Money and Credit, however, prevailed with its view that it would be useful to continue the regional 
Advisory Boards, since "it has proved conducive in the past to cultivate contacts in mutual 
consultation with all groups of the economy in this way, too." See von Bonin (1979), p. 190.
318 However, Advisory Board members are not prohibited or explicitly discouraged from 
communicating views formed with respect to the entire German economy, as e.g. formulated by the 
federal sections of the interest association they represent. 
319 Prior to the 2002 Bundesbank reform, the Landeszentralbanken published the names and functions 
of the members of the Advisory Boards in their annual reports, analysis of which allows an insight 
into the inter-temporal development of board membership.
320 Paragraph 9 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective until December 31, 1998.
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has been very stable over time. The figures valid at end-2003 therefore present a 
typical picture of the professional backgrounds represented. 43% of the 122 members 
of the nine boards were selected from the banking industry, 7% from insurance, 10% 
from commerce, 16% from trade and industry, 8% from the liberal professions, 7% 
from agriculture, and 9% represented wage and salary earners (see chart 13). Looking 
at trade and industry in a wider sense, i.e. including commerce and the liberal 
professions, as the focus of this study, an average of 34% of Advisory Board members 
in total came from these sectors end-2003, as shown in chart 14. At 54%, the Advisory 
Board at the Berlin Regional Office had the highest share of members from trade and 
industry, while the Leipzig Board had the lowest (21%). Representatives from banking 
and insurance make up between 57% in Frankfurt and Leipzig and 31% in Berlin, with 
a total average of 49%. Calibration of the composition is carried out at 
Landeszentralbank level and is subject to no rules other than those laid down in the 
Bundesbank Act and Statute.
Composition of Bundesbank regional Advisory Boards
Chart 13 Chart 14
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
Share of members by professional 
background in % of total of members of all 
Advisory Boards, end-2003
10
16
8
7
9
7
43
Credit 
Insurance
Commerce
Trade and industry
Liberal professions
Agriculture
Wage and salary earners
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
Share of members from trade, industry, 
commerce, liberal professions. Figures in % of 
total Advisory Board members, by Regional 
Office, end-2003
53.8
42.9
38.5
35.7
34.4
30.8
30.8
28.6
28.6
21.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
BER
MAI
MUN
HAN
Average
HAM
STU
DUS
FRA
LEI
From the angle of interest-group politics, the importance of the Advisory Boards 
rested on the fact that they provided direct access to decision-makers directly involved 
in the conduct of monetary policy. This changed after the May 2002 Bundesbank 
reform came into force. Certainly, the Landeszentralbank Advisory Boards have been 
retained as advisory bodies to the Regional Offices321. However, whereas the Advisory 
Boards previously conferred primarily with the presidents of the Landeszentralbanken 
on monetary policy issues, they now merely discuss execution of the tasks falling to 
that area. In other words, the Advisory Boards no longer have a formal advisory 
321 Paragraph 9, Bundesbank Act, as effective from April 30, 2002.
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function with regard to monetary policy322. Furthermore, the obligation to invite the 
finance and economics ministers of the relevant Land government to Advisory Board 
meetings has been repealed323, further diminishing the bodies’ political clout. 
Moreover, board meetings are no longer required to be held at least four times a year, 
including provisions for emergency meetings. The new rules call for only two 
meetings a year324 as a rule, suggesting less chronological proximity to the monetary 
decision-making process as well. Given the loss in political significance resulting from 
the 2002 amendment to the Bundesbank Act, the Bundesbank Executive Board is 
understood to have decided that, as far as possible, one of its members should be 
present at each Advisory Board meeting, promoting greater proximity to the bank's 
decision making body. However, given that the members of the Executive Board other 
than the president are not immediately involved in the monetary decision-making 
process and, at best, fulfil advisory functions in that specific context, the political 
influence of the Advisory Boards has been considerably weakened nonetheless. 
In addition to the Advisory Boards, the Bundesbank’s legal framework provides for a 
number of further formal channels of communication, which, however, represent 
highly indirect ways of communication between the private sector and Bundesbank 
decision makers, placing the two at a considerable distance. As a result, these formal 
but indirect channels must be regarded as inefficient when it comes to communicating 
private-interest preferences with respect to monetary policy. 
Most importantly, a number of formal channels of communication result from 
Bundesbank involvement in Germany's325 economic and financial politics. This 
involvement stems, on the one hand, from the bank's obligation – albeit secondary – to 
support the general economic policies of the Federal Government, which is ongoing 
even after entry into EMU, as already pointed out. In this sense, the bank also serves 
322 Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), p. 12.
323 See Organisational Statute of the Deutsche Bundesbank, as adopted on May 8, 2002.
324 Paragraph 9 (2), Bundesbank Act, as effective from April 30, 2002. Deutsche Bundesbank (2002a), 
p. 12.
325 The Bundesbank also takes part in a number of international activities, either on its own behalf or 
on behalf of the German government. At the formal level, the bank participates in the International 
Monetary Fund, of which the Federal Republic has been a member since 1952. The president of the 
Bundesbank has an ex officio seat on the IMF's highest decision-making body, the Board of 
Governors (for details see Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a), pp. 14-76, Stern (1998), pp. 177-178). 
Second, the Bundesbank is a shareholder in the Bank for International Settlements, with a seat in 
the General Meeting and on the Board of Directors (for details see Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a), 
pp. 202-214, Stern (1998), p. 178). At an informal level, the Bundesbank also plays a part in the 
G10 and G7 meetings. Participation in these international forums will not be analysed in the 
present context, as they are not relevant for domestic private-sector interest groups and their 
communication with the Bundesbank.
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as an important economic advisor to the Federal Government in the pursuit of its 
policies326. 
With regard to the need to support the government's general economic policies, we 
have already seen that the government was entitled to attend the meetings of the 
Central Bank Council as a non-voting observer with the right to delay monetary 
decisions for up to two weeks. As pointed out, this right has never actually been 
invoked. In line with the obligatory invitation to the federal economics and finance 
ministers to attend Central Bank Council meetings, Land economics and finance 
ministers were invited to attend the sessions of the Advisory Boards on a statutory 
basis327. Both forms of obligatory invitation were repealed in May 2002. As to the 
Bundesbank’s role as an economic adviser to the government, the Bundesbank Act 
requires the bank to advise the Federal Government on monetary policy issues of 
major importance and to furnish Berlin with any information requested. Furthermore, 
the Federal Government is enjoined to invite the president of the Bundesbank to attend 
its deliberations on important monetary policy issues328. Via the EU Council of 
Ministers, the Federal Government remains involved in monetary and exchange rate 
policies, so that the Bundesbank's advisory role and participation in the relevant 
cabinet meetings continue notwithstanding the other institutional changes implemented 
in 2002. Bundesbank support for the government and the mutual attendance of 
meetings were seen by the Bundesbank as 
"strengthening the relations between the Federal Government and the 
Bundesbank and give the latter the opportunity to keep itself informed about 
the economic aims pursued by the government."329
In practice, the possibilities of attending each other's meetings have been used 
extensively, especially when fundamental questions were discussed330. 
In addition to its immediate relations with the Federal Government, the Bundesbank 
formally serves as an advisor to four consultative committees at federal level. First, the 
Bundesbank can be consulted by, and is eligible to present its opinions to the German 
Council of Economic Experts331, which regularly advises the Federal Government on 
326 Stern (1998), p. 174.
327 With respect to the Land governments, the Bundesbank had no obligation comparable to that 
pertaining to support for the Federal Government's general economic policies. 
328 See Paragraph 13, Bundesbank Act.
329 Deutsche Bundesbank as quoted in Stern (1998), p. 174.
330 Stern (1998), p. 175. Anecdotal evidence on relations between the Bundesbank and the Federal 
Government as well as on discussions in the course of Central Bank Council and Cabinet meetings 
under mutual participation has been presented by Marsh (1992), pp. 222-337.
331 The German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der 
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) is an academic body that advises the German government and 
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all aspects of economic policy. In particular, the Council examines the sources of 
current and potential problems and makes recommendations on their resolution332. 
Second, the Bundesbank is entitled to attend the deliberations of the Economic 
Council for the Public Authorities333, which advises the Federal Government and 
supports and coordinates the interests of the Land, regional and local authorities with 
regard to the Federal Government's economic policies, especially on questions 
pertaining to public finances, economic provisions and debt policy334. Third, the 
Bundesbank is a permanent member of the Credit Committee of the Public 
Authorities335, which participates in the coordination of public debt policy and 
analyses demand for debt in the public sector and capital market developments336. 
Fourth, the Bundesbank is entitled to attend the meetings of the Council for Fiscal 
Planning337 which reports to the Federal Government and issues non-binding 
recommendations on the coordination of medium term fiscal planning by the federal, 
Land and local governments. Characteristic of the Bundesbank's role in these bodies is 
that it serves as an external advisor, acting by virtue of its competence as the country's 
central bank. As a result, the flow of information runs from the Bundesbank to the 
respective council or committee. Conversely, discussion of Bundesbank or ECB 
monetary policy is not intended. With regard to the potential channels of 
communication between the private sector and the central bank on the bank’s 
monetary policy, these committees can therefore at best be regarded as forums in 
which issues indirectly related to monetary matters are discussed by policy makers at 
parliament on economic policy issues. It was set up by law in 1963 with a mandate to periodically 
assess overall economic developments in Germany. It helps policy makers at all levels to reach 
informed judgements on economic matters. The Council is independent in respect of its advisory 
activities. It analyses the economic situation, forecasts economic developments and makes 
recommendations on how to achieve price stability, high employment, external equilibrium, and 
economic growth. The Council produces an annual report, published in mid-November, and ad hoc 
reports addressing particular problems or in response to a government request. The Council 
consists of five members, nominated by the German government and appointed by the German 
president for a term of five years. Its members may belong neither to the government nor to any 
national or regional legislative body and may not be employed by any public authority except as a 
university lecturer or a co-worker at a research institute of economic or social science. Council 
members must not be representatives or staff members of any industrial or trade federation, 
employers' association or trade union.
332 Stern (1998), p. 175.
333 Konjunkturrat für die Öffentliche Hand. For details see Stern (1998), p. 175.
334 Stern (1998), p. 175. The Council is composed of the federal ministers for economics and finance, 
representatives of each Land government and representatives of regional authorities. Its decisions 
are not binding on the Federal Government.
335 Ausschuss für Kreditfragen der Öffentlichen Hand. For details see Stern (1998), p. 176.
336 The committee is composed of representatives from the Federal and Land governments and is 
chaired by the federal finance minister (Stern (1998), p. 176). 
337 Finanzplanungsrat. For details see Stern (1998), p. 176.
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the federal, Land and regional levels. As channels for the communication of private-
sector interests with respect to monetary policy, however, they are of no discernible 
significance.
At the semi-formal level, not established by law or formal agreements, the 
Bundesbank invites the chief economists of the major nationally organised interest 
associations from trade and industry to roundtable338 discussions at the central office in 
Frankfurt on a half-yearly basis. The primary aim of these meetings is to communicate 
Bundesbank and ECB monetary policy. Participants in the roundtable talks are the 
Head of the Economic Department and other staff members of the Bundesbank339 and 
the relevant representatives from the BDI, the BGA, the DIHK, the HDE, the VDA, 
the VDMA, the WVS, the ZDB, the ZDH, and the ZVEI340. 
Also at the semi-formal level, the Bundesbank holds conferences and workshops 
focussing on promoting academic research and debate on monetary and exchange rate 
theory and policy341. Lately, these academic activities have been enhanced by the 
Economic Research Centre founded in 2000, which brings together Bundesbank 
researchers and visiting scientists from other central banks as well as from scientific 
institutes342. The results of the bank's research activities are published in its monthly 
reports as working and discussion papers, as well as in other publications.
Informally, there is a wide variety of ways of communicating with Bundesbank 
decision makers and expert staff. In the first place, the formal and semi-formal 
activities enumerated above also permit an informal exchange of views. Additionally, 
although not as publicly present as conventional policy makers, former Central Bank 
Council and present-day Board members attend conferences, symposia, and other 
formal and informal events arranged by public, academic or private bodies as guest 
speakers. Also, Bundesbank decision makers meet colleagues from the private sector 
individually. Finally, they are understood to be watchful observers of press coverage 
on Bundesbank activities and of other information and comments forwarded 
individually to the bank. 
338 Volkswirtekreis. The Bundesbank also organises a second regular roundtable to which 
representatives of the financial services industry are invited.
339 Prior to the 2002 Bundesbank reform, the member of the Directorate in charge of economic affairs 
participated in the roundtable meetings.
340 See list of abbreviations, p. 11.
341 An overview of the activities in this respect is published by the Bundesbank in its annual reports. 
342 Research focuses on issues relating to the monetary transmission process, functioning of the 
financial systems, including financial markets and financial intermediaries, the transformation 
process in central and eastern Europe, an analysis of the economic situation and the way in which 
open economies operate. Details on the Economic Research Centre are published by the 
Bundesbank on its internet site.
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II.1.1.4 Behavioural patterns: monetary decision makers at the Bundesbank
In addition to the institutional and procedural framework of a policy process, theory 
suggests that the behaviour of the policy makers and administrators involved in 
shaping policy influences the extent to which interest-group activity bears fruit. In the 
present context, behavioural patterns are relevant inasmuch as they help answer two 
central questions emerging from the picture drawn of the Bundesbank so far. First, 
given the special institutional status the Bundesbank enjoys – especially in respect of 
its political independence –, the question arises as to how far these legal rights and 
obligations have been observed by the bank in practice. In other words, we must 
examine whether the Bundesbank has been as difficult an addressee for interest-group 
activity as the institutional and procedural framework suggests. Second, with respect 
to the substance of policymaking, i.e. the bank's duty to ensure price stability, the 
Bundesbank enjoys considerable discretion, as shown above. Against this background, 
we must ask how far the bank actually exploits its leeway in practice. 
The first question addressed here is prompted by the fact that legal wording 
necessarily leaves room for interpretation. Most importantly, the legal postulate that 
the Bundesbank be politically independent de facto leaves open whether and to what 
extent the bank is exposed to outside influences and in how far its policy makers are 
affected by such influence when it comes to making up their minds on forthcoming 
monetary policy. This is an important question, and the answer is particularly relevant 
in the present context, because the Bundesbank's own behaviour on this count may in 
turn influence the behaviour of private interest groups. If the bank manages to 
represent in a credible manner that its decisions are, in fact, taken independently from 
outside political influence, then this might discourage interest groups from actually 
seeking to influence monetary policy in the first place. After all, why should a specific 
interest group try to influence the Bundesbank if all the others have already failed to 
do so? Conversely, an interest group might feel encouraged to start lobbying the 
Bundesbank if evidence were to suggest that – contrary to the letter of the law – the 
bank actually did respond to political pressures. 
The evidence available on this question so far has two dimensions, a declaratory and 
an empirical one. At the declaratory level, the Bundesbank itself values its political 
independence as a cornerstone of its institutional set-up and as a vital precondition for 
the successful pursuit of price stability343. The bank's appreciation of its autonomy has 
been manifested and is an almost omnipresent element in its publications, reports and 
the speeches given by its executives. Two examples may be singled out in the present 
context. In its monograph "The monetary policy of the Bundesbank", first published in 
1993 and designed to explain to the public its activities and role in the German 
343 Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 8.
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economy, the Bundesbank prefaces its remarks by emphasising the importance of its 
independence:
"Over the long term, prices have risen less steeply in Germany than in most 
other industrial countries. At the same time, the Deutsche Mark has 
appreciated strongly in the foreign exchange markets and developed into the 
anchor currency of the European Monetary System. The stability of the 
Deutsche Mark owes a great deal to the monetary policy of the Bundesbank, 
which has been based on a clear statutory mandate, its independent status 
and its convincing monetary policy stance. Pursuant to the Bundesbank Act, 
the Bundesbank's primary function is to safeguard the currency. To ensure 
that the Bundesbank is able to pursue this target without hindrance, it is 
independent of instructions from the government. These cornerstones of the 
German central bank's constitution have meanwhile come to serve as a kind 
of model for the future European Central Bank."344
The Bundesbank subsequently emphasised the significance of the issue by stating that 
"[i]n addition to defining the traditional task of a central bank, namely that 
of maintaining a properly functioning payment system, the Bundesbank Act 
[…] lays particular emphasis on the responsibility borne by the Bundesbank 
for monetary stability. In the interplay between the various economic policy 
decision-makers – Parliament, the Federal Cabinet, the central bank, both 
sides of industry – the Bundesbank must always regard its function of being 
the guardian of the currency, as spelled out in the Act, as being its primary 
task. That is why the Bundesbank Act has made the central bank 
independent of instructions from the Federal Cabinet. As a logical 
consequence, the basic obligation incumbent on the Bundesbank under the 
Act to support the general economic policy of the Federal Cabinet is 
explicitly subject to the condition that this does not bring monetary policy 
makers into insoluble conflict with their primary objective."345.
The second example of the Bundesbank's own conviction that central bank 
independence is an essential feature of a well-functioning monetary order is the bank's 
strategy during the negotiations towards establishing the single European currency and 
a monetary union in the EU. Both in the Delors Committee346, which in April 1989 
344 Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 8.
345 Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 22.
346 The European Council had confirmed the objective of progressive realisation of economic union in 
June 1988 and mandated a Committee chaired by Jacques Delors, then President of the European 
Commission, to study and propose concrete stages leading to this union. The Committee members 
were the governors of the EC national central banks, Alexandre Lamfalussy as the then General 
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, Niels Thygesen, Professor of Economics at 
Copenhagen University, and Miguel Boyer, the then President of the Banco Exterior de España. 
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issued a report sketching out the plan towards achieving monetary union, and during 
the negotiations at the Intergovernmental Conference on EMU in 1990, the 
Bundesbank representatives consistently made the success of the deliberations 
conditional on the future European central bank’s political independence and on this 
far-reaching autonomy being legally established at Treaty level347. In the course of 
these negotiations the Bundesbank asserted its position and insisted on Bundesbank-
style application of the principle of central bank autonomy, even in the face of 
considerable economic and political reservations among the other European policy 
makers348. 
A wide range of studies have been conducted on the empirical evidence for the 
responsiveness of central banks to outside political pressure. Of the studies dealing 
with the Bundesbank, Maier (2002) has provided a comprehensive overview and 
comparison. The major results are depicted in table 3349. Maier distinguishes in the 
various analyses available between opportunistic models, partisan models and conflict 
models. In opportunistic models350, politicians seek to maximise their popularity and 
the probability of being re-elected. In partisan models351, different social parties 
represent different social constituencies, have different interests and compete for 
influence on monetary policy. Finally, conflict models352 focus on periods of tension 
between government and the central bank. The variables tested include different 
measures of the supply of money353, interest rates354, and inflation. 
The resulting Delors Report stipulated that economic and monetary union should be achieved in 
three discrete but evolutionary steps.
347 Detailed accounts of the negotiations on EMU can be found in Marshall (1999), pp. 78-97 and 
Szász (1999), pp. 98-153. Also Marsh (1992), pp. 301-353.
348 See especially Szász (1999), pp. 147-153.
349 See p. 144. Maier (2002) uses the term "direct influence" to denote direct correlations between 
certain measures of political behaviour and the actions on the part of the central bank. "Indirect 
influence", in contrast, is detected by means of models that measure indirect influence by 
governments, e.g. when fiscal policy is used in line with some version of the political-business-
cycle theory, and the central bank accommodates the subsequent increase in the budget deficit, so 
that an election cycle may show up in some monetary variables (Maier (2002), pp. 20-29).
350 The category of opportunistic models includes political business cycle (PBC) and rational political 
business cycle (RPBC) models. See Maier (2002), p. 10.
351 Partisan models can again be divided into partisan theory (PT) and rational partisan theory (RPT) 
models. See Maier (2002), p. 11.
352 The category of conflict models (CM) also includes party preference theory models (PPT). See 
Maier (2002), pp. 11-12.
353 Measures of the supply of money applied in the studies covered by Maier (2002) are the narrow 
monetary aggregates of central bank money (CBM) and M1 as well as the broad measure M3.
354 Interest rates tested include the German discount and Lombard rates.
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Econometric evidence on direct political influence on the Deutsche Bundesbank
Table 3
Study Influence Model Variables Result
Basler (1978) Direct CM Inflation Bundesbank preferences biased during 70s.
Cowart (1978) Direct PT Discount 
rate
Leftist governments are faced with significantly higher Discount 
rates.
Frey, Schneider (1981) Direct CM Discount 
rate
During conflicts, Bundesbank yields to the government.
Baum (1983) Direct CM Discount, 
Lombard 
rates
No evidence for Bundesbank adopting government's policy
Berger, Schneider (2000) Direct CM Various During conflicts, Bundesbank yields to the government.
Soh (1986) Direct PBC Various Money growth and inflation higher in election years.
Alesina, Roubini (1990, 1992) Direct PBC, PT Inflation Post-electoral jump in inflation. Inflation higher under leftist 
governments.
Alesina et al. (1992) Direct PBC, PT M1 Political business cycle in M1, rightist governmnets have higher M1 
growth.
Lang, Welzel (1992) Direct PBC, RPT M1, M3, 
CBM
No evidence for political business cycle, rational partisan behaviour 
in M3, but not in M1 or Central Bank Money.
Vaubel (1997) Direct PT, RPT, 
PPT
M1 No evidence for partisan theory or rational partisan theory. Evidence 
for party preference theory.
Berger, Woitek (1997) Direct PPT M1, 
Discount 
rate
Rejection of party preference theory and its basic assumptions.
Johnson, Siklos (1994) Direct PBC, PT Interest rate Political business cycle after Bretton Woods. Partisan theory 
significant, but wrong sign.
Berger (1997) Direct PBC, PPT Discount 
rate
Rejection of of political business cycle and party preference theory.
Berger, Woitek (1997) Direct RPBC, 
RPT
VAR No support for political business cycle. Weak evidence for rational 
political business cycle.
Lohmann (1998) Direct PBC, PT, 
PPT, CM
CBM Bundesbank only partially independent. Influence of the Bundesrat 
significant.
Demopoulos et al. (1987) Indirect Monetary 
base
Accommodation of budget deficits.
Giannaros, Kolluri (1985) Indirect M1 No significant impact.
Burdekin (1987) Indirect Monetary 
base
Weak evidence for accommodation.
Missong, Herault (1990) Indirect Interest rate If budget deficit rises, interest rate drops.
Lang, Welzel (1992) Indirect M1, M3, 
CBM
Significant impact of budget deficit.
Source: Maier (2002), pp. 27-29
From his comparative analysis, Maier concludes that there is no clear evidence for 
political influence on the Bundesbank. Studies testing by single monetary instruments 
tend to reject any influence on the Bundesbank's monetary decisions from elections or 
partisan behaviour by policy makers but are found to be technically inappropriate355. 
The models applied in studies concerned with monetary aggregates are judged more 
useful, but there, too, the evidence is mixed. Studies including more countries than 
Germany do not yield solid evidence of government influence on monetary 
355 Maier (2002), pp. 29-31.
145
decisions356. In contrast, studies dealing exclusively with the Bundesbank seem to 
suggest the existence of political pressures and a certain responsiveness on the part of 
the Bundesbank. Maier, however, points out that a number of the relevant studies 
actually exhibit substantial deficiencies, suggesting that the results – significant 
pressure on and responsiveness of the Bundesbank – are not sufficiently reliable. 
Conflict models are found to be more reliable and actually produce some evidence that 
– under pressure – the Bundesbank might have yielded to the government. Finally, the 
hypothesis that government budget deficits are accommodated by the Bundesbank is 
not well supported by the data357.
Given the heterogeneity of the empirical evidence in literature and the fact that certain 
potential sources of political influence had not been covered, Maier supplemented the 
body of literature by testing additional monetary variables – short-term interest rates 
and a monetary policy index – and modelled additional sources of controversy over 
monetary policy by establishing a conflict indicator. 
As to the former, no significant evidence can be found to suggest that political 
business cycles impact on short-term interest rates358. Maier further constructs a 
monetary policy index to include all the possible means a central bank can employ to 
influence the markets. These include public statements, i.e. rhetoric, which in daily 
practice seem to be an important instrument by which central banks seek to influence 
financial market participants’ actions. Most remarkably, the tests produce a stable, but 
twofold, picture. For one thing, analysis of official interest rates as a proxy for actual 
monetary policy confirms earlier results signalling no significant electoral pressure on 
the Bundesbank. At the same time, however, analysis of a specifically defined 
Bundesbank index measuring monetary policy as announced – in contrast to actually 
implemented – by the Bundesbank yields a robust correlation with electoral pressures. 
This has been interpreted by Maier as suggesting that the Bundesbank actually 
responds to electoral pressures at a declaratory level in order to calm down nervous 
politicians, while in fact leaving its monetary policy and its operations unchanged so 
as to prevent economic damage359. 
As to the second set of analyses, Maier extends the potential sources of political 
conflict with the central bank. In all preceding analyses, political pressure was 
assumed to emanate exclusively from government. Maier employs an indicator of 
356 Maier (2002), p. 30. Those studies that do detect political influence are criticised in most cases for 
not taking institutional and other policy features properly into account.
357 Maier (2002), p. 31.
358 Maier (2002), pp. 33-46.
359 Maier (2002), pp. 47-73. 
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political pressure stemming from all potential sources, including interest groups360. 
The results of this analysis again confirm that pressure from politicians did not affect 
German monetary policy361. Similarly, pressure from trade and industry interest 
associations and from trade unions is found to have no impact on Bundesbank policy. 
However, Maier finds robust evidence that opinions from the financial sector do have 
a significant impact on monetary decisions362. Finally, Maier observes that public 
opinion on monetary policy has been very mixed, with pressure from one quarter 
triggering support for the Bundesbank from another. It is suggested that such support 
partly offsets the pressures brought to bear on the bank363.
For the analysis of interest-group activity in the field of monetary policy, the latter 
results raise important issues. They suggest that the Bundesbank responds to pressures 
from the financial sector, but not to lobbying by the government or the rest of the 
private sector, notably trade, industry or trade unions, possibly reflecting financial 
market participants’ greater competence of in monetary matters. 
This interpretation, however, is far from unproblematic. Given its superior command 
of information and expertise on monetary policy – going well beyond that existing in 
the financial services industry – the Bundesbank does not necessarily have a strong 
incentive to take recourse to advice from the financial sector. This lack of incentive 
may be reinforced by the fact that the financial services industry itself may be pursuing 
biased interests, considering that financial market participants benefit most from 
constantly changing market conditions and less so from a stabilisation of monetary 
variables. The latter is an important part of the Bundesbank's mandate. 
Maier explains the statistical significance of the financial market influence thus:
"[C]entral bankers have incentives to listen to the financial sector, be it 
because their utility increases from higher 'popularity' among colleagues, or 
be it to build up reputation for the central bank and thus ensure 
independence in the long run."364
The first part of this argument assumes that popularity among colleagues in the 
financial services industry represents a dominant, if not the dominant, objective 
pursued by Bundesbank policy makers and that this popularity can actually be 
360 The indicator was originally designed by Havrilesky and employed to analyse the pressure on the 
US Federal Reserve Board, suggesting that its policies were, in fact, responsive to pressures 
expressed through newspaper articles and reports. Havrilesky developed and subsequently 
extended this approach (see Havrilesky (1988), (1990), (1993), (1994)).
361 Maier (2002), p. 90.
362 Maier (2002), pp. 75-96.
363 Maier (2002), pp. 97-111.
364 Maier (2002), p. 95.
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increased by listening to their recommendations. The second part of the argument 
assumes that a good central bank reputation can be earned by following 
recommendations from financial market participants and that such behaviour – if 
successful – is not observed by the public. Otherwise, both reputation and 
independence would no longer be credible. None of these assumptions are plausible, as 
Maier indirectly concedes by subsequently explaining the statistical significance of 
public support for the Bundesbank:
"[A] high degree of public support – at least partly – offsets pressures from 
interest groups. […] The policy implications of these findings are clear: 
Public support helps the central bank to concentrate on economic needs and 
makes it easier to completely ignore political pressure."365
In the light of the basic incentives facing the central bank and the financial sector, a 
systematic responsiveness on the part of the Bundesbank to recommendations from the 
financial sector seems rather unlikely. An alternative interpretation of the econometric 
findings would be that the financial sector – given its access to relevant information 
and its expertise in monetary matters – actually comes to conclusions which are very 
similar to those at which a central bank arrives. Forecasts and policy recommendations 
by the financial industry are therefore likely to coincide with those of the central bank. 
Further econometric analysis of such a potential coincidence may be a promising 
step366.
Overall, declaratory and econometric evidence suggests that the legal right and 
obligation to define and conduct monetary policy independently of outside political 
pressures is matched in practice by behaviour on the part of decision makers largely 
consistent with the statutory framework. The Bundesbank and its officials declare their 
commitment to act independently and defend the bank's independence against potential 
intrusions or violations. Econometric analysis additionally suggests that there is no 
unambiguous evidence of any systematic Bundesbank responsiveness to outside 
pressure. These findings coincide with anecdotal evidence on the esprit de corps said 
to shape the behaviour of incoming decision makers. It has been observed with many 
central banks, especially independent institutions, that individuals appointed to serve 
on their decision-making bodies generally adapt to the duties and habits of that 
institution, irrespective for the most part of the economic or political affiliation that 
may have promoted their appointment367. This process, often referred to as the Becket 
365 Maier (2002), pp. 108-109.
366 Maier (2002) in fact started working in this direction by adding some extra economic state 
variables – industrial production and the exchange rate – to check whether bank signalling simply 
picks up the effects of omitted variables, concluding that this was not the case (pp. 93-94).
367 Marshall (1999), pp. 283-285, Bofinger (2003), p. 4.
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effect368, has been observed in the Bundesbank, where it soon induces decision makers 
from very different political and regional backgrounds to feel a responsibility for the 
institution and the currency369. 
The second major behavioural pattern, next to practical adherence to the primacy of 
political independence, has been the Bundesbank's commitment to its functional 
objective – maintaining price stability – and the way in which this has been achieved. 
As observed earlier, the Bundesbank's legal framework provides for a broad definition 
of its objective, combined with considerable discretion in its interpretation and pursuit. 
With respect to behavioural patterns, the question arises as to whether and to what 
extent the Bundesbank has actually exhausted the resultant room for manoeuvre in 
pursuing its monetary policy and in its position within the ESCB. Relevant 
behavioural patterns may, over time, influence interest groups in their political 
activities insofar as discretionary central bank behaviour may be a pre-condition for 
the success of their activities in the event that they do not agree with a given monetary 
stance and seek to have it changed. Conversely, if the central bank establishes 
additional rules for monetary decisions and commits itself to stick to them, then the 
bank's scope for discretionary decisions diminishes – and so do interest groups’ 
chances of influencing these decisions one way or another. At the same time, interest 
groups may have greater incentives to criticise such rules should they run significantly 
counter to the groups’ interests. 
As a matter of fact, monetary theory and practice suggest that for the pursuit of 
broadly defined monetary objectives it is useful, if not indeed necessary, to define 
additional rules on which monetary decisions can be based. Broad monetary 
objectives, such as the pursuit of price stability in the case of the Bundesbank, can 
rarely be influenced directly by the central bank due to the complexity of the monetary 
transmission process and the persistence of time lags between a policy measure and its 
effect on the final target, as already observed in the theoretical analysis above. As a 
result, central banks often define targets, intermediary targets as well as operating 
targets, working towards steering monetary developments as precisely as possible. 
Besides solving the operational difficulties associated with pursuing monetary 
objectives, a commitment to such intermediary steps can help increase the credibility 
368 The term refers to Thomas Becket, Chancellor of King Henry II, who, after he was made 
Archbishop of Canterbury, opposed the king and became a true adherent of the Church. The effect 
refers to the presence of an independent dynamic inside central banks that influences outsiders 
coming into the bank to conform to the bank's norms, beliefs and rituals even if the outsider was 
not previously part of them (Marshall (1999), p. 284).
369 Bofinger (2003), p. 4. For an anecdotal overview of the effect on different Central Bank Council 
members see Marsh (1992), pp. 60-64. Also Marshall (1999), pp. 283-288. Theoretical evidence 
suggests that the effect can be strengthened by increasing the length of office of central bank policy 
board members relative to the length of the electoral interval (Eijffinger (1997), p. 3).
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of the bank and its policies by making its activities more comprehensible and 
transparent370. 
The monetary policy of the Bundesbank between 1974 and 1998 was characterised by 
self-imposed rules, which complemented its legal framework, as well as a recognisable 
determination to retain the option of discretionary monetary measures. As a result, its 
monetary strategy has been interpreted as a policy of stabilisation with discretionary 
elements371. It is characterised by
– a clear commitment to the primary objective of maintaining the stability of the 
currency,
– regular announcements of its annual policy targets, including a detailed 
explanation of past performance as well as of the considerations behind 
forthcoming targets,
– specification of the conditions under which it was willing to deviate from the pre-
announced target, as well as 
– stability-orientation in the application of instruments, avoidance of abrupt changes 
in its policy and a general orientation along the medium-term perspective372. 
Ever since it regained control over the domestic money supply following the abolition 
of the fixed-exchange rate regime under the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the 
Bundesbank has made self-binding commitments with respect to its objective and 
policy targets. It adopted a strategy of money-supply targeting as from December 
1974, announcing target values or ranges for the rate of growth in money supply for 
specified periods of time. As a result, each monetary decision has, in principle, been 
bound by the rules of this strategy and the need to attain the pre-defined policy targets. 
More specifically, the Bundesbank based its strategy on the theoretical and empirical 
relationship between the price level and the supply of money in circulation, the latter 
of which a central bank can influence with some accuracy. Given that, in the medium-
term, an increase in inflation has been found to be impossible without undue growth in 
the money stock, the bank has adopted money supply as its monetary target373. The 
370 Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 266-269.
371 Baltensperger (1998), pp. 536-538, and Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 80.
372 Baltensperger (1998), p. 536.
373 Between 1974 and 1987, the measure of the money stock targeted by the Bundesbank was Central 
Bank Money. From 1988 until 1998, the monetary variable chosen was M3 (Deutsche Bundesbank 
(1995), p. 79). The Central Bank Money stock comprises currency in circulation in the hands of 
non-banks and the required minimum reserves – other than minimum reserve-carrying bank debt 
securities – calculated at constant reserve ratios as at January 1974. The money stock components 
included in Central Bank Money coincide with those included in M3, except for the difference 
between the two aggregates with respect to the comparatively illiquid block of savings deposits 
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target value for growth of the money stock is calculated using a basic formula, 
according to which growth in the money stock374 equals the sum of the real potential 
growth rate375, a medium-term price assumption376, and the longer-term change in the 
velocity of circulation of money377. Importantly, the Bundesbank's medium-term price 
assumption included in the equation represents a maximum value for the rate of 
inflation the Bundesbank is willing to tolerate in the medium term. Implicitly, 
calculation of the money-supply target therefore also gives an indication as to which 
maximum rate of inflation the Bundesbank deems consistent with what the 
Bundesbank Act refers to as safeguarding the currency.
At the behavioural level, the Bundesbank therefore restricted its discretion with a 
monetary strategy including a set of transparent, publicly available rules. As table 4
shows, these rules had to be considered as comparatively strict. The table depicts an 
international comparison of monetary targets valid in 1998, including countries that 
adopted a direct inflation target. Column six contains the rates of underlying normative 
inflation assumed by central banks with a money supply target, including the 
Bundesbank. Column five depicts the equivalent inflation targets of central banks 
pursuing direct inflation targeting. Among the European central banks pursuing 
monetary targets, the Bundesbank had therefore adopted the most ambitious target. 
Besides the practice of monetary targeting and its benefits, as a further rule committing 
the bank to systematic exercise of the scope granted it by law, the Bundesbank has 
gained additional credibility by the fact that it has managed to maintain this strategy 
without interruption since the end of 1974, giving it the longest experience in pursuing 
monetary targets by international standards, and by the fact that it has made particular 
efforts throughout to explain its targeting and its policy decisions to the public in a 
transparent manner378. Furthermore, the Bundesbank's policy has set itself apart from 
with a period of notice between three months and four years and savings bonds with maturities of 
less than four years. In contrast to Central Bank Money, these are not included in M3 (Deutsche 
Bundesbank (1995), p. 81). For an extensive rationalisation of the changeover from Central Bank 
Money to M3 see Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), pp. 81-83. For a discussion of the implications of 
this step see Baltensperger (1998), pp. 510-511.
374 Defined as the growth in the money stock consistent with the economy’s real potential growth rate 
(Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 81).
375 Expansion of the money stock at the potential growth rate is perceived by the Bundesbank as 
securing price stability and providing adequate financial scope for the rise in spending needed to 
absorb available supply (Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 80).
376 The medium-term price assumption represents the maximum inflation rate tolerated by the 
Bundesbank in the medium term (Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 80).
377 Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 83.
378 Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 248-249.
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that of other central banks not only in terms of its stringency, but also inasmuch as it 
has been far more geared towards stability, continuity, and consistency than others379.
Monetary targets in international comparison, 1998
Table 4
Country Type of target Target variable
Monetary 
target (%) 
Inflation 
target (%)
Underlying 
normative 
inflation (%) Intermediate targets
DE Money supply M3 3 – 6 … 1.5 – 2 …
ES Inflation Genral index of consumer 
prices
… 2 … Exchange rate, money stock
FR Money supply M3 5 … 2 Exchange rate, money stock, 
domestic indebtedness
GR Money supply M3 6 – 9 … 2,5 Exchange rate, money stock, 
domestic credit
IT Money supply M2 5 … 2 Exchange rate, additional 
indicators
SE Inflation General index of 
consumer prices
… 2, +/-1 … …
SF Inflation Index of consumer prices … 2 … Exchange rate
UK Inflation Retail price index … 2.5 … Money stock
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), pp. 38 and 43
As regards the details and performance in pursuing its money-supply target, table 5
below provides an overview of the Bundesbank's record. The table illustrates three 
important aspects of implementation of the bank's strategy, especially with respect to 
its attempts at retaining discretion in decision making despite the tight corset of policy 
rules. First, after four initial years of targeting spot values for Central Bank Money, 
which the bank consistently failed to meet, it announced target ranges, or corridors 
designed to give it greater scope in accommodating monetary developments not 
foreseeable at the time the target was defined380. In other words, the Bundesbank 
restored some of the discretion it had stripped itself of by committing itself to a rule 
that proved impossible to meet381. Second, the fifth column shows that in the early 
years of targeting corridors the bank chose to narrow down its target in the course of 
the reporting period, a practice abolished in 1984 so as to give itself the full corridor 
defined at the beginning of the reporting period as a target range. Third, and most 
importantly, column eight shows that the bank failed to meet its targets between 1975 
and 1998 in eleven out of twenty-four reporting periods, i.e. almost half the time.
379 Baltensperger (1998), p. 537.
380 Baltensperger (1998), p. 488.
381 On the arguments surrounding the Bundesbank's changeover from spot targets to corridors as well 
as the advantages and disadvantages of this step, see Baltensperger (1998), pp. 488-489.
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Bundesbank monetary targets and their implementation
Table 5
Target 
achieved
Year Target 
course of year 
(%)
annual 
average (%)
more precise definition 
during the year
course of year 
(%)
annual average 
(%)
1975 CBM 8 … … 10 … no
1976 CBM … 8 … … 9 no
1977 CBM … 8 … … 9 no
1978 CBM … 8 … … 11 no
1979 CBM 6 – 9 … Lower limit 6 … yes
1980 CBM 5 – 8 … Lower limit 5 … yes
1981 CBM 4 – 7 … Lower half 4 … yes
1982 CBM 4 – 7 … Upper half 6 … yes
1983 CBM 4 – 7 … Upper half 7 … yes
1984 CBM 4 – 6 … … 5 … yes
1985 CBM 3 – 5 … … 5 … yes
1986 CBM 3.5 – 5.5 … … 8 … no
1987 CBM 3 – 6 … … 8 … no
1988 M3 3 – 6 … … 7 … no
1989 M3 about 5 … … 5 … yes
1990 M3 4 – 6 … … 6 … yes
1991 M3 3 – 5 … … 5 … yes
1992 M3 3.5 – 5.5 … … 9 … no
1993 M3 4.5 – 6.5 … … 7 … no
1994 M3 4 – 6 … … 6 … yes
1995 M3 4 – 6 … … 2 … no
1996 M3 4 – 7 … … 8 … no
1997 M3 3.5 – 6.5 … … 4 … yes
1998 M3 5 … … 5 … yes
Data sources: Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 79, Bofinger (1996), p. 271, Maier, de Haan (2000), p. 16
Target growth of the money stock
Actual growth of the money 
stock
Given that the Bundesbank failed to meet its targets in nearly half of the reporting 
periods, resulting in a positive money supply bias of 1.17 percentage points between 
1975 and 1995382, its targeting policy has been subject to considerable debate. In the 
course of this it has emerged that the Bundesbank did not strictly adhere to formal 
targets and that its monetary strategy contained further decision making criteria, i.e. 
that a meta-rule383 existed which was not part of the formal targeting process. As the 
Bundesbank itself conceded,
"[i]n the short run, the Bundesbank has never regarded the annual targets as 
the sole guideline for its liquidity and interest rate policy actions, but has 
also taken domestic and external underlying conditions into account. This 
382 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 270.
383 For an analysis of the factors behind this meta-rule see Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 270-272.
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does not mean, however, that, by doing so, it has also relinquished its 
medium-term objectives for appropriate monetary growth."384
Empirical evidence suggests that this meta-rule encompassed at least two important 
elements, namely the current rate of inflation and the external value of the Deutsche 
Mark vis-à-vis the currencies of Germany's most important trading partners. Thus, the 
overall Bundesbank strategy contained certain elements of direct inflation targeting as 
well as exchange rate targeting which the central bank deemed conducive to meeting 
its final objective, i.e. stabilisation of the domestic price level385. The bank's liberal 
handling of its own policy rules, however, did not result in a loss of confidence on the 
part of the wider public in its commitment and ability to fulfil its duties. The 
Bundesbank’s performance was assessed – both by itself and the public – with 
reference to its mission to secure price stability, which was achieved satisfactorily by 
both inter-temporal and international standards. In contrast to the money-supply bias 
of 1.17% between 1975 and 1995, the bank's inflationary bias, measured against its 
own benchmark target of underlying normative inflation, was only 0.4% in the same 
period386. 
Overall, therefore, the Bundesbank's strategy in principle narrowed its room for 
discretionary monetary decisions by means of self-imposed rules and a clear 
commitment to meeting its comparatively strict monetary target. In practice, however, 
the Bundesbank did not submit to these rules in an orthodox manner, taking resort 
instead to discretionary measures as it deemed useful with respect to keeping inflation 
close to this implicit target.
II.1.2 Issue context: monetary policy in Germany
According to the analysis framework outlined in the preceding chapters, the salience 
of a policy issue and the sponsoring it receives from relevant interest groups in society 
are important determinants of the extent to which formal interest groups and 
associations are likely to become active and involved with that issue. It has been 
argued that monetary policy features a number of properties that make it a specific 
policy issue for interest groups to address. Its diffuse impact and the complexity with 
which it feeds into the economy make it difficult to form precise and consistent 
preferences – for individuals, and all the more so across entire groups and sectors in 
the economy. From a theoretical perspective, interest groups’ commitment to the issue 
of monetary policy has consequently been hypothesised as low, especially when one 
384 Deutsche Bundesbank (1995), p. 86.
385 Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 271-277.
386 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 277.
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considers the potentially wide variety of other important economic policy issues with a 
more immediate and focused impact on private-sector actors.
Given these broad hypotheses, it is the purpose of the following sections to analyse 
monetary policies in Germany, assessing the importance of the theoretically relevant 
determinants in this concrete case and highlighting the policy issues raised in the 
empirical analysis below. They show that interest-group activity on monetary policy in 
Germany is shaped by four broad stylised trends:
– First, Germany as a whole is characterised by strong anti-inflationary sentiment, 
which has its origins in negative historical experience. 
– Second, monetary policy in the post-war era has been successful and has been 
perceived as such by the wider public.
– Third, enterprises in trade and industry have little immediate exposure and 
sensitivity to monetary and exchange rate developments.
– Finally, monetary developments – as a policy issue – are clearly dominated by a 
wide variety of other economic policy issues, which have been subject to 
considerable public controversy. 
It will be argued that, as a result, major economic and societal interest groups strongly 
support the basic objectives formerly pursued by the Deutsche Bundesbank, and today 
by the ECB, as well as the broad policy framework in which monetary policymaking 
has been embedded. Neither the conduct of monetary policy nor monetary 
developments are generally regarded as highly salient or critical issues, nor have they 
found significant sponsorship among German interest groups in trade and industry in 
the past decades. The historical record suggests that, for most of the past decades, 
monetary policy has largely been a non-issue on the economic policy agenda.
II.1.2.1 Anti-inflationary sentiment
The most important single determinant of interest-group activity, as argued in chapter 
two, is the impact of a policy issue on the private sector, how policy makers deal with 
the issue and whether the private sector agrees with this response. The considerations
in chapter three show that in this respect monetary policy represents an intricate field 
of policymaking which is flanked by a number of economic variables, most 
importantly inflation, interest rates, and exchange rates. Given the close 
interdependence of these variables and the limited instruments monetary policy makers 
have at their disposal to influence them, they can ultimately pursue only one objective 
at a time, while other aims can at best be taken into consideration at the margin. In 
practice, contemporary monetary systems resolve this problem by defining rules –
establishing central banks equipped with policy objectives – under which the daily 
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business of monetary decision making is conducted on a more or less discretionary 
basis. As described in the preceding section on the institutional context, the monetary 
framework in Germany follows this logic with the establishment of the Bundesbank as 
an independent monetary authority bound by the statutory objective of maintaining 
stable prices and by further, self-imposed targets limiting the scope for discretionary 
policy decisions. With respect to the issue context, the question arises to what extent 
the private sector at large, and enterprises and interest groups in trade and industry in 
particular, have an incentive to accept, share, or even support the overall policy 
framework and objectives of the Bundesbank. 
One important factor shaping the public perception of monetary policy in Germany has 
been the country’s specific experience with inflation in the past. Since the early 
twentieth century, the country experienced two severe monetary crises, each leading to 
a de facto collapse of the monetary system, substantial erosion of wealth and major 
redistributive effects on the economy.
The first of these two currency crises was the period of hyperinflation between August 
1922 and November 1923. Starting with a monthly rate of inflation of 64.6% in 
August 1922, the inflationary process reached a peak in October 1923 with monthly 
inflation of 32,400%387. At the end of November 1923, the value of the Mark to the 
USD had fallen to one 1012th of its pre-World War I level388. The fourteen-month 
period of inflation severely eroded incomes and wealth in the economy, depriving 
holders of money and financial assets as well as creditors of the bulk of their wealth. 
Owners of real assets and debtors, on the other hand, witnessed less dramatic losses or 
even gained from depreciation of the currency389. Further erosion of incomes and 
wealth was eventually brought to a halt with sweeping monetary reform, in the course 
of which two additional currencies were introduced and two additional central banks 
established. In addition to the Reichsbank, which continued to exist and was mandated 
to stabilise the Mark and later the Reichsmark as the country's legal tender, the 
Rentenbank and the Golddiskontbank were established. The former was restricted to 
387 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 113. Bofinger provides a detailed analysis of the effects of inflation and 
hyperinflation on the balance sheet of central banks, illustrated by the example of German 
hyperinflation in 1922 and 1923 (pp. 113-118).
388 James (1998), p. 46. An historical account is also provided by Nölling (1993), pp. 21-24.
389 The redistributive effects of Germany's hyperinflation are discussed by Kindleberger (1993) in a 
chapter on the social aspects of German inflation (pp. 312-314). Notably and in contrast to intuitive 
perceptions of the redistributive effects of inflation, Kindleberger observes that in a number of 
instances the overall distribution of income and wealth was narrowed in Germany as a result of the 
inflationary period. Thus, the ratio of skilled wages to those of common labour narrowed from 
145% in 1913 to 106% in 123. Similarly, wages of high government officials fell by more than 
60% in real terms whereas junior officials lost only about 30%. Nevertheless, midsized businesses 
and midsized farmers were found to have gained on balance. Incomes from interest and rent fell 
from roughly 15% of national income in 1913 to less than 3% in 1925 (p. 313). 
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lending to the public and corporate sectors against the issue of non-legal-tender bank 
notes, while the latter provided enterprises with hard-currency credit against the issue 
of gold-based bonds390. 
The second currency crisis was the result of suppressed inflation during World War II 
and the immediate post-war period391. The Nazi war economy massively expanded 
money supply, with the currency in circulation rising from Reichsmark 5 bn in 1935 to 
Reichsmark 50 bn in 1945392. Bank deposits increased from Reichsmark 30 bn to 
Reichsmark 150 bn, and government debt – even without allowance for war claims of 
Reichsmark 350 bn – soared from Reichsmark 15 bn to Reichsmark 400 bn. During 
the same period, Germany's national real wealth decreased by one-third393. The 
discrepancy between money supply and assets resulted in a substantial monetary 
overhang, with the supply of money exceeding the amount of goods and services 
produced in the economy by a factor of six394. Open inflation was suppressed395, 
however, by an extensive system of price and wage controls and by effectively 
abolishing the price mechanism in many areas through voucher transactions396. This, in 
turn, led to the development of widespread barter trade and increasing Reichsmark-
based black-market activity397, which made up 10% of overall transactions but 80% of 
monetary turnover398. The bizarre mix of white, grey and black economic activity 
continued until 1948 and disappeared overnight with the introduction of the Deutsche 
Mark on June 20, 1948399. Again, the inflationary process itself, and the radical 
monetary reform that stopped it, had immense repercussions on incomes and welfare 
in society400. 
390 Details on the role and activities of the Rentenbank and the Golddiskontbank are provided by 
Kindleberger (1993), pp. 316-317, and James (1998), pp. 52-63. 
391 The monetary and economic development during this second monetary crisis has been documented 
e.g. by Buchheim (1998), Kindleberger (1993), pp. 393-412, Weimer (1998), pp. 31-55, and 
Nölling (1993), pp. 25-43.
392 Smith (1994), p. 6, and Weimer (1998), p. 32.
393 Smith (1994), p. 6. See also Kindleberger (1993), pp. 393-394.
394 Nölling (1993), p. 28.
395 Kindleberger (1993), points out that Germany’s monetary crisis in the war and post-war years was 
the most far-reaching instance of suppressed inflation in a disequilibrium system that Europe had 
ever experienced (p. 394).
396 Weimer (1998), p. 31.
397 Smith (1994), p. 6.
398 Kindleberger (1993), p. 403.
399 On the modalities of the currency reform see Buchheim (1998), pp. 117-136, and Kindleberger 
(1993), pp, 404-407.
400 For a detailed description as well as a review of the reactions of the German public to the currency 
reform see Weimer (1998), pp. 48-49.
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Despite significant dissimilarities between the two currency crises in historical, 
economic, political and technical terms401, their causes and consequences have clearly 
shaped thinking on monetary issues in large sections of society, including policy 
makers and entrepreneurs. 
– First, the two monetary crises painfully demonstrated the consequences of 
inflationary policies and their effects on people’s welfare. Added to this in the case 
of hyperinflation in the 1920s were the repercussions on the stability of the social 
and political system as a whole. 
– Second, with regard to the causes of inflationary development it became evident 
that the lack of a clear and binding mandate and commitment to price stability on 
the part of monetary policy makers had vitally contributed to monetary derailment. 
The Reichsbank wilfully abetted spiralling inflation in both periods, even in 
instances when it was not coerced by the government402. 
– Third, it was evident after the two crises that subservience of the central bank to 
the government – notably with respect to government demands that it finance 
budget deficits by printing money – had been major to inflationary tendencies. 
Inflationary financing of war-, reconstruction- and reparation-related expenses had 
been an easy way for governments to handle the resulting burdens in the short run. 
In the long range, though, this came at the expense of the economy as a whole403. 
As a result, by the end of World War II a strong anti-inflationary sentiment, supportive 
of monetary policy strictly committed to securing stable prices and conducted by an 
independent central bank, had become firmly entrenched in the perception of the wider 
German public as a vital precondition for economic stability and social peace404. This 
sentiment has been summarised by Nölling:
401 For a comparison of the two crises with special respect to these differences see Kindleberger 
(1993), pp. 407-408.
402 James (1998) identifies five causes of hyperinflation in the twenties. First, in order to finance 
World War I, the German government suspended important anti-inflationary safeguards in the 
Reichsbank's legal basis, such as the obligatory backing of German bank notes by gold and 
restrictions on discounting treasury bills. Second, with increasing war-related demand for finance 
the government forced the Reichsbank to discount war loans from 1916 onwards. Third, 
inflationary budget financing continued in the immediate post-World War I period, during which 
reconstruction and reparation obligations aggravated the budgetary situation. Fourth, the 
Reichsbank itself cooperated with the government on inflationary financing by discounting an 
increasing amount of short-term government debt, thereby drastically increasing the supply of 
money in the economy. Finally, the Reichsbank also discounted private bills, and did so at negative 
real interest rates. See James (1998), pp. 47-50, and also Kindleberger (1993), pp. 286-293. 
403 See footnote 402 above. 
404 Marsh (1992), pp. 28-32.
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"Regarding the political consequences, especially after the Second World 
War, the call to protect and safeguard the value of the currency, of incomes 
and of savings ranks – in my assessment – second among the most eminent 
duties of the state. Because next to the demand for "No more war!", the call 
from politicians for "No more inflation!" has assumed great importance. 
This is extremely forceful and should not be underestimated. 
This assessment is widespread, and the consensus in the population, among 
politicians of all parties […], and among the leaders of societal groups of all 
kinds – such as trade unions, entrepreneurs, employers, interest associations 
as well as the churches – is all-embracing and irrefutable."405
Similarly, Marsh notes that 
"Germans are worldwide leaders in announcing and practicing the doctrine 
of the hard currency. Pursued with zeal and promoted with conviction, this 
doctrine has developed many meanings: It is the symbol of the country's 
resurrection after the war and a guarantor of orderly conditions. It provides 
security at home and inspires respect abroad. Without monetary stability, 
wealth can neither be generated nor maintained."406
This general attitude has, in turn, led to a widespread appreciation of the set-up of the 
monetary system, i.e. of the Deutsche Bundesbank as an independent institution bound 
by the objective of securing stable prices407.
II.1.2.2 Performance of the monetary system 
Not only the monetary system as such – its rules, institutions and decision-making 
procedures – has met with widespread approval, but also the monetary achievements 
wrought by these tools. From a long-term view and measured against the objective of 
safeguarding the stability of the currency, the Bundesbank posted a positive track 
record in the first decades of its existence, as illustrated in chart 15 by international 
comparison of the purchasing powers of domestic currencies in 1992 compared with 
their 1948 level. More important for the present purpose than this preliminary long-
term view, however, is the detailed development of the major monetary variables in 
the medium-term past, and the extent to which these variables reached levels that may 
have been relevant to the performance of enterprises in trade and industry. This section 
therefore reviews the most important monetary developments in the past three decades 
and evaluates them with respect to their economic impact. Inflation, interest rate and 
exchange rate developments will be considered in turn, arguing that monetary policy 
405 Nölling (1993), p. 37.
406 Marsh (1992), p. 39.
407 Bickerich (1998), p. 159.
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over the past decades has presented no serious and urgent challenges to the German 
economy, to the effect that – viewed in isolation – it was not a serious policy issue for 
interest groups in trade and industry.
Bundesbank performance on safeguarding stability of prices
Chart 15 Chart 16
–
Source: Nölling (1993), p. 41
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Given that the overriding monetary objective of providing a stable price level is shared 
by the majority of German society, the inflationary record of the Bundesbank, and now 
the ECB, is the single most important criterion by which to judge the performance of 
monetary policy and its potential impact on the economy. The international 
comparison presented in chart 15 above already points to good long-term performance 
in this regard, as the purchasing powers reflect a comparatively low inflationary trend 
in the years between 1948 and 1992. In more detail, this is confirmed by the 
development of inflation in the past three decades, as depicted in chart 16. Since 1970 
the annual average rate of inflation in Germany has never exceeded 7%. Over the 
entire period, inflation was as low as 3.2% on average. Most importantly, considering 
the medium to long-term outlook and formulation of the Bundesbank's monetary 
strategy, inflation has followed a secular downward trend bringing price changes on 
average within the range of the bank's latest assumption of underlying normative 
inflation between 1.5% and 2% and the ECB's recent definition of price stability, i.e. 
annual price changes of below 2%. 
Nonetheless, the development also shows that inflation at times considerably exceeded 
– and by the same token raised – the long-term average. Thus, inflation climbed to 7% 
in 1973 and 1974, to 6.3% in 1981 and to 5.1% in 1992. Each of these periods, 
however, highlights the economic pressures the Bundesbank faced and the inflationary 
effects it had to counter with its monetary policy. In the early seventies, inflationary 
pressure grew, first, in response to wage pressures and excess demand in the 
economy408. As from autumn 1973, the first oil crisis substantially aggravated price 
408 Von Hagen (1998), pp. 440-459.
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pressures, given Germany's strong dependence on crude-oil imports, and, following a 
tripling of oil prices in the course of 1973409, led to a sustained uptrend in domestic 
price levels410. Rising international oil prices, triggering a surge in import prices, were 
also the reason for the second period of above-average inflation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s411. The third phase of inflationary pressure in the early 1990s stemmed 
mainly from German reunification and its economic consequences. Given the low 
levels of productivity in the new Länder, combined with high wage settlements and 
substantial fiscal redistribution, domestic wage and price pressure built up, countered 
by only moderately decreasing import prices412.
In all three periods monetary policy was not the primary cause of inflationary trends. 
On the contrary, policymaking worked effectively to cushion and counter exogenous 
inflationary shocks. This is most clearly evident in the case of the two oil crises, when 
the Bundesbank managed to contain the inflationary effects of external price pressure 
such that the country's rate of inflation remained clearly below the levels observed in 
most other industrialised economies, despite the German economy's comparatively 
high exposure to international oil markets413. In the case of the domestically rooted 
inflationary phase in the early 1990s, the Bundesbank reined in the effects of 
continued wage push, especially in the new Länder, bringing about a sustained 
reduction in inflation. Notwithstanding external shocks, the Bundesbank largely 
succeeded in realising its objective to establish a medium and long-term trend of low 
and falling rates of inflation. This trend has continued since the transfer of monetary 
decision-making powers to the ECB.
This has been achieved by pursuing pre-defined monetary targets. As pointed out in 
the institutional context, the Bundesbank pursued money supply targets as from 1974, 
a policy that has essentially been continued by the ECB. Chart 17 below documents 
the difficulties in meeting these self-imposed targets. Depicting the year-on-year 
changes in money supply – Central Bank Money and, as from 1988, M3 – as well as 
inflation – the German consumer price index – on a monthly basis, the lagged 
correlation between the two variables on which the adoption of money-supply targets 
is founded becomes evident. The targeted measures of money supply have moved 
around the target values or outside the corridors announced by the monetary 
409 Smith (1993), pp. 160-161.
410 Von Hagen (1998), p. 458.
411 Baltensperger (1998), pp. 477-190.
412 Baltensperger (1998), pp. 511-529.
413 Von Hagen (1998), p. 458, and Baltensperger (1998), p. 478.
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authorities for considerable periods414, leading the inflationary surges and contractions 
over time. From the perspective of the private sector, however, the Bundesbank's 
performance on meeting the self-imposed monetary targets has been of limited 
relevance. For one thing, as with the inflation rate itself, the growth in money supply 
has always remained near the target values despite the deviations observed, never 
actually reaching levels causing serious concern among policy makers and analysts. 
Second, the public has been primarily concerned with inflation as such, not so much 
with the underlying technicalities. As a result, deviations of money supply variables 
from their targets have aroused only limited public attention or criticism.
Bundesbank and ECB monetary targets
Chart 17
– Money supply, its target values, and inflation, in % per annum
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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The achievement of a stable price level and an inflationary environment, which, by 
both historical and international standards, must be regarded as very moderate, has 
been consistent with and conducive to the anti-inflationary sentiment generally 
observed in German society. Deviations from this medium to long-term trend, both in 
inflation as well as the underlying monetary targets, have been short-lived, and the 
authorities have generally been able to control them so that monetary policy in this 
regard has posed no significant problems for the private sector.
Despite the general anti-inflationary attitude, inflation is not the only monetary 
variable affecting the economy at large and businesses in trade and industry in 
particular. As the earlier discussion of the process of monetary transmission shows, 
monetary conditions and monetary policy affect economic activity in a wide-ranging 
and intricate manner, of which inflation is but one element. Most importantly, interest 
rates and exchange rates directly affect enterprises in their financing, asset 
414 The chart depicts the money-supply targets of the Bundesbank for the Central Bank Money until 
1988 and for M3 until 1998. For the period since 1999, the ECB's reference value for M3 growth is 
shown, together with the values for changes in M3 in Germany.
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management, and foreign trading activities as well as the related corporate decisions. 
In the short run, changes in these variables can significantly influence the operations of 
individuals and enterprises alike. 
Central bank interest rates in Germany
Chart 18
– Bundesbank and ECB standing facilities at end of month, % per annum
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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Chart 18 above shows the major interest rates set by the Bundesbank, the discount and 
Lombard rates, and by the ECB, the deposit rate and the marginal lending facility, 
which determine the rates at which the central bank absorbs and gives off liquidity to 
the commercial banking sector415. As reference rates for the banking industry, these 
parameters form the basis for other interest rates set within the commercial banking 
sector, both between the banks and between banks and ultimate customers. The chart 
shows that central bank interest rates have varied considerably over the past three 
decades, reaching a peak of 8.75% and 9.75% respectively in summer 1992 and a low 
of 1.00% and 3.00% respectively in summer 2003. Phases of high interest rates, 
especially the years from 1974 to 1976, 1980 to 1983 and 1991 to 1994, reflect periods 
of high inflationary pressures and the Bundesbank's counteractive measures curbing 
liquidity. Conversely, the years 1976 to 1980, 1984 to 1989 and 1996 onward mark the 
troughs in the economic cycle when inflationary pressures were considered low. 
Development in the central bank interest rates shows that, given the spread between 
peaks and troughs in these rates over time, the interest costs of central bank credit 
repeatedly more than doubled and, in turn, halved within comparatively short periods 
of time, i.e. two to four years. In as far as the changes in these reference rates are 
passed on by commercial banks to their ultimate customers, monetary policy-induced 
changes in the refinancing and deposit terms can have a significant impact on the 
415 The chart continues the time series after the beginning of 1999 by depicting the equivalent standing
facilities maintained by the ECB, the deposit and the marginal lending facilities.
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credit costs and returns to capital. The impact is likely to be of particular importance 
for enterprises needing to borrow during high-interest periods.
From a theoretical perspective, two considerations may mitigate the impression that 
the interest-rate environment has been subject to considerable inconsistency over time. 
First, like the development in the rate of inflation, the level and changes of central 
bank interest rates in Germany have been low by historical and international standards. 
Second, the impact of changes in the overall level of interest rates may not necessarily 
be as acute as the above nominal values suggest, since in an inflationary environment 
the burden of interest payments is partly offset by the fall in the value of money. In 
other words, the real cost of credit is determined by the real rather than the nominal 
interest rate416. A short-term measure of the real rate of interest – here the annual 
average of the overnight interest rate on the Frankfurt money market less the 
seasonally adjusted rate of change in consumer prices – is presented in chart 19, 
suggesting that changes in real interest rates were far less pronounced over time – even 
during turbulent periods –, and that the overall level was comparatively moderate, 
reaching a peak of 6.89% in 1991.
Real short-term interest rates
Chart 19
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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In practice, however, assessment of the cost of credit by the private sector is based on 
the determinants immediately affecting it. A comparative view in terms of historical 
416 The Deutsche Bundesbank (2001b) points out that real interest rates have been at an historically 
low level on a long-term horizon, concluding that this real rate of interest is not an impediment to 
sustained economic growth in Germany owing to the favourable financing terms for investment. 
The analysis provides a detailed description of the concept of real interest rates as well as various 
indicators of that concept. The indicator provided in chart 19, in contrast, is a rather simple 
illustration of the differences between nominal and real interest rates. Especially with respect to 
long-term real interest rates, Deutsche Bundesbank (2001b) provides an extensive contemporary 
evaluation.
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trends or the financing terms in other economies is therefore likely to be relevant in the 
specific case of, say, a financing decision. Similarly, real interest rates are of 
comparatively little relevance to corporate financial accounting, which is nominal in 
nature so that the mitigating or amplifying effects of price changes do not become 
immediately visible. As a result, the higher and more volatile nominal rates of interest 
are, the more likely they are to dominate the overall appraisal of interest terms by 
private-sector participants. 
The second major monetary variable of concern for the corporate sector is the 
exchange rate of the domestic currency vis-à-vis the rates of the country's trading 
partners. As pointed out in the institutional context, German monetary policy operated 
under various forms of exchange rate regimes for most of the post-war period. After 
the fixed exchange rate system against the USD under the Bretton Woods agreement 
was abandoned in 1973, the Deutsche Mark, like most other international currencies, 
started to float freely on international foreign exchange markets. As a consequence, the 
1970s were characterised by substantial exchange rate fluctuation. As this was 
perceived to be detrimental to international trade and financial market stability, in 
March 1979 European policy makers adopted the European Monetary System 
following initial experience with managed exchange rates under the snake-in-the-
tunnel arrangement. The Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System was designed to stabilise the exchange rates of the participating currencies417
within a target corridor around a grid of bilaterally fixed parities. The Deutsche Mark
served as the de facto anchor currency of the system. 
Chart 20 shows the development in the major EMU predecessor currencies' exchange 
rates against the Deutsche Mark, indexed at the irrevocable conversion rates as of 
January 1, 1999. Most importantly, exchange rate movements between the currencies 
of the member states participating in EMU were eliminated with their irrevocable 
fixing as of January 1, 1999 and introduction of the euro. Preceding the fixing of intra-
EMU exchange rates, their trend documents the continuous nominal appreciation of 
the Deutsche Mark against most other European currencies over the past three 
decades. The depreciation of European partner currencies is most marked in the cases 
of the Portuguese escudo, the Spanish peseta and the Italian lira, whose nominal value 
vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark upon entry into EMU was only a fraction of their values 
in the early 70s. Within the EMS, this crawling depreciation was accompanied by a 
total of 18 devaluations between the system's inception and its de facto suspension in 
417 The founding members of the EMS were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The latter participated in the ERM only as 
from October 1990. After the ERM was de facto suspended in August 1993, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Luxembourg and from 1995 Austria announced their intention to maintain the narrow band 
of +/- 2.25% around the bilateral parities (Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 605 and 609). 
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1993418. A similar, albeit less pronounced development has occurred with respect to 
other important international, non-EMU currencies, notably the US dollar and the 
British pound, as chart 21 shows419.
DEM exchange rates, historical 
Chart 20 Chart 21
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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From an industry perspective, in principle the persistent nominal appreciation of the 
Deutsche Mark implied ceteris paribus a crawling erosion of competitiveness in 
export business, but also a continuous decline in important prices. However, 
considering that domestic inflation has been low in comparison to most other 
industrialised countries, this nominal effect was considerably weakened over time. 
This becomes evident when comparing nominal exchange rate developments with the 
Deutsche Mark's real effective exchange rate as measured by an inflation-adjusted 
weighted basket of the currencies of 19 of Germany's most important trading partners, 
as in chart 22420. In contrast to what the development in nominal exchange rates 
suggests, the real effective exchange rate of the Deutsche Mark has been 
extraordinarily stable over the past decades, implying only moderate losses in 
international competitiveness421. Nevertheless, as in the case of real interest rates, this 
economic logic is not immediately relevant for enterprises in their day-to-day 
calculations and business planning, as their accounting is based on nominal values. As 
a result, the development in the external value of the Deutsche Mark has, in practice, 
given rise to considerable changes in the immediate business environment for 
enterprises directly or indirectly involved in foreign trade.
418 Deutsche Bundesbank (1997), p. 123.
419 DEM exchange rate from 1999 calculated on EUR basis at final conversion rate of EUR 1 = DEM 
1.95583.
420 DEM exchange rate from 1999 calculated on EUR basis at final conversion rate of EUR 1 = DEM 
1.95583.
421 For an opposite view see Weimer (1998), pp. 461-463.
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Whether these changes in the business environment are positive or negative for the 
enterprises concerned essentially depends on two factors. 
– First, it hinges on the extent to which individual enterprises or sectors are directly 
or indirectly exposed to external trade in general and the weight exports and 
imports have in their turnover. We will look into this question in greater detail in 
the following section. 
– Second, it depends on the intensity and length of the appreciation and depreciation
cycles observable within the secular trend of appreciation of the Deutsche Mark, 
and on individual enterprises’ time horizons. Assuming an enterprise takes a 
medium or long-term outlook, cyclical exchange rate movements may not be 
perceived as critical, because downward and upward movements may even each 
other out over time and the real impact of exchange rate changes has been very 
low in the long-run. For a short-term trade project, however, inter-temporal 
exchange rate alterations may significantly affect its profitability.
DEM real effective exchange rate 
Chart 22
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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II.1.2.3 Exposure of trade and industry to monetary policy
The review of major economic variables shows that monetary policy has achieved a 
stable monetary environment for the German economy over the past three decades. 
Indeed, there has been a clear long-term downward trend in inflation, nominal and real 
interest rates and the fluctuation in exchange rates. At the same time, interest and 
exchange rates in particular naturally continue to move in cycles, at times reaching 
levels – both peaks and troughs – which enterprises exposed to these variables may 
perceive as particularly favourable or unfavourable for their operations. Despite the 
potentially large impact of these variables on the German economy as a whole, the 
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incentives for enterprises and their interest representatives to take political action with 
regard to monetary policy are even less than the overall picture suggests. This is 
because the impact of these variables on business activity is rather slight and diffuse, 
such that the costs and benefits emanating from central bank interest and exchange 
rates may effectively be viewed as negligible. Given the difficulties associated with 
tracing the financial impact of monetary policy measures at the individual enterprise 
level and the lack of representativeness such calculations imply, the following 
aggregate data are presented as examples illustrating the marginal final impact of 
monetary policy decisions on the private sector.
Structure of enterprises’ external finance in Germany
Chart 23 Chart 24
–
Data source: European Central Bank
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At first sight, this point looks counterintuitive. For their financing, German enterprises 
in trade and industry – as chart 23 above suggests422 – are heavily dependent on 
commercial bank credit, as opposed to capital-market based financing, notably through 
bonds or shares423. This is especially so for the large number of small and medium-
sized enterprises, the segment of Germany's corporate landscape accounting for the 
highest proportion of aggregate turnover and employment424. Given the outstanding 
and immediate role of banks and bank credit in the transmission of monetary policy, 
the heavy reliance on bank credit implies rather direct exposure of German enterprises 
to monetary policy measures.
422 Viewed in the long-term, the proportion of credit as the primary source of German non-financial 
enterprises’ financing is structurally higher than depicted in charts 23 and 24, as the data for end-
2000 contain a comparatively high weighting of shares and other forms of equity. The latter was 
particularly high at the reporting date owing to the stock market boom at the time. 
423 European Central Bank (2002), pp. 84-86. Also Smith (1993), pp. 354-366, or Franke (1998), 
pp. 260-263.
424 European Central Bank (2002), pp. 84-86. Also Smith (1993), pp. 419-427.
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The structural exposure to bank credit notwithstanding, interest rates have a very small 
impact on the profit and loss accounts of non-financial corporations in Germany. As 
chart 25 illustrates, the interest paid by German non-financial corporations in 2001 
made up only 1.5% of their total costs, compared to 61.4% spent on materials, 16.6% 
on labour costs, and 2.7% on taxes.
Components of costs and income of enterprises in Germany
Chart 25 Chart 26
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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Over the past three decades, the share of interest-related expenses at non-financial 
corporations has varied between a minimum of 1.2% in the late 1980s and a maximum 
of 2.1% in 1974 and again in 1982, as depicted in chart 27425. 
Weighting of enterprises’ interest expenditure in Germany
Chart 27
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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The cycles of interest expenses broadly followed the movements of central bank 
interest rates, with a lag of one to two years, as the direct comparison shows. As a 
result, the share of interest-related costs has not only been comparatively small, but 
has varied only moderately over time. Even during periods of pronounced rises in 
central bank interest rates, as in the mid-1970s, the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, the 
maximum medium-term increase in the share of interest expenses in total costs 
amounted to only 0.5, 0.8, and 0.6 percentage points respectively.
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Insofar as interest-related costs – however small – strain German enterprises’ 
profitability, on average the burden weighs more heavily on small and medium-sized 
firms than on large enterprises. A breakdown of the corporate sector by legal forms –
as presented in chart 28 – shows that the share of interest expenditure is smallest for 
corporations, slightly higher but still below the total average for partnerships, but twice 
as high as average for sole proprietorships, i.e. in general the smallest business units. 
Further, the industry breakdown in chart 29 shows that the burden of interest servicing 
is greatest for firms in the capital-intensive construction and transport sectors. For 
firms engaged in wholesale trade, however, the share of interest expenses is 25% 
below the total average. In industries characterised by large corporations with easier 
access to alternative forms of external finance, such as manufacturing companies and 
utilities, the proportion of interest servicing is also comparatively low, despite their 
capital intensity.
Weight of interest expenses for enterprises in Germany
Chart 28 Chart 29
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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As a result, the overall burden of interest-related costs on German enterprises is low 
compared with other cost components. The direct impact of monetary policy –
although probably more marked for the large number of small and medium-sized 
enterprises and for companies in the construction and transport sectors – is relatively 
small. The impact is even less pronounced on the income side of German enterprises’ 
profit and loss accounts, as the share of interest-related income in total corporate 
revenues amounts to only 0.7% in the data for 2001426. Overall, monetary policy has 
not had a critical impact on German enterprises’ profitability in the recent past. 
A second factor weakening the perception of monetary policy as an economic burden 
on corporate activities is that central bank interest rates are not transmitted directly 
425 The share of German enterprises’ interest income is even lower, as shown in chart 26.
426 See chart 26 on page 168.
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into the corporate sector, being channelled instead through the commercial banking 
system and other segments of the financial markets. This has two intermediary effects 
on the perception of monetary policy. First, the level of market interest rates on bank 
lending differs from central bank rates, depending on the pricing behaviour of 
individual banks. These are driven mainly by considerations of their own profit 
margins, the credit quality of the borrower and the maturity of the loan.
Interest rates on corporate credit and corporate bond yields
Chart 30
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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Chart 30 depicts minimum, average, and maximum rates offered by German 
commercial banks for long-term corporate lending between EUR 0.5 m and EUR 5 m 
as registered by the Bundesbank between 1996 and June 2003. The interest rates on 
corporate credit are generally above central bank lending rates and, most importantly, 
move within a broad corridor between the minimum and maximum rates observed. On 
average, lending rates were 1.79% above the central bank rates during the reporting 
period, with minimum and maximum values for that difference of 0.77% and 2.98% 
respectively. The spread between the highest and lowest reported lending rates 
amounted to 2.64% on average, with a minimum of 2.14% and a maximum of 3.99%. 
In terms of ultimate customers’ perception, this implies that the interest rate terms for 
corporate loans – although dependent on the overall interest environment created by 
the central bank – are primarily set by the banking sector, shifting the focus of 
attention to the latter. This view is accentuated by the fact that the lending rates to 
ultimate customers set by commercial banks tend to anticipate central bank rate rises, 
while being slow to follow an easing in overall interest rates. In addition, direct capital 
market-based financing via corporate bonds can be achieved at comparatively low 
interest rates, as the level of corporate bond yields in chart 30 suggests. In the case of 
corporate securities, the average difference to central bank rates amounts to only 
1.06%, with a maximum of 3.00% and a minimum of -0.10% during the reporting 
period. 
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The second intermediary effect weakening the association of credit costs with central 
bank policies relates to the maturity of corporate credit. In Germany, lending to 
corporate borrowers tends to be long-term in nature, i.e. with maturities of more than 
five years, and mainly on the basis of fixed-rate loan agreements427. Changes in the 
monetary environment therefore tend to have a direct impact on an individual 
enterprise only when it takes out a new loan or renegotiates an existing contract. 
Consequently, unless corporations are heavily exposed to short-term or revolving 
loans, changes in the overall interest environment do not immediately weigh on the 
cost side.
The immediacy with which changes in the monetary environment are perceived by the 
private sector is tempered not only in respect of changes in interest rates, but also with 
regard to exchange rate movements. Again, checks on the perception of the effects of 
monetary policy do not immediately follow from the basic characteristics of the 
German economy. After all, the German economy is highly integrated into the global 
economy, with total receipts from exports, cross-border services and factor income of 
EUR 877 bn and expenditure on imports, cross-border services and factor income of 
EUR 783 bn in 2002, as shown in chart 31. Repeatedly, the country has been the 
world's largest exporting nation, with shipments amounting to 36% of GDP in 2003.
427 European Central Bank (2002), p. 84. Since the late 1990s, a marked increase in the share of short-
term financing has been observed. The stability of this trend has not yet been verified, however. 
Germany's international trade and capital flows
Chart 31 Chart 32
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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Despite this substantial engagement in cross-border trade, however, exchange rate 
movements are becoming less important to German businesses. As already pointed 
out, the past decades brought profound stabilisation in the vast majority of exchange 
rates within the ERM. With the launch of EMU, exchange rate-related costs have been 
eliminated completely with respect to eleven of Germany's trading partners. 
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This trend has been complemented by the patterns of German trade. As chart 32
shows, trade with EMU member states accounts for almost half of Germany's exports 
and imports. In other words, a large part of German trade has been pursued with 
countries whose currencies stabilised significantly vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark over 
the past years and which in 1999 also joined the single currency. Other important 
European trading partners not belonging to EMU, such as Denmark, Sweden and the 
Czech Republic, have also used the Deutsche Mark and subsequently the EUR as an 
anchor currency, leading to increasing stabilisation of the relevant exchange rates. 
At less than 25%, trade with other economies whose currencies have been floating 
freely against the Deutsche Mark and EUR, i.e. most importantly the US, the UK, 
Switzerland and Japan, has a modest share in Germany's total external trade. As 
observed above, these currencies have remained subject to substantial medium-term 
fluctuation. 
An additional aspect weakening involvement with exchange rate-related issues results 
from the structure of exports and imports across industrial sectors. As charts 33 and 34
show, the four sectors most strongly involved in export business are, at the same time, 
also the sectors most heavily engaged in imports, albeit in a different order and in 
different proportions. This overlap reflects, among other things, that – directly or 
indirectly – the production of finished goods in Germany depends enormously on 
imports of raw materials or intermediary goods. Insofar as this is the case, the effects 
of alterations in the exchange rate can cancel each other out along the value chain, 
limiting possible distortionary effects on exchange rate developments occurring 
between the purchase of imported raw materials or semi-finished goods and sale of the 
final product.
German foreign trade by sector
Chart 33 Chart 34
–
Data source: Federal Statistical Office
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A similar picture emerges in the context of Germany's external capital links. Again, 
German enterprises’ commitment is substantial, with a total of EUR 699 bn invested 
abroad end-2001. 81% of this took the form of foreign direct investment and 19% 
loans granted by German shareholders in foreign companies, as chart 35 shows. In 
total, German corporations and individuals hold interests in more than 28,000 
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enterprises abroad with an aggregate turnover of more than EUR 1 trillion in 2001 and 
total assets of EUR 4.8 trillion. Again, however, a country breakdown reveals that 
large proportions of cross-border investment have been realised in countries with 
stable exchange rate links to the domestic currency.
Germany's foreign capital and direct investment links
Chart 35 Chart 36
–
Data source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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The country breakdown of foreign direct investment nevertheless also shows that 
cross-border links, especially with the US as the single largest target country for direct 
investments from Germany, should not be underestimated. The same applies to the 
share of exports and imports transacted with that country, amounting to 10.5% and 
7.8% respectively of the 2002 total. In these cross-border business links, the exchange 
rate has remained a critical variable, influencing the value of the relevant engagements 
and the related revenues and expenditures. 
One way of looking at these cross-border exposures is to refer to the possibility for 
trading enterprises to hedge their exchange risks on financial derivatives markets. The 
importance of these markets for covering trading risks has increased steadily since the 
1980s, creating a market segment with an average daily turnover of USD 853 bn in 
over-the-counter and USD 10 bn in exchange-traded foreign-exchange derivatives428. 
Germany is the fifth-largest market for OTC foreign exchange derivatives with daily 
turnover of USD 65.2 bn or 5.5% of the world market429. In the German market, 
contracts involving the US dollar capture the largest market share of 44.4%, as chart 
37 shows. In April 1998, daily world market turnover in Deutsche Mark foreign 
exchange contracts with other currencies amounted to USD 218 bn, of which the 
largest share, namely 76%, were contracts for US dollars, 5% each for Japanese yen 
428 Bank for International Settlements (2002), p. 18. Figures for April 2001.
429 Bank for International Settlements (2002), p. 21. Figures for April 2001.
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and British pounds, and 6.4% for other EMS currencies430. With respect to the euro, 
worldwide derivatives turnover today totals USD 303 bn daily, with USD contracts 
accounting for 84.5%, JPY contracts 5.9%, and GBP contracts 4.6%431.
German foreign exchange derivatives market by currency and counterparty
Chart 37 Chart 38
–
Data source: Bank for International Settlements
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Only 7.6% of the daily trading in foreign exchange derivatives on the German market 
is transacted directly with non-financial customers, suggesting that the large majority 
of derivatives contracts are concluded among financial market participants, as chart 38
pinpoints. This raises the question as to how far trade and industrial enterprises 
actually make use of hedging instruments to insure themselves against exchange rate 
risks. A 1997 survey among 126 non-financial firms in Germany432 showed as many as 
78% used derivative instruments; 96% of these employed exchange rate derivatives as 
opposed to, say, interest rate or commodity derivatives. Use of derivatives was found 
to be most extensive in the services and mechanical engineering industries, nearly all 
of which were engaged in derivatives dealings, followed by the metal, electronics, and 
chemical industries. Derivatives usage was lowest in the retail and consumer products 
sectors, where less than 80% of the responding firms reported positively, and in the 
construction business, with just over 60% of firms participating in derivatives 
trading433. The pattern by sector was found to correspond largely to the respective 
industries’ exposure to foreign trade434.
Most importantly, however, the survey points to substantial limitations in the use of 
foreign exchange derivatives. In the main, the survey addressed large corporations 
430 Bank for International Settlements (2002), p. 19. Figures for OTC products in April 1998.
431 Bank for International Settlements (2002), p. 19. Figures for EUR-based OTC products in April 
2001.
432 See Bodnar, Gebhardt (1998). Figures cited here are likely to have changed substantially after the 
national currencies of the member states participating in EMU were replaced by the euro.
433 Bodnar, Gebhardt (1998), p. 4.
434 Bodnar, Gebhardt (1998), pp. 5-6.
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with annual turnover of more than EUR 100 m. Within this cohort of large enterprises, 
the responses showed that company size was the decisive determinant for derivatives 
usage, with participation ratios ranging from 94% among corporations with turnover 
between EUR 2.5 bn and EUR 5 bn to only 50% among firms with turnover of less 
than EUR 250 m. This size effect points to the high fixed costs of hedging 
programmes that make derivatives usage uneconomical for smaller enterprises435. This 
correlation is corroborated by the responses from businesses not using derivatives, 
61% of which cited the lack of sufficient risk exposure as the most important reason 
for non-usage436. As a result, the vast majority of enterprises are unlikely to be in a 
position in which taking recourse to foreign-exchange hedging is economically viable. 
Finally, even enterprises using foreign exchange hedging still face costs from 
exchange rate fluctuation between the euro and non-EMU currencies, since hedging as 
such gives rise to trading and transaction costs. In other words, exchange rate hedging 
merely transforms the potential costs associated with the risk of exchange rate 
alterations into the more calculable ex ante costs of purchasing derivative contracts. 
Either way, exchange rates and their movements create costs for enterprises. 
Consequently, fluctuations in the exchange rates of major non-EMU trading partners 
remain a source of substantial expense for German enterprises. 
II.1.2.4 Dominance of competing economic issues
The fourth factor weakening the involvement of stakeholders in trade and industry 
with monetary policy is the dominance of competing policy issues. As pointed out in 
chapter IV, the resources constraints facing interest associations and their members 
naturally limit the number of policy issues they can handle at a time, as well as the 
intensity with which selected policy issues can be addressed. The question arises as to 
what extent the political agenda is occupied with competing policy issues that are also 
relevant for interest groups in trade and industry and may outweigh monetary policy in 
terms of importance for the political activities of these groups.
Issue agendas are different for each stakeholder in the political arena and vary over 
time, making an all-encompassing view of the agenda of issues competing with 
monetary policy a resource-intensive undertaking beyond the scope of the present 
analysis. Nevertheless, in order to achieve a view of the policy agenda on which 
monetary policy is likely to compete, the economic policy agenda as viewed by the 
German Council of Economic Experts will be examined here. As noted in the 
institutional context, the German Council of Economic Experts is an academic body 
set up in 1963, which advises the German government and parliament on economic 
435 Bodnar, Gebhardt (1998), p. 5.
436 Bodnar, Gebhardt (1998), p. 6.
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policy issues. It periodically assesses Germany's economic development and, acting as 
a body independent in its advisory activities, makes policy recommendations with a 
view to concurrently ensuring price stability, high employment and external 
equilibrium, plus steady and adequate economic growth. The Council comprises five 
economic experts – mainly academics – nominated by the government and appointed 
by the president for a term of five years.
The Annual Report, which the Council publishes each November and in which it 
assesses the country’s economic development, systematically examines the hurdles on 
the way towards achieving the four major economic objectives of price stability, high 
employment, external equilibrium and adequate economic growth. It also submits 
policy proposals for resolving the problems identified. As such, it represents a useful 
indicator of the country's economic policy agenda. First, it is primarily concerned with 
the economic problems of the country as a whole. To that end, it also keeps a sharp 
watch on the needs of Germany's corporate sector. The latter point is underscored by 
the close cooperation between the Council and business associations in drafting the 
report437. At the same time, its analysis is not limited to the particular preferences of a 
single interest group, as the Council has to base its analysis and judgment on the 
Federation's economic policy objectives, and not on those of particular segments in 
society. Albeit not perfectly congruent with the views of interest groups in trade and 
industry, the Council's reports contain valuable hints about the problems besetting 
Germany's corporate sector. Second, the Annual Reports provide for strong continuity 
in criteria of issue selection, analysis, and methodology over time, permitting quite a 
consistent view of the evolution in Germany's economic policy agenda. Finally, the 
Council concentrates on economically relevant issues. This fades out a number of 
other politically, socially and otherwise relevant policy issues but allows for a focused 
comparison of monetary policy with other existing policy issues. 
A proxy for the composition and development of the economic policy agenda in 
Germany can be achieved by listing and comparing the policy issues addressed by the 
Council in its Annual Report. Although the reports cover the whole range of economic 
policy-making areas, an indicator of the priorities set by the Council is the foreword in 
each report, which summarises the main findings and recommendations. Charts 39 and 
40 summarise the findings reached by recording the major policy issues identified in 
the executive summaries of the Council's Annual Reports since 1970.
437 Close cooperation is documented inter alia by the Council's acknowledgements in the forewords of 
its Annual Reports. See German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report, 1970-2003.
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Issue agenda – economic policy issues 1970-2003
Chart 39
–
Data source: German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Reports, 1970-2003
Number of years in which economic policy issues were addressed by the German Council of Economic Experts in 
its Annual Report, 1970-2003
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As depicted in chart 39, monetary policy is referred to explicitly in eleven of the 34 
executive summaries since 1970. Exchange rate developments or policies are referred 
to in six reports. In addition to these two issues, the reports regularly feature at least 15 
other policy areas as relevant to overall achievement of the country's economic 
objectives. Fiscal policy, together with tax policy, clearly dominates prioritisation by 
the Council over the past decades, featuring in nearly three-quarters of all reports. 
Second, labour market and wage policy play an important role in nearly half of the 
reports respectively. Further important issues include international competitiveness, 
industrial policy, the international economic environment and the different elements of 
Germany's welfare state, most importantly the healthcare, pension and unemployment 
benefit systems. As a result, monetary policy over time has competed with a relatively 
large number of other important policy issues. The ranking of monetary and exchange 
rate issues on the economic policy agenda over the past years is illustrated in chart 40. 
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Issue agenda – density of issues and the role of monetary and exchange rate policy
Chart 40
–
– Average number of major policy issues addressed per year: 
– Average indicative ranking of monetary policy in the relevant years:
– Average indicative ranking of exchange rate policy in the relevant years:
Data source: German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Reports, 1970-2003
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More detailed examination of the distribution of policy issues over time reveals three 
important properties of the agenda.
– First, the number of issues on the political agenda has tended to increase over 
time, most notably during the 1990s. In fact, the Council’s analyses and comments 
suggest that the country's economic problems have become more numerous and 
more severe over the past three decades. 
– Second, in terms of content there has also been a marked shift away from classical 
macroeconomic issues, such as the balance of payments, exchange rate and 
monetary policy and income policies, which were dominant throughout most of 
the 1970s, towards supply-side issues and heightened concern with the level and 
structure of taxation, the structure of labour markets, wage levels, industrial policy 
including privatisation, and lately the welfare state and reform of the related 
benefit and insurance systems. 
– Third, monetary and exchange rate policies have entered the list of major issues 
less and less frequently over time, starting from almost annual references in the 
early 1970s – i.e. at the time of exchange rate turmoil and accelerating inflation 
during the first oil crisis – and emerging only occasionally since the 1980s, e.g. in 
the context of the post-reunification inflationary period or pronounced exchange 
rate developments in the mid-1990s and since adoption of EMU.
– Fourth, when attempting to rank the issues in each executive summary from the 
order in which they are mentioned, the space devoted to them and the urgency 
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attached to individual issues verbally, it becomes clear that – in line with the 
preceding findings – monetary and exchange rate policies were among the 
dominant issues, taking first or second rank in a shortlist of policy issues, mainly 
in the early 1970s and on occasion in the 1980s. Since then, other policy issues 
have dominated the arena, with monetary issues getting less attention than the 
growing majority of other issues.
An important case highlighting these four observations is the Council's 2002 report, in 
which the experts tabled a programme comprising 20 measures they deemed necessary 
to return Germany to higher employment and economic growth. The 20 measures, 
listed in table 6, essentially feature supply-side measures typical of the policy debate in 
the past 15 years related to fiscal and tax policy as well as to reform of the welfare 
system. Monetary and exchange rate-related issues do not play a role, save for a very 
indirect reference via the call on the government to meet the conditions of the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact and thereby contribute to a stability-oriented monetary 
policy at EU level438. This, however, is not addressed to the central bank and monetary 
decision makers.
On the individual political agendas of business interest groups in trade and industry, 
the small and diminishing role of monetary policy is accentuated by their specific 
outlook on the political environment. They are likely to take a less macroeconomic 
view of the policy agenda, giving priority to the policy issues of immediate relevance 
to their members, their sector or the region in which they operate. Thus, specific tax 
provisions, market regulation, industrial policy or sectoral wage developments feature 
more prominently on individual group agendas. Monetary policy and exchange rates 
are likely to be regarded as exogenous economic conditions whose impact has been 
small and has declined in past decades, and which are much harder to influence than 
other policy issues decided by elected policy makers. 
438 The rise of supply side-related policy issues over the past decades has been analysed in historical 
perspective by Weimer (1998), pp. 435-467.
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German Council of Economic Experts: Twenty measures for employment and growth
Table 6
– Lowering tax rates further, aiming for integration of income and company taxation
– Rolling back the state in favour of private activity, while at the same time shifting government 
spending towards public-sector investment
– Reducing public debt, which implies strengthening the forces of growth and easing the burdens 
on future generations
– Elements of a growth programme for east Germany
– Reducing marginal fiscal charges on labour
– Keeping pay increases below the rate of growth in labour productivity
– Limiting unemployment benefits to 12 months again
– Integrating unemployment benefits into social benefits
– More employment in the low wage sector requires reform of the structure of social welfare 
benefits
– More flexibility – responsibility of parties to collective pay agreements
– Amendment to statutory regulations in the interests of decentralised wage-setting
– Expanding the possibilities for fixed-term employment contracts – less stringent protection 
against dismissal
– Allocation of new roles to statutory and private health insurance
– More performance-based fee structures for outpatient doctors
– Liberalisation of pharmaceutical sales
– Freedom of contracting for the statutory health insurance schemes
– No discretionary extension of contributions base
– Shift from income-related contributions to flat-rate capitation charges geared to health costs
– More competition in private health insurance
– Pro-active approach to budget consolidation – adherence to Stability and Growth Pact
Source: German Council of Economic Experts, Annual Report 2002-2003
This is indicated by the policy areas interest associations cover. Table 7439 provides an 
indicative list of major issue areas addressed by a selection of the leading German 
interest associations in trade and industry covered in this study440. Monetary and 
exchange rate matters are not explicitly covered by any of these associations. In 
individual cases, they are subsumed under general economic issues in as far as the 
latter are dealt with at all.
In summary, the general economic policy agenda and the areas of activity of 
Germany's major interest associations in trade and industry make it evident that 
monetary policy is only one of a considerable number of important policy issues and 
that it has diminished markedly in importance and attention over time, outweighed by 
439 See p. 182.
440 Table 7 is compiled on the basis of lists of topics covered by the relevant interest associations or 
the titles of their organisational units as published by these associations in brochures, annual 
reports and on their internet pages as per February 12, 2004. Associations and areas of activity are 
listed in alphabetical order.
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other general economic policy issues as well as by individual and specialised 
associations’ sector- and industry-specific concerns.
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German trade and industry associations and major areas of activity
Table 7
Name of association Sector Major areas of activity
– Export controls – Export finance
– Export counselling – Export pricing
– Export credit insurance – Export promotion
– Central and east European affairs – Public procurement, defence industry
– Economic policy – Small and medium-sized enterprises
– Energy, telecommunications – Taxation, fiscal affairs
– Environmental affairs – Technology, innovation
– EU affairs – Trade policy
– International markets – Transport policy
– Legal affairs, competition
– Agricultural, environmental policy – Logistics and transport policy
– Finance and taxation – Trade policy
– Legal affairs and competition – Wage and social policy
– Business location policy – Innovation, environment, energy policy
– Business services for members – International affairs
– Economic policy – Legal affairs
– EU affairs – Services, infrastructure, regional policy
– Finance and taxation – Small and medium-sized enterprises
– Economic policy – Social policy
– International contracts and relations – Technology
– Legal, taxation, business affairs
– Bank cards, customer cards – Euro, European Monetary Union
– Business administration, controlling – Innovation
– Business establishment, succession – Labour, social policy
– Business location, transport policy – Legal affairs, competition
– Consumer policy, non-food products – Postal policy
– Economics and statistics – Taxation
– Electronic business – Vocational training
– Environmental policy
– Chemicals policy – Science and research
– Economic policy, fiscal policy – Trade policy
– Environmental affairs, responsible care
– Automotive parts and accessories – Technology
– Environmental affairs – Trade fairs
– EU affairs – Trade, commodities, economic policy
– Legal affairs, taxation, insurance – Trailers, superstructure, containers
– Logistics – Transport policy
– Statistics, analysis, forecasts
– Business administration – Market information systems
– Economics, statistics – Standards
– EU affairs – Taxation
– Finance, controlling – Technology, environment
– Informatics, communication – Trade policy
– Legal affairs – Transport policy
– Business services for members – Taxation
– EU affairs – Trade fairs
– Science and research – Trade policy
– Business administration, taxation – Information technology
– Economic, industrial, trade policy – Legal affairs, public procurement
– Economics and statistics – Research, vocational training
– Electrical engineering – Sales promotion
– Environmental policy – Transport policy
Sources: Annual reports, background brochures and internet websites of relevant interest groups
Zentralverband 
Elektrotechnik- und 
Elektronikindustrie e.V., 
ZVEI
Electrical 
engineering
Verband Deutscher 
Maschinen- und Anlagenbau 
e.V., VDMA
Mechanical 
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II.1.3 Group context: industry and trade associations in Germany 
The third determinant of interest-group activity is the interest group context. Assuming 
that enterprises and interest groups in trade and industry do indeed have identifiable 
preferences with respect to monetary policy, the question arises whether and how these 
preferences are communicated to the relevant policy makers, and what resources the 
actors mediating these interests can fall back on in their work. This section reviews the 
interest groups potentially relevant to the communication of trade and industry’s 
monetary policy-related interests in Germany, arguing that the relevant associations 
are a formidable force in Germany's political arena. But not only is their interest in 
monetary affairs very low, as argued in the preceding sections; even when interest 
groups in trade and industry do have preferences on monetary issues that they wish to 
communicate, the effectiveness of the relevant interest associations’ work is, ceteris 
paribus, constrained by certain limitations to the monetary policy-related 
informational resources and internal coherence necessary for effective representation 
of such potential preferences.
II.1.3.1 Interest associations in trade and industry
Interests pertaining to monetary and exchange rate policy in Germany are 
communicated via the country's existing infrastructure of trade and industry interest 
associations. Specific cause groups dedicated to monetary policy issues do not exist in 
trade and industry, nor in any other economic or societal stratum in Germany441. 
For interests in trade and industry, this infrastructure essentially centres around five 
leading interest associations442:
441 No relevant entries can be found e.g. in the interest-group registry of the Deutsche Bundestag or in 
Hoppenstedt (1998). With the Association for the Monetary Union of Europe, AMUE, an interest 
group existed from 1987 to 2002 dedicated to promoting the establishment of a single currency in 
Europe. AMUE was a network of European business leaders engaged in formal and informal 
activities, in the establishment and operation of which German managers and policy makers played 
a key role. As AMUE was concerned with bringing about a new overall monetary regime for 
Europe, rather than with influencing operation of the existing system, the association is not covered 
in the present context. AMUE was dissolved after its objective had been achieved in 2002 with the 
physical introduction of the euro. For a detailed account see Collignon, Schwarzer (2003).
442 Other interest associations related to the two sectors in the economy are the Bundesvereinigung 
Deutscher Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA, representing employers, the Vereinigung Deutscher 
Elektrizitätswerke e.V., VDEW, and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Gas- und Wasserwirtschaft 
e.V., representing utilities, and other specialised umbrella associations representing the transport 
sectors, tourism, cooperative businesses, agriculture and the liberal professions. For a complete list 
see Hoppenstedt (1999), pp. 76-153. These associations are not covered here on a systematic basis 
because of their high degree of thematic or sectoral specialisation – rendering activity on monetary 
issues rather unlikely – and because the majority of enterprises represented by these associations is 
also directly or indirectly represented by the five leading associations above. This also applies to 
overarching committees and confederations, such as the Gemeinschaftsausschuss der Deutschen 
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– Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., BDI
The BDI is Germany's top industrial association with 36 sectoral industry 
associations as its members. In the main these consist of large corporations in the 
automobile, construction, chemical, media, electronics, commodities, 
telecommunications, mechanical engineering, steel, tourism, and transport sectors.
– Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, DIHK
The DIHK is the top-level association of Germany's 81 chambers of industry and 
commerce. Given that all enterprises in Germany443 are obliged by law to be a 
member of one of the chambers of industry or commerce irrespective of their 
sector or size, the DIHK represents more than three million enterprises and 
characterises itself as the representative of Germany's trade and industry as a 
whole444.
– Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH
The ZDH is the umbrella organisation of skilled crafts in Germany, uniting 55 
craft chambers, membership in which is prescribed by law for craft enterprises, as 
well as 46 national sectoral confederations, in which craft enterprises can 
participate voluntarily. Indirectly, these associations represent a total of 840,000 
enterprises, especially small and medium-sized.
– Bundesverband des Groß- und Außenhandels e.V., BGA
The BGA is the peak organisation for interest groups associated with wholesale 
and foreign trade. Its membership comprises 15 Land associations, twelve regional 
associations as well as 48 national sectoral associations, representing a total of 
120,000 enterprises, most of them small and medium-sized. 
– Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels, HDE
The HDE is the peak association of German retail businesses, composed of 15 
Land associations, 74 regional associations, and 26 national sectoral associations, 
representing 430,000 enterprises of all sizes, most of them small or medium-sized.
The work of these five top umbrella associations is complemented by the activities of a 
large number of sectoral or regional organisations, some of the most important of 
Gewerblichen Wirtschaft and the Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Handelsverbände, in which the 
five major peak associations participate on selected issues of joint concern.
443 Enterprises in the handicraft business, the free professions and agriculture are exempted from this 
rule (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (2003), p. 4). For a detailed description of the legal 
and statutory provisions of the German system of business chambers as well as the related funding 
system see Triesch, Ockenfels (1995), pp. 137-144. 
444 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (2003), p. 4
185
which are included in table 7 above, and which are either constituents or members of 
the peak organisations, or associated with them.
The five top associations are well-established in the German political system; most of 
them, including their sectoral member associations, can look back on a long history of 
interest representation, often dating back to the nineteenth century445. Since their re-
establishment between 1945 and 1948446, the trade and industry associations have 
become the most important interlocutors for policy makers with trade and industry447. 
Being the formal interest associations of the corporate sector, this is quite natural for 
the most part. Nevertheless, the importance of these associations has been 
strengthened by two factors.
– First, German trade and industry is highly organised448. As pointed out, enterprises 
in trade and industry are obliged by law to become part of their local chamber of 
industry or commerce. Similarly, all crafts businesses are organised in their local 
craft chambers. The local units are ultimately represented by the DIHK or the 
ZDH at federal level. In addition, a great number of enterprises are voluntarily 
organised in specific sectoral interest associations, most of which are, in turn, 
members of one of the above peak associations, especially the BDI449. 
– Second, the German political system has generally been characterised by a 
comparatively close relationship between policy makers and organised interests, 
amounting at certain times to neo-corporatist tendencies450. This proximity of 
politics and organised interests has also extended to the relations between policy 
445 For an historical overview see e.g. Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (1992), 
Volume 1, pp. 13-103. Also Weimer (1998), pp. 68-70.
446 Weimer (1998), pp. 68-70, Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (1992), Volume 1, 
pp. 109-133.
447 Wilson (1990), p. 95.
448 Wilson (1990), p. 94.
449 Wilson (1990) estimates that voluntary associations cover more than 70% of the corporate sector, 
with only the smallest-scale employers as an exception (p. 94).
450 Wilson (1990), pp. 88-101. Wilson also elaborates on the changing patterns in these corporatist 
structures, arguing that the 1960s and ‘70s saw a brief but marked rise in neo-corporatist 
relationships between government and business. These relationships, however, failed to become 
institutionalised in a formal way in the long run. Also, informal neo-corporatist structures 
weakened in the 1980s. The failure of neo-corporatism to develop fully is traced back to the fact 
that in many instances neither interest associations nor the Federal Government were able to make 
binding commitments – the former because of certain shortcomings in their authority over their 
members, and the latter due to the intricacies of the federal system, in which it relies on the support 
of the Länder for most decisions relevant to economic policymaking. In addition, Wilson 
emphasises that the Federal Government is not in command of all areas of economic policymaking. 
He explicitly refers to monetary policy in this context and to the Bundesbank as one of the central 
banks "most insulated from political control" (p. 99). Paterson, Southern (1991) emphasise, 
however, that corporatist or neo-corporatist tendencies have been limited in terms of the policy 
areas in which they occurred, over time, as well as in intensity (pp. 242-246). 
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makers and industry. Close formal, semi-formal and informal participation by 
business associations in the process of federal policymaking has resulted in these 
associations bringing substantial political weight and influence to bear on the final 
outcomes of the political process. Historically, this tendency has been most 
pronounced under conservative governments451. 
In terms of political influence at federal level, therefore, the peak trade and industry 
associations play an important part in communication of the interests of trade and 
industry as a whole. Regional and sector-specific associations, in contrast, focus on 
their specific constituencies’ immediate sectional concerns. 
In this environment peak associations are likely to play a significant role in 
communication between business and the Bundesbank. As argued above, monetary 
policy measures cannot be implemented in a discretionary manner with respect to 
regions or sectors, say, but necessarily act on the economy as a whole in an 
indiscriminate manner. By the same token, monetary objectives are formulated with 
respect to the entirety of the state or economic area to which they apply, and monetary 
strategy, tactics and measures have to meet these economy-wide objectives and the 
needs of the economy in its entirety. As a result, monetary policy makers are primarily 
concerned with aggregate economic developments and, as a corollary, with aggregate 
economic interests. Regional or sectoral preferences and information are relevant for 
the central bank only in as far as they help to establish a complete picture of the 
economic situation. As a result, the wider an association’s constituency and the greater 
its representativeness with respect to the economy in general and economic sectors in 
particular, the more relevant it is likely to be as a contact for the central bank. In that 
sense, the above peak associations are the primary interlocutors for the Bundesbank. 
This is largely reflected in the composition of the roundtable of economists that the 
Bundesbank invites on a twice-yearly basis, as noted in the institutional context.
This centripetal tendency, however, does not imply that peak associations are the only 
forms of formal organisation appropriate and able to communicate with the 
Bundesbank. As the discussion of channels of access to the Bundesbank also shows, 
the Bundesbank maintains formal contacts with interest groups through the Advisory 
Boards located at the bank's regional offices, which will be subject to closer 
examination in part III452. In practice, the members of the Advisory Boards have a 
clear regional background. In the case of representatives of trade and industry the 
majority are recruited from the regional or local sections of one of the above top-level 
associations or their member organisations, complemented by a number of members 
451 Triesch, Ockenfels (1995), p. 67, Conradt (1989), pp. 103-105, Paterson, Southern (1991), pp. 242-
246, Wilson (1990), p. 95.
452 Especially sub-chapter on the Regional Advisory Boards, p. 313.
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from single, mainly local enterprises. Thus, of the 122 members of the nine Advisory 
Boards, 42 were appointed from trade and industry, 31 of which represented regional 
or local business associations – i.e. regional or local chambers of trade, commerce or 
craft, or sectoral business or employers associations – and ten of which represented 
single enterprises453. In as far as they are the main interlocutors in the process of 
formal communication with the Bundesbank, the regional and sectoral business 
associations therefore also play an important role in the communication of business 
interests.
II.1.3.2 Association-specific exposure and issue involvement 
The above analysis of the issue context suggests that the overall and directly 
perceivable impact of monetary and exchange rate policy on German enterprises in 
trade and industry has been slight in the recent past, thus substantially lowering the 
incentives for trade and industry groups to become closely involved with monetary 
affairs as a policy issue. In as far as they do have an impact, however, monetary and 
exchange rate developments will bear most heavily on enterprises 
– which are heavily dependent on bank lending or other forms of debt in their 
operations, the cost of which responds sensitively to changes in central bank 
interest rates, i.e. in particular small and medium-sized enterprises and the retail, 
construction, transport, and utility sectors,
– whose turnover is sensitive to changes in the interest rate environment, e.g. 
consumption-dependent retail business and, again, the construction sectors,
– which are heavily exposed to exchange rate risk, i.e. through direct or indirect 
involvement in exports or imports, e.g. the mechanical engineering, chemical and 
automobile industries.
As an indication, and based on the empirical findings in the issue context above, these 
exposures can be summarised as in tables 8 and 9 for changes in interest and exchange 
rates respectively.
453 Figures at end-2003, including commerce and liberal professions.
188
Business exposure to changes in interest rates
Table 8
by size of enterprise by sector
Higher – Large – Transport
– Construction 
– Retail
– Utility
– Manufacturing 
Lower – Small – Trade and commerce
Economic exposure
to changes in 
interest rates Medium-sized–
Given the structural composition of Germany's peak business associations and their 
member organisations, the economic exposures at enterprise and sectoral level are 
likely to be reflected in the aggregated preferences of the peak, sectoral, and regional 
associations. Thus, the BDI's position on monetary policy may be strongly influenced 
by the fact that the enterprises in its constituency are, on average, larger than those of 
the other peak associations such that interest rate-related developments may be 
relatively less important. At the same time, exchange rate-related developments are 
likely to be of comparatively high relevance given the marked exposure to foreign 
trade. In contrast, the DIHK's commitment to the interests of the large number of small 
and medium-sized enterprises suggests relatively stronger preferences with respect to 
interest-rate policy, while exchange rate issues may not figure as prominently as in the 
BDI. The same logic applies, possibly even more so, to the ZDH and HDE, which 
feature a large proportion of small, domestically oriented enterprises. At the BGA, 
again, involvement with interest rate-related issues may be comparatively weak, owing 
to the low weighting of interest expenditure in total costs, but exposure to exchange 
rate risks may be rather high on average. The sectoral member associations of the 
umbrella groups representing, for example, the transport, construction and retail 
sectors are, in turn, likely to be particularly attentive to interest rate trends and less so 
to exchange rate developments. The opposite should apply to associations in the 
automotive, mechanical engineering and chemical sectors.
Business exposure to changes in exchange rates
Table 9
by size of enterprise by sector
Higher – Large – Automotive
– Mechanical engineering
– Chemicals
– Electronics
– Construction
Lower – Small – Other sectors
to changes in 
exchange rates – Medium-sized
Economic exposure
Despite these general centripetal trends in the potential impact of monetary 
developments on the aggregate preferences of Germany's large business associations, 
there is also an important structural element weakening the homogeneity of aggregate 
preferences and of these entities’ overall issue involvement. The wide range of 
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possible interests of affiliated enterprises combined with the large constituencies of the 
peak associations necessarily result in considerable heterogeneity within each peak 
association. This is particularly apparent in the case of the DIHK, in which all 
enterprises – other than the crafts, the liberal professions and agricultural businesses –
are indirectly members on a statutory basis. Albeit in a less pronounced manner, this 
logic also applies to the other peak associations. In as far as interest aggregation within 
each association results in lowest-common-denominator or median outcomes, the 
positions reached on monetary or exchange rate issues are likely to be cautious – if, 
indeed, a common position can be reached at all. 
II.1.3.3 Business associations’ resource endowment
The resources at the disposal of interest groups are an important determinant of their 
ability to represent their members’ interests forcefully and effectively. As pointed out 
in chapter IV, this includes financial resources, command of information relevant to 
communication with policy makers and the ability to apply political or market pressure 
on policy makers in order to promote their own interests.
With respect to the financial endowment of business associations in Germany, it has 
been observed that in general German business associations have considerable 
financial resources at their disposal, drawing on their broad fee-paying membership as 
well as on substantial additional grants from members and affiliates454. Generous 
financial resources have enabled the associations not only to establish effective 
lobbying machineries with highly qualified staff working on all political issues of 
concern to the associations and their members455, but also to provide far-reaching 
selective benefits to their members, most importantly legal, business and tax 
consultancy as well as strategic advice. In principle, therefore, German business 
associations are in a position to devote substantial resources to the analysis of 
monetary issues and political work on them. 
As to informational resources, German business associations generate a considerable 
amount of data, statistics, and qualitative information on the economic performance, 
activities and prospects of their constituencies on a regular basis as well as in the 
course of individual or irregular fact-finding missions. Generation of information 
within the associations typically rests on three channels of internal communication: 
454 See Triesch, Ockenfels (1995), p. 28. Wilson (1990) describes the BDI's financial resources as 
lavish (p. 95). Paterson, Southern (1991) find that the member associations of the BDA – which 
include most peak employers’ associations – are extremely well funded (p. 233).
455 Wilson (1990), p. 95.
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– the aggregation of interests and information in the course of the associations' 
internal decision-making processes via general meetings, committee meetings and 
working groups,
– the regular or irregular collection of statistical data on the member associations 
and affiliated enterprises, and
– the regular or irregular conduct of opinion and assessment surveys among the 
members or affiliates. 
The specific value of the information thus produced derives from its industry and 
sector-specific originality, which in terms of the amount and degree of detail, timely 
availability, and its often forward-looking nature frequently extends beyond the 
statistical data collected by official bodies, most importantly the Federal Statistical 
Office and the Bundesbank itself. As already pointed out, one important question 
calling for further examination is whether such sector- or region-specific information 
beyond that already available to the authorities is, in fact, needed when taking the 
relevant monetary policy decisions. 
With respect to the ability to apply political pressure on policy makers, the resources 
available to private interest groups in Germany are severely restricted by the 
independent status of the Bundesbank and ECB. As already pointed out in the 
institutional context, Germany's monetary system has been explicitly designed to limit 
outside influence on monetary decision making as far as possible. Consequently, there 
are no direct links enabling private-sector interests to exert pressure on the central 
bank. Indirectly, influence on the nomination and appointment of Bundesbank decision 
makers at the governmental and Bundesrat level represents a theoretically possible 
avenue. The likelihood of its relevance in practice, however, is very slight, given the 
legal requirements of candidates’ qualifications combined with the high degree of
competition among candidates and their supporting political factions and the weak 
incentives for candidates to behave in consistency with their promoters’ expectations 
once they have assumed office. Similarly, monetary policy does not lend itself to 
pressure from market behaviour by private sector participants.
Overall, therefore, resource endowment presents a varied picture characterised, on the 
one hand, by the major associations’ generally lavish financial and human-capital 
resources and their potential to contribute – albeit very specific – information to the 
process of formulating monetary policy and, on the other, the highly limited political 
and economic leverage on monetary developments and decisions. 
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II.1.4 Interim conclusions
Analysis of the institutional, issue and group contexts of business interest group 
activity on monetary policy in Germany shows that the task environment within which 
trade and industry associations and their members formulate and express their 
preferences with regard to monetary and exchange rate policy differs considerably 
from that observed in many other policy areas. The findings can be summarised as 
follows. 
Institutional context
– The conduct of monetary policy in Germany has been embedded in a well-defined 
institutional and procedural framework, which shapes the communication of 
interests from the private sector in a number of important respects. 
– Communication of interests is facilitated, in principle, by the fact that monetary 
decisions are isolated from other policy areas and delegated to one single expert 
institution, the central bank. This also applies to exchange rate policies as long as 
no exchange rate agreements are concluded at an intergovernmental level. 
– Communication of interests is, at the same time, hampered by the Bundesbank’s 
special status as an institution independent of political influence, a principle 
safeguarded in institutional and personnel respects. This independence largely 
obstructs indirect influence via the surrounding political framework, especially the 
government or parliament, and also reflects on potential direct relations with the 
Bundesbank.
– The Bundesbank is largely self-sufficient in terms of resources, including material, 
informational and personnel resources. As a result of the high level of experience 
and expertise, the bank does not in essence rely on external input in the form of 
policy advice and information.
– Due to its federal structure the Bundesbank, in its former role and today as part of 
the ESCB, theoretically offers a multitude of institutional points of access for 
interest groups. Formal and semi-formal access, however, is limited in scope and 
restricted to an advisory role relatively far removed from the nucleus of decision 
making. The remoteness of these potential avenues increased with the 2002 
Bundesbank reform.
– The insulating properties of the institutional framework also reflect on the 
behavioural patterns of Bundesbank decision makers, who regard their political 
independence as an essential condition for the proper pursuit of their primary 
objective. The latter is the dominating motivation behind their decisions, 
strengthened by strict, even though not absolute, self-imposed policy rules.
192
– This institutional framework – as depicted in chart 41 below456 – may have 
discouraging effects on interest groups trying to communicate their monetary 
policy interests.
Channels of direct influence on the Bundesbank
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Issue context
– The issue context is dominated by historically rooted anti-inflationary sentiment 
among the German population as in general, and the business community in 
particular. This coincides with the Bundesbank's objectives. As to the primary 
purpose of monetary policy, therefore, there is strong agreement between 
monetary policy makers and the business sector.
– With respect to this primary purpose, the Bundesbank – and since 1999 the ECB –
have delivered a remarkably positive performance, keeping inflation low by 
456 Chart 41 shows the potential direct channels of influence. For the sake of simplicity, indirect 
channels, especially the media, have not been included. Nevertheless, they may play an important 
role in mediating, mitigating, or amplifying mutual influence in the policy arena.
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historical and international standards and effectively countering surges in wages 
and prices.
– The transmission of monetary decisions into the economy has been accompanied 
by significant changes in the interest rate environment for businesses over the past 
decades. The impact of these changes, however, has on average been small, owing 
to the small proportion of interest expenses in German enterprises’ total costs and 
income and the low level and stability of real interest rates. 
– A similar picture emerges with the impact of exchange rate developments, where 
the distortionary effects have been weakened by the historical stabilisation and –
eventually – elimination of exchange rates with the other EMU member states, 
Germany's most important trading partners. Stabilisation, although far less 
pronounced, has also been achieved with respect to the major non-EMU exchange 
rates.
– Despite these general trends and structures weakening the involvement of business 
interests with monetary and exchange rate affairs, some sectors are particularly 
exposed to interest and exchange rate developments. These include the transport, 
construction, and retail sectors, where corporate financing and demand from end-
customers are particularly exposed to interest rates. Similarly, the automotive, 
mechanical engineering, chemical and electronics sectors are particularly involved 
in foreign trade. In addition, small and medium-sized enterprises are likely to be 
more exposed to changes in interest rates and can less easily access derivatives 
markets to hedge against interest and exchange rate risks. 
– Issue involvement is additionally weakened by the fact that monetary and 
exchange rate related policy issues have, in the past years, been dominated by a 
whole range of other economic policy issues on the political agenda. Only in 
periods of strong international and domestic monetary and exchange rate pressures 
– and increasingly less so since the 1980s – has monetary policy assumed a 
significant position on the economic policy agenda.
Group context
– Interest aggregation and expression with respect to monetary and exchange rate 
issues is achieved through the existing infrastructure of business associations and 
their peak associations. Given its insignificance in terms of impact and urgency, 
monetary policy has not aroused sufficient attention to provoke the formation of 
dedicated cause groups. 
– Germany's peak business associations feature a wide and heterogeneous 
membership in terms of both the size of the enterprises represented and their 
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sectoral affiliation. This heterogeneity hampers the efficient aggregation of 
interests with regard to monetary and exchange rate policy.
– Downstream interest associations – especially the sector-specific organisations –
are likely to find it easier to formulate common positions. Their importance, 
however, may be severely limited by the Bundesbank’s strong economy-wide 
outlook, in which particular interests are relevant only insofar as they are 
conducive to reaching conclusions on the monetary conditions in the economy as a 
whole. 
– Given the Bundesbank's strong institutional status and the logic of monetary 
policy, the scope for exerting political or economic pressure on monetary policy 
makers is negligible.
– That said, German business associations do have substantial resources at their 
disposal in terms of both funding and human capital, and they generate a wealth of 
original information for use in the discourse with policy makers.
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II.2 After entry into EMU: a new policy context
By establishing the European Monetary Union and its associated institutions and 
policy processes, the EU has elevated monetary decision making from the national to 
the EU level. Accordingly, the member states participating in EMU, i.e. those member 
states without a derogation or an opt-out as defined in the EC Treaty457, have 
surrendered individual monetary sovereignty, handing it over to the EU to be exercised 
by the newly created institutional superstructure of the ESCB. The ECB, as the 
repository of the participating member states’ monetary sovereignty, determines the 
single monetary policy for the entire euro area – a larger and more heterogeneous 
monetary area than existed in any of the constituent member states prior to EMU. This 
applies not only to macro-level economic development and market structures, but also 
to the underlying corporate interests in trade and industry. The institutional, issue and 
group contexts within which corporate interests regarding monetary policy are 
formulated and articulated by interest groups in Germany have changed as a result. 
These changes are traced in the following sections, where it will be argued that there 
are a number of factors complicating the representation of interests, while the potential 
for disagreement with monetary policy has intensified.
II.2.1 Institutional context
Entry into EMU has fundamentally altered the institutional context of interest-group 
activity on monetary policy. Even though the new institutional structures and policy 
processes established in the form of the ECB are largely familiar as such – especially 
to observers from Germany, since the ECB’s set-up and operations resemble those of 
the Bundesbank in many ways –, the institutional framework within which interest 
groups articulate their interests is altogether novel. After all, for the first time in 
decades, the primary addressee of concerns related to monetary issues has changed, as 
the locus of monetary decision making has been shifted to a new level superimposed 
on the existing structures. As a result, old channels of access and communication have 
diminished in importance, while new ones have opened up.
Most importantly, the locus of monetary decision making has shifted to a newly-
established institution whose mandate – although similar to that of the Bundesbank –
457 Article 122, EC Treaty, provides for the possibility of the Council granting derogation to individual 
member states, exempting them temporarily from participation in the Third Stage of monetary 
union and from the relevant Treaty provisions as enlisted in Article 122 (3), EC Treaty. At the time 
of writing, member states with derogation were Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and Sweden. Denmark and the 
United Kingdom have been granted an opt-out from EMU by way of Protocols 11 and 12 of the 
Maastricht Treaty. For details on the institutional and procedural provisions see Smits (1997), 
pp. 134-139.
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puts it in a stronger position within the constitutional and political system of the EU 
than that of the Bundesbank in Germany. Most notably, the legal basis of the ECB, 
including its statutes, is anchored in the EC Treaty, giving it quasi-constitutional 
status. Apart from the legal implication that it thus enjoys a higher legal status than the 
Bundesbank, this carries important political implications inasmuch as amendment of 
the ECB’s legal status or any of the provisions in its legal basis requires amendment of 
the EC Treaty, which in turn presupposes a unanimous decision on the part of all 25 
EU member states. Given the difficulty in reaching such consensus, the probability of 
an alteration in any of the statutory provisions governing the ECB, most particularly 
essential provisions pertaining to the bank’s independence and objectives, is very 
slight. This specific position renders the position of the ECB within the EU’s 
constitutional and political system stronger than that enjoyed by any other central 
bank458.
Like the Bundesbank, the ECB’s mandate encompasses the exclusive assignment of 
tasks related to monetary policy. These include 
– definition and implementation of the single monetary policy of the Community,
– the conduct of foreign exchange operations,
– holding and management of the official foreign reserves of the member states, and
– promotion of the smooth operation of payment systems459, as well as the 
– exclusive right to authorise the issue of banknotes within the Community460 and to 
approve the volume of coin issuance by the member states461.
– In addition, the ECB contributes to the work of the authorities charged with the 
prudential supervision of credit institutions and with ensuring the stability of the 
financial system462.
– The ECB also fulfils advisory functions and must therefore be consulted on any 
act by the Community or the member states in its area of competence463. 
458 Smits (1997), pp. 168-169.
459 Article 105 (2), EC Treaty, and Article 3 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank. For detailed discussion of the relevant legal aspects 
see Smits (1997), pp. 193-198.
460 Article 106 (1), EC Treaty.
461 Article 106 (2), EC Treaty.
462 Article 105 (5), EC Treaty, and Article 3 (3), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank. Further to this task, the Council may confer specific 
tasks upon the ECB concerning policies related to prudential supervision of credit and other 
financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings (Article 105 (6), EC Treaty).
463 Article 105 (4), EC Treaty, and Article 4 (a), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank.
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Furthermore, the ECB may submit its opinions to Community institutions or 
bodies or to national authorities on matters in its area of competence464.
– Further, the ECB participates in international monetary institutions465, deciding 
how the ESCB is represented in international cooperation involving its work466.
– Finally, the ECB and the national central banks are called on in the Statute of the 
ESCB to collect the statistical information necessary to properly pursue the bank's 
objectives, either from the relevant Community or member-state bodies or directly 
from economic agents467. 
In contrast to monetary decisions, the conclusion of formal agreements on exchange 
rate systems falls not within the sphere of competence of the ECB, but within the 
Council’s remit. On such matters, however, the ECB has the right to table policy 
initiatives and present them to the Council in the form of recommendations. Further, 
the Council is obliged to consult the ECB on any measures within this area of 
policymaking468. This also applies to the formulation of general points of reference for 
exchange rate policy in relation to currencies for which no formal exchange rate 
arrangements exist469. In addition, the ECB needs to be consulted on Community 
positions at international level concerning issues of particular relevance to economic 
and monetary union470.
As in the case of the Bundesbank, the ECB’s activities in the field of monetary policy 
are governed by the principles of political independence and the objective of pursuing 
price stability. As to independence, the political autonomy of the ECB is explicitly 
rooted in the text of the Treaty: 
"When exercising the powers and carrying out the tasks and duties conferred 
upon them by this Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB, neither the ECB, nor 
a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-making bodies 
shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from 
any government of a Member State or from any other body. The 
Community institutions and bodies and the governments of the Member 
464 Article 105 (4), EC Treaty, and Article 4 (b), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank.
465 Article 6 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
466 Article 6 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
467 Article 5, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
468 Article 111 (1), EC Treaty, and Article 111 (3), EC Treaty.
469 Article 111 (2), EC Treaty.
470 Article 111 (4), EC Treaty.
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States undertake to respect this principle and not to seek to influence the 
members of the decision-making bodies of the ECB or of the national 
central banks in the performance of their tasks."471
The provision establishes the principle of central bank autonomy for the ECB going 
beyond the relevant provisions in the original Bundesbank Act in two important 
respects. First, it is defined as applying explicitly not only to the government, but to all 
political bodies at EU and member-state level as well as to any other body. By virtue 
of the latter provision, the independence of the ECB also implicitly applies to 
influence from the private sector. Second, ECB independence is defined not only to 
the extent that monetary decision makers shall not take instructions from these bodies, 
but also that they shall not seek such instructions in the first place472. As already 
pointed out with respect to the Bundesbank, these strict provisions and their legal 
status – based on the Treaty requirement that the law of all national central banks be 
compatible with the provisions in the Treaty itself as well as in the ECB’s Statute473 –
also apply to all national central banks. The ECB’s particular institutional status is 
underscored by its position within the EU political system. The ECB is endowed with 
a legal personality of its own474 and the most extensive legal capacity enjoyed by legal 
persons in the member states475, allowing it to act autonomously without the need to 
derive its authority and competences from being an organ of the Community476. 
The overall political and operational independence of the ECB has been underpinned 
by elements securing personnel and financial autonomy. As to independence of the 
personnel, the members of the ECB’s Executive Board have to be of recognised 
standing and professional experience in monetary or banking matters477. They are 
appointed478 by common accord of the governments of the member states at the level 
of Heads of State or Government on a recommendation from the Council after the 
latter has consulted the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the 
471 Article 108, EC Treaty, and Article 7, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and the European Central Bank.
472 Smits (1997), p. 161.
473 Article 109, EC Treaty. 
474 Article 107 (2), EC Treaty.
475 Article 9 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
476 Smits (1997), p. 162.
477 Article 112 (2.b.), EC Treaty, and Article 11 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank. For a detailed discussion see Smits (1997), pp. 162-
164.
478 Chart 42 illustrates the appointment procedure.
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ECB479, for an eight-year, non-renewable term of office. Executive Board members are 
protected against dismissal on political grounds in as far as removal from office is 
limited to cases in which a member no longer satisfies the conditions for performance 
of his duties, or to cases of serious misconduct. In either instance, the decision on 
compulsory retirement rests with the European Court of Justice, following an 
application by the ECB’s Governing Council or Executive Board480. Finally, members 
of the Executive Board are prohibited from engaging in occupations outside the bank 
during their term of office, irrespective of whether such activity is gainful or not, 
unless exemption is expressly granted by the Governing Council481. A similar, albeit 
not as strict, body of rules has been devised for the other members of the Governing 
Council, i.e. the Governors of the national central banks. Thus, the statute requires a 
minimum term of office of five years and stipulates that they may be dismissed only 
for the same strict reasons of health and misconduct that apply to the members of the 
Executive Board482. Decisions to this effect may also be referred to the European 
Court of Justice483. No explicit rules have been established at EU level with respect to 
the professional background and expertise of the Governors of the national central 
banks or to possible limitations on the renewal of office and the holding of positions 
outside the ESCB during their term of office. These details have been left to the 
national legislators. Nevertheless, the relevant article in the ECB Statute reiterates that 
national rules need to be in conformity with the provision made in the Treaty and the 
ECB Statute484.
The financial independence of the ECB is secured by its endowment with equity as 
well as the returns it generates on its activities in the financial and foreign exchange 
markets. The bank’s equity, amounting to EUR 5 bn, is owned by the national central 
banks, who are the sole subscribers and holders485. The national central banks’ 
479 Article 112 (2.b.), EC Treaty, and Article 11 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank.
480 Article 11 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
481 Article 11 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank. For a discussion, especially with respect to the ability of Board members to take up 
professional positions after their service at the ECB, see Smits (1997), p. 163-164.
482 Smits (1997), p. 165.
483 Article 14 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank. The role accorded to the European Court of Justice in this context is unusual, given 
that the appointment and release of decision makers at national central banks comes within the 
remit of the member states. For a discussion of the legal implications see Smits (1997), pp. 165-
166.
484 Article 14 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
485 Article 28, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank. The shares of individual national central banks in the ECB’s capital are determined 
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monetary income is redistributed among them at the end of each fiscal year. The net 
profits of the ECB are allocated to the bank’s general reserve fund486 and to the 
shareholder national central banks487.
Overview ECB appointment procedures
Chart 42
Source: Articles 11 and 12, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank
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Despite its considerable degree of autonomy, the ECB does not operate in political 
isolation either, but is required by the Treaty to cooperate with the other decision 
makers at EU level. The obligation to cooperate with the Community institutions is 
established in four respects: first, the general obligation to support the economic 
policies in the Community, second, the mutual participation in meetings as provided in 
the Treaty, third, the fulfilment of Treaty-based information requirements, and, fourth, 
participation in the Community’s economic-policy coordination processes. 
With respect to supporting the economic policies in the Community, the Treaty 
requires the ESCB as a whole – including the ECB and the national central banks – to 
support these policies with a view to contributing to the achievement of Community 
by a key for subscription defined in Article 29 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System 
of Central Banks and the European Central Bank. For details see e.g. Görgens et al. (2001), pp. 66-
72.
486 The share of the ECB’s net profit allocated to its general reserve fund may not exceed 20% of the 
net profit (Article 33 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the 
European Central Bank). 
487 Distribution of the net profit from the ECB among the shareholding national central banks follows 
the proportions they hold in the ECB’s capital (Article 33 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank). For details see e.g. Görgens et 
al. (2001), pp. 66-72.
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objectives488. In addition, the ESCB is required to act in accordance with the principle 
of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of 
resources489, and in compliance with the principles of ensuring stable prices, sound 
public finances and monetary conditions and a sustainable balance of payments490. The 
importance of these constraints, however, is limited by two factors. In the first place, 
the obligation refers to general economic policies and does not extend to single, 
specific policy measures. This is quite similar to the requirements in the Bundesbank 
Act. Second, the ECB's obligation to support general economic policies must be 
considered a comparatively weak legal and political constraint on its actions, as no 
single general economic policy exists at Community level; there is only a set of 
national economic policies, whose mutual coordination and consistency the member 
states are committed by the Treaty to strive for491. In economic terms, however, the 
absence of a single economic policy makes the task of the ECB more difficult in 
practice, as the impact of its policies varies across the member states because of 
theirdifferent national economic rules492. 
As to mutual participation in meetings, the Treaty stipulates that the President of the 
Council and a member of the Commission may participate in the meetings of the 
ECB's Governing Council. The Council President and the Commissioner are not 
entitled to vote on the Governing Council, but the President of the Council may submit 
a motion for deliberation by the Governing Council493. A right to call for the 
postponement of monetary decisions, as was the case with the Bundesbank, has not 
been written into the Treaty494. Conversely, the President of the ECB must be invited 
to participate in Council meetings when the Council is discussing matters pertaining to 
the objectives and tasks of the ESCB495. Finally, the President of the ECB and the 
other members of the Executive Board may be heard by the relevant committees of the 
European Parliament, either at Parliament’s request or on the ECB's own initiative496. 
488 Article 105 (1), EC Treaty.
489 Article 105 (1), EC Treaty.
490 The principles referred to in Article 105 (1), EC Treaty, are contained in Article 4, EC Treaty. Here 
especially Article 4 (3), EC Treaty. For an interpretation of the principles of the Community and 
those underlying EMU, as well as of the implications of these principles for the behaviour of the 
ECB, see Smits (1997), pp. 190-192.
491 Smits (1997), p. 187.
492 Smits (1997), p. 187. For an extensive discussion of the legal implications and political 
implications of the ECB's obligation to support the general economic polices in the Community see 
Smits (1997), pp. 187-192.
493 Article 113 (1), EC Treaty.
494 For details see Smits (1997), pp. 170-171.
495 Article 113 (2), EC Treaty. For details see Smits (1997), pp. 173-174.
496 Article 113 (3), EC Treaty. For details see Smits (1997), p. 174.
202
In practice, the President of the ECB appears before the European Parliament 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs on a quarterly basis to report on the 
bank's monetary policy and answer questions497. 
With respect to reporting requirements, three elements have been established in the 
Treaty. First, the ECB is required to draw up and publish reports on the activities of 
the ESCB at least once a quarter. In addition, a consolidated financial statement of the 
ESCB has to be published each week. Finally, the ECB is required to address an 
annual report on the activities of the ESCB and on the monetary policy of the previous 
and current year to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Commission, 
and the EU Council. All reports and statements in this respect must be made available 
to the public free of charge.498
As regards the interplay of the institutions and actors involved in the various areas of 
economic policymaking, the EU has responded to the asymmetry between the single 
European monetary policy and the fact that other major fields of economic 
policymaking – notably fiscal, structural, and wage and labour-market policies – have 
remained in the national domain, by strengthening economic-policy coordination 
among the member states. The relevant policy processes range from single policies, 
which include the monetary policy of the ECB, to weakly coordinated initiatives 
among the various decision makers and other parties involved, as shown in table 10. 
Besides the single monetary policy, the ECB also plays a legally manifested role in 
formulation of the euro area's single exchange rate policy as well as in the – weakly 
coordinated – external representation and communication of euro area economic 
policies. In addition to policy processes established by the Treaty, further processes of 
economic-policy coordination have been devised, in some of which the ECB plays a 
part.
497 European Central Bank (2004), p. 69.
498 Article 15, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank. See also Smits (1997), pp. 174-175.
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Forms of economic-policy coordination in the EU
Table 10
Policy
Area Form Mode Procedures
Monetary policy Single policy, euro area Single institution ECB
Council
ECB
Eurogroup
Commission
Member states
Commission
Council
Treaty rules Member states Excessive Deficit Procedure
Common rules Commission Stability and Growth Pact
Common objectives Joint fora Council
Information exchange Eurogroup
Peer review
Rules Member states
Joint decisions Commission
Council directives Council
Peer review
Dialogue Joint fora ECB
Commission
Council
Eurogroup
Social partners
Member states
Commission
Council
Eurogroup
Dialogue Joint fora Social partners
Commission
Council Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
ECB
Information exchange Member states
Best practices Commission
Guidelines Council
Peer reviews Social partners
Member states
Commission
Best practices Council
Guidelines
Peer reviews
Joint fora ECB
Eurogroup
Commission
External 
representation and 
communication
Employment guidelines, Luxembourg 
Process
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
Coordination in the CouncilInformation                         
exchange
Reports on economic reform, Cardiff 
Process
Coordination in the Council
Broad Economic Policy                 
Guidelines
Broad Economic Policy Guidelines
Coordination in the             
Council
Common understanding
Actors involved
Information exchange
Coordination in the CouncilCommonly agreed objectives
Implementation by the 
Commission
Single policy
Source: European Commission (2002), p. 4
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Policy co-ordination
Coordination in the CouncilSingle policy, euro areaExchange rate 
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Euro area economic policy coordination centres on the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, which the Council adopts on an annual basis. The aim of the Guidelines is 
to present broad recommendations for policy actors on macroeconomic and structural 
policies, and to provide a yardstick for ex post assessment in the context of multilateral 
surveillance499. The Guidelines are not legally binding, and compliance is based on 
peer pressure, which can be reinforced by means of Council recommendations to non-
499 European Commission (2002), p. 5.
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compliant member states500. The general guidelines formulated in the course of this 
procedure are complemented by four coordination processes aimed at strengthening 
overall economic stability and cohesion within the euro area. First, the Stability and 
Growth Pact provides rules for disciplining fiscal policies in the member states. 
Second, the Luxembourg Process aims at devising employment guidelines on labour 
markets in the member states. Third, the stability and efficient functioning of product 
and capital markets is subject to economic reforms coordinated in the course of the 
Cardiff Process. Finally, the Cologne Process aims at improving the interaction of 
macroeconomic policies and wage developments with a view to supporting non-
inflationary growth and employment501. The ECB's participation in EU economic 
policy coordination is – save for informal exchanges of information among policy 
makers and the social partners in other EU forums not directly related to monetary 
policy – restricted to the Macroeconomic Dialogue, in the course of which 
representatives of the Council, the ECB, the Commission and the social partners meet 
to discuss economic policy and other matters of common interest. Being the ECB’s 
only formal channel of communication with representatives from private interest 
groups, this dialogue is analysed in more detail below. 
Overall, the ECB's independence is thus complemented by a range of instruments 
designed to ensure cooperation between the various decision makers and consistency 
of the policy processes at EU level. Most importantly however, none of the provisions 
may impair the independence of the ECB and its personnel in the pursuit of their tasks. 
In particular, influence on the ECB's monetary policy may emanate neither from the 
ECB's obligation to support general economic policies nor from its participation in the 
Community's economic policy coordination. 
Next to political independence, the second major element in the EMU’s monetary 
framework is that the ECB and the national central banks have been committed at 
Treaty level to the primary objective of maintaining price stability in the euro area502. 
Closely related to the above observations, the provision identifies price stability as the 
priority objective, while other aims of economic policy – i.e. support for general 
economic policies in the Community and for the principle of the Community – are 
strictly subordinate. As in the case of the Bundesbank, the primary objective is not 
defined in closer detail by the legal framework, giving the bank the authority to 
500 Recommendations to promote compliance with the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines were issued 
by the Council for the first time in 2001 (European Commission (2002), p. 5). Ex post surveillance 
of compliance with the Guidelines is provided by means of annual Implementation Reports.
501 For a detailed description of the policy processes see European Commission (2002). The processes 
are illustrated in chart 43 on page 205.
502 Article 105 (1), EC Treaty, and Article 2, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Banks and the European Central Bank.
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establish its own definitions of the concepts and to devise the intermediary targets it 
deems appropriate for its work503. Unlike the case of the Bundesbank, the Treaty 
clearly refers to internal price stability as the reference value for the ECB's work, so 
that maintaining stability of the external value of the euro does not fall within the 
bank's remit504.
Economic policy coordination in EMU
Chart 43
Source: European Commission (2001), p. 5
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In order to achieve this objective, the ECB is not only free to define own policy 
targets, it is also furnished with a wide choice of policy instruments. In dealing with 
credit institutions, public entities and other market participants505, the ECB can 
503 Smits (1997) emphasises the point that no definition of price stability is provided in the Treaty and 
that the ECB is free to determine for itself what level of price stability it deems acceptable in the 
context of its overriding objective. With respect to the latter, Smits emphasises that there are no 
checks on the ECB's auto-interpretation other than the possibility of appeal to the European Court 
of Justice on the grounds of infringement of Treaty obligations, and the political weight of 
judgement by the European Parliament, to which the ECB reports (pp. 186-187).
504 Smits (1997), p. 184. Exchange rate developments may nevertheless influence monetary decisions 
inasmuch as they impact on the internal value of the currency. 
505 Article 17, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank. With respect to operations with public entities, the Statute prohibits overdrafts, the 
purchase of debt instruments or any other type of credit facility with the ECB or with the national 
central banks in favour of Community institutions or bodies, central governments, regional local or 
other public authorities, and any other public authorities (Article 21 (1), Protocol on the Statute of 
the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank).
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conduct open-market operations and credit operations, and can decide on other 
operational methods of monetary control as it sees fit506. The general principles 
governing the use of these instruments are established by the ECB itself507. With 
respect to external operations involving central banks and financial institutions in other 
countries or international organisations, the ECB may, furthermore, undertake spot and 
forward foreign exchange transactions in all types of assets, including securities and 
precious metals, hold and manage these assets, and conduct all types of banking 
transactions with third countries and international organisations, including borrowing 
and lending508.
Overall, the ECB, in conjunction with the national central banks, therefore occupies an 
eminent position within the EU’s constitutional and political system and exercises a 
great degree of autonomy – with regard to its monetary decision-making, to the targets 
and to the instruments it applies in the pursuit of its objectives. As a consequence, and 
in certain respects more so than the Bundesbank prior to EMU, the ECB enjoys wide 
room for manoeuvre in designing and conducting its policies, making it the central 
addressee for private-sector interests in the area of monetary and exchange rate policy. 
Although the central addressee for monetary policy-related interests, because of its 
narrowly defined institutional accessibility the ECB offers only very limited avenues 
for the communication of interests. As in the case of the Bundesbank, low accessibility 
results from the secluded monetary decision-making process as well as the political, 
human and material resources that also make the ECB largely self-sufficient in its 
operation.
Monetary decision making within the ESCB is in the hands of the ECB. Although the 
Treaty defines monetary policy objectives and tasks for the ESCB as a whole509, it is 
up to the ECB to ensure that they are implemented, either by its own activities or 
through the national central banks510. Within the ECB, decisions are taken by its two 
decision making bodies, the Governing Council and the Executive Board511. The 
former is composed of the presidents of the national central banks and the members of 
506 Article 18 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
507 Article 18 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
508 Article 23, Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
509 For a discussion of the legal background of the allocation of objectives, tasks, and functions to the 
ESCB as a whole, to the ECB and to the national central banks see Smits (1997), pp. 178-180.
510 Article 9 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
511 Article 9 (3), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
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the Executive Board itself, which, in turn, comprises the president and vice president 
of the ECB and four further members512. The Governing Council adopts the guidelines 
and takes the decisions necessary to ensure performance of the ESCB’s duties, 
including the formulation of Community monetary policy, the adoption of 
intermediate monetary objectives, the setting of interest rates and management of the 
ESCB reserves. The Executive Board is in charge of implementing monetary policy, 
instructs the national central banks, performs other duties delegated to it by the 
Governing Council, and prepares the meetings of the Governing Council513. The 
national central banks support the ECB in its policies and are subject to the 
instructions of the Governing Council and the Executive Board514.
The meetings of the Governing Council at which monetary policy decisions are taken
have to be held at least ten times a year by statute515. Monetary decisions are taken by 
a simple majority, with each member of the Council casting one vote516. This shall be 
cast by the members of the Council in a personal capacity only, irrespective of their 
national origins517. The President of the Council and a member of the Commission are, 
as already mentioned, entitled to attend Governing Council meetings, but are 
prohibited from voting. The President of the Council may, however, submit a motion 
for deliberation. 
As far as private-sector interest groups are concerned, the monetary decision making 
process, as summarised in chart 44, is thus largely shielded from external political 
pressures or influence. Going by the statutory provisions, and save for the optional 
attendance of Council or Commission representatives518, monetary decisions are taken 
512 Article 11 (1), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
513 Article 12 (1) and Article 12 (2), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and the European Central Bank.
514 Article 14 (3), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
515 Article 10 (5), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank. In practice, the Governing Council meets every two weeks. The first meeting in each 
month is regarded as particularly relevant for monetary decisions, as it is followed by a press 
conference held by the president and vice president of the ECB, in which the bank presents its 
policy-relevant assessment of economic developments to the public (European Central Bank 
(2004), p. 69).
516 Voting modalities will change once the number of member states participating in EMU exceeds 
fifteen. While the six members of the Executive Board will retain a permanent voting right, the 
votes of the Governors of the national central banks will be subject to a rotation system (European 
Central Bank (2004), p. 12).
517 European Central Bank (2004), p. 12.
518 Smits (1997) rightly points out that the presence of the President of the Council as well as a 
Commission member has to be understood as a possibility for the two bodies to make their views 
on economic and monetary conditions freely known to the Governing Council. An exchange of 
208
exclusively within the ECB and with the support of the national central banks. Formal 
means of communicating external views, e.g. via an advisory body representing 
private-sector or academic opinions on monetary policy, have not been devised at 
Treaty level. 
Organisation of ECB monetary policy decision making
Chart 44
Source: EC Treaty and Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank, various articles
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Despite the lack of institutionalised direct communication between the ECB and the 
private sector as provided in the Treaty, channels for articulating interests nevertheless 
exist. In the first place, formal forums exist outside the Treaty, in the context of which 
the ECB discusses its policies with external political players and market participants 
through the various mechanisms of the Community’s economic policy coordination. 
The ECB's participation in EU economic policy coordination is – save for informal 
exchanges of information among policy makers and the social partners in other EU 
forums not directly related to monetary policy – restricted to the Macroeconomic 
Dialogue. At the same time, the Macroeconomic Dialogue represents the only formal 
channel of communication between the ECB and representatives of the private sector. 
The rationale519 and objectives of the Macroeconomic Dialogue were laid down in the 
resolutions of the 1999 Cologne Council: 
views appears to have been explicitly encouraged by the legislator, as the possibility for the 
President of the Council to table a motion suggests (pp. 171-172). 
519 The Council's resolution to set up the Macroeconomic Dialogue goes back to an initiative by the 
then German Council Presidency, which felt inspired by the concept of Germany’s Konzertierte 
Aktion (European Commission (2002), p. 40). The plan to solve the economic and financial 
problems besetting the Federal Republic at that time by coordinating the actions of government, 
representatives of employers and employees and representatives of other economic interest groups 
was first put into practice on February 14, 1967 and subsequently anchored in the 1967 Law for 
Stability and Growth. On that basis, it was conceived as an instrument for the Federal Government 
to formulate broad, non-binding macroeconomic guidelines, whose implementation was sought by 
means of joint action with the major economic interest groups in society. In practice, the effects of 
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"[i]n order to bring about strong growth in employment while maintaining 
price stability, fiscal policy, monetary policy and wage developments must 
interact in a mutually supportive way. The European Council calls upon all 
those who decide or influence economic and employment policy to 
contribute to more employment on the basis of strong, non-inflationary 
growth, respecting, at the same time, their independence and autonomy in 
their own areas of responsibility. In a macroeconomic dialogue based on 
mutual trust, information and opinions should be exchanged in an 
appropriate manner concerning the question of how to design 
macroeconomic policy in order to increase and make full use of the potential 
for growth and employment. The European Council deems it necessary […] 
to set up a regular Macroeconomic Dialogue […] within the framework of 
the Ecofin Council in cooperation with the [Employment and Social Policy 
Council], with representatives of both formations of the Council, the 
Commission, the ECB and the social partners."520
In line with this broad mandate, the definition of the substance and potential contents 
of the discussions between Council, Commission, ECB, and the social partners 
remains diffuse: 
"[f]or a consistent policy mix to be implemented successfully it is helpful to 
have a fruitful macroeconomic dialogue between social partners, fiscal and 
employment policy makers and monetary policy makers within existing 
institutions. In the course of this dialogue, the starting position and future 
prospects could be discussed on the basis of statistical data and analyses, 
and ideas could be exchanged as to how, while retaining their respective 
responsibilities and preserving their independence, those involved consider 
that a policy mix can be achieved that is conducive to growth and 
employment under conditions of price stability."521
Konzertierte Aktionen remained highly limited. While representing a tool for communicating views 
and interests, and despite providing important psychological stimuli at a time of economic 
recession, the dialogue proved ineffective as a means of resolving conflicts of interest among the 
participants. As a result, disagreement resurfaced once the recession of the late 1960s had been 
weathered. As from the early 1970s, this led to high wage demands by the trade unions, 
intransigence on the part of employers and a tightening of the monetary stance by the Bundesbank. 
Eventually meetings under the heading of Konzertierte Aktionen were discontinued from 1977, 
after the trade unions had withdrawn their participation. For detailed discussions see e.g. Weimer 
(1998), pp. 186-189, and Härtel (1999). For a contrasting view, attributing failure of the 
Konzertierte Aktionen to a lack of institutional arrangement and the incompatibility of coordinated 
behaviour with the policy rules to which the actors concerned were subject, see Heise (2002), p. 11.
520 Resolution of the Cologne European Council, Part III: Macroeconomic Dialogue for the promotion 
of growth and employment, as quoted in European Commission (2002), pp. 39-40.
521 Presidency report to the June 1999 Cologne European Council, as quoted in European Commission 
(2002), p. 41.
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As a result, the Commission has been lukewarm about the prospects of the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue and its ability to bring about effective results with respect to 
a consistent policy mix, stating that 
"[t]he effectiveness of a dialogue like this is inherently difficult to measure. 
Moderate wage agreements conducive to employment gains and thereby to 
sustainable growth owe to many factors. But regular meetings of key players 
certainly contribute to better absorb the rules of the game in Stage 3 [of 
EMU] and to improve the economic performance."522
However, such concerns over the effectiveness of a macroeconomic dialogue in terms 
of defusing conflicts of interest among major players in the economy do not 
necessarily impair the significance of the Macroeconomic Dialogue as a channel 
through which private-sector representatives can articulate their views to the ECB 
directly. 
In practice, the Macroeconomic Dialogue is held twice a year, with one meeting in the 
autumn after presentation of the Commission's economic review and forecasts, and a
second meeting in spring when the Commission has published its recommendations 
for the annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines. The agenda for the meetings 
usually contains the current economic agenda, current policy challenges, and other 
topics of common interest. Each meeting comprises three gatherings, namely that of a 
steering group and sessions at the technical and political levels. The steering group sets 
the agenda for the technical discussions, which in turn prepare the political session523. 
At the political level, participants in the meetings include524: 
– Council
Ministers from the Council troika, Ecofin and the Economic and Social Policy 
Council (ESP) and the chairmen of the European Financial Committee (EFC), the 
Economic Policy Committee (EPC), and the Employment Committee.
– Central bank
One representative each from the Governing Council of the ECB and a non-euro-
area central bank.
– Commission
The Commissioners for economic affairs and employment.
– Social partners
522 European Commission (2002), p. 40.
523 European Commission (2002), p. 41.
524 European Commission (2002), p. 41.
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The presidents or general secretaries of the European associations of the social 
partners.
In contrast to the formal or semi-formal arrangements for communication between the 
private sector and the Bundesbank in Germany, i.e. the regional Advisory Boards and 
the roundtable of economists, the Community's Macroeconomic Dialogue is not 
specifically designed to establish or promote communication between the private 
sector and the central bank. Given the presence of other policy makers and the group’s 
broad mandate, discussions are not solely destined to get business associations and the 
ECB talking, but aim at a multilateral exchange of views on a potentially wide variety 
of issues relevant to the coordination of economic policies between the member states, 
the Commission, the ECB and the major representatives of labour market participants. 
In addition, the formulation of the Dialogue’s mandate strongly suggests that, in theory 
at least, interest groups participate in the Dialogue not to represent the overall 
commercial interests of their members, but are invited as "social partners", i.e. as 
representatives of the organisation involved at national level in the wage formation 
process. On an ex ante basis, this limits discussions in the context of the Dialogue to 
issues related to wages and labour market policies, so that the private-sector 
representatives’ general views on monetary and exchange rate developments in a 
broader sense are not formally part of the discussions under the terms of the mandate. 
This reflects the fact that the primary purpose of the Dialogue lies in the coordination 
of economic policies, especially between the Council, the member states, the 
Commission and the ECB. Representatives of the private sector are invited for the sake 
of their role in wage determination and their importance with respect to employment 
policy525. A priori, exchanges of views between the representatives of EU business 
associations and the ECB therefore have to be regarded as ancillary effects of a 
Dialogue with quite different aims.
Next to the ECB's participation in the Macroeconomic Dialogue at Community level, 
communication via the national central banks represents a further important potential 
way in which private-sector interests may influence monetary decision making at 
Community level. The ECB itself assigns an essential role to the national central banks 
in its communication strategy, emphasising that in a multicultural and multilingual 
environment the maintenance of close contacts with national and regional audiences 
represents an important element in communication of the single monetary policy526. 
525 For a comprehensive analysis of the political rationale of the Macroeconomic Dialogue, its 
importance for economic policy coordination among the institutions and bodies of the Community, 
and its prospects as an effective body for policy coordination see Heise (2002). 
526 European Central Bank (2004), p. 70. The ECB's emphasis admittedly rests on communicating its 
policies to national and regional audiences, rather than on receiving feedback and reaction from 
these audiences. 
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Thus, private-sector interests can be communicated via the national central banks 
within the Eurosystem in as far they have direct or indirect avenues of communication 
with the private sector. As we saw in the above, the Bundesbank – as one example of a 
central bank within the Eurosystem – has a number of channels through which it can 
obtain information from the private sector in Germany formally or informally, not 
least in the form of the Advisory Councils at the Regional Offices and the roundtable 
of economists at the Central Office. Even though different in extent and design, the 
other national central banks within the Eurosystem have their own patterns of 
communicating with interest groups. Thus, formal bodies in which private-sector 
representatives discuss monetary policy with the decision makers exist at three further 
national central banks, i.e. in the Netherlands, in Belgium, and in Austria, as illustrated 
in table 11 below. In these cases, as well as in those countries where no such formal 
bodies have been established, additional semi-formal or informal channels of 
communication are likely to exist, as well as indirect forms of communication, e.g. via 
the media or other political bodies in the national political system.
 The effectiveness of communication via the national central banks in the Eurosystem 
is, however, severely limited by two important factors. First, the marginal impact of 
interventions by interest groups with their respective national central banks is greatly 
diluted by the fact that each central bank is represented on the ECB's Governing 
Council by one governor, giving each a comparatively small weighting in the voting 
process. On the basis of twelve member states participating in the third stage of EMU, 
this implies a share of one in eighteen votes for each national central bank governor. 
Thus, even if an interest group were able to influence the governor of its national 
central bank in a significant way, the final effect of doing so on the ECB's monetary 
decisions would remain highly uncertain. Influencing monetary decisions via the 
national central banks is further complicated in that the governors of the national 
institutions are not entitled to represent national interests on the Governing Council, 
acting instead in an entirely independent, personal capacity and committed to taking a 
purely euro area view on monetary decisions527. To what extent the governors comply 
with this rule is of course an open question, especially since monetary decisions are 
confidential and voting behaviour on the Council is not disclosed by the ECB. 
However, even if Council members did allow their monetary judgments to be guided 
by national or, for that matter, sectoral or other particular considerations, the degree of 
the marginal impact of such considerations on the final decision for the entire euro 
area would be considerably diminished by the process of monetary decision making 
within the Eurosystem.
527 European Central Bank (2004), p. 12.
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Finally, beyond formal institutional arrangements, the ECB is also involved in a range 
of informal contacts with its environment. Thus, the members of the Executive Board 
and Governing Council are known to take on a large number of public engagements, 
including appearances and speeches at public events and interviews. They also receive 
visitors from the general public as well as experts from a variety of institutions. In 
addition, the ECB describes itself as committed to open dialogue with the academic 
world.528
In addition to the monetary decision makers’ mandate and accessibility, EMU is also 
likely to confront interest-group representatives with behavioural patterns on the part 
of policy makers varying to some extent from those encountered in the past. As 
observed above, Bundesbank policy makers’ behaviour has been characterised by a 
strong commitment to the principles manifested in the bank’s legal framework, i.e. a 
strong pledge to institutional and personal independence and to the primary objective 
of price stability, especially in the form of imposing self-binding policy targets and 
strategies. Both patterns of behaviour have been observable over several decades of 
the bank's operations.
The ECB, in contrast, is a very young institution, which means that it is still too early 
to identify historically rooted behavioural patterns with any degree of certainty. 
Commitment by ECB policy makers to the bank's fundamental legal principles of 
independence and the pursuit of price stability are, nevertheless, already evident. As to 
independence, the specific status of the ECB in the Treaty and within the Community's 
political system has been consistently stressed by ECB officials as an essential 
prerequisite for pursuing anti-inflationary monetary policies529. 
Similarly, the ECB has filled out the broad objective of maintaining price stability with 
intermediary targets and an explicit strategy, limiting its own discretion and making its 
policy measures more transparent. By and large, the ECB adopted principles for its 
policymaking similar to those of the Bundesbank's prior to 1999, although in a 
formally different manner. The ECB's monetary strategy consists of two elements:
– a quantitative definition of the primary objective of the single monetary policy, 
namely price stability, and
– a two-pillar structure of indicators used to achieve this objective. This assigns a 
prominent role to the supply of money, including a reference value for growth of 
the broadly defined monetary target, and features a broadly based assessment of 
the outlook for future price developments and the risks to price stability in the euro 
area as a whole.
528 European Central Bank (2004), p. 69.
529 See e.g. Issing (2000), p. 149.
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The ECB defines price stability in quantitative terms as a year-on-year increase in the 
EU's Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area of below 2%530. This 
target value is comparable to the Bundesbank's concept of underlying normative 
inflation, which was last designated as encompassing a range of 1.5% to 2%. Like the 
Bundesbank, the ECB takes a forward-looking, medium-range view of price 
developments and has committed itself to securing price stability – as quantitatively 
defined – in the medium term531. 
In contrast to the Bundesbank's strategy, the ECB's two-pillar architecture explicitly 
states that the ECB takes a wide range of indicators into consideration when making its 
policy decisions, of which the supply of money is one, albeit prominent, variable. 
Unlike the Bundesbank, the ECB initially refrained from formulating an explicit target 
or corridor for money growth, specifying instead a quantitative reference value of 
4.5% of annual M3 growth, derived from three elements: the quantitative definition of 
price stability – below 2% – plus the trend in real gross domestic product growth –
estimated as being within a range of 2% to 2.5% – plus a medium-term decline in the 
velocity of circulation of M3 in the range of 0.5% to 1% per annum. At the same time, 
the ECB conceded that monetary data, on their own, do not constitute a complete 
summary of all the information about the economy required to set an appropriate 
monetary policy. Consequently, as a second pillar of its strategy the bank chose to 
have a broadly based assessment of the outlook on price developments and the major 
risks to price stability in the euro area play a major role in its policy decisions This 
includes such factors as wages, the exchange rate, bond prices and the yield curve, 
various measures of real activity, fiscal policy indicators, price and cost indices, and 
business and consumer surveys532.
Compared with that of the Bundesbank, the ECB's strategy and the self-binding rules 
applied are less stringent, affording it more discretion in its policy decisions. In fact, 
the two-pillar approach not only allows for a wide range of variables to shape 
monetary decisions, but also explicitly mentions information from market participants, 
e.g. from business and consumer surveys, which may potentially be taken into account. 
Discretion was expanded in May 2003 when the ECB effectively abandoned its 
quantitative monetary reference value for M3 by announcing that the Governing 
Council no longer reviews it on an annual basis533. Nevertheless, the monetary pillar 
and the reference value have been retained as a benchmark for analysing the 
530 European Central Bank (1999), pp. 45-46. For a comprehensive explanation of the ECB's monetary 
strategy and its components see European Central Bank (2001).
531 European Central Bank (1999), p. 47.
532 European Central Bank (1999), p. 49.
533 European Central Bank (2003), p. 91.
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information content of monetary developments and – according to the ECB – as a 
medium to long-term quantitative benchmark for assessing monetary developments534.
In addition to the ECB’s commitment to the principles laid down in its legal 
framework, one further aspect may potentially shape ECB policy makers’ behavioural 
patternsf. Being a young institution, the ECB naturally cannot look back on a long 
record of accomplished anti-inflationary policy and defence of its independence as 
manifested in the Treaty. At the same time, it has been emphasised that credibility in 
these two respects has to be built up by the ECB over time: the legal framework alone 
cannot guarantee successful anti-inflationary policy, nor can credibility in terms of 
anti-inflationary reputation and institutional and personal independence be inherited 
entirely from the predecessor institutions535. In addition, as discussed in greater detail 
below, conducting monetary policy successfully in the euro area is a more difficult 
task than the ECB's predecessor central banks faced, given that a monetary stance has 
to be established for an economically more heterogeneous area than the constituent 
economic areas the national central banks were dealing with prior to 1999. 
Consequently, the ECB has an uphill task in its early years, putting considerable 
pressure on it to make the single currency work and to make a success of EMU, as an
historically unique political venture. Since the success of the undertaking will 
ultimately be measured primarily against the overriding objective of maintaining stable 
prices and stable monetary conditions in the entire euro area, this pressure is likely to 
influence ECB decision makers’ behavioural patterns to the effect that they will be less 
prepared to let themselves in for looser monetary conditions than in a routine 
environment. 
Finally, the institutional context has not changed in terms of the shift in monetary 
decision making powers to the Community level. As important as this primary 
political restructuring are two important secondary effects that have occurred in 
response to the single currency at the national level and affect communication between 
monetary decision makers and interest-group representatives. First, monetary union 
has led to a marked shift in the national central banks’ remit and functions. From a 
position of autonomy in determining the monetary stance for the national economies, 
national central banks have moved to become part of the ESCB and the Eurosystem. 
Instead of being in charge of monetary policy in their member states, they now merely 
participate in the monetary decision making process on the Governing Council of the 
ECB. Beyond that, it is now the task of the national authorities to implement the 
534 European Central Bank (2003), p. 91.
535 Szász (2000), pp. 1-4.
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monetary and other decisions taken by the ECB. In doing so, they are strictly 
subordinated to the guidelines and instructions given by the ECB536. 
Second, and in response to the national central banks’ new role, most member states 
have reformed their national monetary authorities with the aim of adjusting their legal 
basis to the requirements of the Treaty under Article 14 (1) of the ESCB Statute and of 
streamlining the national institutions in line with their narrower mandate. As observed 
with the Bundesbank, the 2002 institutional reform led to a substantial reduction in the 
number of members on the bank's decision making body, marked simplification of 
appointment and decision making procedures and the definition of a more efficient 
internal structure, in the course of which the Regional Offices were deprived of their 
political status within the Bundesbank. Not least, streamlining also implied that the 
Advisory Boards at the Regional Offices formally lost their role as advisors on 
monetary issues. This vividly illustrates the erosion of political power at the 
Bundesbank and the bodies associated with it. At the end of the day, EMU and 
establishment of the ECB therefore necessarily result in a weakening of the input into 
monetary policy formation achieved via the existing channels of communication 
between the national central banks and the private sector.
Based on the agreement between the EU leaders on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe of June 17 and 18, 2004, the institutional set-up of the ECB 
and the economic policy framework of EMU can be expected to remain essentially 
unchanged in the course of the constitutional reform of the Union being undertaken at 
the time of writing537. 
Most importantly, price stability will remain as the primary objective of the ECB, the 
ESCB538 and the EU539. Further, the three features on which the ECB's sui generis 
status within the Treaty framework is based, namely the bank's independence, its legal 
personality and its regulatory powers, will be maintained under the Constitution540. 
536 Article 14 (3), Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European 
Central Bank.
537 The manuscript of this study was completed before the final ratification and entry into force of the 
European Constitution. All references made here apply to and assume entry into force of the Treaty 
establishing a European Constitution in the text version agreed upon by the Heads of State or 
Government during their meeting on June 17 and 18, 2004 in Brussels. 
538 Article I-29 (2). For a detailed discussion see ECB (2004), p. 58.
539 Article I-3 (3). For a detailed discussion see ECB (2004), p. 58.
540 ECB (2004), p. 61. The ECB's independence is manifested in Article I-29 (3) of the Constitution. 
Compared with the Treaty provisions currently in force, the Constitution will, in fact, reinforce the 
bank's independence by recognising its financial independence for the first time. The ECB's legal 
personality is also confirmed in Article I-29 (3). The bank's regulatory powers will remain 
unchanged. The Statute of the ECB and the ESCB will remain in force – annexed to and an integral 
part of the Constitution (ECB (2004), p. 61). The bank's sui generis status is underlined by 
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The term Eurosystem will be introduced at Treaty level for the first time, conferring 
constitutional status on the concept referring to the ECB and the national central banks 
of the member states that have adopted the euro. Amendments to the Treaty 
framework are minor and apply to selection of the ECB Executive Board – the 
decisions on which will in future be taken by a qualified majority vote in the European 
Council rather than by common accord, as is the current practice541 –, the procedures 
for revising certain provisions under Part III of the Constitution542, and certain 
provisions concerning the international role of the euro543. In addition, minor changes 
have been made to the procedure for amending the Statute of the ECB and the ESCB 
in the areas of statistics collection and the bank's capital544. Changes to the economic 
policy framework of EMU, too, will be minor. Thus, the euro group – the group of 
finance ministers of the member states that have adopted the euro plus representatives 
from the ECB and the European Commission – will be recognised in primary law for 
the first time545. In addition, the Constitution will clarify that decisions on non-
compliance by a member state of the euro area with the broad economic policy 
guidelines or the excessive deficit rules are to be taken only by euro area member 
states546. With respect to the institutional and procedural provisions relevant in the 
context of analysing interest group relations with the ECB, however, the planned 
European Constitution provides for no changes.
In summary, EMU has changed the operational environment of interest groups with 
respect to monetary affairs in a number of respects. From the viewpoint of interest 
groups in Germany, this renders the effective communication of private-sector 
classification of the ECB as one of the "other Institutions and bodies" of the EU and the explicit 
differentiation of the ECB from the Institutions listed under Article I-18, namely the European 
Parliament, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (ECB (2004), p. 61). 
541 ECB (2004), p. 62.
542 Under the simplified revision procedure of Article IV-7b, provisions in Part III of the Constitution 
can be revised by a unanimous decision of the European Council without convening an Inter-
Governmental Conference. Ratification by all member states, though, is still required, as is the 
prior consultation of Parliament and the Commission, as well as of the ECB in the event of 
institutional changes in the monetary area (ECB (2004), p. 62). 
543 According to Article III-90, euro-area member states may adopt decisions in Council that establish 
common positions and ensure unified representation within international financial institutions and 
conferences. In this context the ECB observes that its exclusive competence for the monetary 
policy of the euro area and thus the right to determine the euro area's position on monetary policy 
remains anchored in other provisions of the European Constitution (ECB (2004), pp. 62-63.
544 According to Article I-24 (2), decisions or regulations in these areas which are not initiated by the 
European Commission, but e.g. by the ECB itself are subject to qualified majority voting in 
Council more rigidly defined than otherwise. For details, see ECB (2004), p. 63.
545 ECB (2004), p. 56. 
546 ECB (2004), p. 56.
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preferences even more difficult than in the national pre-1999 context. The major 
factors contributing to this conclusion are:
– Monetary decision-making has been elevated to a supra-national level, widening 
the distance between interest groups and policy makers. 
– The ECB enjoys a broad legal mandate and extensive discretion in pursuing its 
objectives, complemented by an unmatched degree of political independence vis-
à-vis all public and private bodies at Community and member state level. 
– Institutional accessibility is severely restricted by the secluded process of 
monetary decision-making and the absence of formal channels of direct 
communication with the private sector at Community level.
– Stronger channels of communication may continue to exist at member state level. 
Their final impact on ECB-level decision making, however, is limited by the low 
weighting of the votes of individual governors on the ECB Governing Council and 
their obligation to act in a personal capacity on behalf of the euro area as a whole, 
and not as representatives of their member states.
– General commitment to the legal principles governing monetary policy at 
Community level as well as the pressure to steer euro area monetary policy 
successfully, especially in the early days of monetary union, are important factors 
conditioning the behavioural patterns of decision makers at the ECB and the 
national central banks.
– The input into monetary policy formation achieved via the channels of 
communication between the national central banks and the private sector is 
weakened by the diminished role of the national authorities and the advisory 
bodies associated with them.
II.2.2 Issue context
With the shift in the locus of monetary decision making to the Community level, the 
issue context in which interest groups work with respect to monetary affairs has also 
changed. In the first place, the ECB has to conduct a monetary policy suitable for the 
entire euro area. As the euro area is economically more heterogeneous than each of the 
constituent member states, determining an optimal policy stance is more difficult than 
in the member states prior to 1999. And second, monetary policy has developed from a 
national to a Community issue, changing the political agenda of the interest groups 
involved. Taken together, these factors alter the issue context from the vantage point 
of interest groups, forcing them to adjust their activities in this policy field.
As to the first factor, the single monetary policy of the Community needs to establish 
an optimal policy stance for the euro area as a whole. However, compared with smaller 
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economic areas – such as the member states prior to 1999 – the EMU single monetary 
area exhibits greater heterogeneity of economic cycles and structures. These 
differences make it more difficult to formulate an appropriate monetary stance for the 
euro area as a whole than for more homogenous monetary areas. Thus, the national 
economies of the euro area continue to exhibit substantial differentials with respect to 
their domestic growth and inflation rates. In 2003, the spread between the countries 
with the highest and lowest growth performance amounted to 5.6 percentage points, 
while the difference between the highest and lowest inflation performance was as 
much as 3 percentage points, as illustrated in charts 45 and 46. At the same time, rates 
of unemployment ranged from 3.7% to as much as 11.3%, as depicted in chart 47.
Euro area differentials in GDP growth and inflation
Chart 45 Chart 46
–
Data source: Eurostat
GDP growth rate at constant prices (1995=100), 2003
-0.9
-0.8
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.2
1.6
1.9
2.4
4.7
-0.1
-2.0 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0
NL
PT
DE
FR
IT
euro area
EU
BE
AT
LU
IE
FI
ES
GR
–
Data source: Eurostat
Annual average rate of change in Harmonised Indices of 
Consumer Prices (HICPs), 2003
4.0
3.4
3.3
3.1
2.8
2.5
2.2
2.2
2.1
2.0
1.5
1.3
1.3
1.0
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
IE
GR
PT
ES
IT
LU
FR
NL
euro area
EU
BE
AT
FI
DE
Ceteris paribus, the differences in cyclical variables reflect disparities in economic 
structures and differing degrees of economic development in the various member 
states. Growth rates tend to be higher in those member states in the process of catching 
up with the wealthier economies. As chart 48 shows, these structural income 
differentials are still substantial within the euro area in marginal cases, despite great 
homogeneity among the majority of member states.
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Euro area differentials in unemployment rates and per capita income
Chart 47 Chart 48
–
Data source: Eurostat
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Similarly, cyclical and structural indicators of the member states’ fiscal positions –
which influence the level of interest rates in the member states as well as for the euro 
area as a whole – point to considerable differences in the underlying economic 
conditions among EMU participants, with budget balances ranging from deficits of 
3.5% to surpluses of 4.2% and consolidated public debt between 5.7% and 106.7% of 
GDP in 2002, as depicted in charts 49 and 50, respectively.
Despite considerable convergence over the past decades, economic heterogeneity 
between the member states persists. In principle, this makes finding an optimal 
monetary policy for the euro area as a whole more complicated. Most importantly in 
the current context, it implies that an optimal euro area-wide monetary policy can 
depart from the monetary stance deemed appropriate for each individual member 
economy547. From the perspective of an economy exhibiting structurally low growth 
and inflation rates, such as Germany for example, a single monetary policy dovetailed 
to the entire euro area will therefore probably tend to be tighter than a policy stance 
geared to that economy in isolation. Given the strong concurrence of interest groups in 
Germany with monetary policy prior to 1999, in principle structural deviations 
between a tailor-made monetary policy for the domestic economy and a one-size-fits-
547 The question as to whether and how an optimal monetary policy can be achieved for an economic 
area the size of the euro area has accompanied the political process of creating a monetary union in 
the Community all along, inspiring a great deal of controversy and literature on the subject. A 
systematic analysis of the effects of economic heterogeneity on the conduct of monetary policy in 
Europe as well as a discussion of EMU in the light of the theory of optimal currency areas has been 
provided by De Grauwe (1994), especially pp. 5-59. 
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all stance within the euro area have the potential for greater or more frequent interest 
group disagreement with the monetary policy of the ECB.
Second, the status of monetary policy on political agendas at both the national and the 
EU level has changed with the third stage of EMU. At the national level, monetary 
policy continues to compete with other economic policy issues. Although monetary 
decisions are now taken at Community level, their impact on enterprises remains 
structurally unchanged, and channels of communicating interests with regard to 
monetary policy retain a strong domestic dimension given the role of the national 
central banks within the Eurosystem, as observed above. In addition, the most 
important areas of economic policymaking, most notably taxation, fiscal and labour 
market issues as well as social policy, which in the past have proved dominant on the 
domestic economic agenda, remain within the realm of policymaking at member state 
level. As a result, economic policy in general has retained a strong national dimension. 
The overall domestic bias of policy makers, market participants and the public at large, 
as manifested not least in the fact that much of the reporting and analysis of monetary 
developments still focuses on the domestic economies, has further contributed to the 
circumstance that monetary policy is still largely discussed in a national context.
At the same time, the Union’s single monetary policy, determined exclusively at 
Community level by a separate, dedicated EU body, has turned monetary policy into a 
unique EU issue. As such, it is a novelty on the EU policy agenda. To be sure, EMU as 
the political and economic process leading up to creation of the single currency and 
establishment of the institutional framework within which the single monetary policy 
for the euro area is determined, has been an item on the EU's political agenda for some 
time, going back to the first proposals on monetary unification in the Werner Plan. In 
the discussions and work towards reaching the third stage of EMU, private sector 
interest groups played a key role548. Once EMU had been achieved, however, the day-
to-day conduct of monetary policy in the euro area and the formation and articulation 
of private-sector interests in monetary policy was a new issue on the policy agenda of 
interest groups at EU level. 
548 For a comprehensive description and analysis of interest-group activity with respect to establishing 
and shaping EMU and its institutional framework see Collignon, Schwarzer (2003).
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Euro area differentials in public deficits and public debt
Chart 49 Chart 50
–
Data source: Eurostat
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As a result, ECB policies compete on the EU political agenda with the major economic 
policies pursued exclusively or concurrently at EU level, including establishment and 
maintenance of the internal market, the common agricultural policy, competition 
policy, employment policy, commercial policies, industrial policy, structural policies, 
and economic-policy coordination. 
In structural terms, this constellation of economic policy issues at EU and member 
state level features an important asymmetry in as far as the issues with which the 
single monetary policy competes at EU level are only loosely related to monetary 
policy, with the notable exception of economic-policy coordination. More closely 
related policy areas, such as fiscal and labour market policies, are almost exclusively 
part of the national economic policy agendas, where monetary policy, in turn, has lost 
political momentum after entry into the third stage of EMU. This asymmetry of the EU 
and domestic policy agendas reflects the more general asymmetry in the allocation of 
powers and duties between the national and the Community level within the EU in the 
context of economic policies, where the single currency has led to exclusively 
supranational policymaking on monetary policy, while a number of important policy 
areas still fall within the competence of the member states. Like the political level, 
where attempts have been made to bridge this asymmetry by calling for intensified 
coordination of national economic policies, the fragmented allocation of competencies 
between the EU and the member states makes specific demands of interest groups and 
their activities in this policy field. Irrespective of the individual consequences interest 
groups draw from this for their work, the distribution of policy competencies 
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complicates the localisation of monetary issues on the economic policy agenda, both at 
the member state and the EU level. 
Finally, the urgency of exchange rate related issues has ceteris paribus declined for 
enterprises engaged in intra-euro area trade since introduction of the single currency. 
As pointed out above, exchange rate exposure for transactions between the member 
states in the euro area has been eliminated as a result of the irrevocable fixing of 
exchange rates and the replacement of national currencies by the euro. Consequently, 
the related costs and risks have been reduced to zero in the euro area, eliminating them 
for most of enterprises’ foreign transactions within that area, as illustrated by charts 51
and 52 in the instance of Germany. 
German trade by region
Chart 51 Chart 52
–
Data source: Statistisches Bundesamt
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II.2.3 Group context
Together with the institutional and issue contexts, the interest group context within 
which views on monetary issues are aggregated and represented differs markedly 
today from that prior to introduction of the single currency. In the first place, monetary 
policy is now on the political agendas of an additional level of interest representation, 
namely interest groups operating on an EU-wide basis. Second, the number of interest 
groups concerned with monetary decisions today is a multiple of that observed in each
individual economy when these decisions were still in the hands of national 
authorities, now encompassing general and sectoral groups at regional, national and 
EU level. Third, the heterogeneity of interests represented by these groups within the 
euro area as a whole is greater than that observed in each individual member state. 
Competition among private-sector interests with respect to monetary policy in the euro 
area is tighter today than in the individual member states when monetary decisions 
were still in the hands of national authorities, owing to the much higher number of 
interested parties within the political arena, which, in turn, represent a far more 
heterogeneous array of interests. In contrast to the national central banks pre-1999, 
which essentially dealt with the interest groups operating within the respective 
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member states when conducting their policies, the ECB and the national central banks 
of the Eurosystem today face a multitude of interest groups at various levels of the 
political system. With monetary policy as a Community issue since entry into the third 
stage of EMU, EU-level peak interest associations now represent the natural interest 
group counterparts of the ECB at the Community level. At the same time, national and 
regional interest groups continue to work towards influencing ECB monetary policy 
by targeting their respective national central banks. Thus, the arena of interest groups 
potentially involved in articulating interests on monetary issues in the euro area 
encompasses the relevant peak, sectoral, and regional business associations in the 
twelve participating member states as well as their counterparts at the EU level. The 
wider scope of interests involved also applies to all other potential stakeholders, such 
as governments, parliaments, other political bodies at member state and EU level, 
think tanks and academic institutions. The result is a large and potentially crowded 
arena of stakeholders latently interested and active in the field of monetary 
policymaking in the euro area.
As in the case of Germany, no dedicated cause group exists at EU level which is 
exclusively concerned with monetary issues. Rather, interests with respect to monetary 
policy are aggregated and represented through the existing infrastructure of business 
associations. Despite the Community’s infancy compared with the polities of the 
member states, this infrastructure is well-established, with the major industry 
federations dating back to the early 1950s, when interest representation at trans-
national level arose in response to the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community549. EU-level business associations are officially registered with the 
Commission and are generally regarded as preferred interlocutors by the relevant 
Community policy makers, with a number of the peak associations enjoying a 
privileged status within the Community's policy processes550.
For interests in the area of trade and industry, this infrastructure essentially centres 
around three peak interest associations:
– Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe, UNICE
Founded in 1958, UNICE is the peak industrial association at EU level, 
representing 34 national industry federations from 27 countries. 
– Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Eurochambres
Founded in 1958, Eurochambres represents 41 national associations of chambers 
of commerce and industry, a European network of 2,000 regional and local 
chambers with more than 17 million member enterprises in Europe.
549 Mazey, Richardson (1993), p. 192.
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– Eurocommerce
Founded in 1993, Eurocommerce represents more than 100 European and national 
associations of enterprises in retail, wholesale, and international trade in 29 
countries. 
These cross-sectoral peak business associations are complemented by a number of 
specialised sectoral interest associations, whose membership in turn consists of the 
major national sectoral business associations. 
As to association-specific exposure and issue involvement, the patterns are similar to 
those observed in the case of German business associations. However, the variety of 
enterprises ultimately represented by peak EU associations in terms of their size, 
dependence on foreign capital and their exposure to national or regional economic 
cycles and movements in interest and inflation rates and to extra-euro area exchange 
rate risks is necessarily greater than within national associations. The heterogeneity of 
interests with respect to monetary policy represented within peak EU business 
associations is therefore greater than within their national counterparts, to the effect 
that the views represented at EU level are highly aggregated and naturally reflect a 
comparatively low common denominator. 
The position of EU business associations is also similar to that of their national 
counterparts, e.g. in Germany, in terms of their endowment with resources,. 
Financially, business associations in Brussels are generally well-equipped by their 
constituent groups in the member states. Access to information and data is also secured 
by the national member associations, making most EU business groups providers of 
unique, aggregated EU-wide information on their specific area of activity. Thus, both 
UNICE and Eurochambres publish EU-wide surveys among enterprises in their 
constituencies, providing information on the economic situation in their sectors, as 
well as assessments of overall economic conditions. Since introduction of the single 
currency, these surveys have been extended to encompass assessments on monetary 
and exchange rate conditions, indicating that information relevant to monetary affairs 
exists or is being generated and that these associations have, in fact, picked up on the 
issue and the views articulated by their members. Considering that they can generally 
draw on years of experience in analysing the EU economy as a whole, EU business 
associations have in fact enjoyed a certain informational lead over the ECB, whose 
own work on analysing European monetary, financial, and general economic 
conditions began only in mid-1998. Although supported by the resources provided by 
the national central banks as well as the preliminary work undertaken by the European 
550 Mazey, Richardson (1993), p. 193.
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Monetary Institute551, the ECB has been dealing with an entirely new policy problem –
i.e. of devising a single monetary policy for an economic area whose composition was 
decided only months before the bank's operations started – relying on new, largely 
untested statistical and analytical groundwork. At least in the initial period, EU-level 
business associations have therefore benefited from a certain routine in collecting and 
analysing EU-wide evidence, which the ECB as such did not itself possess. 
With respect to political resources, on the other hand, EU-level business associations 
are as limited as their national counterparts in Germany prior to 1999. As argued 
above, monetary decisions are taken by means of a closed process with very few 
points of access. Given the set-up of the monetary system of EMU and the 
appointment, monetary decision making and implementation procedures of the 
Eurosystem, no practical ways of exerting political pressure on monetary decision 
makers exist.
II.2.4 Interim conclusions
With entry into EMU, the participant member states shifted the locus of monetary and 
exchange rate decision making to the EU level, thereby significantly moving the 
institutional, issue, and group goalposts for business interest group activity. More so 
than in the case of Germany and the Bundesbank, the task environment within which 
trade and industry associations deal with monetary and exchange rate policy differs 
considerably from the environments in other areas of policy-making at EU level. The 
findings can be summarised as follows: 
Institutional context
– The institutional framework of monetary policy at EU level mirrors that previously 
operated in Germany in important respects, providing a well-defined institutional 
and procedural framework, isolating monetary decisions from other policy areas 
and delegating it to one single expert institution, the ECB. 
– In many respects the institutional independence of the ECB is more pronounced 
than that of the Deutsche Bundesbank, given enshrinement of the principle of 
central bank independence in the Treaty and the ECB's position within the 
institutional framework of the EU as the only single independent decision-making 
body. This suggests that direct and indirect influence by interest groups via the 
551 The European Monetary Institute (EMI) was established on January 1, 1994 as the predecessor 
institution to the ECB, preparing the upcoming central bank’s work in terms of coordination of the 
national central banks’ monetary policies, strengthening their cooperation, technical preparation of 
the ECB's work – including setting up a payment system, designing policy instruments and 
preparing the physical currency changeover – and supervision of the European Monetary System. 
For a comprehensive analysis of the EMI's role and work see Mehnert-Meland (1995), pp. 53-69.
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surrounding political framework, especially via the EU's executive and legislative 
institutions, is even more limited than in many national jurisdictions. Institutional 
independence is further strengthened by the ECB's own substantial material, 
informational and personnel resources, coupled with those of the national central 
banks within the ESCB.
– Owing to their pyramid structure, in principle the ECB and ESCB offer a 
multitude of institutional points of access for interest groups. In practice, though, 
direct formal access to the ECB by interest groups is limited: The twice-yearly 
Macroeconomic Dialogue, as the only formal point of contact with interest groups, 
does not even fulfil an advisory function as far as the ECB is concerned. 
Issue context
– The single monetary policy is a relatively new issue on the EU policy agenda, 
building on a multitude of diverse inflationary developments and policy 
approaches in the respective member states that belong to EMU. Within the single 
currency area, economic conditions differ substantially in structural as well as 
cyclical terms, pointing up a relatively high degree of heterogeneity of interests 
associated with monetary and exchange rate issues across the currency area.
– With respect to this primary purpose, the ECB has delivered a remarkably positive 
performance, keeping inflation low by historical and international standards and 
countering surges in wages and prices effectively while maintaining a largely 
stable interest rate environment. At the same time, there have been substantial 
swings in the external value of the euro versus the US dollar, while exchange rate 
movements between the participating member states were eliminated with entry 
into EMU. As a result, monetary and exchange rate related policy issues have 
largely remained in the background of policy debate, with the exception of the 
euro exchange rate. 
– At the national level, numerous sectors nevertheless remain specifically exposed to 
interest and exchange rate developments, including the transport, construction and 
retail sectors, the automotive, mechanical engineering, chemical and electronics 
industries, and interest rate-sensitive small and medium-sized enterprises. 
– Issue involvement at the EU level is weakened by the fact that monetary and 
exchange rate-related policy issues are relatively new on the policy agenda. For 
practical purposes, this means that many policy makers and interest groups are 
being systematically exposed to monetary issues for the first time. More so than at 
national level, EU economic policy debate was dominated by a whole range of 
other economic policy issues on the past political agenda, mainly focusing on 
improving the structural competitiveness of the EU economies, including 
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completion of the single market and pursuit of the Lisbon Agenda. In view of this, 
monetary policy has remained detached from overall economic policy debate at 
EU level.
Group context
– With EMU, monetary policy is now on the agendas of an additional level of 
interest representation, i.e. interest groups operating on an EU-wide basis. Interest 
aggregation and expression with respect to monetary and exchange rate issues are 
achieved through the existing infrastructure of EU-level business associations and 
their peak organisations. Given its insignificance in terms of impact and urgency, 
monetary policy has not aroused sufficient attention to provoke the formation of 
dedicated cause groups. 
– With national central banks as important parts of the ESCB and ECB 
communication strategy, avenues of interest communication at the national level 
have not become obsolete. Interest mediation can thus be sought through both 
traditional regional and national channels and through new channels at EU level. 
– Not only does a greater spectrum of interests exist within the euro area, but also a 
great number of interest groups at all levels of policymaking are competing for 
influence. This makes the group landscape more fragmented. Peak interest 
organisations at EU level have the task of aggregating a more heterogeneous set of 
interests among a large number of diverse constituent or associated groups in the 
member states, complicating the emergence of strong policy positions on monetary 
and exchange rate-related issues. 
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Part III Empirical analysis
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III.1 Research design
In chapters I.1 and I.2, a theoretical framework was devised to assess whether and to 
what extent private-sector interest groups are likely to seek political influence on 
monetary policy makers and which channels they use to communicate their interests. 
Chapter II.1 provided preliminary evidence on the institutional, issue, and group 
contexts within which interest groups operate in Germany. 
The key propositions identified at the end of chapter I.2 are tested against the reality of 
relations between private-sector interest groups and central banks in chapter III.2, 
analysing interest group relations with the central bank in the case of Germany and the 
impact of institutional, issue and group contexts on the behaviour of major trade and 
industry associations in Germany with respect to monetary issues and the Bundesbank. 
The research design applied in testing the propositions is presented below. 
III.1.1 Analysis of interest group behaviour in Germany and at EU level
Developments and policies, decision-making structures and processes in monetary 
affairs differ considerably across countries. The same applies in many cases to interest 
group structures, strategies and activities in general. If the theoretical observations 
made earlier are correct, then the extent to which interest-group activity can be 
observed is likely to differ, depending on which country or economic area is 
examined. Ideally, a comprehensive analysis should seek to assess as great a number 
of countries as possible to produce maximum evidence and insight into the behaviour 
of interest groups in this policy area. By the same logic, it is desirable to examine as 
many players, i.e. interest groups and policy makers and their representatives, as 
possible. For the sake of practicability, however, it is necessary to stake out the scope 
of analysis and limit the set of respondents. Accordingly, the following analysis will 
be limited in a number of dimensions to ensure relevance and focus.
First, the empirical evaluation will be concerned primarily with interest groups in 
Germany and their behaviour towards the German central bank, i.e. the Bundesbank. 
This choice is based on three considerations. 
First, for most of the post-World War II period the Bundesbank was one of the most 
important central banks in the world, second only to the Federal Reserve System in the 
United States and on eye level with the Bank of Japan.
Second, until 1999 it was the leading central bank in Europe and de facto the anchor of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System552, making it the 
552 Bofinger et al. (1996), p. 608. 
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benchmark for monetary policies in the participating member states during the past 
two decades. 
This latter point is of pivotal importance for the present analysis. As discussed above, 
central banks obliged to operate within a certain exchange rate regime and to maintain 
a certain exchange rate parity are not in a position to pursue an autonomous monetary 
policy. The extent of their autonomy depends on the limitations the regime imposes. In 
such circumstances potential public debate necessarily focuses on the appropriateness 
of the exchange rate regime as such, the band in operation or the targeted central 
parity. Since monetary policy in the narrow sense does not exist where exchange rate 
regimes are in operation, an analysis of private-sector reactions to monetary policy 
under such circumstances is likely to produce very specific results, which in the 
present context are not looked for. In contrast, a public debate on monetary policy as 
under examination here can only be observed in the context of autonomous monetary 
policymaking, unconstrained by exogenously determined exchange rate targets.
The Bundesbank is a suitable object of analysis because it was able to pursue monetary 
policies largely unaffected by formal exchange rate arrangements after abolition of the 
Bretton Woods System in March 1973553 and, in contrast to most other EU central 
banks, even during the existence of the European Monetary System, whose Exchange 
Rate Mechanism provided for exchange rate bands554 and bilateral commitments to 
intervene in defence of the agreed currency parities. Monetary policy for the Deutsche 
Mark, as the de facto anchor currency, was pursued by the Bundesbank more or less 
autonomously, while the remaining ERM members worked towards keeping their 
currencies within the agreed exchange rate bands. As a result, the Bundesbank was not 
only the leading central bank in the EU, but also the only one to consistently pursue an 
autonomous monetary policy. For interest groups in Germany, this implied that there 
was, in fact, an autonomous monetary policy to discuss. Conversely, an empirical 
examination of interest group behaviour in other ERM member states would be limited 
in the above-mentioned sense. Consequently, Germany is, taking the pre-EMU era into 
553 On the functioning of the Bretton Woods System see Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 607-608.
554 From its establishment in 1979 the EMS provided for a standard narrow exchange rate band of +/-
2.25%, which was adhered to by the EMS founder members Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Italy operated under the optional, wider band of 
+/- 6%. The United Kingdom joined the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS in October 1990 at 
+/- 2.25%. Following the exchange rate turmoil in autumn 1992 and spring 1993, the exchange rate 
band was widened to +/- 15% in August 1993, by which the ERM was de facto suspended. 
Continuation of the narrow band on a bilateral basis was agreed only for the Dutch Guilder and the 
Deutsche Mark (Bofinger et al. (1996), pp. 605-609).
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account, the only EU country555 for which the present analysis in its narrow focus can 
be appropriately pursued.
Third, the Deutsche Bundesbank has been portrayed as the institutional and, moreover, 
the behavioural role model for the ECB. The overall monetary objectives and most of 
the institutional and procedural features of the Bundesbank were used as a blueprint 
for the ECB during the negotiations on the statutes of the European System of Central 
Banks and the ECB. Bundesbank monetary policy decisions and operations are still 
seen as setting an example for the ECB's actions even today. Selecting Germany as an 
exemplary study consequently offers the additional advantage that empirical evidence 
may allow for subsequent conclusions on the ECB’s potential present and future 
behaviour.
In this sense, the Bundesbank also represents a suitable substitute for the ECB as an 
object of analysis. Since taking over monetary decision making in the euro area from 
the participating national central banks in 1999, the ECB represents the most 
interesting study case in Europe. National central banks in the member states of that 
area, including the Bundesbank, are still part of decision making structures but today 
no longer possess autonomous decision-making powers in the field of monetary 
policies. 
However, despite the relevance of the ECB for studies on monetary policymaking, it 
does not lend itself as the primary object of analysis in the present context. After only 
few years of operation, structures of communication with the private sector are still in 
the process of development, just as the ECB and the national central banks of the 
Eurosystem have remained concerned with adapting to the new political landscape: 
Thus, the ECB revised its monetary policy strategy after the first years of operation556
in spring 2003, while the Bundesbank put an extensive internal structural reform into 
place in summer 2002557. Similarly, just a few years into the euro era, interest 
associations are equally unlikely to have reached equilibrium in their activities 
pertaining to monetary policy and central banks. A final judgement on the relations 
between EU interest groups and the ECB may therefore be premature at the current 
juncture.
In addition, focusing on the Bundesbank as the primary object of analysis is justified 
on the grounds that much of the contact between central banks and the private sector in 
the euro area is likely to remain associated with the national central banks, which are 
555 With respect to the criteria applied here, the United Kingdom also represents a suitable, but not as 
important a test case as Germany. 
556 For details on the results of the ECB's evaluation of its monetary policy strategy see European 
Central Bank (2003a).
557 For details on the structural reform of the Deutsche Bundesbank see Deutsche Bundesbank (2003a)
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not only responsible for the operations of the Eurosystem in the member states, but 
also for communication of the ECB's monetary policy in the respective constituent 
countries of the euro area. Besides the potential exemplary role that the relations 
between national central banks and the private sector prior to the delegation of 
monetary policy to the ECB may play for communication by the ECB with interest 
groups, relations at the national level may still be important for the formulation of 
monetary policy at the European level today through the influence national central 
banks have on euro area monetary decisions inside the ECB Governing Council. 
In the light of these considerations, focusing the following empirical analysis on 
Germany and the relations between interest groups and the Bundesbank seems a 
promising way to proceed. This will be done in chapter III.2
The shift of monetary sovereignty to the ECB nevertheless needs to be taken into 
account. Not only has it transferred the locus of monetary decision making to a new 
superstructure above the existing national central banks and thereby diminished the 
political weight of each of the latter institutions in their national policy arenas, it has 
also triggered far-reaching measures by the member states aimed at streamlining the 
national central banks. Both developments are likely to alter communication between 
the national central banks and the interest groups in their constituencies. In order to 
capture the potential impact of this important systemic break, monetary policymaking 
at the euro-area level will be analysed, concentrating on how the shift of monetary 
decisions to the European level in 1999 has impacted interest group behaviour, and to 
what extent and how business interests are communicated at the European level with 
respect to monetary issues. This will be the subject of chapter III.3. 
III.1.2 Qualitative and quantitative approach
The objective of the empirical analysis in chapters III.2 and III.3 below is to answer –
for the specific cases of Germany and the euro area – the three general questions 
identified at the outset, namely,
– Do interest groups seek to influence monetary policy decision making?
– What are the factors contributing to the decision whether to express interests with 
respect to monetary policy, and to what extent? 
– If influence on monetary decisions is sought, how are interests articulated by the 
relevant groups?
To that end, it seeks to compare the propositions established in chapter I.2558 with the 
reality of interest group activities and monetary policy practices.
558 See list of propositions on pp. 96 to 98.
240
In order to gain a picture of the motivations and behaviour of German interest groups 
with regard to monetary affairs, empirical evidence has been collected through 
interviews with decision makers and experts from interest associations as well as from 
the Bundesbank and the ECB, investigating their perception of monetary and exchange 
rate developments and policies as well as the factors promoting or hampering political 
activity. The approach rests on semi-structured, focused interviews with experts and 
decision makers in the policy field along a catalogue of questions designed to 
operationalise the key propositions. A set of core questions was identified559 and 
worded so that it could be put forward to all interviewees, i.e. to respondents from 
central banks, on the one hand, and corporations or interest associations, on the other. 
Additional questions were raised on a case-by-case basis to allow for detailed follow-
up discussions and a more focused approach towards individual experts’ or decision 
makers’ specific perceptions. All questions were formulated as open questions, 
allowing respondents to answer freely and individually and to elaborate where deemed 
appropriate. Furthermore, questions were drafted560 and interviews conducted561 in line 
with the present standards in qualitative social science research. 
Following collection and transcription562 of the interviews, a combined qualitative and 
quantitative approach563 was adopted to evaluate responses. Answers to core questions 
559 For a complete list of the core questions, see annex below (p. 379).
560 Questions were designed to satisfy contemporary scientific standards to a maximum degree, 
including brevity, comprehensibility and precision. Ingratiation, double negations, normative 
concepts, suggestive questions and multiple dimensions were excluded. Indirect questions were 
avoided as far as possible. For a list of criteria for qualitative interviews see Dieckmann (1997), 
pp. 410-414. The qualitative methods applied here are based on the techniques presented in Flick et 
al. (2000), pp. 224-587, and Schnell et al. (1999).
The questionnaires were derived directly from the propositions established in the theoretical part of 
this study and organised in thematic blocks so as to ensure coherence in content and 
comprehensibility on the part of interviewees. To facilitate responses, the sequence of questions 
was arranged so that general, less complex questions would be used to introduce interviewees to 
the subject matter. More complex or controversial issues were raised in the second and third quarter 
of each interview. The final quarter of each interview was dedicated to specific follow-up 
questions. Interviews were designed to last for an average of one hour. 
The questionnaires were tested by means of a sequence of pre-tests, after each of which the 
contents, phrasing and sequencing of questions were revised where appropriate.
All interviewees were provided with appropriate background information, i.e. a two-page 
description of the research project as well as a curriculum vitae, before appointments were 
arranged. 
561 See Hopf (2000), Hermanns (2000), Dieckmann (1997), pp. 410-418.
562 The methods applied in transcribing interviews were based on Kowal, O'Connell (2000).
563 Combining qualitative surveys with quantitative evaluation methods has been advanced as one way 
of improving evaluative objectivity in social science research (Dieckmann (1997), pp. 451-455, 
also Kelle, Erzberger (2000)). However, there is a risk of blurring results at the interface between 
the two approaches, namely when translating qualitative items for use in quantitative analysis by 
means of coding (Schmidt (2000)).
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were compared among all respondents and coded according to the method proposed by 
Schmidt (2000), i.e. in a first step coding categories were identified for each question. 
Subsequently, individual answers were coded and the resulting quantification 
processed, evaluated and appropriately displayed. Coding and quantification result 
exclusively from evaluation of the qualitative answers. Interviewees were not asked to 
give their own quantitative assessments. Throughout the study, these quantitative 
results complement the qualitative material in the form of quotations from 
interviewees564 or insights from other sources, such as related literature or archival 
material. 
This inherently qualitative approach to analysing interest group behaviour towards 
monetary policy stands in some contrast to the almost exclusively quantitative 
methods applied in the existing literature, which is concerned with the closely related 
analysis of influence on monetary policy decisions by governments and party politics. 
In this latter field of study, scholarly attention has so far focused on the degree to 
which monetary policy decisions are in fact influenced by electoral politics. To this 
end, econometric models have been applied, relating monetary developments to the 
occurrence of elections, elected policy makers’ party affiliations or the existence of 
conflicts between monetary decision makers and elected politicians565. By regressing 
indicators of these potential sources of political influence on observed monetary 
developments, these models yield important insights into the correlation between 
monetary decision making and electoral politics.566
Similar approaches have been applied to private-sector interests, even though attention 
to this issue has at best been marginal, as already pointed out. Most importantly, 
Havrilesky567 examined banking and other private sector influences on monetary 
policy in the US by regressing directives from the Federal Advisory Council, a body 
composed of private-sector representatives advising the Federal Reserve Board, on the 
central bank's Federal Funds Rate. Havrilesky also tested the impact of business 
surveys568. More recently, Maier et al.569 and Maier570 picked up on a method 
564 All interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. Any quotations are reproduced 
anonymously. 
565 A comprehensive overview of existing studies on political business cycles and the models applied 
in the field of study is provided by Maier (2002), pp. 10-12. 
566 Maier (2002) contains a review of the major results yielded by applying econometric models in this 
context (pp. 15-31). 
567 Havrilesky (1993), pp. 251-285.
568 Here the quarterly survey of the National Association of Business Economists. See Havrilesky 
(1993), pp. 271-272.
569 Maier, Sturm, de Haan (2000). 
570 Maier (2002), pp. 87-96.
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Havrilesky had used in a different context571 and tested the responsiveness of monetary 
indicators to private-sector statements on monetary policy as reflected in newspaper 
articles in the case of Germany. 
What characterises the above-mentioned studies is their common objective of 
determining the final influence of interested parties – be they located in electoral 
politics or in the private sector – on monetary developments or decisions. To that end, 
it is appropriate to measure statistically the dependence of monetary variables on the 
behavioural variables associated with interest group activity.
In contrast, the focus of the present study lies on quite different aspects. It tries to look 
into the black box of interest representation, which is taken as given in the above-
mentioned studies, and seeks to examine the incentives groups face when they decide 
in the first place whether or not to take political action on monetary policy. Secondly, 
it sets out to describe the means by which interest groups seek to exert political 
influence on monetary policy decisions once they have decided to do so. Both of these 
issues, as well as the questions and propositions derived, essentially touch upon the 
perception of a policy issue and the related variables and upon the decisions and 
behaviour based on these perceptions. With respect to their empirical evaluation, such 
perceptual and behavioural patterns clearly do not lend themselves to a purely 
econometric analysis. Thus, the sensitivity of interest groups and their members 
towards the economic effects of monetary developments on their businesses and 
operations cannot be read off directly from readily available statistics. The same 
problem applies to the role of institutional or behavioural hurdles, which might 
discourage interest groups from approaching decision makers on monetary affairs. 
Similarly, the channels interest groups use if they do approach monetary policy makers 
are not plainly evident. 
The qualitative approach aims to open up these difficult perceptual and behavioural 
issues to empirical analysis. First of all, it enables research into issues in a way that 
provides a comprehensive picture of the policy issue and policy arena, and of how the 
relevant actors operate within it. In as far as these insights generate comparable 
answers, their contents can, where appropriate, be quantified and prepared for 
statistical analysis572. In addition, by using focused but open interview methods in 
contrast to standardised questionnaires, it is possible to capture the subjective views of 
those actors who effectively shape political communication between the private sector 
and monetary policy makers. Furthermore, this technique leaves room for arguments 
571 Havrilesky had initially constructed his SAFER index in order to measure public statements by 
politicians in the executive branch in the US and their effects on monetary policy (original study 
see Havrilesky (1988), later refined in Havrilesky (1993), pp. 29-80). 
572 Dieckmann (1997), pp. 453-455. Also Kelle, Erzberger (2000). 
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that cannot be anticipated from a purely theoretical discussion on which the 
instruments of research, i.e. propositions and questions, are based573. 
In order to maximise the benefits of qualitative interviews and to anticipate their 
limitations as a research instrument in the present context, it is also useful to look into 
the problems associated with this method. Three major sources of difficulty have been 
identified in literature574. First, the results of qualitative methods are likely to depend 
very much on the choice of interviewees. Qualitative interviews are generally designed 
so as to produce detailed and comprehensive information through intensive and 
lengthy conversations with the interviewees selected, aimed at a better and deeper 
understanding of the reality under consideration. This often needs to be achieved at the 
cost of rather small samples of interviewees, compared with standardised mass 
questionnaires. All else being equal, this reduces the representativeness of the research 
results575 and may amplify the problems associated with selection biases576. As 
discussed in more detail below, this problem arises only to a very limited extent in the 
present context, and corrective measures have been taken by addressing all relevant 
peak interest groups within the domain of trade and industry in Germany and at the EU 
level577. 
Second, conducting and evaluating qualitative interviews can be more problematic 
than with their quantitative counterparts, i.e. in the context of standardised mass 
questionnaires, inasmuch as the advantage of qualitative techniques in terms of more 
individual, focused and detailed investigation of a certain issue can come at the cost of 
lower comparability of individual responses. This may result from less uniform 
conduct of individual interviews in terms of application, phrasing or sequencing of 
questions, or from the challenge of ensuring an objective evaluation of the resulting 
responses578. In order to minimise the problems associated with the conduct and 
573 For a discussion of the benefits of qualitative research methods in social sciences see Dieckmann 
(1997), pp. 443-445. Dieckmann points to a third benefit of qualitative methods, namely that they 
allow the observation of interviewees in "day-to-day situations" as opposed to the "artificiality of 
interview situations", which may be generated by standardised questionnaires or laboratory-based 
quantitative social science research. The latter are, in practice, not viable as research instruments in 
discourse with high-ranking experts or policy makers. 
On the benefits of qualitative research methods in social sciences, see also Flick, von Kardoff, 
Steinke (2000). With respect to the theory of qualitative social science research see Dieckmann 
(1997), pp. 375-381, von Kardoff (2000) on qualitative evaluation research and Flick (2000) on the 
design and process of qualitative research. 
574 For an overview see Dieckmann (1997), pp. 451-455.
575 Dieckmann (1997), p. 326.
576 Dieckmann (1997), pp. 326-329.
577 Sectoral interest groups were selected on the basis of their importance in economic terms, i.e. with 
a view to the shares of the output of their members in GDP and in external trade.
578 Dieckmann (1997), p. 453.
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evaluation of qualitative interviews, the present analysis is based on the rules 
commonly devised for ensuring objectivity, reliability and validity in social science 
research579 as far as applicable and realistic in the present context.580 In addition, 
maximum comparability was sought, as described above, by devising a set of core 
questions, which were put forward consistently to all interviewees, ensuring the 
existence of a set of questions and responses largely satisfying quality criteria 
observed in quantitative studies. Furthermore, comparable responses were 
systematically coded and statistically evaluated, ensuring that the core of empirical 
evidence was founded on quantitative findings backed up with additional qualitative 
insights from interviews, literature and archival material where appropriate. 581
Finally, the quality of the empirical results critically depends on the precision and 
truthfulness of the replies obtained from interviewees. As explicitly intended by such 
an approach, qualitative methods primarily capture subjective views, impressions and 
opinions, rather than measuring objective states of the world. Subjective replies may 
be imprecise, not well founded or even untruthful. 
579 Dieckmann (1997), pp. 216-227.
580 With respect to objectivity in conduct and evaluation, all interviews were conducted and evaluated 
solely by the author of the study, so that variances in application and interpretation can practically 
be ruled out. 
With respect to reliability, all questions were subjected to extensive pre-tests and subsequently 
revised to ensure maximum comprehensibility and precision, largely ruling out misunderstanding 
or misinterpretation of the questions during interviews. 
Concerning validity, the questionnaire, the formulation of questions and the selection of 
interviewees were designed to ensure maximum validity in terms of content, criteria and construct, 
as suggested by Dieckmann (1997), pp. 224-225.
581 The sensitivity of qualitative methods to the potential problems cited above has given rise to doubts 
over the scientific value of studies based on such methods. Some researchers working on social 
science methodology have argued that qualitative approaches are less suitable for testing 
hypotheses precisely because they are said to perform less well than quantitative methods in terms 
of the comparability of individual responses. See Dieckmann (1997), pp. 444-445. In fact, 
adherents of qualitative methods have themselves rejected the testing of hypotheses as a field of 
application for qualitative techniques, arguing that the formulation of hypotheses on an ex ante
basis as such was inadequate because it represented, at best, prior knowledge and, at worst, a 
systematic bias on the part of the researcher. This may distort subsequent research results from the 
very outset. According to this view, research should be guided by maximum openness with respect 
to statements, interpretations and the setting of priorities by the actors under scrutiny. The 
formulation of theories and hypotheses should be the result of empirical work rather than preceding 
it. See Meinefeld (2000), pp. 266-269. 
The present analysis seeks neither to follow nor to contribute to this academic debate. Rather, a 
pragmatic approach is taken with the objective of describing and exploring a specific field of 
policymaking. It is based on sound theoretical foundations, the theoretical and empirical validity of 
which has been tested and confirmed elsewhere, and applies the most suitable empirical method, 
i.e. a qualitative proceeding. Potential weaknesses are minimised by incorporating alternative, 
quantitative approaches, as specified above. 
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In order to minimise the potentially distortionary effects of this problem, the 
interview-based study below was conducted exclusively with well-informed decision 
makers and experts. Information obtained in the course of the interviews that was 
either formulated imprecisely, speculative in nature or otherwise inappropriate for the 
present purpose was not included in the evaluation. In addition, given the sensitivity of 
the majority of issues discussed during interviews, all interviewees were assured that 
the contents of the conversations would remain confidential. In most instances, 
confidentiality was a precondition for the interview as such as well as for the 
unconstrained disclosure of information and personal views. As a result, the 
information obtained in the course of the interviews is presented below in an 
anonymized manner without explicit reference to the names of individual 
interviewees. This also extends to the names of the organisations the interviewees 
represented. 
III.1.2.1 Sample
With respect to the sample of decision makers and experts asked to provide 
information on the relations between interest groups and central banks, selection was 
made both with respect to the relevant institutions and actors as well as to the types of 
decision makers and experts addressed inside each institution. 
As to the types of institutions and actors under scrutiny, empirical evidence was 
collected among both central banks and interest groups. In the case of Germany, 
evidence on the central bank view of the problem was gathered from representatives of 
the Bundesbank, including the Bundesbank headquarters in Frankfurt/Main as well as 
its constituent regional central banks, i.e. the Hauptverwaltungen or 
Landeszentralbanken582. 
Among private-sector interest groups, the analysis focuses on the major German peak 
business associations in industry and trade. By looking at these peak business 
associations, the study seeks to capture a picture of interest groups which, in principle,
– are representative of the private-sector economy at large in terms of exposure to 
monetary developments and the related policy decisions,
– are exposed to monetary or exchange rate developments in a significant way,
582 Until the Bundesbank's April 2002 institutional reform, regional central banks were known as 
Landeszentralbanken, i.e. state central banks. In the course of the reform, the legal and institutional 
status of these regional entities was altered. Since May 2002, these entities have been referred to as 
Hauptverwaltungen, i.e. main administrative units. Further details are provided below.
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– are sufficiently resourced to actually have sufficient means for conveying their 
interests to policy makers, provided such interests exist and are deemed worthy of 
pursuit,
– exhibit some degree of homogeneity in purpose, exposure, and interests so as to 
make motivations and activities relating to monetary affairs directly comparable,
– reflect the views of those associations, groups, and individuals involved in formal 
and semi-formal contacts with the monetary authorities.
As defined in the introduction, interest groups in trade and industry fulfil these criteria 
most appropriately and therefore represent the primary focus of the present analysis. 
By the same token, certain sectors and sub-sectors of the economy are not covered 
here explicitly. As explained in the introduction, these include agriculture, finance, 
employer and employee organisations. 
Specialised sectoral or regional business associations have been included in the 
fieldwork selectively, based on two criteria. Sectoral or regional groups or their 
representatives were addressed583
– if they were represented on a formal or semi-formal advisory body to the central 
bank or to a relevant policy committee – i.e. on one of the Bundesbank's Advisory 
Councils, or on its roundtable of economists – or 
– if their constituencies were economically particularly exposed to monetary or 
exchange rate developments.
Other sectoral or regional interest associations in trade and industry are not included in 
the analysis. In terms of contents, this is unlikely to result in significant omissions, as 
the perceptions on the part of these associations are likely to be proxied by the views 
expressed by those representatives interviewed. On average, the responses gained from 
representatives of regional or sectoral groups, e.g. sitting on a Bundesbank Advisory 
Council, should not deviate systematically from their equivalents not represented on 
such bodies584. In addition, all relevant regional or sectoral interest groups in trade and 
industry are constituents, members, or associates of the peak cross-sectoral 
associations covered in the analysis. 
583 Further details are presented in chapters III.2 and III.3 as well as in the annex below.
584 The only substantial exception to this assumption are views expressed with respect to the channels 
of communication used by interest groups to mediate their interests with respect to monetary 
policy. The criteria for selection of interest groups applied here necessarily produce a selection bias 
in favour of groups with either formal or semi-formal contacts with central banks, or with 
substantial exposure to monetary or exchange rate developments. This bias is taken into 
consideration in the analysis below.
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At the euro area level, background interviews were conducted with representatives at 
the ECB and peak EU industry and trade associations. The sample of central bank and 
interest group representatives was selected with reference to the same criteria as in the 
case of Germany. National central banks in other euro area member states and interest 
associations operative at the national level in euro area member states other than 
Germany were not included in the analysis.
In line with the overall qualitative approach and in order to obtain responses with a 
great degree of detail and validity, the empirical work presented here focuses on 
interviews with working-level experts as well as with decision makers. Based on the 
above selection criteria, a total of 180 decision makers and experts were identified as 
holding positions or possessing substantial knowledge relevant to the present topic in 
the entities specified above. Identification of the target group was based on the 
evaluation of organisation charts, direct requests for appropriate contacts and explicit 
recommendations by experts or decision makers. 84, or 47% of that group were 
identified as being of particular relevance to the current study owing to their 
involvement in communication between central banks and interest groups and were 
approached for background interviews. 27, or 32%, of these requests were not 
answered or turned down with reference to the confidentiality of the issue, the 
insignificance of private-sector activity for monetary policy, lack of evidence, or other 
constraints. 
The total sample of experts and decision makers therefore consisted of 57 respondents, 
who were interviewed between November 2002 and August 2003. Two additional 
respondents – one high-ranking official at the EU Commission close to the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue, and one academic – were consulted, and their insights 
entered the study as background information but were not included in the quantitative 
evaluation. 
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Composition of sample of interviewees
Table 12
DE, EU
Federal peak 
associations
Regional level, 
Advisory Board DE total
EU peak 
associations EU total Sample total
Number 12 12 24 9 9 33
% of total 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 72.7 27.3 100.0
DE, EU
Bundesbank, 
Central Office
Bundesbank, 
Regional Offices DE total
ECB, Central 
Office EU total Sample total
Number 7 15 22 2 2 24
% of total 31.8 68.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 91.7 8.3 100.0
Sample total
Number 57
% of total 100.0
Sample total
Number 57
% of total 100.0
Retired
8
14.0
Acting
49
86.0
Experts
32
56.1
Decision makers
25
43.9
DE EU
Memorandum items
All respondents
DE EU
Business associations from trade and industry
Central bank
A detailed breakdown of the sample is provided in table 12 above. Of the 57 
interviewees, 33 came from interest groups and 24 from central banks. The former can 
be decomposed into 24 respondents reporting on interest group activity in Germany 
and nine at EU level. The sample of German interest group representatives was evenly 
distributed among respondents from peak federal associations and members of the 
Bundesbank's regional Advisory Boards. Among the 24 respondents at central banks, 
22 came from the Bundesbank and two from the ECB. The Bundesbank sample 
included seven respondents from the bank's Central Office and 15 from its Regional 
Offices. 
In total, the sample of interviewees comprised 25 decision makers, i.e. high-ranking 
central bank officials including acting board members and retired members of the 
Bundesbank's central bank council, and 32 experts working as economists, personal 
assistants or communications specialists involved in the preparation of monetary 
policy decisions and in maintaining and preparing external contacts. 49 respondents 
were acting decision makers or experts, while eight were retired at the time of 
interviewing. 
Overall, the sample of 57 respondents covers a large number of the relevant experts 
and decision makers in the specified entities, or their designated representatives, 
providing a strong empirical basis for the analysis presented below.
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III.1.2.2 Evaluation
Following collection and transcription585 of the interviews, a combined qualitative and 
quantitative approach586 was adopted to evaluate responses. Answers to core questions 
were compared among all respondents and coded according to the method proposed by 
Schmidt587:
– In an initial step, coding categories were identified for each question. 
– Second, the answer categories were complemented by a scale of numerical values 
to enable quantification of the answers given by respondents.
– Subsequently, individual answers were coded and scaled on that basis.
– The resulting quantification was processed and evaluated mathematically.
– Where useful, insights gained from quantification were complemented by 
quotations or other qualitative elements from the interviews, with the aim of either 
explaining or elaborating on numerical results, or to identify behavioural or 
perceptional aspects that could not be explored by quantitative means.
Evaluation encompassed the aggregation of numerical values and calculation of 
statistical averages across the key strata of the samples, i.e. for interest group and 
central bank respondents as well as for regional or federal level responses in the case 
of Germany. 
Calculation of arithmetic averages was selected as the most important indicator for 
aggregate responses, reflecting the total of all observations in the sample or its sub-
sets. In addition, median responses were calculated, providing evidence on the typical 
responses delivered by interviewees. The median is considered a particularly robust 
indicator useful for evaluating small samples ranked along ordinary scales, especially 
in cases where single, extreme observations tend to have a substantial impact on the 
arithmetic average588. Median values are referred to in the above analysis in cases 
where substantial aberrations from the arithmetic average were observed. Mean and 
585 The methods applied in transcribing interviews were based on Kowal, O'Connell (2000).
586 Combining qualitative surveys with quantitative evaluation methods has been propagated as one 
means of improving evaluative objectivity in social science research (Dieckmann (1997), pp. 451-
455, also Kelle, Erzberger (2000)). However, there is a risk of blurring results at the interface 
between the two approaches, namely when translating qualitative items for use in quantitative 
analysis by means of coding (Schmidt (2000).
587 Schmidt (2000).
588 For comprehensive discussions of the various measures of the centres of distribution, see e.g. 
Wonnacott (1990), pp. 32-39, and Dieckmann (1997), pp. 555-663.
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median values for the entirety of the sample and its sub-sets on all propositions 
evaluated in a quantitative manner are presented below589.
Beyond these fundamental calculations, the response set does not lend itself to further 
statistical and econometric evaluation due to the small size of the sample – i.e. the 
limited number of respondents available in this policy area – and the relatively small 
number of individual statistical items collected in the course of the qualitative 
fieldwork as a result. Most importantly, regressions and the values yielded for 
correlation coefficients to identify interdependencies between the different 
institutional, issue, or group determinants tested here were found to lack statistical 
robustness. This lack of robustness, however, is primarily the result of the small size of 
the sample, which does not allow for meaningful sophisticated statistical analysis. It 
does not imply that no correlations exist between the different variables, for example, 
or that such correlation could be detected if the sample included a sufficient number of 
items. 
To compensate for the fact that a meaningful sophisticated statistical analysis was 
discouraged by the small number of statistical items available, qualitative remarks 
made by the respondents and recorded in the course of the interviews are used in the 
above analysis to explain, illustrate, and compare the basic statistical evidence. 
In addition, the responses on propositions 3 and 15 are analysed in qualitative terms 
only590. In practice, the majority of responses were found to be highly differentiated, 
tempering and qualifying the overall reaction, so that an unambiguous allocation of 
reactions to a set of categories of answers and to a corresponding scale of numerical 
values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses. 
Similarly, the respondents’ reactions to the follow-up questions pertaining to the ways 
and means of communicating interests in practice, i.e. the channels used for 
articulating interests in the area of monetary policy, are captured above in qualitative 
terms only. Again, a majority of responses were highly differentiated, discouraging 
quantification in a meaningful way and rendering qualitative analysis the superior tool 
for investigation.
Coding and quantification are exclusively the result of evaluation of the qualitative 
answers. Interviewees were not asked to give their own quantitative assessments. 
Throughout the study, these quantitative results complement the qualitative material in 
the form of quotations from interviewees or insights form other sources, such as 
related literature or archival material.
589 See pp. 390-406.
590 See pp. 392 and 404 below.
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III.1.2.3 Time horizon
Private-sector attitudes and activities with respect to monetary policy not only differ 
across countries but are also likely to change over time in each individual economy. In 
an inter-temporal perspective, relations between the private sector and monetary 
institutions and decision makers are likely to be characterised by both structural and 
cyclical elements. Structural relations in the current context would encompass any 
kind of contact, formal or informal, which the two sides maintain on a continuous 
basis, irrespective of whether the private sector agrees with the course of monetary 
policy, and aimed at securing a long-term exchange of views between the two sides. 
Cyclical activity, in contrast, would be in response to particular, acute developments in 
monetary policy which in terms of salience and urgency of the issue compel interest 
groups to take concrete action. 
In the present context, structural and cyclical elements are of equal interest. Both 
elements together constitute interest groups’ political activities with respect to 
monetary policy, and measuring the extent to which such activities are pursued is one 
aim of this study. In addition, the intensity with which relations are maintained in both
respects can, in as far as cyclical activity is an indicator of the acuteness of an issue, 
give additional hints as to the intensity of preferences in trade and industry vis-à-vis 
monetary policy. 
In terms of the time horizon under consideration, this implies that empirical evidence 
has to be collected in two dimensions. First, in order to identify structural patterns 
hypotheses with respect to interest-group behaviour need to be tested against political 
practices in general, irrespective of acute monetary developments. Considering that 
structural patterns, too, can change over time, research in this regard focused on recent 
and present-day patterns and was primarily addressed to acting experts and decision 
makers.591 Second, in order to gain an impression of the cyclical variance in interest-
group activity with respect to monetary policy, acting as well as retired respondents 
were asked about past experiences in this policy field, with responses concentrated on 
the 1990s but some also reaching back into earlier decades.
591 Empirical evidence in the form of background interviews was collected between October 2002 and 
October 2003.
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III.2 Private-sector interest groups and the Deutsche Bundesbank
Following the analytical approach outlined above, the analysis proceeds in two steps. 
The first part of this chapter examines and describes the environment in which interest 
group preferences with respect to monetary policy are formed and communicated. 
Along the lines of the broad analytical framework outlined above, the following 
sections are concerned with the Bundesbank and other policy makers relevant to the 
institutional context in which interest groups operate. Further, the issue context –
monetary policy in Germany – is analysed with respect to the historical development 
of major monetary variables as well as the record of policy decision making in the 
past. Finally, a section is dedicated to the group context, looking at the specific 
exposure of industry and trade to monetary developments as well as the interest-group 
infrastructure through which policy preferences can be aggregated and communicated. 
Examining these three contexts in some detail helps to interpret the empirical findings 
presented in the second part of this chapter. The findings are structured around the 
three policy contexts. The questions aimed at verifying or rejecting the core 
propositions above and the responses collected in the background interviews with 
experts and decision makers are presented and discussed in turn. This is followed by a 
comparative analysis of the results as well as a set of interim conclusions.
Against the background of the framework conditions under which the formation, 
aggregation, and representation of interests among German enterprises in trade and 
industry takes place with respect to monetary policy, decision makers and experts from 
business associations, individual enterprises and the Bundesbank and ECB were 
interviewed with the aim of identifying the factors promoting or hampering the 
expression of interests in practice. 
Following an outline of the specific sample of decision makers and experts whose 
contributions are evaluated in this chapter, the analysis commences with the results 
from the respondents' assessment of the level and kind of interest group activity in 
monetary affairs, followed by detailed analyses of the views expressed on the 
institutional, issue, and group contexts in which interest representatives operate. The 
chapter is then wound up with interim conclusions on the evidence from Germany. 
III.2.1 Sub-sample of decision makers and experts in Germany
The sample of interviewees was composed of decision makers and experts from
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– the peak German business associations in trade and industry, including industry592, 
chambers of commerce593, wholesale and foreign trade594, retail trade595, and 
skilled crafts596,
– interest associations from those sectors in the German economy identified above 
as being particularly exposed to interest and exchange rate developments, 
including the export597, construction598, automotive599, chemical600, mechanical 
engineering601, and electronics602 sectors,
– those associations represented on the roundtable of economic experts at the 
Bundesbank Central Office603, as well as those represented on the Advisory 
Boards of the Bundesbank Regional Offices604,
– the Bundesbank Central Office as well as its Regional Offices. Interviewees from 
the Central Office included current members of the Executive Board, former 
members of the Central Bank Council and former Bundesbank presidents, as well 
as expert staff from the bank's economics and communications departments. 
Respondents from the Regional Offices included acting presidents of the Regional 
Offices as well as former presidents of the Landeszentralbanken, or experts 
speaking on their behalf605. 
592 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., BDI.
593 Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, DIHK.
594 Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels e.V., BGA.
595 Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels, HDE.
596 Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH.
597 Bundesverband des Deutschen Exporthandels e.V., BDEx.
598 Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie e.V., HDB.
599 Verband der Automobilindustrie e.V., VDA.
600 Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V., VCI.
601 Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau e.V., VDMA.
602 Zentralverband Elektrotechnik- und Elektronikindustrie e.V., ZVEI.
603 The roundtable is composed of representatives from the BDI, DIHK, HDE, ZDH, VDMA, HDB, 
VDA, and VCI.
604 The sample included representatives of regional business associations sitting on the Advisory 
Boards of the Bundesbank's Regional Offices in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, 
Leipzig, Mainz, and Munich. The Advisory Board members interviewed were representatives –
mainly presidents – of regional chambers of commerce, trade, and crafts as well as of regional 
industry associations or individual enterprises. Three Advisory Board members were represented 
by their staff.
605 In total, the sample included acting or former decision makers or experts from the Bundesbank's 
Regional Offices in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, Mainz, Munich and Stuttgart 
and from the former Landeszentralbank in Bremen.
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Interviewees at German business associations and the Deutsche Bundesbank
Chart 53 Chart 54
–
– Total number: 
Composition of sample of interviewees at German interest 
associations
24
44%
4%9%
43%
Experts at federal
level
Decision makers
at federal level
Experts at
regional level
Decision makers
at regional level
–
– Total number: 
Composition of sample of interviewees at the Deutsche 
Bundesbank
22
14%
18%
27%
41%
Experts at Central
Office
Decision makers at
Central Office
Experts at Regional
Offices
Decision makers at
Regional Offices
The number of decision makers and experts interviewed in Germany between 
November 2002 and January 2004 totalled 46, 24 of whom were representatives of 
business associations and 22 representatives from the Bundesbank. Twelve of the 24 
business representatives were selected from federal business associations, including 
peak associations as well as sectoral organisations. Twelve business representatives 
came from regional or local organisations represented on one of the Bundesbank’s 
nine Advisory Boards. As chart 53 shows, the majority of respondents at federal peak 
associations were expert staff working at the headquarters of these associations, while 
the majority of representatives of regional interest associations were decision makers. 
Representatives from regional associations were approached for their membership in 
one of the Bundesbank's Advisory Boards. Interviews were conducted directly with 
these members, who, in general, hold the position of presidents of the relevant regional 
association. Overall, more than one quarter of all 42 Advisory Board members from 
trade and industry were interviewed.
On the Bundesbank side, seven respondents were interviewed at the Central Office and 
15 at the Regional Offices. As chart 54 above shows, respondents at the bank's Central 
Office were evenly distributed between decision-maker and expert status. At the 
regional level, the number of interviewees at decision-making level outnumbered that 
of expert-level interviewees, reflecting the comparatively large number of former 
Landeszentralbank presidents who – as ex officio members of the former Central Bank 
Council – were directly involved in monetary decision making prior to 1999606. In 
total, the number of retired Bundesbank staff amounted to eight – two former decision 
makers at the bank's Directorate and six former Landeszentralbank presidents.
The sample consequently captures the major stakeholders in the monetary policy field 
as well as a large number of the key individuals involved at decision-making and 
606 Acting presidents of the Regional Offices who are no longer directly involved in monetary 
decision-making have been categorised as experts rather than decision makers.
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expert levels in policymaking at present and in the recent past. In so far, the sample 
can be regarded as ample and highly representative of the relevant policy 
community607.
III.2.2 Interest-group activity on monetary policy in Germany
The most fundamental question to be answered at the outset in the present context is 
whether and to what extent interest groups actually undertake political action on 
monetary policy. From a lobbying angle, the answer to this question is interesting in its 
own right, but it may also carry important implications in terms of empirical findings 
on the influence of private interests on monetary policy established in literature 
examining the pressures on monetary policy. It may be recalled from the discussion in 
the institutional context that empirical evaluations of the impact of interest-group 
statements as reflected in newspaper coverage on monetary policy in Germany show 
that the effects of such public utterances is minimal at best.
607 All quantitative data presented below, including coding and quantification of responses, are derived 
exclusively from evaluation of the qualitative answers. Interviewees were not asked to give their 
own quantitative assessments. Cases in which no or an inconclusive answer was obtained are not 
included in the calculations and illustrations. The same applies to cases in which a given question 
was not asked to individual respondents due to time constraints during the interview. For the sake 
of transparency, all graphical illustrations cite the number of responses included in the 
quantification.
However, this does not necessarily mean that no influence on monetary policy is 
sought at all. Interest groups may seek to influence monetary decisions by means other 
than public statements vis-à-vis the media. If this were the case, then analyses based 
exclusively on indices of interest group positions as reflected in the media – valuable 
as such indices are as an indicator – may miss out on signals from interest groups to 
monetary policy makers relevant for the assessment of pressure on decision makers at 
central banks. Given the broad behavioural patterns of monetary policy makers at the 
Bundesbank discussed earlier, the possibility cannot be ruled out that the Bundesbank 
may prefer a confidential style of communication outside the public arena, considering 
that policy recommendations in public may signify impairment of the bank's 
independent status and of its reputation as the expert institution on monetary issues. In 
addition, public comments on monetary policy by an interest group may not entirely 
reflect that group's position, especially in terms of its intensity, as interest groups 
themselves have incentives to support the Bundesbank publicly, given a certain 
commitment to monetary stability and central bank independence on their own part. 
In line with the propositions derived from the theoretical discussion, interviewees were 
therefore asked about the extent to which monetary policy and the Bundesbank are 
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subject to interest group lobbying and about the channels used by group 
representatives to influence monetary decision making.
Proposition 1 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
intensively"
1
"Intensively" 2
"Moderately" 3
"Very 
moderately"
4
In general, interests with respect to
monetary or exchange rate policy
are not communicated very
intensively to the relevant decision
makers.
As addressed to interest groups:
"Do you or the organisation you
represent, in general, mediate interests
with respect to monetary or exchange
rate policy?"
As addressed to central banks:
"Do interest associations, in general,
mediate interests with respect to
monetary or exchange rate policy?"
"No" 5
The general assessment by the decision makers and experts questioned shows that 
monetary policy is, in fact, a policy field in which the communication of business 
interests is almost negligible. 35% of all respondents stated that such interests were, in 
general not communicated at all. Another 41% perceived the communication of 
interests as very moderate. 20% of respondents considered interest group activity 
moderate, and only 4% thought that such activity could be described as intensive, as 
illustrated in chart 55. In other words, more than three quarters of all respondents 
considered lobbying on monetary policy as very moderate or non-existent. The 
numerical average of the responses amounted to 4.07, indicating that, on average, 
interest group activity was judged very moderate608.
However, perception of the intensity of interest-group activity differs markedly 
between interest group and central bank representatives, i.e. between the senders and 
recipients. As chart 56 shows, the average numerical values for the two sides – 4.21 
and 3.91 respectively – suggest that interest group representatives considered their 
individual activities to be less intensive than their addressees. This discrepancy is 
particularly visible at the federal level, i.e. comparing the responses by representatives 
of peak federal associations – 4.42 on average609 – with those of Bundesbank staff at 
608 The corresponding median value was 4.00, indicating that the typical response lay very close to the 
average.
609 For respondents of regional interest groups represented on the Advisory Boards, the average value 
was 4.00, while the median result was 5.00, suggesting that the typical answer among these 
respondents was tilted even more towards a more pessimistic assessment of interest group activity 
in this policy field.
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the Central Office – 3.57 on average –, implying that monetary policy makers 
perceived significantly stronger activity on the part of interest groups than the latter 
said they were taking.
These numerical results are underscored by the structure of replies from the two sides, 
as shown in charts 57 and 58. Most strikingly, 67% of replies from federal-level peak 
associations considered that virtually no systematic communication of business 
interests with respect to monetary policy existed. In contrast, the majority of members 
of Bundesbank Advisory Boards at regional level perceived their activities as slightly 
more intensive, albeit as still very moderate. At the Bundesbank, more than three-
quarters of respondents rated interest intermediation moderate or very moderate, with 
less than one-quarter of replies suggesting practically no interest group activity. The 
latter were made exclusively by respondents at the bank's Regional Offices, where 
interest-group politics was seen as less intensive – 4.07 on average – than by their 
colleagues at the Central Office – 3.57 on average.
Interest group activity on monetary policy
Chart 55 Chart 56
– All respondents, in % of total responses
– Number of responses:
– Average value of responses: 4.07
46
0
4
20
41
35
0
10
20
30
40
50
V
er
y
in
te
ns
iv
el
y
[1
]
In
te
ns
iv
el
y
[2
]
M
od
er
at
el
y
[3
]
V
er
y
m
od
er
at
el
y
[4
]
N
o 
[5
]
– Average values of responses by level
– Number of responses: 46
4.21
4.00
3.91
3.57
4.07
4.42
3.5 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5
Total
Federal
level
Regional
level
Interest group
Central bank
Chart 57 Chart 58
– Respondents from interest groups, in %
– Number of responses: 24
0
8 8
38
46
0
8 8
17
67
0
8 8
58
25
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
V
er
y
in
te
ns
iv
el
y
[1
]
In
te
ns
iv
el
y
[2
]
M
od
er
at
el
y
[3
]
V
er
y
m
od
er
at
el
y
[4
]
N
o 
[5
]
Interest groups, total
Federal level
Advisory Board members
– Respondents from Deutsche Bundesbank, in %
– Number of responses: 22
0 0
32
45
23
0 0
43
57
00 0
27
40
33
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
V
er
y
in
te
ns
iv
el
y
[1
]
In
te
ns
iv
el
y
[2
]
M
od
er
at
el
y
[3
]
V
er
y
m
od
er
at
el
y
[4
]
N
o 
[5
]
Bundesbank, total
Central Office
Regional Offices
In summary, therefore, lobbying by private business associations on monetary policy –
viewed in isolation and without regard for potential distortion from competing 
dominant issues – is very moderate, a view shared by a great majority of policy makers 
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and experts on both the association as well as the central bank side. Central bankers, 
however, consider interest group activity markedly higher than their counterparts in 
the private sector, which together with replies from the Regional Offices suggests that 
the Central Office is slightly more exposed to interest group activity than the 
Hauptverwaltungen. 
Proposition 2 Question Categories Scale
"Much more 
intensively"
1
"More 
intensively"
2
"As 
intensively"
3
"Less 
intensively"
4
In general, communication of
interests with respect to monetary
or exchange rate policy is
significantly lower than in other
policy fields.
As addressed to interest groups:
"Do you or the organisation you
represent, in general, mediate interests
with respect to monetary or exchange
rate policy to the same extent as with
respect to other policy fields?"
As addressed to central banks:
"Do interest associations, in general,
mediate interests with respect to
monetary or exchange rate policy to the
same extent as with respect to other
policy fields?"
"Much less 
intensively"
5
The findings on proposition 1 are confirmed by the results yielded after adding a 
comparative dimension to the assessment, i.e. interest group activity with respect to 
monetary policy is not just low by itself but it is lower than that observed in other 
areas of economic policymaking, e.g. with respect to fiscal and tax policy, regulatory 
policy, or labour market and wage policies. Adding this comparative dimension is 
useful in two respects. First, it provides an anchor for assessing the intensity of interest 
intermediation. The question as to how much lobbying is being undertaken naturally 
triggers the counter-question: By which standards? Comparison with other policy areas 
is the most relevant yardstick to be applied in the current context. Second, it is of 
assistance in interpreting the findings on the first proposition in as far as it helps 
explain the particular insignificance of interest representation with respect to monetary 
policy detected by the majority of peak business associations. 
First, the responses to this proposition confirm and accentuate the evidence on the first 
proposition. Asked to what extent communication of interests with respect to monetary 
policy was comparable to activities in other policy areas, 27% of all respondents stated 
that activity was less intensive and 70% stated that it was much less intensive than in 
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other policy areas610. At 4.67, the numerical average of total responses was close to the 
maximum possible. This result is accentuated by the median value, which is 5.00 for 
all respondents as well as for almost all sub-sets611 of the sample, suggesting that 
activities were generally regarded as much less intensive than in other policy areas. 
Only one respondent – from a federal business association with a focus on trade 
interests – considered the communication of interests with respect to monetary and 
exchange rate issues comparable to other activities. 
610 See chart 59. 
611 Bundesbank staff at the Central Office produce a median reply of 4.50 (see also p. 391).
Second, the distribution among interest group and Bundesbank representatives, as 
depicted in charts 61 and 62, suggests that interest associations at federal level regard 
their work on monetary policy as particularly less intensive when compared to other 
policy issues. Almost all respondents stated that monetary affairs-related political 
activity was much less extensive than activities in other policy areas. Compared with 
the non-comparative assessment of interest group activity under the first proposition, 
this result strongly suggests that the large federal business associations in particular are 
involved in a greater number of policy issues, with monetary policy clearly being of 
lesser priority. Central bankers, in contrast, are almost exclusively concerned with 
monetary policy and confronted with the views expressed by a wide variety of 
associations, so that interest group activity on aggregate is perceived as more 
intensive, explaining the difference in answers between the two sides on the non-
comparative and comparative propositions.
This interpretation is supported by the comments of the majority of respondents, 
pointing – especially at federal level – to major policy areas such as taxation, industry 
regulation, labour market and wage policy, and social security provisions as the fields 
in which the major business associations take an interest, formulate and express strong 
positions and seek to influence policy makers actively and on a continuous basis. 
Most regional and local-level business representatives drew attention to the wide 
variety of taxation, regulation and public procurement-related issues discussed at Land 
or community level, on which they concentrated their lobbying activities. A large 
number of respondents stated that monetary and exchange rate issues were, by their 
nature, federal – and since 1999 EMU-wide – concerns which did not fall within the 
scope of their activities in the strict sense. In this sense, membership on the Advisory 
Boards at the Bundesbank Regional Offices was characterised by many members as an 
anomaly compared to their conventional activities, which were mainly restricted to 
policy issues with a regional dimension.
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Interest group activity on monetary policy compared with other policy fields
Chart 59 Chart 60
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A number of respondents pointed out in this context that in practice the intensity of 
activity in the various policy areas differed markedly over time, depending on the 
salience of each individual issue, as analysed in greater detail below. None of the 
respondents commenting on this point reported instances in which action on monetary 
or exchange rate policy had clearly dominated interest group activity. A number of 
respondents observed instances of intensified work in this policy area relative to other 
policy fields, including 
– the period of monetary and exchange rate instability during the early and mid-
1970s,
– exchange rate fluctuations in the mid-1980s,
– the high-interest period in the first half of the 1990s and the tensions within the 
EMS of 1992 and 1993, and 
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– backing of the plan to establish a monetary union within the EU in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s and the subsequent promotion of the EMU project.
Respondents emphasised that at any given moment in recent history, other economic 
policy issues, especially taxation, industry regulation and welfare policy, took clear 
preference over monetary and exchange rate issues in terms of lobbying activity by the 
interest groups concerned. 
Proposition 3 Question Categories612Scale
None
None
None
Mediating interests with respect to
monetary or exchange rate policy
does not yield sufficient benefits
relative to the associated costs.
"Do you, in principle, consider
mediating interests with respect to
monetary or exchange rate policy to be
worthwhile pursuing?"
None
The third general proposition derived from the theoretical discussion is that mediating 
interests with respect to monetary policy does not yield sufficient benefits relative to 
the associated costs. Assuming that enterprises and their interest representatives 
essentially compare the potential costs and benefits when deciding on whether to take 
political action on a certain policy issue, it has been hypothesised that the potential 
benefits of doing so are particularly low and the related costs particularly high – given 
the specific properties of the issue, institutional, and group contexts in which lobbying 
activities on monetary issues would occur. 
In order to examine whether this logic applies in practice, interest group 
representatives were asked whether in principle they considered mediating interests 
with respect to monetary policy worthwhile. The responses to this question produced 
three major insights. Most importantly, all respondents agreed that a meaningful cost-
benefit analysis of whether and to what extent action should be taken on monetary or 
exchange rate issues was not feasible. Acknowledging that it was generally difficult to 
weigh up the costs and benefits of interest-group activities, the potential material 
benefits from influencing monetary policy were considered particularly hard to 
capture, either in a qualitative or quantitative manner. A number of respondents 
612 Responses to this proposition are analysed in qualitative terms only. In practice, the majority of 
responses were found to be highly differentiated, qualifying the overall response, so that an 
unambiguous allocation of reactions to a set of categories of answers and a corresponding scale of 
numerical values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses.
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pointed to the complexity of the monetary impulse transmission mechanism, combined 
with the differences in their members’ exposure to interest, exchange and inflation 
rates as the most important source of uncertainty in the calculus. 
In addition, a majority of respondents observed that lobbying central bank decision 
makers was considered more resource-consuming than lobbying conventional 
politicians and policy makers, given their independent status and expertise. In order to 
reach a reasonable level of communication with monetary policy makers, substantial 
resources were considered necessary, presupposing additional investment in the issue. 
Second, and subject to the predominant view that a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of 
political action was particularly difficult in the area of monetary and exchange rate 
policy, responses to proposition 3 exhibited a discernible, albeit non-quantifiable tilt 
towards pessimistic assessment of the net benefits of political action in this area. 
Systematic interest group activity on monetary policy was not considered worthwhile 
by a large majority of respondents, with roughly two-thirds of the 24 interest group 
representatives who gave an assessment on this question positing that systematic 
lobbying on monetary policy was rather or even very worthless. Only about one-third 
of the respondents considered it worthwhile to some extent, mentioning potential 
benefits from becoming engaged. 
Almost all of the sceptical respondents argued that there was no reason to lobby in the 
first place. Monetary policy is generally perceived as working effectively and largely 
in consistency with the general interests of the business sector. In addition, many 
respondents argued that changes in monetary and exchange rate variables were a part 
of the economy's cyclical development, which had to be taken as largely exogenous. In 
line with this reasoning, one respondent from a peak industry association stated that 
"[c]hanges in interest and exchange rates over time are a natural thing. 
Complaining about their movements is like objecting to the weather."
Another characteristic reaction, by a federal sectoral industry association, was that 
"[i]nfluencing monetary or exchange rate decisions would be unrealistic at 
best. The financial and reputational costs of targeting the Bundesbank would 
be astronomical – only to find out that the Bundesbank does not actually 
have very much of a choice when making its policy decisions owing to the 
pressures from international financial markets."
Further, many also referred to the Bundesbank's economy-wide outlook, in the context 
of which individual positions on the policy stance were considered irrelevant, and to 
the bank's independence and the difficulties this implied for influencing its policies. A 
number of respondents held that central banks, including the Bundesbank, had no 
realistic chance of intervening effectively on exchange rates, even if they wanted to. It 
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was pointed out that central banks’ abilities to influence interest rates, inflation and 
other monetary variables, were rather limited.
According to a less sceptical interpretation, if preferences existed on the state of the 
economy and the course of monetary policy, then mediating and explaining these 
interests could do no harm. These respondents maintained that arriving at a moderately 
informed opinion on monetary policy was not particularly resource-consuming for 
interest groups. 
Third, as in the case of propositions regarding the intensity of interest-group activity, 
respondents at federal level were on average particularly sceptical about the usefulness 
of political action in this policy area, with about half of them conjecturing that it was 
very worthless to operate in this field. Again, the reservations at this level are likely to 
be closely associated with the density of political issues covered at federal level, 
suggesting that from a comparative perspective the expected pay-offs from work in 
other, more pressing policy areas were deemed higher than from activities associated 
with monetary policy. Here too, a number of representatives from business 
associations pointed out that the major policy challenges and the greatest material 
impact of economic policies on their constituents were expected from tax and 
regulatory policies. The economic impact of the latter was considered comparatively 
straightforward to qualify and quantify, while policy makers in these areas were 
considered much easier to approach than monetary decision makers.
III.2.3 Institutional context
Monetary policy decisions are taken within an institutional context differing markedly 
from other policy areas, especially from political decisions taken in a parliamentary 
context. In the final analysis, the theoretical considerations and the basic patterns of 
decision making in Germany discussed above suggest that these institutional 
specificities are likely to constrain interest representation by private interest groups. 
The feedback by interest group and central bank representatives shows that in practice 
the institutional framework strongly conditions the way in which the two sides 
communicate. The hurdles to accessibility in the form of the Bundesbank's 
independence and certain behavioural patterns by monetary decision makers are, 
however, not fundamentally criticised, being respected by the majority of interest 
representatives as largely unavoidable. 
The central question arising in this context is whether institutional hurdles existed 
impeding interest group representatives’ access to monetary decision makers, and to 
what extent the associated difficulties in mediating private-sector interests contributed 
to the low level of such activity observed above. To answer this question, the 
interviewees in trade and industry and the Bundesbank were first asked whether the 
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Bundesbank was actually perceived as particularly inaccessible, compared to other 
political institutions and policy makers. Evidence on the most important explanatory 
variables identified theoretically – i.e. the Bundesbank status of independence within 
the political system, its independence from political support from the private sector, 
the bank's superior provision with information and expertise in its area of 
policymaking and certain behavioural patterns on the part of Bundesbank policy 
makers – is presented in the subsequent sections. 
Proposition 4 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
accessible"
1
"Rather 
accessible"
2
"Rather 
inaccessible"
3
Central banks are perceived as
inaccessible to interests from the
private sector, compared to other
political bodies.
"Is the central bank – compared to
other political bodies – viewed as
accessible to interests from the
corporate sector?"
"Very 
inaccessible"
4
Asked whether the Bundesbank was perceived – in general terms – as accessible for 
interest groups trying to communicate their interests in monetary policy, a relative 
majority of 49% of all respondents considered the bank to be either very or rather 
accessible, with 44% tending to the latter. In contrast, 51% characterised the bank as 
either rather inaccessible or very inaccessible, as shown in chart 63. At 2.63, the 
average numerical value of the replies was slightly below the median answer613 of 3.00 
so that the overall picture is one of inaccessibility. On average, accessibility was 
deemed slightly greater by central bank respondents, while interest-group 
representatives were considerably more sceptical about the Bundesbank's accessibility, 
as the comparison in chart 64 suggests. Respondents from peak federal associations 
and the Bundesbank Central Office, in turn, perceived accessibility to be greater than 
their regional counterparts, suggesting that the bank's Regional Offices are less 
accessible than the Central Office614. 
613 On this proposition, average and median responses did not differ systematically. For details see p. 
393. 
614 Interviewees were asked to give an assessment based on their experience with the levels with 
which they were primarily concerned, i.e. either the bank's Central Office or the Regional Offices. 
The replies obtained on this proposition can, therefore, also be used to draw conclusions about the 
difference in accessibility for the two levels. 
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Institutional accessibility of the Bundesbank
Chart 63 Chart 64
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A detailed view on the quantified replies, as provided in charts 65 and 66, points up 
three important properties of the distribution of answers. First, the majority of 
Advisory Board members, 66% in total, considered the Bundesbank either rather or 
very inaccessible. Only one quarter of respondents characterised the bank as rather 
accessible. This assessment differs markedly from that of interest group respondents at 
the federal level, as reflected in the corresponding numerical averages of 2.92 and 2.60 
respectively. The remarks made by respondents at both levels suggest that the relative 
and – after entry into EMU and the recent institutional reform – increasing remoteness 
of the Bundesbank's Regional Offices and the adjacent Advisory Boards from 
monetary decision making is the most important factor explaining this difference. In 
addition, verdicts in the case of Advisory Board members that the Bundesbank was 
considered very inaccessible may be influenced by their assessment of the specific 
behaviour of individual presidents of the respective Regional Offices, some of whom 
were reported to have displayed particular seclusion or disinterest during Advisory 
Board meetings. Finally, for almost all Advisory Board members, the board represents 
the only channel of communication with the Bundesbank, reducing their contacts with 
the relevant experts and decision makers to the now half-yearly board meetings.
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Conversely, the large number of respondents from peak federal associations 
considering the Bundesbank a rather accessible institution can be traced back to the 
fact that, if at all, federal-level interest representatives maintained relations with the 
Bundesbank's Central Office and thus enjoyed greater proximity to the bank's decision 
making bodies. Further, a majority of the respondents perceiving greater accessibility 
relative to their peers also reported that they maintained more than one point of contact 
to the Bundesbank, e.g. membership in the roundtable of economists plus informal or 
personal contacts with Bundesbank experts or decision makers. 
Third, the marked difference in assessment between interest group and central bank 
representatives results primarily from the responses given by decision makers and 
experts at the bank's Central Office, all of whom considered the Bundesbank to be 
either very or rather accessible. This contrasts with 61% of the representatives at the 
Regional Offices, who stated that the bank was either rather or very inaccessible. 
Detailed responses by representatives at the Regional Offices suggest that much of this 
critical assessment reflects reservations as to their own position in the policymaking
process. Certain doubts as to the influence of the presidents of the 
Landeszentralbanken on monetary decision making at the time were articulated by a 
number of retired LZB presidents, suggesting that – although formally provided with 
an equal vote on the Central Bank Council – individual views from the Regional 
Offices did not have the same weight as for example a policy position prepared by the 
Central Office-based Bundesbank Directorate. This distribution of influence was 
subsequently accentuated by entry into EMU and the bank's recent structural reform, 
as a result of which it is now only the president of the Bundesbank who formally 
participates in monetary decision making at the ECB level. The above empirical 
results therefore pay tribute to the fact that the presidents of the Regional Offices and 
the other members of the bank's Board are no longer formally involved. 
Finally, detailed remarks by interest group respondents suggest that, comparatively 
speaking, Bundesbank policy makers are perceived as less accessible – although not 
fundamentally so – than policy makers in other policy fields, especially governmental 
or parliamentary functions at federal or Land level:
– Their independence of political support was mentioned as the single most 
important factor limiting comparative accessibility. 
– Second, a majority of interest group respondents refer to the superior expertise of 
the Bundesbank and its officials in their field of policymaking as a factor 
rendering intervention on their part obsolete or difficult, setting communication 
with the Bundesbank clearly apart from that with other political bodies. 
– Finally, a number of respondents, both at the federal and regional level, pointed 
out that it was more difficult to establish regular contacts with Bundesbank 
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officials than with other policy makers because the Bundesbank, being located in 
Frankfurt, was geographically detached from the country's political centre, Berlin, 
and from the Land capitals. 
Overall, this quantification shows that interest group representatives, especially those 
operating at the regional level, perceive the Bundesbank as not very accessible on 
average. Nevertheless, these initial results do not lend strong support to the proposition 
that inaccessibility is a dominant explanation for the low level of interest group 
activity in monetary policymaking. The structure of assessments is rather 
heterogeneous, though, suggesting that the criteria or the experiences on which the 
positions are based differ considerably among the respondents. As the following 
dissection of the determinants of institutional accessibility shows, the differences in 
perception are likely to originate from the varied experiences with policy makers’ 
behavioural patterns. In contrast, the impact of the bank's political independence and 
resource-related autonomy on interest groups’ ability to influence monetary policy 
decisions is perceived as strong quite homogeneously across the sample of interest 
group interviewees.
III.2.3.1 Institutional mandate and accessibility 
The concentration of decision-making powers in one single institution separate and 
largely independent of the surrounding political system is the central feature 
distinguishing monetary policy from most other instances of political decision making. 
In the case of the Bundesbank, a comparatively high level of independence was 
established, accompanied by a clear assignment of tasks, broadly defined single 
objectives and far-reaching discretion with respect to the strategies, tactics and 
instruments applied to meet its objectives. While the clear assignment of tasks can 
facilitate interest group activity in as far as it implies that one single interlocutor exists 
for private-sector concerns, the independence of the Bundesbank may be perceived as 
an obstacle to effective interest representation, as it limits the channels of 
communication, especially the indirect communication of interests via the government 
and other political bodies, and potentially constrains the responsiveness of 
Bundesbank decision making to private-sector preferences. As to the institutional 
mandate, the respondents were therefore asked to give their assessment of the impact 
of central bank independence on communication between the Bundesbank and private-
sector interest groups. 
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Proposition 5 Question Categories Scale
"Strong 
obstacle"
1
"Obstacle" 2
"Weak 
obstacle"
3
Political independence is an
obstacle for private interests in
mediating their interests to the
central bank.
"Is political independence of the
central bank perceived as an obstacle to
mediating corporate interests?"
"No obstacle" 4
In practice, the Bundesbank's independence is assessed differently by the actors 
involved. Asked whether they perceived the Bundesbank’s political autonomy as an 
obstacle to mediating private-sector interests, 47% of all respondents said it did 
represent an obstacle, or even a strong obstacle, while 54% considered it to be a weak 
obstacle or did not perceive it as an impediment to interest group politics at all, as 
illustrated in chart 67. The numerical average of the total responses works out at 2.70, 
i.e. slightly below the median of 3.00, suggesting that overall independence is 
perceived as a rather weak impediment. Although, at 2.79 and 2.63 respectively, 
central bank and interest group respondents arrived at a similar assessment of this 
issue on average, interest group representatives interestingly considered political 
independence to be less of an obstacle than their counterparts at the Bundesbank. This 
picture is confirmed by the median responses for the sub-sets, which show that interest 
group respondents typically considered independence a weak obstacle, while 
Bundesbank respondents typically viewed it as an obstacle, or even a strong obstacle 
in the case of the respondents at the Central Office. This discrepancy is confirmed by 
average numerical values, as chart 68 suggests. 
The differences in perception become more apparent in the breakdown of responses 
according to the respondents’ background, as in charts 69 and 70. More than half of all 
interest group respondents state that independence is, in fact, an obstacle or even a 
strong obstacle to interest communication, with no significant differences between the 
responses from federal and regional-level interest representatives. More than two-
thirds of all Bundesbank representatives at the Central Office, in contrast, consider 
independence to be no significant obstacle to communication with the private sector. 
Respondents from the bank's Regional Office adopted no dominant stance on this 
issue. 
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Impact of institutional independence
Chart 67 Chart 68
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The reactions captured in this quantitative evaluation give the initial responses to the 
question concerning the impact of independence and are therefore likely to reflect the 
respondents’ intuitive views. A more differentiated picture on the structure of 
responses can be obtained by taking into account the more detailed comments made, 
especially on the interest group side. 
First of all, in-depth analysis of the responses reveals a close qualitative correlation 
between the assessments of accessibility, as examined under proposition 4, and of 
political independence, as examined here. In general, respondents critical of the 
Bundesbank’s accessibility also referred to its independence as a serious obstacle to 
mediating interests, and vice versa. Conversely, those interest group representatives 
who perceived the Bundesbank as rather accessible also rejected political 
independence as a significant hurdle to political communication. 
Second, most commentators point out that they prefer to distinguish between 
– political independence in the strict sense, i.e. the legal bar on orders being issued 
to the central bank by government or other political bodies in the constitutional 
system, and 
270
– political independence in a wider sense, i.e. that the central bank should not be 
subject to political or otherwise motivated external influence.
Without exception, all commentators agree that political independence in the strict 
sense is an important, if not necessary precondition for monetary stability and a highly 
desirable feature of the country's monetary system. Accordingly, political institutions, 
i.e. government, parliament, or other national and international political institutions, 
should be prohibited from actively influencing monetary policy or from seeking such 
influence. As emphasised by a number of respondents, this naturally extends to the 
private sector, which by its very nature does not possess instruments of direct 
influence on central bank decision making. 
In contrast, political independence in the wider sense is a more controversial issue in 
Germany. Particularly as far as those respondents are concerned for whom 
independence does represent an obstacle to the communication of interests, for either 
of the following two reasons the logic of independence from politics also spills over 
into the private sector with regard to the expression of group-specific preferences on 
monetary policy. First, monetary policy should exclusively serve the common good 
and should therefore be conducted and based on an economy-wide view rather than on 
particular interests. In this sense, interest group activity is not considered legitimate, 
even by a considerable number of interest group representatives. Second, interference 
with the Bundesbank in its monetary decision making – especially in public – is 
considered counterproductive in as far as interest groups demand that the central bank 
be politically independent on the one hand, while simultaneously seeking to influence 
its policy decisions on the other. For a number of interest group respondents, claiming 
non-interference from political institutions while at the same time having the private 
sector attempt to influence monetary decisions would be inconsistent and damaging to 
the group’s credibility. As a result, interest group representatives emphasising these 
arguments tended to see political independence as a constraining factor – also on the 
private sector.
On the other hand, a large number of respondents stressed that political autonomy was 
to be understood in the narrow sense only, and that in the wider context of interest 
group politics no limitation applied to the communication of interests. In these 
respondents’ view, central bank independence serves to prevent monetary measures 
becoming instrumentalised by electoral politics. In as far as the private sector has no 
direct influence on the Bundesbank and its decisions, mediating group interests in this 
policy area is, in principle, a legitimate expression of private interests. Being 
independent, the Bundesbank can decide for itself whether and to what extent it 
chooses to take these interests into consideration when adopting its monetary 
decisions. Nevertheless, even among the respondents arguing along this line, a great 
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majority emphasised that the Bundesbank’s specific status necessitated a much more 
moderate way of communication than in other areas of policymaking.
Both strands of argument were also reflected in the replies from Bundesbank 
representatives. In general, Bundesbank respondents emphasised that political 
independence was a fact, placing the bank in a position to take autonomous decisions 
on monetary questions. This applied to the Bundesbank's own monetary policy prior to 
1999 as well as to formulation of the monetary stance the bank's president defends on 
the ECB Governing Council. In the light of this, the great majority of Bundesbank 
decision makers did not perceive the expression and communication of private-sector 
interests as interfering with the bank's activities or its independence, provided such 
claims were not aimed at limiting the Bundesbank's independence as such. 
Calls for the latter from the business sector have reportedly never been registered in 
the bank's history. Quite the contrary, the business community is perceived as having 
been one of the most reliable, if not the most reliable, supporters of the Bundesbank 
whenever its institutional independence was at stake in the past. Bundesbank and 
interest group representatives cited as two recent examples calls in 1998 and 1999 by 
the then finance minister Oscar Lafontaine for a more lenient monetary policy and the 
attempt by finance minister Theo Waigel in 1997 to revalue the Bundesbank's gold 
reserves with the aim of paying down part of the national debt. In both cases, the major 
business associations were said to have supported the Bundesbank, arguing that the 
government’s plans marked illegitimate encroachment on the bank's exclusive rights 
and obligations. 
Overall, therefore, Bundesbank independence is largely considered a factor 
constraining, or at least moderating, the communication of private-sector interests to a 
greater or lesser extent and for differing reasons. It is nonetheless seen as a vital 
precondition for a well-functioning monetary regime. 
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Proposition 6 Question Categories Scale
"Strong 
dependence"
1
"Moderate 
dependence"
2
"Weak 
dependence"
3
Given their institutional, material,
and expertise-based resources,
central banks are not dependent on
external political support in order
to fulfil their tasks in the field of
monetary or exchange rate policy.
"Does the central bank depend on
external political support in order to
fulfil its tasks in the field of monetary
or exchange rate policy?"
"No 
dependence"
4
The legal guarantee of political independence places the Bundesbank in a strong 
position. Legally manifested independence as such, however, does not necessarily 
mean that monetary decisions are taken in political isolation. On the contrary, analysis 
of the institutional framework of monetary decision making shows that a number of 
points of contact exist between the Bundesbank and politics and private-sector 
interests, ranging from appointment procedures through mutual participation in Central 
Bank Council and Cabinet meetings to mutual advisory functions. Thus, the 
Bundesbank is likely to be exposed to political interests and pressures. In view of this, 
the question was raised as to what extent the bank depended on external political 
support from the private sector.
The reactions to this proposition strongly confirm that the Bundesbank's specific 
institutional status is acknowledged by both Bundesbank and private-sector 
respondents as promoting a high degree of political independence. More than half the 
interviewees see no need for external political support for the Bundesbank. Another 
quarter perceive political dependence as weak. Only 16% see a moderate degree of 
dependence on external political support, as illustrated in chart 71. Chart 72 shows that 
this overall assessment is shared in largely the same way across the federal and 
regional level, and by central bankers and interest group representatives alike. 
The share of respondents perceiving no dependence at all, however, is markedly higher 
among interest representatives than among the respondents at the Bundesbank. Interest 
group respondents typically see no dependence on political support at all, as indicated 
by a median response of 4.00 for the sub-set615. Central bank respondents, in contrast, 
typically see weak dependence. This result is underpinned by the comparison of charts 
73 and 74 below. Most importantly, more than a quarter of the respondents at the 
bank's Central Office consider the need for external political support to be of moderate 
importance to the bank. 
615 For detailed figures, see p. 395.
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Bundesbank dependence on external political support
Chart 71 Chart 72
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In essence, this difference can be traced back to the role of public opinion and the 
importance allocated to that role by Bundesbank staff, especially at the Central Office. 
Rather than a short-term need for political backing on certain monetary decisions, 
respondents at the Bundesbank emphasised the importance of the wider public’s 
general attitude towards the central bank and its policies. By this reasoning, long-term 
support from the wider public – as documented for instance in opinion polls, media 
coverage, expert analyses or interest group positions – is perceived to be important 
because it reflects public approval and indirectly strengthens the bank’s own 
institutional position within the political system. As one of the most important 
decision-making bodies in economic policy, the lack of direct democratic legitimacy is 
pointed out by a number of central bank respondents as a potential source of criticism 
– especially from politicians at times when they deem monetary stimuli to economic 
growth useful in the electoral cycle. Public approval for its policies, in this sense, is 
seen as an important pillar on which the Bundesbank's political independence rests in 
the long run. 
Anecdotal evidence from interviews with interest group representatives in turn 
suggests that not just the bank's autonomy but the entire institutional set-up and the 
bank's past achievements are widely appreciated by the private sector. Asked for their 
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assessment of the Bundesbank's institutional framework and its policy performance 
over the past decades, interest-group representatives consistently approved of the 
existing arrangements and welcomed the adoption of a similar design at EU level for 
the institutional arrangement of the ESCB. Typical of the overall assessment by 
business representatives was the remark made by an Advisory Council member, who 
stated that 
"[o]ver the past forty years, the Bundesbank has been the only institution in 
Germany's political system – maybe with the exception of the Constitutional 
Court – which has functioned well, fulfilled its duties, and consistently 
worked for the benefits of the entire country.".
At the same time, many interest-group respondents observed that they saw a close 
relationship between the Bundesbank's success over time and the fact that it relied very 
little on external political support, including backing from politics or interest groups. 
Again, one typical reaction may be quoted, given by a representative from a peak 
business association, who observed that 
"[m]any of the problems the German economy faces today can, in 
aggregate, be traced back to the overload of interest group demands on the 
state, and the fact that policy makers gave in to these demands. I dare not 
think how monetary policy would have developed had Bundesbank policy 
makers been exposed to similar demands, and had they reacted in the same 
way as their colleagues in Bonn and Berlin have done in the past. Viewed in 
this light, the Bundesbank's institutional framework and its policies cannot 
be valued highly enough."
Conversely, respondents from interest associations see a strong causal link between the 
effects of central bank independence on the communication of private sector interests 
and the Bundesbank’s lack of need for external political support. Almost all 
respondents attesting a constraining impact of political independence on interest group 
activities trace this back to the perceived fact that the Bundesbank does not rely on, 
and does not respond to, external political support of any kind in its operations. 
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Proposition 7 Question Categories Scale
"Strong 
dependence"
1
"Moderate 
dependence"
2
"Weak 
dependence"
3
Given their focus on aggregated
economic indicators and their
access to the relevant statistical
resources, central banks are not
dependent on external information
with respect to monetary or
exchange rate conditions and
developments in order to fulfil
their tasks in the field of monetary
or exchange rate policy.
"Does the central bank depend on
external information in order to fulfil
its tasks in the field of monetary or
exchange rate policy?"
"No 
dependence"
4
Next to political support, policy makers may also depend on external resources to 
perform their tasks. Expertise in the relevant policy field and information concerning 
the object of policy measures constitute the most important resources private-sector 
interest groups can contribute to the policymaking process. With respect to central 
banks in general, and the Bundesbank in particular, it has been observed that the 
specific and exclusive assignment of monetary policy-related responsibilities as well 
as ample endowment with financial resources has promoted the establishment of a 
profound bedrock of expertise and information inside the monetary authority, 
including command over the statistical and scientific resources necessary to perform 
its tasks. Given the information and expertise-related lead central banks have in 
comparison to other stakeholders – including business associations, but also research 
institutions and think tanks –, the latter are less likely to be able to contribute 
significantly to the process of monetary policy formation than they usually are in other 
fields of policymaking.
This proposition was tested by asking stakeholders how dependent they considered the 
Bundesbank on information and expertise from the private sector for the fulfilment of 
its monetary policy tasks. As with the results on external political support, more than 
three-quarters of all respondents consider the Bundesbank’s dependence on external 
information to be either weak or non-existent. Only 18% believe that there is a 
moderate degree of dependence in this regard, as depicted in chart 75. The numerical 
average of all replies, at 3.41, is well above the median value and nearly as high as that 
obtained on the preceding proposition. 
Again, responses were relatively homogenous across levels of decision-making as well 
as between interest group and central bank respondents, as chart 76 shows. The 
maximum deviation from the average occurs in the responses from central bank 
representatives, as also reflected in the detailed illustration of responses in charts 77
and 78. As with proposition 6 and the related question of central bank dependence on 
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political support, interest group respondents were more sceptical as to central bank 
dependence on external information than their counterparts at the Bundesbank: the 
average numerical value for the former set is 3.58, while the latter average was 3.20. 
The corresponding median values of 4.00 and 3.00 respectively support this 
conclusion616.
Bundesbank dependence on external information
Chart 75 Chart 76
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Once again, the replies from central bank representatives were significantly more 
varied than those from the interest groups consulted. Respondents at the bank's Central 
Office presented a more open picture of the bank than suggested by theory and 
perceived by their counterparts in the private sector, reporting moderate or weak 
dependence on external information in 86% of the interviews conducted. Only 14% of 
the respondents at the Central Office reported no dependence on external sources of 
information, against 54% at the Regional Offices, where the need for input from 
outside the central bank is perceived to be significantly lower.
Detailed comments from the interest group representatives show the vast majority 
stressing the high level of expertise and abundant supply of statistical data at the 
616 For details, see p. 396.
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Bundesbank’s disposal as the primary reasons leading them to conclude that the bank 
does not need to take recourse to information from the private sector. In this view, the 
Bundesbank is not only largely self-sufficient with respect to information and 
expertise; a great majority of respondents emphasised that in practice information 
flows in the opposite direction, i.e. from the Bundesbank to the private sector. Thus, 
most interest groups use publicly available Bundesbank statistics and analyses for their 
own work. In addition, the Bundesbank's assessments of economic and monetary 
developments in Germany are regarded by most interest representatives as a 
benchmark for the formation of their own opinions. Finally, the Bundesbank's 
explanations of monetary policy decisions, most importantly through its monthly 
reports, are generally regarded by business association experts as useful information 
for an understanding of economic and monetary developments and policy positions. 
For the most part this assessment has been carried over to the period since 1999 and 
the transfer of monetary authority to the ECB. 
The Bundesbank broadly shares this view, also pointing to the existing expertise and 
data resources. Central bank respondents agree that in principle these resources suffice 
to reach appropriate monetary judgements. At the same time, however, a number of 
decision makers and experts pointed out that additional information, which is obtained 
directly from market participants and other sources and not collected by the 
Bundesbank itself, can be useful in two respects:
– First, additional information on regional and sectoral economic developments can 
help establish as complete a picture of the state of the economy as possible. 
Particularly with regard to sectoral developments, business associations can 
contribute insights which would not otherwise have been readily available to the 
bank.
– Second, and most importantly, it was pointed out that the usefulness of statistical 
data is naturally limited when it comes to forming expectations of future economic
developments. The backward-looking nature of most statistical analyses can partly 
be compensated by examining economic variables containing information on 
future developments – mainly by capturing market participants’ expectations –
such as the term structure of interest rates and financial futures and options market 
valuations. Obtaining information on the expectations and planned activities of 
major actors in the economy – for example with respect to investment, 
consumption, pricing and wage formation – is nevertheless regarded as useful for 
rounding off the picture generated by conventional statistical and econometric 
means. 
Given these two factors, the sectoral and regional information provided by external 
sources, including business associations, as well as by scientific institutions, think 
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tanks or international organisations, is considered useful by Bundesbank respondents 
for obtaining a comprehensive view of present and future economic developments. 
The Bundesbank’s ultimate reliance on such external information, however, is still 
perceived as very low, since the information is generally considered non-essential to 
the bank’s work, serving primarily as a backup complementing the bank's own 
findings, and as a way of verifying its own economic assessments.
III.2.3.2 Behavioural patterns of Bundesbank policy makers
Next to the Bundesbank's political independence and the strength of its resources of 
expertise and information, monetary policy makers’ behavioural patterns represent a 
third possible institutional explanation for the low level of interest group activity on 
monetary polices. As discussed above, the specific institutional provisions governing 
the Bundesbank are largely matched by the behaviour of its policy makers, who are 
committed to maintaining a high level of personal independence as well as to the 
bank's policy objectives, backed up by additional rules working as a self-constraint on 
policy makers’ discretion. For the present purpose, this essentially shows that –
beyond the institutional safeguards towards securing a stability-oriented monetary 
policy – policy makers are personally committed to fulfilling the bank's objective, not 
least by shielding the institution and themselves against influences which may run 
counter to this objective. With respect to the factors influencing the incentives for 
interest groups to articulate their preferences on monetary policy, the question arises 
whether policy makers are actually perceived to be interested in the views of the 
private sector, or whether such views are considered irrelevant by monetary decision 
makers.
Proposition 8 Question Categories Scale
"Highly 
interested"
1
"Interested" 2
"Slightly 
interested"
3
Given the independence of central
banks in terms of political,
material, and expertise-related
resources as well as their focus on
aggregated economic indicators,
central bank policy makers are not
interested in the views of private-
sector interest groups on monetary
or exchange rate policy.
"Are central bank representatives
interested in the preferences of the
corporate sector regarding monetary or
exchange rate policy?"
"Not 
interested"
4
Asked whether they perceived the Bundesbank and its policy makers to be interested 
in the positions of private-sector interest groups on monetary developments and 
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monetary decisions, more than half the total respondents stated that they considered 
monetary policy makers to be either highly or moderately interested, as depicted in 
chart 79. More than one quarter of respondents considered central bankers slightly 
interested, while 19% thought that the bank was not interested at all. In comparison, 
interest group representatives considered the Bundesbank less interested than 
Bundesbank officials perceived themselves to be. This difference was, again, most 
pronounced at the federal level, as chart 80 shows, and is confirmed by the typical 
response as measured by the statistical median of 3.00 for interest group and 2.00 for 
central bank respondents617. 
617 For details, see p. 397.
Once more, the structure of replies reveals a certain heterogeneity in the assessment by 
interest group representatives, of whom more than a quarter considered Bundesbank 
staff to be interested, more than a third considered them slightly interested, and one-
fifth deemed them not interested at all, as illustrated in chart 81. Only one Advisory 
Board member perceived bank staff to be highly interested. In contrast, the great 
majority of Bundesbank staff, as shown in chart 82, said they were interested or even 
highly interested in interest groups’ views on the bank's monetary policy, namely 59% 
and 9% respectively. Only 14% considered interest group views slightly interesting for 
Bundesbank staff. Another 14% stated that Bundesbank staff were not interested at all.
Like the comments made in the context of the role of private-sector information, 
respondents rather critical of the Bundesbank's interest in private-sector interest 
groups’ opinions of its policies primarily emphasised the bank's expertise and its 
command of scientific and statistical resources as the reason for limited interest. 
Furthermore, most respondents referred to the fact that monetary policy was, by 
nature, aimed at the economy as a whole, making regional or sector-specific views 
largely irrelevant for the central bank’s own assessment of monetary conditions. In 
close relation to this, it was pointed out by many respondents that owing to the bank's 
obligation towards the general good it would, as matter of principle, be wrong for 
monetary policy makers to take particular interests into consideration. As a 
consequence, they should not be exposed to particular preferences and should not 
therefore be interested in them in the first place. 
Respondents rating Bundesbank policy makers rather interested in interest group 
views, on the other hand, referred to the additional information on the impact of 
monetary developments on the private sector and expectations as to the future course 
of monetary variables, future policy measures and forthcoming market activities, 
especially with respect to pricing and wage bargaining behaviour, that may emerge 
from interest groups’ views and be potentially useful for the bank's opinion formation. 
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Second, an exchange of views is considered by some respondents as a measure 
necessary for the central bank to underscore its legitimacy, being an institution largely 
unaccountable to the political environment. This argument, so the respondents 
emphasised, applied irrespective of whether policy makers ultimately take the opinions 
and information thus gathered into consideration when making their policy 
judgements. 
Bundesbank interest in private-sector views
Chart 79 Chart 80
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Finally, the responses from interest group representatives suggest that behavioural 
patterns contain a strong individual element and vary greatly. Thus, a large majority of 
respondents stressed that interest in the assessment of business associations, openness 
towards interest group views and the readiness to discuss the bank's policies vitally 
depended on the attitudes of individual policy makers. This element was particularly 
emphasised by members of the bank's Advisory Boards with respect to their 
relationship with the presidents of the Regional Offices. In practice, the exchange of 
views with the Bundesbank was said to be severely limited by the lack of interest and 
willingness on the part of individual officials to discuss the bank's policies. At the 
same time, some Bundesbank decision makers were explicitly pointed out as 
comparatively open to discourse with interest group representatives. As a result, many 
interest-group representatives cited the personal accessibility of Bundesbank policy 
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makers as a very important determinant for their own ability to present their views to 
the bank. 
III.2.4 Issue context
Next to the institutional context, theory suggests that the specific issue context may be 
the second broad factor explaining the low level of interest group activity on monetary 
affairs. With respect to monetary policy in Germany, it has already been observed that, 
first, there is broad agreement with the overall objectives set for the conduct of 
monetary policy; second, the immediate economic impact of monetary policy on the 
business sector is very low; third, the effects of monetary policy are diffuse and work 
through complex channels; and finally, the political agenda business associations work 
on is very full. These four factors diminish the importance of monetary policy as a 
political issue for interest groups – a tendency powerfully confirmed by the responses 
obtained from interest group and Bundesbank officials.
III.2.4.1 Agreement with monetary policy objectives
The preceding section showed that the institutional framework within which monetary 
policy in Germany is embedded is strongly supported by the German business sector. 
By the same token, the interest group representatives addressed expressed very strong 
agreement with the Bundesbank's and – since 1999 – the ECB's primary objective of 
maintaining price stability as well as with the central banks' overall approach to 
reaching that objective. 
Proposition 9 Question Categories Scale
"Agree 
strongly"
1
"Agree" 2
"Disagree" 3
Individual firms or interest
associations agree with the
objectives and the overall conduct
of monetary or exchange rate
policy.
"Do interest groups, in general,
disagree with the overall objectives and
the conduct of monetary or exchange
rate policy?"
"Disagree 
strongly"
4
Asked whether interest groups in business agreed with the established central bank 
objectives and the overall conduct of monetary policy by the Bundesbank and the 
ECB, 47% of the respondents stated that they agreed with the conduct of monetary 
policy. Another 53% even professed strong agreement, as depicted in chart 83. None 
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of the interviewees considered the business sector in general or a discernible segment 
of it as being in disagreement with the primary aims of monetary policy. As the 
comparison of the average numerical values on this question in chart 84 illustrates, 
agreement on the part of interest group representatives – irrespective of whether they 
work at federal or regional level – is, in fact, even stronger than their central bank 
counterparts believed. 
As one senior expert at a large federal, cross-sector industry association typically 
observed:
"A stability-oriented monetary policy is of elementary importance for a 
business location like Germany. The quality of a location is primarily 
determined by its economic stability. A stable, inflation-free monetary 
environment is an important part of the latter, and a necessary precondition 
for good economic development."
A former member of the of Bundesbank's Central Bank Council maintained that 
"[f]or industry, monetary stability is everything. It was – and in my 
perception still is – something like a fetish."
As to the reasons for their agreement with the given monetary policy objectives, 
business representatives emphasise the importance of stable prices for the proper 
functioning of the market economy in general and for investment and planning 
certainty at individual enterprises in particular. Also, Germany's experience with 
inflation in the inter-war and post-war period was cited as an important historical 
factor shaping the perception of the great majority of actors in the business sector. 
Finally, all interest group respondents considered the constitutional manifestation of 
price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy an important element, 
stressing that it was considered sensible to commit policy makers as strongly as 
possible to this end and to avoid any inroads for inflationary policies.
In conformity with the strong overall agreement on the objective of price stability 
throughout the business sector, interest group respondents described anti-inflationary 
policies as the most important by far of their own monetary policy preferences. At the 
same time, interest group respondents’ reactions show that price stability is not the 
only objective they associate with monetary policy. Thus, a large majority of 
respondents stated that low nominal and real interest rates were conducive to their 
business environment. In particular, interest associations representing small and 
medium-sized businesses expressed a strong preference for low interest rates, referring 
to their members’ heavy dependence on external capital. In the same vein, most 
respondents argued in favour of export-friendly exchange rate policies, saying that 
their members had perceived past periods of weakening exchange rates for the 
Deutsche Mark and the euro as mitigating the generally high level of production costs 
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in Germany, helping enterprises exposed to international competition to strengthen 
their competitive positions, albeit only temporarily. Finally, a large number of 
respondents stressed the importance of stability of the major relevant monetary 
variables as another key priority among businesses. By this reckoning, it is not only 
specific levels of interest rates or exchange rates that enterprises perceive as a burden, 
but also the frequency and magnitude of changes in these variables. High variability 
was pointed out as a significant factor aggravating enterprises’ investment and 
planning activities. Continuity in the movement of financial variables was considered 
by many as an important objective of monetary policy. 
Interest group agreement with Bundesbank objectives
Chart 83 Chart 84
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Given these multiple, not necessarily consistent preferences, the question arises as to 
how interest groups assess the monetary policymaking record over time. As we saw 
from the above analysis of the issue context, the German economy has been 
confronted with considerable movement in inflation, interest and exchange rates, 
moderate as they may be by international or historical standards. In particular, the 
Bundesbank adopted restrictive monetary stances in order to counter inflationary 
pressures, often accompanied with phases of rising and high interest rates as well as a 
strengthening of the external value of the currency. Ceteris paribus, such restrictive 
policy measures increase domestic enterprises’ financing costs and can hurt their 
international competitiveness. As a result, it is conceivable that enterprises disagree 
with monetary policy decisions at certain points in time when the economic effects of 
monetary developments are perceived to be particularly painful, even if, in principle, 
they support the objectives the central bank pursues. 
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Proposition 10 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
frequently"
1
"Frequently" 2
"Rarely" 3
"Very rarely" 4
Interest groups rarely disagree
with the monetary or exchange
rate policy decisions of the central
bank.
"Have interest groups encountered
situations in the past in which they
urgently disagreed with the conduct of
monetary or exchange rate policy?"
"Never" 5
Evidence from the interviews held with experts and decision makers from business 
associations and the Bundesbank shows that disagreement with individual monetary 
policy decisions is very rare. Asked whether there had been situations in which 
German business strongly disagreed with the monetary policy decisions of the 
Bundesbank or the ECB, more than 31% of all respondents stated that business had 
never strongly disagreed with the course of monetary policy, as shown in chart 85. 
Among interest group representatives, this figure was as high as 46%. Another 50% 
reported that disagreement had been rare or very rare. Notably, only one respondent 
representing a largely export-oriented constituency expressed frequent dissatisfaction 
with monetary decisions, pointing to the financial burden to the members of his 
association originating from exchange rate movements and their desire for further 
stabilisation of external currency value. On average, agreement as expressed by 
interest group representatives was significantly higher than central bank officials 
expected it to be (see chart 86), with a particularly high average level of agreement 
among Advisory Board members at the regional level.
In their comments, the vast majority of interest group representatives reported that 
disagreement with monetary policy decisions very rarely centred on the direction of 
interest rate adjustments. Most respondents emphasised that they had very rarely
disagreed with the central banks' overall assessment of monetary and economic 
conditions. In contrast, in the rare cases that disagreement was reported to have 
occurred, it focused principally on the timing and magnitude of monetary measures. 
Thus, a large number of interest group representatives stated that monetary authorities 
tended to react very early in the economic cycle to signs of inflationary pressure with a 
tightening of their monetary stance. At times, such early reactions were judged 
premature by some respondents. In the same vein, the relaxation of monetary 
conditions was perceived as taking place comparatively late in the economic cycle, 
leading some commentators to conclude that monetary stimuli should be given more 
early when economic downturns are immediately foreseeable. 
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As a former member of the Bundesbank Central Bank Council said:
"Certainly, there have been controversial discussions at times. But these 
were without exception concerned with the details – the timing and size of 
monetary measures – and never led to outright controversy. The real fights 
were with the Federal Government."
One federal-level sectoral industry representative characteristically observed that 
"[t]here can be no question that – as a capital intensive industry – we strictly 
prefer low interest rates to high ones, and – as an export-oriented sector – a 
weak exchange rate to a tight one. But whatever the preferences, our basic 
belief is in the expertise and wisdom of the Bundesbank. Thus, we usually 
refrain from commenting on its monetary decisions, and most times there is 
no reason to complain in the first place."
Disagreement with course of monetary policy
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Interest group representatives deemed the scale of monetary policy responses to 
movements in the economic cycle problematic even less frequently. In this regard, 
most respondents emphasised that they trusted the Bundesbank and the ECB to find an 
appropriate response development in the overall monetary environment. Some 
respondents, however, pointed out that in certain instances the Bundesbank was 
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perceived as having been too restrictive in its reactions to inflationary pressures. This 
referred mainly to the mid-1990s, when monetary tightening was considered too harsh 
and too prolonged by some. Some respondents also cited the monetary tightening in 
the early ‘80s as an example of too rigorous a monetary hardening by the Bundesbank. 
The breakdown in charts 87 and 88 shows that the overall assessment on the interest 
group side is largely shared by their counterparts at the Bundesbank, albeit in a more 
heterogeneous manner. While almost nine out of ten officials at the bank's Central 
Office considered disagreement by interest groups to occur very rarely, only one-third 
of their colleagues at the Regional Offices shared this view. Two-thirds of the latter 
had more varied views on the question, with half of them reporting rare disagreement 
and another fifth never observing disagreement at all. As a consequence, at 3.50 the 
median answer among respondents at the Regional Offices was lower than the rest of 
the sample618, suggesting that dissatisfaction with the course of monetary policy –
inasmuch as it exists at all – is slightly more frequently articulated at the regional than 
the federal level.
Given the respondents’ occasional disagreement with the de facto conduct of monetary 
policy in the past – as rarely as this may have occurred –, none of the respondents 
naturally ruled out the possibility of objections to monetary decisions in the future, as 
well as political action by interest groups in response to such objections. As one 
representative of a large, cross-sectoral federal industry association typically 
remarked:
"We have not encountered extreme monetary situations over the past 
decades. Occasionally, conditions got tenser, compelling us to ask monetary 
policy makers to use the scope and discretion at their disposal – in both 
directions, depending on the circumstances. In difficult times, the pain that 
industry can take naturally decreases. But in general, the threshold for 
interest group action in the policy area remains an abstract one. The trigger 
only becomes evident in each concrete case. Either way, there can be no 
doubt that in difficult circumstances, well-known and recognised 
fundamentals of our policy positions may need to be revised, and we and 
our members may become very nervous."
III.2.4.2 Size and urgency of impact of monetary policy
A result of earlier consideration has been that, owing to the complexity with which it 
affects the economy at large and individual enterprises in particular, and given the 
comparably small immediate economic impact it has on businesses, the perceived need 
618 For statistical details, see p. 399.
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for political action on monetary policy is further lessened. This tenet is largely 
confirmed by the reactions from the decision makers and experts consulted. 
Proposition 11 Question Categories Scale
"Strong" 1
"Moderate" 2
"Weak" 3
Monetary or exchange rate policy
is not perceived to have a
significant effect on individual
firms or interest associations.
"Is monetary or exchange rate policy
perceived by the private sector to have
an economic impact on individual
corporations or interest groups?"
"Negligible" 4
Asked about the perceived impact of monetary policy measures or the absence of such 
measures, only 17% of all respondents considered there was a moderate impact on 
trade and industry, while 69% observed only a weak impact and 12% described the 
economic impact as negligible, as shown in chart 89. The average values of the 
answers, as illustrated in chart 90, show interest group representatives reporting a 
slightly weaker perceived impact than their counterparts at the Bundesbank. A median 
value of 3.00 for all respondents as well as all sub-sets, however, suggests that 
respondents typically reacted in a homogenous way. 
A detailed examination of the responses, as presented in charts 91 and 92, reveals no 
significant differences in the assessments of the perceived policy impact between the 
federal and regional levels. Interestingly, no discernible patterns existed with respect 
to the type of enterprises the interest group respondents represented. In other words, 
neither the associations representing small and medium-sized enterprises, nor those 
representing the export sector or large industrial corporations reported a particularly 
strong or weak perceived impact of monetary policy on their members. As a result, 
monetary policy is generally regarded as weak in its economic impact on the 
operations of German enterprises in trade and industry.
This perception was typically reflected in the statements made by interest-group 
respondents with respect to both monetary and exchange rate developments, as the 
following quotations exemplify:
"The share of interest-related costs in total corporate expenses is very low. 
Thus, a movement in central bank interest rates does not make much of a 
difference. Psychologically, such movements may well accumulate over 
time. But the impact of this effect – via consumption and investment 
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behaviour – is too indirect and difficult to account for to be a driving factor 
for enterprises’ behaviour."619
"The impact of monetary policy on the average enterprise in Germany is 
minimal, especially when compared to other sources of risk. This is linked 
to the share of interest-related costs in companies’ total expenses. 
Considering that on average interest expenditure makes up between 0.5% 
and 1.5% of total operating costs, while wage costs are around 25% to 30%, 
it becomes clear that managers have more urgent things to do than complain 
about the monetary environment."620
"The danger to the German economy from exchange rates is very low. 
Exchange rates were stabilised after the launch of the EMS at the end of the 
1970s. With the advent of the euro, 90% of our members’ trade is either 
transacted within the euro area or denominated in euro. For the rest, 
effective insurance is in principle possible through exchange rate hedging. 
So even a difficult period such as 2003, when we had three appreciations of 
10% each a week, does not seriously endanger our trading activities."621
"Interest expenses have never been of great concern to German industry. In 
fact, our exposure has consistently declined over the past years. Financially, 
monetary tightening is hardly noticeable for an average business. Marginal 
as the impact may be, though, we would always prefer low refinancing 
conditions to high ones."622
Insofar as monetary policy was conceded by interest-group representatives as having a 
significant effect on enterprises, respondents strongly confirmed the above findings on 
the exposure of sectors and groups of enterprises. From the respondents’ comments, 
particular exposure to monetary policy is given in the following cases:
– Small and medium-sized enterprises, owing to the high average rate of debt 
financing and their dependence on bank credit in this regard.
– Capital-intensive industries whose investment decisions are influenced by debt 
financing costs, making them relatively interest rate-sensitive, such as the 
mechanical engineering, chemical and construction sectors.
619 Quote by a senior expert at a large federal cross-sectoral industry association.
620 Quote by a senior Bundesbank official.
621 Quote by a representative of a federal-level group specialising in trade issues. The view that 
exchange rate risks can be countered effectively by hedging transactions was challenged by a 
number of other respondents who pointed out that hedging instruments were largely inappropriate 
for use by small and medium-sized enterprises owing to the small trading volumes. Also, it was 
emphasised that hedging was a very costly way for a company to protect itself against exchange 
rate and interest rate exposure.
622 Quote by a representative of a regional industry group.
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– Sectors whose products are subject to interest rate-sensitive demand patterns in 
consumption and investment, such as the retail and wholesale trade and 
construction.
– Enterprises heavily exposed to export or import activities, especially large 
industrial corporations in the automobile, chemical and mechanical engineering 
businesses.
Perception of economic effects of monetary policy on enterprises
Chart 89 Chart 90
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Despite these patterns of interest and exchange rate exposure, none of the respondents 
representing enterprises in any of the above sectors regarded the impact of monetary 
policy on their constituencies as strong. The fact that specific patterns of exposure are 
not directly reflected in the immediate responses to this question by decision makers 
and experts can be traced back to three arguments that were contained to varying 
degrees in the vast majority of responses and broadly confirm a number of 
observations made on the issue context earlier on.
First, inflation, interest and exchange rate related costs were said to be only one factor 
in corporate expenses, and a very minor one at that. This was also said to apply to 
expenses on interest or exchange rate hedging for enterprises in a position to insure 
themselves against the associated risks on derivatives markets. Compared with the 
costs of changes in monetary variables, without exception the respondents found other 
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corporate expenses a much greater burden. The most important cost factor for German 
firms, as seen by a large majority of respondents, is wage and labour costs, including 
non-wage social security contributions. In addition, expenses on material and 
commodity factor inputs were cited as an important cost component. Finally, the 
burden of corporate taxation was stressed. Next to these direct cost components, many 
respondents pointed out that even the impact of economic policy measures weighing 
indirectly on the profitability of German enterprises, such as economy-wide or sector-
specific regulation and indirect taxes influencing corporations’ investment behaviour 
and their customers’ consumption and investment patterns, were considered to have a 
greater impact on the corporate sector than monetary policy. 
Second, the perception of the impact of monetary policy was said to be narrowed by 
the cyclicality of monetary developments and the periodicity of monetary policy 
decisions. Thus, many respondents pointed out that even at times of rising or high 
interest rates, enterprises could be sure that, owing to the cyclicality of monetary 
policy, they would eventually return to lower levels again. In this respect it was 
stressed that monetary policy differed fundamentally from other policy areas and that 
the burden of taxation, for example, had in the past trended almost exclusively upward. 
Tax rates were rarely seen to fall. In contrast, the fact that enterprises could be certain 
that – however high interest rates rose at any given point in time – they would sooner 
or later come down again greatly diminished the overall impact of monetary policy as 
perceived by business. This logic, it was pointed out, certainly also applied to the 
reverse constellation, i.e. corporations were realistic and understood that low interest 
rates in one period were sure to be followed by rising interest rates in a subsequent 
period. As a result, the majority of respondents characterised the cyclicality of 
monetary policy as a quasi-natural phenomenon623 in the face of which it was up to 
businesses to optimise their finance and asset management behaviour so as to keep 
corporate costs as low as possible. In essence, this view was also said to apply to 
exchange rate developments.
Accordingly, the effective magnitude of the impact of monetary policy on the 
corporate sector is determined by the level of inflation, interest and exchange rates at 
any given moment in time, the length of the prevailing business cycle and the duration 
of periods of rising and high as well as falling and low levels of the major monetary 
variables. The duration of cycles has been emphasised by respondents representing 
export-oriented enterprises as particularly important for the impact of exchange rate 
developments on firms exposed to international competition. Thus, even critical 
appreciations of the domestic currency were reported to be manageable by the majority 
623 This logic essentially forms the basis of the views reported in the quotation on page 262, 
suggesting that it was pointless trying to influence monetary policy. 
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of export-oriented firms as long as they were of limited duration. Prolonged phases of 
exchange rate appreciation, in contrast, were considered harmful to international 
exporting firms’ competitiveness. The Deutsche Mark's appreciation against the 
US Dollar and many European currencies throughout the 1990s was repeatedly 
referred to as an example of a difficult period for export-oriented firms.
As to the periodicity of monetary decision making, some respondents stated that 
central banks’ step-by-step approach, with monetary decisions taken every two to four 
weeks and often evolving in a sequence of small, quarter percentage-point steps at a 
time, made it difficult to assess the aggregate effect of monetary policy over time. 
Equally, however, the respondents emphasised that this evolutionary approach was 
considered useful and necessary insofar as it promoted continuity in the development 
of the target variables and thereby helped maintain an overall stable monetary 
environment. 
As one industry representative typically noted: 
"Monetary decisions usually come in small, incremental steps. Of course, 
we observe these developments over time and are therefore aware of the 
aggregate impact of a sequence of monetary measures over the political 
cycle. But there can be no doubt that the visibility of monetary policy and 
the major private-sector actors’ awareness is, in practice, constrained by the 
incremental nature of monetary decision making. If central bank verdicts 
came as one big bang once a year, private-sector reactions would certainly 
be different from those observed in current practice."
Third, almost all experts and decision makers pointed out that a precise determination 
or quantification of the effects of monetary policy on the business sector – a factor to 
be discussed in detail below – was rendered difficult by the complexity of the 
monetary transmission process and the wide variety of different channels through 
which policy measures fed into the economy. In contrast to most other policy areas, 
and notably with respect to taxation, wage settlements, social security contributions 
and even regulation, where the impact of policy measures was almost comprehensively 
calculable, the economic impact of monetary developments and monetary policy 
measures was considered diffuse and difficult to aggregate. 
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Proposition 12 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
precisely"
1
"Rather 
precisely"
2
"Rather 
vaguely"
3
"Very 
vaguely"
4
The magnitude of the impact of
monetary or exchange rate policy
on individual firms or interest
associations is difficult to
determine.
"Is it possible for individual enterprises
or interest groups to determine the
magnitude of the impact of monetary
or exchange rate developments on
them?"
"No" 5
Derived from the above qualitative feedback, only 13% of all respondents stated that 
the economic impact of monetary developments and policy decisions on individual 
enterprises and interest groups could be determined rather precisely, as shown in chart 
93. More than 55%, in contrast, reported that monetary effects could be determined 
only rather or very vaguely. Almost one-third of respondents even held that no 
sensible quantification was possible. The problem of identifying monetary policy 
effects was considered particularly acute by interest group respondents, with a 
numerical value of 3.96 compared to the total average of 3.84 and an average for 
central bank responses of 3.64. Interest group representatives at the regional level were 
most critical of their ability to assess the magnitude of the effects of monetary policy, 
with a numerical average of 4.00, as illustrated in chart 94.
On the basis of the detailed reactions, three sources of imprecision can be identified, 
rendering determination of the magnitude of the impact from monetary policy 
decisions particularly difficult. 
– First, the multitude of channels through which monetary policy is transmitted to 
private sector enterprises makes a comprehensive calculation difficult.
– Second, monetary policy does not work directly on enterprises, but indirectly 
through intermediaries and financial markets. As a result, it is impossible for 
enterprises to distinguish which changes in the conditions for corporate financing 
and asset management are actually the result of monetary policy measures or their 
omission, and which changes are caused by the behaviour of financial 
intermediaries and market participants. In addition, time lags in the effects of 
monetary policy measures resulting from the indirectness of transmission were 
said to complicate accurate assessment.
Although in principle true for all major financial variables such as bond-market 
yields, equity prices or exchange rates, a large number of respondents, especially 
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those representing small and medium-sized enterprises, pointed to the banking 
sector as the major source of irritation in this respect. Given the high degree of 
dependence on bank credit, particularly by small businesses, respondents 
emphasised that banks were generally considered reluctant to pass on interest rate 
cuts to their ultimate clients, resulting in considerable time lags in transmission 
and substantial mark-ups in the lending rates quoted to enterprises compared to 
equivalent bond-market rates. In addition, it was pointed out by interest 
representatives that at times the problem as viewed by enterprises was not the rates 
at which credit was available, but rather whether and how much credit banks were 
willing to grant to individual firms. In periods of weak corporate returns and 
liquidity, banks’ reluctance to extend loans in conjunction with high interest rate 
mark-ups was reported as a critical factor for the profitability and, indeed, in 
marginal cases the existence of individual firms. 
Indirectness of transmission not only makes it difficult to trace potential changes 
in financial variables back to their source and to identify the potential role of 
monetary policy as one possible cause, it also complicates identification of the 
appropriate addressee for political action by interest groups. In terms of interest 
rates on corporate credit, enterprises therefore primarily consider individual banks 
or the banking sector at large as the most important determinant of lending terms. 
The part played by the underlying monetary conditions is said rarely to be taken 
sufficiently into consideration. Much of the criticism of corporate financing terms 
by the business sector therefore concentrates on the banking sector as the primary 
addressee and rarely reaches the central bank.
– Third, enterprises’ individual exposure to changes in inflation, interest and 
exchange rates proved varied even within specific regions or sectors. As a result, 
interest group representatives maintained that an aggregation of the effects of 
monetary policy on enterprises in specific sectors, regions or the economy at large 
would either yield very limited results or be extremely costly.
In these respects, a vast majority of respondents confirmed the hypothesis that 
monetary and exchange rate policy was more difficult to assess than other policy 
issues. The effects of taxation and regulation were cited as the most important 
examples of policy areas where the effects on industry were more immediate and 
easier to assess in terms of their qualitative and quantitative impact. However, the 
difference between monetary and exchange rate developments on the one hand and 
other policy issues on the other is not considered a qualitative one. Policy measures in 
the form of taxation or industry regulation were recognised as difficult to account for 
in their long-term effects and in quantitative terms. Similarly, substantial differences in 
exposure on the part of individual interest group members were also observed in other 
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policy areas. Nonetheless, monetary and exchange rate developments were broadly 
regarded as clearly harder to account for.
Size of economic impact of monetary policy
Chart 93 Chart 94
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As a result, the diffuse transmission of monetary policy, the indirectness of channels of 
transmission and the differential impact on individual enterprises and sectors were 
firmly corroborated by interest group representatives as the most important reasons for 
the difficulties in determining the magnitude of the economic impact of monetary 
policy on Germany's business community.
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Proposition 13 Question Categories Scale
"Very strong" 1
"Rather 
strong"
2
"Rather 
weak"
3
Owing to the comparatively low
and varied impact of monetary or
exchange rate policy on individual
enterprises, interest associations
find it difficult to form strong
preferences with respect to the
day-to-day conduct of monetary or
exchange rate policy.
"Do interest groups have strong
preferences with respect to the conduct
of monetary or exchange rate policy?"
"Very weak" 4
Given the perception that monetary policy has a rather varied impact on individual 
enterprises and sectors, the question arises to what extent it is possible for interest 
associations to form strong preferences with respect to this policy issue, the latter 
being an important precondition for effective interest representation vis-à-vis policy 
makers. 
Asked whether interest associations in fact had strong preferences on how monetary 
policy is conducted, a majority of respondents referred back to the general priorities in 
the form of stable prices, low interest rates, export-friendly exchange rates and an 
overall stable monetary environment, as discussed above624. With respect to these 
general priorities, interest-group preferences were confirmed as strong on average.
In contrast, with respect to the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy interest group 
preferences were perceived as comparatively weak. Very much like the responses to 
the initial question on the intensity of interest group activity in the field of monetary 
policymaking, 90% of all respondents considered interest group preferences over time 
as either rather or very weak, as illustrated in chart 97. Only four respondents, 
including one former Bundesbank official and two experts from federal business 
associations primarily representing enterprises in the construction and machinery 
sectors, considered interest group preference rather strong on a continuous basis. On 
average, central bank representatives perceived interest group preferences with respect 
to the conduct of monetary policy as slightly stronger than reported by interest group 
representatives themselves (see chart 98). The latter typically described their 
preferences as rather to very weak, with a median response value of 3.50, against 3.00 
for the total and the remaining sub-sets of respondents625.
One sophisticated response was that
"[t]he final impact of monetary measures is inscrutable. We cannot see what 
exactly happens down the line of the transmission mechanism, and it is 
624 See page 282.
625 For statistical details, see p. 402.
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impossible to follow their impact over time. Nor can we account for the 
impact on individual enterprises, especially the dynamic effects. This is not 
least because most companies look at the issue from different perspectives 
all at the same time – as borrowers and investors, as exporters and 
importers. Sure, we can easily calculate the impact of an interest rate hike 
on a company's forthcoming financing conditions. But that is only a very 
small part of the complete story."626
This was complemented by a point from a respondent at a federal-level, sectoral 
industry association, who added: 
"Especially in our sector, the electronics trade, the structure of interests with 
respect to external trade becomes even more complex. By the time a final 
product is completed in our industry, it and its constituent parts have 
travelled several times around the world. It is therefore impossible in this 
sector to tell exports from imports, and vice versa. Against that background, 
drawing conclusions on our exchange rate policy preferences becomes an 
almost futile task."
In line with earlier findings on the intensity of interest group activity, periods when 
preferences were considered to have been strong include the early to mid-1990s and 
the early ‘80s, during which interest rates were comparatively high, both in nominal 
and real terms. Some respondents also pointed to interest and exchange rate 
developments during the early to mid-’70s, which were described as having triggered 
strong criticism from individual interest associations.
Finally, the responses suggest that in terms of preference formation, too, monetary and 
exchange rate policy represents a particularly delicate policy area for interest groups 
when compared with other fields. In line with the view expressed in the context of the 
economic impact of monetary and exchange rate developments, interest group 
representatives largely confirmed that producing stable and forceful positions in this 
policy area was more difficult than, say, on taxation, labour and welfare legislation or 
industry regulation, owing to the hardly discernible impact of monetary and exchange 
rate developments as well as the varied interests within their constituencies. 
626 Quote by a regional industry representative.
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Strength of preferences on monetary policy
Chart 97 Chart 98
– All respondents, in %
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– Respondents from interest groups, in %
– Number of responses: 24
0
13
38
50
0
17
42 42
0
8
33
58
0
20
40
60
80
100
V
er
y 
str
on
g
[1
]
Ra
th
er
str
on
g 
[2
]
Ra
th
er
w
ea
k 
[3
]
V
er
y 
w
ea
k
[4
]
Interest groups, total
Federal level
Advisory Board members
– Respondents from Deutsche Bundesbank, in %
– Number of responses: 17
0
6
71
24
0
20
80
00 0
67
33
0
20
40
60
80
100
V
er
y 
str
on
g
[1
]
Ra
th
er
str
on
g 
[2
]
Ra
th
er
w
ea
k 
[3
]
V
er
y 
w
ea
k
[4
]
Bundesbank, total
Central Office
Regional Offices
III.2.4.3 Monetary policy on the economic policy agenda 
In the light of strong agreement with central bank policy, the low and diffuse impact of 
monetary developments and the comparatively weak preferences of German business 
associations from trade and industry, the question arises as to what extent monetary 
policy can compete as a policy issue on the overall economic policy agenda. 
Considering the great number of competing issues and the need for interest 
associations to prioritise their activities, monetary policy theoretically plays no 
prominent role in the overall economic policy discourse. This hypothesis was strongly 
confirmed by business and central bank respondents.
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Proposition 14 Question Categories Scale
"Highly 
significant"
1
"Significant" 2
"Insignificant
"
3
Given the low perceived impact of
monetary or exchange rate
developments and the importance
of other policy fields, monetary or
exchange rate policy is not
perceived by interest groups as a
priority issue on the economic
policy agenda.
"Compared with other policy issues on
the political and economic agenda,
how significant an issue in general is
monetary or exchange rate policy as
far as interest groups and their
members are concerned?"
"Highly 
insignificant"
4
Asked how significant an economic policy issue monetary policy was assessed as 
being, more than half of all respondents stated that it was regarded as a highly 
insignificant issue627 (see chart 101). Another 36% regarded it as insignificant. Four 
respondents, one with a strong export-oriented constituency and three representing 
primarily small and medium-sized businesses at regional level, considered monetary 
and exchange rate issues significant. At 3.45, the average numerical value of all replies 
shows that monetary issues are, in general, regarded as unimportant compared to other 
topics on the economic-policy agenda. This view is shared homogeneously by the 
respondents from interest groups and the Bundesbank and irrespective of whether 
respondents were active at federal or regional level, as illustrated in chart 102. The 
overall picture is confirmed by the median responses delivered on this question, which 
amounted to 4.00 for all respondents as well as the sub-sets628, suggesting that 
monetary and exchange rate policy was typically assessed as being a highly 
insignificant policy issue. Compared with the responses on the perceived economic 
impact of monetary policy629, the comparative assessment presented here underlines 
the importance of the former and suggests that – given the salience of other policy 
issues – monetary matters appear to be even less relevant for the work of the interest 
groups consulted. 
627 The share of respondents considering monetary affairs highly insignificant was even higher when 
looking at interest group respondents alone, namely 58% in total and 67% among respondents at 
federal level. 
628 The median response for the entirety of respondents as well as the sub-sets totalled 4.00, except for 
respondents from the Bundesbank, whose median response was 3.50. For statistical details, see p. 
403.
629 See p. 287.
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Monetary issues on the economic-policy agenda
Chart 101 Chart 102
– All respondents, in %
– Number of responses:
– Average value of responses: 
42
3.45
0
10
36
55
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
H
ig
hl
y
sig
ni
fic
an
t
[1
]
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
[2
]
In
sig
ni
fic
an
t
[3
]
H
ig
hl
y
in
sig
ni
fic
an
t
[4
]
– Average values of responses by level
– Number of responses: 42
3.42
3.25
3.50
3.50
3.50
3.58
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Total
Federal
level
Regional
level
Interest group
Central bank
Typically, one expert from a large sectoral association at federal level stated that he 
could 
"[…] easily name a hundred policy issues which are more important to this 
association than monetary or exchange rate matters. Monetary policy is a 
non-issue compared with other policy fields, and this is true for most of the 
time".
Other respondents from a regional chamber of commerce maintained that 
"[c]ertainly, there are times when monetary and exchange rate decisions 
received greater public attention. However, monetary developments 
consistently range far behind other economic policy topics, first and 
foremost tax and fiscal policies, wage developments, non-wage 
contributions and industry regulation."
"Even at times of extraordinarily high interest rates – by historical as well as 
international standards – other, more pressing economic problems kept us 
preoccupied. In the past half decade, at any rate, we have been operating in 
a very benign monetary environment, so that monetary issues were 
completely outside of our attention."
"To us, interest and exchange rates are non-market framework conditions. 
No need and no use for lobbying. As a consequence, we save our resources 
for more important issues."
In line with the above list of economic policy issues derived from the annual reports of 
the German Council of Economic Experts, the priority issues on the political agendas 
of the interest representatives addressed can be summarised as follows:
– level and structure of taxation, especially corporate taxes,
– fiscal policy, government spending, subsidies,
– wage settlements and labour market structures,
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– non-wage social security contributions and the structure of the welfare system,
– economy-wide or sector-specific market regulation,
– industrial policy, especially with respect to small and medium-sized enterprises,
– credit policy.
The last point on this list illustrates the relevance of the earlier finding that with 
respect to financing terms for German enterprises it is not monetary policy but the
lending policies in the banking sector that are considered the primary source of 
controversy, especially since the late 1990s. The importance of this issue reportedly 
stems from two sources. In the first place, small and medium-sized enterprises have 
come under increasing pressure with respect to their financing patterns since the 
second half of the 1990s, when a number of German banks began to optimise their 
loan portfolios. Banks have tried to reduce their individual value at risk, wound up 
non-performing loans and pruned the share of high-risk, low-return commitments. This 
has reduced the availability and affordability of credit to small and medium-sized 
businesses in recent years, as many respondents pointed out. In addition, German 
enterprises were said to have been particularly concerned about the progress of 
deliberations on the reform of international capital adequacy standards for commercial 
banks in the context of the Basel II negotiations. The majority of respondents feared 
risk-adequate credit pricing would substantially push up the cost of credit for small 
and medium-sized firms. Against the backdrop of these two developments, the 
German commercial banking sector’s lending policy has become a relatively important 
issue for a number of interest associations in trade and industry. Monetary conditions, 
in contrast, are not subject to political activity by the relevant interest groups in this 
context.
III.2.5 Group context
In addition to the limited accessibility of the central bank as an independent policy 
maker and the low and diffuse impact of monetary policy, limitations on the interest 
associations’ ability effectively to represent the interests of their members have been 
identified as a third potential factor behind the low level of interest group activity on 
monetary policy. There can be no doubt that the associations from trade and industry 
under consideration in the present context generally represent strong and effective 
lobbying organisations. At the same time, we have seen that business associations may 
have difficulties in arriving at strong common policy positions on monetary issues and 
are likely to lack the political and information-related resources necessary to make a 
strong case. These propositions are largely supported by the feedback from decision 
makers and experts active in this field of policymaking.
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III.2.5.1 Heterogeneity of preferences within interest associations
As observed above, a majority of respondents said they did not perceive interest group 
policy positions on day-to-day monetary policy decisions as strong. Although a solid 
consensus was reported with regard to the broad monetary priorities, i.e. stable prices, 
low interest rates and export-friendly exchange rates as well as a stable monetary 
environment, interest associations’ and their members’ preferences on individual 
monetary policy decisions over time were considered rather weak. Given the 
difficulties encountered in identifying monetary policy impacts and the varied 
exposures observed among enterprises and different sectors of the economy, the 
question arises whether this weakness in preferences can be traced back to a lack of 
homogeneity in interest associations’ policy preferences. 
Proposition 15 Question Categories630Scale
None
None
None
Heterogeneity of interests related
to monetary or exchange rate
affairs within existing interest
groups weakens the formation of
strong policy positions in the
business sector.
"To what extent does the heterogeneity
of interests related to monetary or
exchange rate affairs within existing
interest groups weaken the formation
of strong policy positions in the
business sector?" None
First, in practice heterogeneous preferences on monetary policy within individual 
interest associations have a very subtle, non-decisive impact on their activities, as 
interest group representatives’ reactions to this proposition show. Three general trends 
can be deduced from their responses:
– In line with the above findings on the strength of policy positions, all interest 
group respondents reported homogeneous and strong commitment by their 
associations and members to the objective of maintaining price stability. Equally, 
no significant internal frictions were reported on secondary preferences, i.e. with 
respect to low interest rates and export-friendly exchange rates. With regard to 
general policy objectives, therefore, heterogeneity of preferences was not 
considered a significant problem. 
630 Responses to this proposition are analysed in qualitative terms only. In practice, the majority of 
responses were found to be highly differentiated, qualifying the overall response, so that an 
unambiguous allocation of reactions to a set of categories of answers and a corresponding scale of 
numerical values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses.
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– Accordingly, in the absence of major policy conflicts – of which there are very 
few, as borne out in the replies to the question on whether there had been instances 
of urgent disagreement with central bank policies in the past – interest associations 
and their members were said not to take up explicit policy positions. This in itself 
reflected not a lack of consensus, but rather the strong common perception that 
nothing needed to be done.
– In cases of conflict between these primary and secondary objectives, e.g. when 
interest rates were raised sharply by the central bank to counter inflationary 
pressures, most respondents reported a generally strong consensus on the 
fundamental assessment of the state of the economy. The rare debates that ensued 
were concerned primarily with whether and when the interest association should 
adopt certain measures and how emphatic the action should be. 
– This basic homogeneity of preferences with respect to monetary policy was 
essentially observed across the whole range of interest associations, irrespective of 
whether they were federally or regionally organised, and regardless of their size 
and the sector under consideration.
– However, representatives from large, federal, cross-sectoral interest associations 
did tend to emphasise the existence of differing interests – especially along 
sectoral lines and with respect to the average sizes of the enterprises represented –
within their organisations more strongly than those from sectoral or regional 
organisations. Nevertheless, none of the representatives inferred systematic 
disagreement or frictions from these differences.
– Internal differences in the assessment of monetary conditions, if observed, were 
said either to lead to a delay in the association's reaction or were resolved by 
toning down policy messages. 
– Many respondents emphasised that strong policy messages on which no consensus 
could be found at peak association level could still be approved and disseminated 
via the regional or sectoral organisations, where agreement was found easier to 
reach. 
– Finally, it was pointed out that the coverage of broad economic policy issues was 
characterised by an implicit division of labour aimed at establishing and 
representing policy positions on such issues – including monetary policy – at the 
peak level, i.e. primarily via the federal cross-sectoral associations of the BDI and 
DIHK, which enjoy the greatest degree of interest coverage. Specific concerns 
with regard to monetary policy at sectoral or regional level could be voiced via the 
dedicated associations. The latter, however, generally reported that they did not 
regard monetary policy as a primary field of activity, but rather relied on their 
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peak associations to take care of this issue. Failure to act because of unclear 
responsibilities within this implicit arrangement was not observed by any of the 
respondents, who pointed out that coverage of all issues considered vital was 
secured by means of appropriate communication between the various actors.
As a result, the responses by interest group representatives suggest that heterogeneity 
of preferences does not constitute a significant explanation for the low level of interest 
group activity on monetary developments and policy. On the contrary, the existing 
association infrastructure was stressed as being effective in aggregating and 
communicating common preferences, also in the monetary area.
Homogeneity of interests and coverage of interests by interest associations
Chart 103
hi
gh
lo
w
low highcoverage of interests in society
ho
m
og
en
ei
ty
 o
f i
nt
er
es
ts
Regional 
cross-sectoral 
associations
Regional 
sectoral 
associations Federal sectoral 
associations
Private or 
corporate 
individuals
Peak federal
cross-sectoral 
associations
Second, interest group responses suggest that there is an indirect trade-off between the 
homogeneity of preferences by interest associations and their coverage of interests in 
society at large, which becomes particularly relevant in the context of monetary policy. 
Homogeneity of preferences tends to increase, the smaller and more focused an 
association is. At the same time, the larger the association, the broader its membership 
and therefore its coverage of interests in society. This trade-off can be illustrated 
diagrammatically as in chart 103. When mediating interests with respect to monetary 
policymaking, the disseminating organisation’s representativeness plays an important 
role, as policy makers necessarily take an economy-wide view in the context of their 
policy objective and mindful that their instrument cannot be applied in a discriminate 
manner. Peak cross-sectoral associations have therefore been described by interest 
group representatives as particularly suitable for mediating interests with respect to 
monetary policy. This view was shared by a number of respondents at the 
Bundesbank.
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III.2.5.2 Political and information-related resources
Despite having substantial financial and personnel resources at their disposal, theory 
suggests that interest associations in trade and industry may not be in a position to 
apply political pressure or contribute appropriate information or expertise on monetary 
affairs. Responses to the propositions on the dependence of the Bundesbank and the 
ECB already showed that central banks were deemed well-equipped with political 
independence and expertise and information-related resources in their area of 
operation. To complete the picture, we still have to investigate whether and to what 
extent interest groups consider themselves endowed with the political and 
informational resources enabling them to exert influence on monetary policy makers.
Proposition 16 Question Categories Scale
"Significant 
potential 
pressure"
1
"Moderate 
potential 
pressure"
2
"Insignificant 
potential 
pressure"
3
Interest associations and their
members do not possess means of
exerting economic or political
pressure on the central bank.
"Do interest groups or their members
possess means of exerting pressure on
monetary policy makers?"
"No potential 
pressure"
4
Tallying with the results obtained on the institutional context, interest group and 
Bundesbank representatives strongly confirmed the propositions that interest groups 
did not possess means of exerting economic or political pressure on the central bank. 
Asked whether sources of economic or political pressure were available to interest 
associations and their members, 84% of all respondents stated that no such means 
existed. Another 16% considered potential political pressure to be insignificant, as 
shown in chart 104. Chart 105 illustrates that this assessment was homogeneously 
shared by interest group and Bundesbank representatives at all levels. Even more 
distinctly than this, the median values, at 4.00 for all responses as well as all sub-sets, 
suggest the typical view is that interest groups cannot exert any systematic economic 
or political pressure at all631.
631 For statistical details, see 405.
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On average, interest group representatives were slightly more sceptical of their own 
ability to exert political or economic pressure on the monetary authorities, with only 
two respondents reporting insignificant potential pressure. Among their Bundesbank 
counterparts, five respondents considered pressure possible, albeit insignificant. All 
other interviewees did not see any way in which interest associations could exert 
pressure on the authorities, as detailed in charts 106 and 107.
In principle, this verdict extended to all conceivable forms of political pressure. 
Without exception, respondents referred to the special institutional status of the 
Bundesbank and ECB, which rendered attempts to exert pressure either futile or self-
defeating:
– No respondent reported involvement in or interference with the appointment of 
central bank officials. This was deemed ineffective owing to the Beckett effect. In 
addition, most interest group representatives asked said the selection of 
Bundesbank and ECB decision-making staff was generally satisfactory, so that no 
interference had been regarded as necessary in the past. 
– Indirect pressure via other political institutions in the central bank environment, 
i.e. especially via government or parliament, was generally rated 
counterproductive, since these political institutions were the primary subject of 
central bank independence and therefore not an effective channel of 
communication.
– If any potential for political pressure – however insignificant – was identified, then 
this was related to business associations’ importance for the formation of public 
opinion at large, primarily through the multiplication of views within their 
organisations and through positions adopted in public, e.g. via the media. Public 
opinion, in turn, was regarded by the Bundesbank as an important element in 
support of its own independent position. At the same time, interest group 
respondents reported that they did not consider the wider public an appropriate 
avenue through which to exert indirect influence on monetary decision makers, 
both for idealistic reasons and in terms of practicability: Systematic pressure via 
public opinion was perceived as undermining the bank's independence, which the 
business sector, in turn, regarded as an essential part of the monetary order, and 
the ability to influence public opinion on a highly specific issue such as monetary 
policy was seen as very limited. 
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Means of exerting political pressure
Chart 104 Chart 105
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Chart 106 Chart 107
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With regard to economic pressure, a number of interviewees from both the interest 
group and the central bank side acknowledged the interdependence of central banks 
and the private sector, first of all through the formation of market prices and wages, 
which directly determine the primary policy objective of the Bundesbank and the 
ECB. In addition, the central bank's ability to influence major monetary variables, such 
as interest and exchange rates, depends on the behaviour of financial intermediaries 
and other financial market participants playing a part in the monetary transmission 
process. 
However, it was stressed that the ability of actors in trade and industry to exert 
pressure on monetary policy makers through their market behaviour was highly 
limited. 
– First, the role of businesses in trade and industry is limited to the process of price 
and wage formation. Their part in the transmission of monetary stimuli, in 
contrast, was basically rated non-existent and mainly passive in nature, i.e. 
enterprises are the final link in the monetary transmission chain. 
– Most importantly, however, neither wage formation and price setting nor financial 
market activity were regarded by any of the respondents as a means of exerting 
pressure on policy makers. Although conditioning monetary policy makers’ 
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decisions, respondents saw no way in which market behaviour could in fact coerce 
a central bank into policy measures it actually rejected. Moreover, meaningful 
pressure from market activity, e.g. with respect to price setting, presupposes a 
certain critical amount of collective action on the part of market participants, 
which was deemed highly unlikely given the existing level of competition in most 
product markets. 
In this regard, too, a majority of respondents saw monetary policy as differing 
markedly from other policy areas. Even though not applied on a continuous basis, 
conventional fields of policymaking were said to offer ways of exerting political or 
economic pressure that could be used as a last resort in the course of policy formation. 
One typical example cited was the threat that costs from higher taxation or tighter 
regulation could be passed on to final customers or might be translated into lower 
employment. While elected politicians generally tended to be responsive to such 
arguments, the only yardstick non-elected central bank policy makers were measured 
by was their ability to maintain price stability. The latter, again, can be achieved 
irrespective of market participants’ immediate reaction. 
Almost as clearly as they rejected the possibility of exerting political or economic 
pressure on the Bundesbank or the ECB, so the respondents doubted whether interest 
associations were able to contribute expertise or information that, in turn, might enable 
them to influence monetary policy decision making.
Proposition 17 Question Categories Scale
"Contribute 
greatly"
1
"Contribute" 2
"Contribute 
slightly"
3
Individual firms or interest
associations do not possess
relevant information exclusively
available to them alone, which
they can contribute to the
discourse with the central bank.
"Can interest groups provide central
banks with expertise or information of
relevance to the conduct of monetary
or exchange rate policy?"
"Cannot 
contribute"
4
Asked whether interest groups were able to contribute expertise or information of 
relevance to the monetary decision-making process, three-quarters of all respondents 
stated that interest groups could contribute only slightly or not at all. Only one-quarter 
thought they could contribute moderately or greatly, as illustrated in chart 108. On 
average, interest group representatives again proved slightly more critical of their own 
capabilities than perceived by their central bank counterparts, especially at the federal 
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level632. More than half of all interest group representatives had the impression they 
could not contribute at all. Another 35% considered their potential to contribute 
minimal. Overall, the structure of responses closely correlates with those outlined 
above in respect of the monetary authorities’ dependence on external expertise and 
information633.
Information-related interest group resources
Chart 108 Chart 109
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Also in line with the evidence on central bank dependence on external expertise and 
information, interest group representatives view their abilities as more limited than do 
their counterparts at the Bundesbank. This is illustrated in charts 110 and 111 as well 
as by the median values attained for the sub-set responses. More than half the interest 
group respondents rated their potential to contribute expertise or information non-
existent, another third as very low. The typical response by interest group respondents 
overall, as well as the federal and regional sub-sets, was 4.00, i.e. indicating no 
capacity to contribute at all. Among central bankers, in contrast, one-third stated that 
interest groups could, in principle, contribute. 5% even considered that potential to be 
632 See chart 109.
633 See page 275. 
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great634. Only 43% deemed the information potential low, and another 19% non-
existent. Median answers by Bundesbank respondents – 3.00 for the total sub-set, 3.00 
for respondents at the Regional Offices, and 2.00 at the Central Office – show that 
interest groups’ ability to contribute valuable information was typically considered 
greater than by interest group representatives themselves635. 
III.2.6 Secondary evidence on communication of interests in practice
Confirming the central hypothesis of this study, evidence from interviews with 
decision makers and experts from German trade and industry associations shows that 
interest group activity with respect to monetary policy is very low. At the same time, it 
becomes evident that interest groups are neither indifferent nor altogether silent on this 
policy issue. Specific interests do exist, and they are articulated via the existing 
association infrastructure. Two broad questions therefore remain to be answered. First, 
it needs to be determined what triggers interest group activity – especially the 
articulation of specific views vis-à-vis monetary policy makers – over time. In other 
words, given that most of the time monetary policy works to the satisfaction of the 
business sector but that there are also periods when interest groups become concerned 
over the effects of monetary developments on their members, how is the decision on 
articulation of the resulting preferences taken? Second, how do interest associations 
actually communicate their interests once they deem political action necessary? 
III.2.6.1 Group-internal decision making
Against the background of empirical findings so far, monetary policy provides a 
particularly illustrative example of the general problem in interest group analysis of 
how a certain policy issue is elevated to priority status on an association's agenda. In 
other words, the above evidence suggests that monetary policy is, for most of the time, 
a non-issue or, at best, a latent issue. At times of growing impact and urgency of 
monetary developments and decisions, the monetary policy issue naturally moves to 
the forefront. Eventually, albeit rarely, business representatives adopt strong positions 
on monetary policy and articulate their members’ related interests vis-à-vis policy 
makers or in public. One important question emerging from the analysis so far is how 
monetary policy gets pushed up the political agenda, rising from latency to urgency. 
Very much like other policy issues, the prioritisation of monetary policy on the 
associations' policy agendas is determined by two sources of input into their internal 
decision making processes: first, by the assessment at association level, and second, by 
634 14% of respondents based at the bank's Central Office consider interest groups’ ability to deliver 
valuable information great. 
635 For statistical details see p. 406.
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the views voiced by their members. In the case of monetary policy, evidence suggests 
that the first element is particularly strong.
All peak federal-level associations, whether cross-sectoral or sectoral, maintain 
economics departments concerned with analysing the relevant economic and political 
developments. Almost all peak associations dedicate some part of this expertise to the 
regular monitoring and evaluation of monetary or exchange rate developments. These 
dedicated resources usually take the form of one economic expert – in the case of 
individual peak cross-sectoral associations sometimes two experts – whose portfolio of 
responsibilities also includes monetary and exchange rate matters among what is 
generally a large number of other issues as well. This includes monitoring the 
development of major monetary variables, as well as the collection and review of 
information and statistics in this field. An association's view on monetary 
developments and policy measures is essentially formulated by these experts and 
subsequently communicated to monetary policy makers directly or indirectly by them 
or by other association officials. 
With opinion formation primarily undertaken at the associations' central offices, 
bottom-up communication of preferences from member enterprises on monetary issues 
proves to play a moderately complementary role. In principle, monetary policy-related 
preferences can be communicated to associations through the conventional channels of 
group-internal communication, i.e. membership assemblies, committees and informal 
communication. Selected peak associations were even said to maintain specific 
working groups or committees on money and credit issues, in which monetary and 
exchange rate issues could in principle be communicated. However, none of the 
respondents found that bottom-up communication from member or constituent 
regional sections or from member enterprises had in the past yielded strong systematic 
impetus to the associations’ monetary policy-related activities, being regarded mainly 
as complementary anecdotal evidence in addition to the associations' existing views, 
expertise and information. 
III.2.6.2 Fundamental characteristics of communication 
Interest group activity on monetary policy is not only low but also differs in quality 
from activities in other policy fields. A central finding from the conversations with 
decision makers and experts from interest organisations in trade and industry is that 
none of the actors characterised their activities in the monetary arena as lobbying in 
the strict sense. The concept was almost exclusively regarded as inappropriate as a 
precise description of the activities in this field of policymaking. 
On the basis of the comments from the respondents, communication with the 
Bundesbank and the ECB can – more so than in other policy areas – best be 
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characterised as an exchange of views and information, or as an informed dialogue, 
differing in quantity or quality from conventional lobbying activities in at least four 
respects:
– Focus on general welfare
Respondents from the major interest associations stressed their awareness of the 
Bundesbank's and ECB's commitment to the primary objective of maintaining 
price stability. Neither bank is mandated to give in to particular interests from 
whatever side, nor would it be appropriate for them to do so. Information from the 
private sector can only be taken into consideration by monetary policy makers 
inasmuch as it is relevant in obtaining a comprehensive picture of the state of the 
economy. Interest group representatives stated that as a result they did not consider 
pushing narrow particular interests helpful in the context of monetary affairs. 
– Contents of policy messages
With a view to respecting the independence of the Bundesbank and ECB, many 
respondents considered ex ante monetary policy recommendations and demands or 
ex post criticism of monetary decisions in public to be counterproductive. Most 
associations were said to resort primarily to cautious ex post assessments of policy 
decisions.
– Rhetoric
A large majority of respondents stated that they adjusted their rhetoric to the 
specific circumstances in discourse with monetary policy makers. Statements were 
generally aimed at providing factual, expertise-based information on the potential 
effects of monetary conditions and decisions on their constituencies in a non-
confrontational manner. 
– No pressure
Pressure – political, economic, or rhetorical in nature – is regarded as ineffective 
and an inappropriate means of mediating interest group positions in monetary and 
exchange rate policy. 
– Direction of flow of information
Given the asymmetry in monetary expertise and the Bundesbank's and ECB's 
informational lead in this area, a great amount of information was reported as 
actually flowing from the monetary authorities to the private sector, and not vice 
versa. This appears to be particularly so with respect to regional-level 
communication, i.e. at the Advisory Boards; but it also applies to the roundtable of 
economic experts at the bank's Central Office and to Bundesbank and ECB 
communication in general, where both interest group and central bank respondents 
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perceived explanation of the course of monetary policy and individual policy 
decisions as the primary purpose of communication.
Despite the differences in communication versus other policy areas, this 
characterisation should not be misinterpreted as implying that wherever monetary 
policy is concerned business associations act as impartial promoters of the common 
interest. Most interest group representatives left no doubt that communication with the 
central bank had the primary purpose of furthering their members’ interests. Rather, 
the above characteristics bear witness to the fact that 
– disagreement with the central bank, should it occur at all, is hardly ever perceived 
as so acute that a demanding or confrontational posture needs to be taken, and that 
– interest groups are careful to adopt a rhetoric which they deem appropriate in 
discourse with an institution they generally hold in high esteem and which would 
not, anyway respond to explicit demands, even were they tabled. 
Finally, it became evident that the equilibrium in communication between the interest 
associations and the central bank critically depends on the coincidence of priorities on 
both sides and on interest groups’ overall concurrence with the implementation of 
these priorities by the Bundesbank and ECB. A number of interest group respondents 
pointed out that if systematic disagreement on objectives and priorities were ever to 
arise, political activities by interest associations – whatever form these would then take 
– would possibly be stepped up significantly, and that communication might become 
less conciliatory in tone in such a hypothetical circumstance. 
III.2.6.3 Channels of communication 
If interest groups take an interest in monetary affairs, these interests are communicated 
via the conventional channels, even though the relative importance of these 
instruments for effectively communicating preferences may differ marginally from 
conventional policy areas636.
Most importantly, the interest group representatives addressed expressed a clear 
preference for direct communication with the Bundesbank. This generally works 
through three major channels:
636 As described above, the interviewees addressed in the course of the field work were selected on the 
basis of their involvement with monetary affairs. The regional interest group representatives in 
particular were all selected on the strength of their membership on the Bundesbank's regional 
Advisory Councils. Consequently, a selection bias cannot be ruled out with respect to the priority 
the respondents assigned to certain channels of communication, especially as regards direct formal 
ways of communication. The analysis therefore refrains from weighting the importance of the 
different channels of influence or from quantifying the views expressed by the respondents. 
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– First, via the only formal consultative channel enshrined in the Bundesbank Act, 
namely the Advisory Boards at the bank's nine Regional Offices, 
– second, via the semi-formal channel established with the roundtable of economists 
from trade and industry and, 
– third, via informal direct contacts between the decision makers or experts from the 
Bundesbank on the one hand and interest associations on the other. 
– Indirect channels, in contrast, are said to play a negligible role, with the exception 
of the media.
III.2.6.3.1 Regional Advisory Boards
The Advisory Boards at its nine Regional Offices represent the only formal channel of 
communication between the Bundesbank and the private sector, as outlined above. As 
such, the Boards theoretically assume a key role in the transmission of private-sector 
interests. In practice, they are highly appreciated by their members as a forum for 
exchanging views, even though their effectiveness as a channel of communicating 
interest, expertise and information has reportedly remained limited and is expected to 
have declined following the recent organisational reform of the bank.
As to the purpose of the Advisory Board, it has already been pointed out that prior to 
the 2002 institutional reform this was defined as conferring with the presidents of the 
Land Central Banks on questions of monetary policy. Up to then the LZB presidents 
were members of the Bundesbank's Central Bank Council, which determined the 
country's monetary policy until Germany joined EMU in 1999. Since 2002, the task of 
the Advisory Boards has been defined as discussing with the presidents of the 
Regional Offices execution of the tasks falling to that area. From a statutory 
perspective, monetary policy is therefore no longer the subject of the Boards' work. 
Meetings used to be held four times a year, a frequency which has now been reduced 
to two. 
In practice, participants in Board meetings, i.e. the presidents of the Regional Offices, 
their members and the finance or economics ministers in the relevant regions, gather at 
the respective Regional Offices for two to three-hour meetings. Depending on the
conventions at the different Regional Offices, the formal sessions are often followed 
by an informal part, usually in the form of a joint lunch or dinner. The sessions begin 
with an introductory presentation by the president of the Regional Office or one of the 
office's experts, analysing the monetary and wider economic conditions and explaining 
the Bundesbank's, and since 1999 the ECB's, monetary policy decisions. This 
introduction is followed by a general discussion, in some cases preceded by a tour de 
table, allowing each Board member the opportunity to give an initial reaction to the 
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bank's remarks. Sometimes, experts or decision makers from inside or outside the 
Bundesbank are invited to Board meetings to give presentations on selected policy 
issues. Meetings and the contents of the discussions are confidential. Minutes of each 
session are prepared by the President's office, circulated among the members and 
subsequently archived at the Regional Office637.
In principle, the discussions at Advisory Board meetings were reported to focus on 
monetary policy, but in many cases they also moved on to other topics of general 
economic relevance. While monetary policy took centre stage in the Bundesbank's 
introductory remarks, the presence of the regional finance or economics ministers was 
said to be viewed by most Board members as an opportunity to discuss more pressing 
issues, such as fiscal, labour market or regulatory affairs, with the political 
representatives. Some Board members said this opportunity was one of the most 
important reasons for their participation. 
Asked for an assessment of the importance and effectiveness of the Advisory Boards, 
the relevant respondents emphasised that the meetings were deemed an important 
forum for exchanging views with policy makers. Only a very small minority of 
individual Board members considered attendance at the meetings purely a matter of 
duty. In general, seven elements can be identified in the Boards’ overall appreciation:
– The vast majority of Board members appreciated the meetings as an important 
channel of communication with monetary policy makers and representatives of the 
Land governments.
– The primary benefit of the meetings, as viewed by Board members from trade and 
industry, lay in the easy and regular access to first-hand information on monetary 
policy and the state of economic affairs in Germany. 
– The primary benefit of the meetings, as viewed by Bundesbank respondents, lay in 
explanation of the bank's and subsequently the ECB's monetary policy. Board 
members were considered important multipliers in the process of informing the 
wider public of the bank’s activities. 
– Board meetings were, in principle, considered to be a forum for articulating 
private-sector interests with respect to monetary policy. Assessments on the 
Boards' effectiveness as a channel of communication were inconclusive, with 
views ranging from great effectiveness – emphasising the immediacy of access 
and the interest on the part of Bundesbank officials – to very low effectiveness –
referring to the bank's independence and the lack of interest on the part of 
Bundesbank officials. A large majority of interest group respondents emphasised 
637 Like other confidential Bundesbank documents, Advisory Board minutes are classified for thirty 
years. 
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that they were not aware of the impact of deliberations during Board meetings on 
opinion formation within the Bundesbank. 
– A significant constraint on the effective articulation of interests appears to be that 
Advisory Boards were composed of regional or local interest group representatives 
who did not possess the monetary policy expertise and information that their 
counterparts at peak federal associations commanded, and whose political weight 
in terms of representativeness was clearly limited.
– Many Board members pointed out that overall appreciation of the Advisory 
Boards considerably varied, depending on the approach taken by individual 
Regional Office presidents. Accordingly, openness for discussion and interest in 
private-sector views was said to differ strongly. 
– All participants valued the meetings for their confidentiality. In many cases, a 
great degree of openness in the discussions was said to result from this 
confidentiality. Confidentiality and openness were perceived as promoting a frank 
exchange of views, firstly between the Board members and Bundesbank 
representatives, secondly between the members and regional ministers, and finally 
also among interest group representatives themselves. As to the latter effect, some 
interest group representatives emphasised that the Board represented a forum in 
which employers and trade union representatives were able to discuss wage and 
labour market policies outside the conventional ideological constraints. 
The institutional reform implemented in mid-2002 diminished the statutory role of the 
Advisory Boards, as observed above. This is mainly because of the new mandate, 
which no longer foresees an advisory function on monetary policy; decreasing 
proximity to the decision-making process since the presidents of the Regional Offices 
are no longer involved in monetary decision making; removal of the obligation to 
invite the relevant ministers of finance or economics; and the lesser frequency of 
Board meetings which, at twice a year, narrows the scope for near-time comments on 
individual monetary decisions. At the same time, the Bundesbank has tried to preserve 
some political weight for the Boards by deciding that each Board meeting should be 
attended by one member of the bank's Governing Board, even though its constituents –
save for the Bank's president – are not formally involved in monetary decision making 
either. 
Consequently, the future role of the Advisory Boards is viewed critically by a majority 
of the members addressed. Most respondents expected the Boards to lose political 
importance as a result of the organisational changes, making them less attractive as a 
channel for communicating private-sector interests. Some respondents consider the 
Boards now completely ineffective in this regard, calling future participation into 
question, at least inasmuch as this participation may not necessarily be exercised by a 
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top-level representative. Many respondents, on the other hand, stated that participation 
remained interesting in principle, provided that comprehensive information continued 
to be given on monetary decisions and the Bundesbank's assessment of the state of the 
economy, or that the economics or finance ministers continued to attend.
III.2.6.3.2 Roundtable of economists
At the semi-formal level, not established by law or formal agreements, on a half-yearly 
basis the Bundesbank invites the chief economists of the major nationally organised 
interest associations from trade and industry to the central office in Frankfurt for an 
economists’ roundtable. As pointed out above, the primary aim of these meetings is to 
communicate Bundesbank and ECB monetary policy. Participants in the roundtable 
are the chief economist of the Bundesbank, the member of the Executive Board in 
charge economic affairs and the relevant representatives from the BDI, DIHK, HDB, 
HDE, VDA, VDMA, ZDH and ZVEI. Like Advisory Board proceedings, meetings of 
the economists’ roundtable begin with an introductory presentation on monetary 
developments and the Bundesbank's assessment of the general economic environment 
and major financial market developments. These introductory remarks are followed by 
a tour de table allowing each participant the opportunity to give an initial reaction to 
the bank's remarks, and a general discussion.
Discussions in the context of the economists' roundtable were reported as very focused 
on monetary policy, complemented by detailed discussions of credit and financial 
market developments and policies. General economic policy was said to be of 
secondary importance.
In general, the economists’ roundtable is appreciated by interest group and central 
bank representatives as a confidential, expert-level forum for exchanging views on 
monetary and financial market affairs. As to its effectiveness as a means of 
communicating private-sector interests, respondents stated that they considered the 
direct exchange of views with the Bundesbank's top-level experts and decision makers 
very useful. But they also emphasised the factual, non-political nature of the 
discussion, which was intended as an expert-level exchange of economic assessments 
rather than the communication of particular interests, and was respected as such. Some 
respondents pointed out that the frequency of meetings, at two a year, was too little to 
react to individual policy measures and articulate views on them. 
III.2.6.3.3 Informal communication with the Bundesbank
Informal communication between the private sector and the Bundesbank takes two 
major forms, namely personal contacts and the dissemination of specific information 
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by interest associations to the Bundesbank beyond the articulation of views in the 
formal or semi-formal contexts.
Informal personal contacts were reported to exist, even though interest group 
respondents generally judged them far less intensive than those with other 
policymakers. Personal contacts are mainly horizontal in nature, between monetary 
policy makers on the one hand and high-level interest-group representatives on the 
other, as well as among experts at the federal or the regional levels. They range from 
individual meetings dedicated to discussing certain issues of common concern, 
through mutual invitations to academic or social events, to chance meetings. Although 
important for maintaining contacts between the two sides, such informal personal 
meetings were generally not considered relevant to particular monetary policy 
measures.
Especially for peak cross-sectoral or sectoral associations, publications containing 
policy studies, opinion polls, regular assessments of general economic and individual 
sector-specific conditions, and statistical releases were seen by both sides as important 
instruments of mutual information, not least because some of these publications 
regularly documented interest associations’ assessment of monetary conditions, 
including potential policy recommendations. 
III.2.6.3.4 Indirect communication 
The most important indirect means of communicating monetary policy-related views, 
particularly from the viewpoint of top-level business associations, is the dissemination 
of views and information via the media. The public release of economic reports and 
studies was described by the peak associations in particular as an opportunity to 
portray the impact of monetary and exchange rate developments on their 
constituencies and, if deemed appropriate, to publicise how they would like monetary 
policy to develop, moving forward. 
Media relations are, however, approached with considerable caution by the interest 
groups investigated. Most importantly, detailed responses by experts and decision 
makers show that statements on monetary and exchange rate policy are much less 
frequently communicated to the media than in other fields of policymaking. In line 
with the earlier findings on issue salience and interest groups’ self-assessment of their 
ability to influence monetary decisions, respondents pointed out that their ability to 
introduce policy positions into the public arena was limited. Given the far greater 
importance of taxation, welfare reform, industry regulation or trade issues, for 
example, the majority of respondents typically considered monetary and exchange rate 
issues unattractive for communication though the media. In addition, those 
respondents whose organisations had communicated their views on monetary issues to 
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the media in the past emphasised that in this area particular care was devoted to the 
way in which policy messages were communicated. Many respondents emphasised 
that explicit and systematic policy recommendations to the relevant decision makers, 
as are frequently proposed in other policy areas, are not considered an effective means 
of communicating monetary policy related interests. 
This qualitative finding confirms quantitative results reached earlier by Maier638, who 
investigated a segment of media work by interest groups on monetary policy. Maier 
examined the statements made by different stakeholders in three important German 
daily newspapers639 between January 1960 and December 1998, producing a 
comprehensive overview of interest group comments on monetary policy over almost 
four decades. Interest groups investigated in that analysis included organisations from 
the financial sector and export-based and domestically oriented employers’ 
organisations640. For each sector, Maier calculates the number of observations, i.e. the 
number of newspaper articles found in the reporting period, the sum of all 
observations641, and a ratio denoting the percentage of articles demanding tighter 
monetary policy over the total number of articles642. The calculations suggest four 
important conclusions, which the qualitative findings of the present research 
corroborate:
– Trade and industry take recourse to the media relatively seldom – here specifically 
the press – to mediate their views on monetary issues. In the course of 39 years, 
Maier counted 527 relevant articles in the three newspapers under investigation. 
Only 10.4% of the statements made there came from employers’ organisations 
outside the financial sector643. In total, only 23 statements by domestically oriented 
organisations were counted. Considering that some public statements by the 
organisations under review are likely to have been reported simultaneously by all 
three newspapers examined, the effective number of times these organisations 
actually turned to the media may, in fact, be much lower. Looking at the three 
638 Maier (2002), pp. 75-96.
639 The dailies analysed by Maier were the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, and 
Handelsblatt (Maier (2002), p. 80).
640 Further stakeholders analysed were the government, trade unions and other sources (Maier (2002), 
p. 84.
641 To indicate the policy message conveyed by the relevant interest group in each article, Maier 
counts articles demanding higher interest rates as +1 and articles calling for monetary relaxation 
as -1, and subsequently adds up all correspondingly labelled observations (Maier (2002), p. 80).
642 By this classification, a ratio of +100% would denote a state in which all articles found called for 
monetary tightening. A ratio of -100%, in contrast, would indicate a case in which all articles called 
for monetary relaxation. Maier's main results are reproduced in table 32 on p. 320.
643 Government accounted for 16.1%, the financial sector for 26.6%, trade unions for 13.1%, and other 
sources for 20.9%.
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press sources in isolation, it becomes evident that domestically oriented interest 
organisations were cited only on seven, 13, and three occasions respectively over 
the nearly four decades under scrutiny. 
– Most of the statements from employers’ organisations – almost 60% – originated 
from export-oriented organisations, suggesting either that export-focused 
organisations were more prone to work via the media, or that exchange rate-related 
issues were debated more controversially than monetary policy in the narrow 
sense. The latter interpretation is supported by the -94% ratio of calls for monetary 
relaxation to total observations, suggesting that the vast majority of export-
oriented interest group interventions were critical of a monetary policy perceived 
as too tight. Further, the latter interpretation seems warranted in the light of the 
findings on the impact of monetary and exchange rate policy and the evolution of 
the issue agenda as reported above.
– Even in the rare cases when domestically oriented organisations did turn to the 
press, on average their interventions aimed at tightening rather than easing the
monetary stance, as the ratio of +4% shows. Indeed, the ratio for one of the three 
newspapers was +23%, indicating that on average the relevant organisations were 
supportive of raising interest rates. This picture bears out the theory suggested by a 
majority of respondents in this study that industry associations actually tended to 
back the Bundesbank – informally as well as publicly – in its stability-oriented 
monetary policy.
– The analysis of press reports is also consistent with the findings reported here on 
the intensity of the political work by industry associations as opposed to other 
groups. The figures show that in the period under review organisations from the 
financial sector and trade unions were significantly more active than employers’ 
organisations. In addition, Maier finds that interest groups’ overall lobbying on 
monetary policy is far lower than, for example, in the US644. 
In as far as press relations give an indication of industry associations’ general 
approach to the media in the current context, these findings confirm the general thrust 
of the answers we observed.
644 Maier (2002), p. 80.
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Survey of mediation of interests via the media
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Government
Number of observations 36 30 19 85
Sum -32 -26 -13 -42
Ratio -89% -87% -69% -49%
Financial sector
Number of observations 39 58 43 140
Sum -29 -26 -23 -58
Ratio -74% -45% -43% -41%
Employers' organisations: export-oriented
Number of observations 9 14 9 32
Sum -9 -12 -9 -30
Ratio -100% -86% -100% -94%
Employers' organisations: domestic-oriented
Number of observations 7 13 3 23
Sum -1 3 -1 1
Ratio -14% 23% -33% 4%
Trade unions
Number of observations 16 42 11 69
Sum -16 -42 -11 -69
Ratio -100% -100% -100% -100%
Other sources
Number of observations 25 67 18 110
Sum -17 -47 -8 -72
Ratio -68% -70% -44% -65%
Total
Number of observations 153 254 120 527
Sum -111 -158 -70 -339
Ratio -73% -62% -58% -64%
Source: Maier (2002), p. 84.
Pressure from
Other channels of indirect communication were said to exist, but generally regarded as 
comparatively unimportant for the communication of monetary policy-related 
preferences. These include testimonials before expert councils not directly related to 
monetary policy, including the German Council of Economic Experts, as well as 
participation in public opinion polls. Similarly, individual enterprises’ responses to 
surveys, including the Ifo-index on economic expectations established by the Munich-
based Ifo Institute for Economic Research, which is widely recognised as the most 
important indicator of business expectations in Germany, or economic surveys on 
business expectations carried out by the European Commission, are considered to be 
important economic indicators through which individual enterprises’ business 
sentiment can be conveyed, but they are not regarded by business associations as 
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instruments of communicating concrete monetary policy-related interests. Respondents 
pointed out that these surveys and indicators did not contain detailed information on 
monetary conditions and did not transmit identifiable and co-ordinated interests and 
expectations. Similarly, international organisations regularly commenting on 
Germany's economic policies, such as the OECD or the IMF, were not used by interest 
associations as indirect ways of articulating monetary policy-related interests.
Finally and most importantly, almost all respondents emphasised that a number of 
indirect channels often used in other policy areas were not viable in the context of 
monetary affairs. In particular, political institutions, especially government and 
parliament, were unavailable for indirect lobbying on monetary policy, as noted above. 
Not only was the independence of the Bundesbank and ECB perceived as an effective 
hurdle to influence on monetary policy from the political arena, but demands on 
monetary decision makers from the political side were also widely perceived as 
counterproductive – often provoking monetary authorities not to follow precisely those 
claims staked out by politicians. As well as being counterproductive, instrumentalising 
politicians in this regard was considered inconsistent with the general call by 
Germany's business associations for central bank independence. In practice, business 
associations have repeatedly found themselves supporting the Bundesbank in its 
policies and defending it against intrusion by policy makers, as already noted. 
III.2.7 Comparative analysis
Given these results, we need to establish whether they add up to a coherent picture in 
terms of the theoretical thoughts enumerated at the outset of this study. It was 
hypothesised that interest group activity on monetary and exchange rate policy was 
likely to be low by the standards of other major economic policy areas owing to the 
specific framework conditions governing the institutional, issue, and group 
environments encountered in this policy arena. 
Most importantly, the overall explanatory approach has been confirmed by a consistent 
set of empirical findings, none of which squarely rejected the underlying propositions. 
No contradictions have been identified between the responses on the core propositions. 
An overview of the propositions and the general results achieved so far is presented in 
table 13 below. 
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Central propositions and empirical support, summary table
Table 13
Proposition
Empirical 
support
General context
Proposition 1
In general, interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy are not 
communicated very intensively to the relevant decision makers.
strong
Proposition 2
In general, communication of interests with respect to monetary or exchange 
rate policy is significantly lower than in other policy fields.
very 
strong
Proposition 3
Mediating interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy does not 
yield sufficient benefits relative to the associated costs.
strong
Institutional context
Proposition 4
Central banks are perceived as inaccessible to interests from the private sector, 
compared to other political bodies.
strong
Proposition 5
Political independence is an obstacle for private interests in mediating their 
interests to the central bank.
strong
Proposition 6
Given their institutional, material, and expertise-based resources, central banks 
are not dependent on external political support in order to fulfil their tasks in 
the field of monetary or exchange rate policy.
very 
strong
Proposition 7
Given their focus on aggregated economic indicators and their access to the 
relevant statistical resources, central banks are not dependent on external 
information with respect to monetary or exchange rate conditions and 
developments in order to fulfil their tasks in the field of monetary or exchange 
rate policy.
very 
strong
Proposition 8
Given the independence of central banks in terms of political, material, and 
expertise-related resources as well as their focus on aggregated economic 
indicators, central bank policy makers are not interested in the views of 
private-sector interest groups on monetary or exchange rate policy.
moderate
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Central propositions and empirical support, summary table
Table 13 continued
Proposition
Empirical 
support
Issue context
Proposition 9
Individual firms or interest associations agree with the objectives and the 
overall conduct of monetary or exchange rate policy.
very 
strong
Proposition 10
Interest groups rarely disagree with the monetary or exchange rate policy 
decisions of the central bank.
strong
Proposition 11
Monetary or exchange rate policy is not perceived to have a significant effect 
on individual firms or interest associations.
strong
Proposition 12
The magnitude of the impact of monetary or exchange rate policy on individual 
firms or interest associations is difficult to determine.
strong
Proposition 13
Owing to the comparatively low and varied impact of monetary or exchange 
rate policy on individual enterprises, interest associations find it difficult to 
form strong preferences with respect to the day-to-day conduct of monetary or 
exchange rate policy.
moderate
Proposition 14
Given the low perceived impact of monetary or exchange rate developments 
and the importance of other policy fields, monetary or exchange rate policy is 
not perceived by interest groups as a priority issue on the economic policy 
agenda.
very 
strong
Group context
Proposition 15
Heterogeneity of interests related to monetary or exchange rate affairs within 
existing interest groups weakens the formation of strong policy positions in the 
business sector.
moderate
Proposition 16
Interest associations and their members do not possess means of exerting 
economic or political pressure on the central bank.
very 
strong
Proposition 17
Individual firms or interest associations do not possess relevant information 
exclusively available to them alone, which they can contribute to the discourse 
with the central bank.
very 
strong
This inherent consistency notwithstanding, it is necessary to discuss the detailed 
results with respect to their implications for the central questions addressed in this 
study. This discussion takes account of four dimensions of interdependence between 
the dependent and independent variables identified here, i.e. on the one hand the extent 
to which interest group activity in this policy area can be identified, and on the other 
the issue, institutional, and group contexts. These four dimensions are:
– the extent to which the independent variables – the three contexts – can in fact 
explain the dependent variable – the amount of political activity,
– the extent to which the propositions within the institutional, issue, and group 
contexts respectively are consistent, 
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– the extent to which individual propositions across the three contexts are consistent, 
and
– the extent to which responses across individual propositions yield a coherent and 
plausible picture.
As to the causal relation between the amount of political activity on the one hand and 
the three specific policy contexts on the other, the above analysis suggests that 
institutional, issue, and group framework conditions provide a plausible account of 
interest groups’ political activity with regard to monetary and exchange rate policy in 
Germany. Taken together, the three contexts explain the decisive driving – and braking 
– forces behind the low level of lobbying encountered in this policy area, with an 
emphasis on the issue-related properties of the matter as the main moderating factors. 
Even though the institutional environment and specific group capabilities in this field 
of monetary policymaking certainly also discourage political work in this regard, the 
issue context – i.e. broad agreement with central bank objectives, low perceived policy 
impact, and weak preferences – are found to be the most important brake on lobbying. 
In other words, the analysis shows that owing to the issue environment, most of the 
time there is no significant reason for lobbying in the first place, and therefore no 
identifiable demand for political activity. Institutional and group conditions add to the 
disincentives to taking political action on the supply side, as interest groups’ abilities 
to contribute to the central bank's policy-making process in terms of political support 
and information are limited, and their ability effectively to mediate these interests 
within the existing institutional framework is rather restricted. In addition, none of the 
responses suggested that factors existed, other than those identified in the core 
propositions, which they considered instrumental for their political activities and their 
decision to operate with respect to monetary and exchange rate issues as they do. In 
this sense, the list of independent variables worked out here can be considered 
exhaustive.
Second, the consistency of responses within each of the contexts can also be regarded 
as high. As to the extent of interest group activity as the dependent variable, responses 
show that both in isolation and from a comparative angle, interest group attention to 
monetary issues is broadly regarded as very moderate, based on a relatively 
homogeneous set of responses. In the same vein, the expected pay-off of measures in 
this policy area is considered relatively slight, again in quite a homogeneous manner. 
Differences in assessment occur in nuances inasmuch as interest group activity is rated 
even less intensive when compared with activities in other policy fields than when 
viewed in isolation. 
With respect to the institutional context, overall accessibility is considered rather low, 
even though the dispersion of views is slightly wider than on other propositions. This 
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understanding is based mainly on the Bundesbank’s perceived independence from 
external political support and information, underlining the bank’s autonomy in terms 
of political power as well as material and immaterial resources. Political autonomy is 
generally prized as a precious good worth defending. This is suggested by the 
reference made by a number of respondents to the fact that they repeatedly feel 
compelled to defend the bank's decisions and status against occasional intrusions from 
the political level. This may at first sight seem to be a contradiction, but it is explained 
when the respondents make it clear that they regard the societal consensus in support 
of central bank independence as stable and violations of the bank's status as 
exceptional and non-existential. Backing for the bank from interest groups, if and 
when it is given, can therefore be viewed as precautionary rather than a matter of 
immediate necessity. Surprisingly, political independence as such is not generally 
regarded as an immediate or onerous burden on interest groups’ relations with the 
Bundesbank. This protective measure is – in the eyes of many interest group 
respondents – designed with politicians in mind rather than interest groups. Even if 
interest group representatives do feel affected in principle, they nevertheless deem 
interest group activity legitimate, given that the bank cannot be coerced into following 
the advice from the private sector and is free to choose how to react to private-sector 
views. All the same, interest groups perceive very little demand for political and 
informational resources by the central bank. By the same token, they find central bank 
interest in interest group views on monetary decisions moderate at best. 
As to the issue context, a high degree of consistency can be detected between the key 
propositions and the responses yielded. The very strong overall support for the general 
objectives of monetary and exchange rate policy is underscored by strong confirmation 
of the proposition that interest groups rarely disagree with day-to-day policy decisions. 
In conformity with this picture, monetary and exchange rate developments are 
generally perceived to have a low impact on the interest groups consulted and their 
constituents compared with other policy issues. At the same time, though, interest 
groups find it hard to assess the precise magnitude of that impact. The question 
naturally arises as to how respondents can maintain that monetary developments have 
a very low impact even though they are uncertain of its precise magnitude owing to the 
complexity of the way monetary stimuli work on the economy. What at first sight 
appears contradictory is most likely shedding light on the subjectivity and narrowness 
of enterprises’ and their interest associations’ perception of the related economic 
developments. Judging from the detailed responses, the latter assess monetary and 
exchange rate developments by their immediate impact on corporate operations and 
financing, i.e. on interest rates, lending terms, asset management, imports and exports. 
This impact can, in principle, be calculated with some precision, and – given that it is 
small compared to enterprises’ other cost and income components – it is generally 
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viewed as negligible. At that point already, however, varying and rivalling exposures –
i.e. being debtor and creditor or importer and exporter at the same time – render a 
formal assessment difficult. Things become even more complicated once indirect 
channels of transmission and second-round effects are taken into consideration. This 
complexity, however, seems to be largely faded out by individual enterprises for lack 
of immediacy and relevance, considering that the initial impact is in itself considered 
minimal. This sequence of events, in turn, explains the conundrum addressed at the 
outset of this study. While overall effects of monetary measures on the economy and 
general welfare at large are substantial in statistical terms and comparable to the 
effects of measures in other economic policy areas, the immediate, calculable impact 
as perceived by enterprises and their interest associations is very small in comparison. 
From this focused perspective, low interest group activity is not an omission but rather 
a rational response given the existence of other, more pressing and more concrete 
problems. Finally, the issue-related picture is complemented by the finding that 
interest groups do not therefore easily form string preferences with respect to day-to-
day policy decisions and that, compared with other policy issues, monetary and 
exchange rate matters are not perceived as priority issues on their political agendas. 
As to the group context, interest group representatives clearly declare that there is 
precious little they believe they can contribute to policy formation, perceiving their 
political and informational resources as inadequate for shaping policy debates as they 
are accustomed to do in other policy areas. This is complemented by the view that the 
heterogeneity of interests within the interest groups consulted weakens the formation 
of strong policy positions on the issue, albeit not very substantially.
Third, the individual responses yield an overall complementary and coherent picture. 
Most importantly, there is a strong correlation in responses between the institution-
related propositions that the Bundesbank does not depend on external political support, 
on the one hand, or external information, on the other. Naturally, information and 
political support were considered closely related by most respondents in as far as they 
were ultimately granted with the aim of furthering the aims of the respective interest 
group. At the receiving end, the Bundesbank's autonomy in both regards was regarded 
as a manifestation of the idea of institutional independence. Given the Bundesbank's 
endowment with both expertise and political autonomy, a consistent set of responses 
was obtained. Both together represent the most important drivers behind scepticism as 
to the bank's accessibility, whereas political independence as an immediate obstacle 
and a lack of interest in private-sector views can be considered secondary in 
importance. As already pointed out, the fact that political independence was not 
regarded as a very strong immediate obstacle to interest group activity, while the bank 
was viewed as independent of external political support, should not be interpreted as a 
contradiction. Rather, the former was seen as applying primarily to electoral and 
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government politics. Insofar as government respects and safeguards political 
independence in practice, the bank is in no immediate need of political support from 
the private sector for most of the time. The views on interest associations’ ability to 
contribute political support and information to the policymaking process presented in 
the group context are strongly in line with the results on the corresponding questions in 
the institutional context. Similarly, the results on agreement with central bank 
objectives, the lack of disagreement with day-to-day policy decisions, their immediate 
effects on enterprises and interest groups and the prioritisation of monetary and 
exchange rate affairs on the political agenda add up to a consistent picture. 
Interestingly, groups’ perceived issue-related weakness in forming strong preferences 
for day-to-day monetary policy decisions does not prevent them from actually 
adopting strong policy positions at group level where necessary, i.e. when certain –
albeit apparently unquantifiable – critical thresholds of sensitivity towards monetary 
and exchange rate developments are transgressed by policy makers. Once more, the 
solution to the apparent contradiction seems to lie in the time horizon applied: interest 
groups obviously find it more difficult to assess and respond to short-term, incremental 
developments, as investigated in the issue context, than to form general policy 
positions as addressed in the group context.
Finally, responses across the spectrum yield a consistent picture with two important 
exceptions. First, responses at the regional level differ repeatedly – although not 
substantially – from those at the federal level. Thus, regional representatives are more 
critical of the Bundesbank's institutional accessibility, perceive less interest in private-
sector views by the bank, agree less rarely with monetary policy measures, and 
perceive the impact of monetary developments to be stronger than their counterparts at 
the federal level. The discussion above, however, indicates that these differences do 
not reveal systematically different attitudes towards the issue at large, but rather reflect 
their particular position within the economic and institutional environment. For one 
thing, the more critical view of institutional accessibility reflects the increasing 
remoteness of the Advisory Bodies from the locus of monetary decision making 
following the changeover to the euro and the recent institutional reform of the 
Bundesbank. Further, detailed answers by the relevant respondents suggest that the 
lower degree of interest as perceived at the regional level also bears witness to these 
institutional changes, as well as to the specific behaviour of individual presidents of 
the Regional Offices chairing the sessions of the regional Advisory Boards. Finally, 
the responses on the impact of monetary policy and the greater dissatisfaction with 
monetary decisions appear to be related to the fact that Advisory Board members 
generally represent small and medium-sized enterprises whose exposure to bank 
credit, and hence to monetary conditions, is greater than that of larger companies. With 
financing conditions in general having become tighter between the mid-1990s and 
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early 2000s for small and medium-sized enterprises, the perception of monetary affairs 
has become more critical in these circles. However, this result has to be qualified by 
the recognition that most detailed responses showed respondents failing to differentiate 
strictly in their comments on financing conditions between the changing patterns of 
bank lending originating from the behaviour of commercial banks and the effects on 
lending conditions that can actually be traced back to monetary decision making. 
Considering that central bank-controlled monetary conditions progressively eased in 
that period, it must be doubted whether the criticism voiced by respondents at the 
regional level in the present context can, in fact, be ascribed wholly or partially to 
central bank decision making645. 
More important, however, is the rift in the perceptions between interest group 
respondents and central bankers. Compared to their interest group counterparts, central 
bank policy makers and experts perceive 
– interest group activity to be more intensive, 
– themselves as more accessible, 
– political independence as less of an obstacle to communication with the private 
sector,
– their reliance on external political support and information as more intensive,
– themselves as more interested in private-sector views,
– interest groups as more critical of the Bundesbank's objectives, and more often in 
disagreement with its policies,
– the impact of their actions on enterprises to be more substantive, and
– interest groups’ information-related resources with respect to monetary and 
exchange rate affairs as more substantial.
These discrepancies can partly be explained by central banks’ subjective self-
perception of their activities and their relevance for the economy, as pointed out 
earlier. Interest group views may be perceived as relatively more intensive, since the 
central bank is the intended addressee. Accessibility may be considered greater by 
central banks than by interest groups, whose benchmarks may suggest that greater 
openness is exercised by other institutions. Similarly, political independence may look 
much less of an obstacle to the central bank than to an interest group seeking to 
overcome that hurdle. By the same token, monetary policy makers are likely to 
perceive themselves as much more reliant on and open to outside information than 
645 When attention was drawn to this difference in the course of the relevant interviews, respondents 
generally revised their responses wholly or partially. Even though the empirical evaluation was 
adjusted for this effect, it is likely to have influenced the final results presented here.
329
outsiders themselves may believe. Finally, their specialised insight into the subject 
matter may enable central bankers to have a broader view of the impact of their actions 
on the corporate sector than individual entrepreneurs or managers.
Subjectivity may, however, be only one element in an explanation of these systematic 
deviations. The responses obtained offered no indication that the deviations did not 
also reflect unique differences in the approaches to certain issues. Thus, the bank may 
not be as indifferent to private-sector views as the latter perceive it to be, implying 
greater scope for private-sector central bank communication than realised so far. Even 
though the bank and its representatives did not report concrete attempts to intensify 
mutual interaction, a number of respondents stated that they appreciated the exchange 
of information with the private sector and welcomed direct or indirect contributions to 
the policy debate. 
To be sure, if the Bundesbank desired greater input from the private sector it could 
invite interest groups or enterprises to become more active, formally or informally. 
Invitations for exchanges of views beyond the formal and informal channels examined 
so far have not been issued in recent history, though646. In the same vein, it is worth 
noting that there is no indication that the Bundesbank or members of the Advisory 
Boards have made use of the option to convene extraordinary board meetings during 
the period reviewed in this study. This suggests three possible conclusions. First, there 
is disagreement among Bundesbank decision makers as to the benefits of more far-
reaching consultation, with the consequence that no decisions are taken in that 
direction. In fact, feedback from high-level decision makers within the bank suggests 
that such disagreement may exist, as interest in private-sector views varied 
considerably at that level. Second, interest in private-sector attitudes towards monetary 
policy may only be declaratory in nature, blurring the reactions obtained from the 
relevant respondents. Most likely, however, there is no immediate contradiction in the 
strong declarative interest by bank representatives and the fact that nothing has been 
done so far to intensify the dialogue with the private sector. A broad majority of 
respondents at both regional and federal level inside the Bundesbank said they felt 
existing arrangements were largely appropriate and sufficiently flexible to allow the 
bank to access additional information from the private sector on an ad hoc basis as 
necessary, e.g. through extraordinary meetings of Advisory Boards or the roundtable 
of economists, or by means of informal communication. 
646 More intensive consultation with the private sector has repeatedly been sought by the Bundesbank 
on an ad hoc basis. Exchanges of views in that sense, however, occurred with respect to topics not 
related to monetary or exchange rate policy, e.g. technical implementation of the changeover to the 
euro, Basel II, or payment systems. 
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III.2.8 Interim conclusions
The results of the survey among 46 decision makers and experts on monetary and 
exchange rate affairs from German business associations and the Bundesbank confirm 
the major propositions of this study. 
– Interest group activity in the field of monetary and exchange rate affairs is low, 
especially when compared with other policy areas, owing to the fact that the 
expected benefits do not justify the costs associated with more intensive activity.
– Institutional accessibility is one of two major explanatory variables for low interest 
group activity. Political independence and ample endowment with material 
resources and expertise in its field of policymaking contribute greatly to the fact 
that the Bundesbank does not need to rely on political support or information from 
the private sector, effectively insulating the bank from external influence. This is 
recognised by interest group representatives and enters their cost-benefit analysis 
of action in this policy field.
– The second major explanatory variable is the coincidence of major policy 
objectives between the private sector on the one hand and the Bundesbank and 
ECB on the other, coupled with a great degree of agreement with the monetary 
authorities’ policies in general. Most of the time, monetary policy thus becomes a 
non-issue as perceived by trade and industry associations. 
– Even if monetary and exchange rate developments do become more urgent across 
economic cycles, their direct and indirect impact – if at all identifiable – is 
regarded as very low compared with that of other economic policies. As a 
consequence, preferences with respect to monetary and exchange rate policies are 
comparatively low in intensity. Despite the considerable impact of monetary 
policy on the economy as a whole, it is not a priority issue on the political agenda 
of business associations. 
Two additional findings deserve emphasis:
– Heterogeneity of interests does not seem to play as great a role in inhibiting 
interest group activity on monetary affairs as theory might suggest. Preferences are 
perceived in a general manner, and in most cases they are not necessarily 
considered contradictory. 
– Interest group and central bank perceptions differ systematically in as far as 
Bundesbank respondents consider themselves more interested in private-sector 
information and views and less exposed to external dependencies, and monetary 
policy plays a more significant role for enterprises than perceived by respondents 
in the private sector. These systematic deviations point up room for improvement 
in communication as a whole. 
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Finally, the specific institutional, issue and group contexts condition the way the two 
sides communicate with each other:
– Most importantly, interest groups do not lobby monetary policy makers in entirely 
the same way as they approach decision makers in other conventional policy areas. 
The style of communication is rather un-political, factual, and non-prescriptive, 
tending to take the form of an informed, expertise-oriented dialogue geared 
towards the general good – or this, at least, is what is professed.
– The preferred channels of communication with the Bundesbank are direct in 
nature, with the Advisory Boards and economists’ roundtable as the formal and 
semi-formal forums. Communication via the media is an important tool, but it is 
used with care in order to avoid the public perception that business associations 
are interfering with the policies and independence of the monetary authorities.
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III.3 Interest-group activity after entry into EMU
Since 1999 monetary policy in Germany – as in all other countries participating in 
EMU – has been determined by the ECB. The Bundesbank is a member of the ESCB 
and participates in formulating and implementing the ECB’s policies, but a monetary 
policy for Germany alone no longer exists. From the perspective of national interest 
groups, participation in EMU therefore marks a fundamental change in their monetary 
policy-related task environment. It also implies that the overall policy context has 
changed. As a result, the question arises whether and to what extent this change affects 
interest groups’ perceptions and activities with respect to monetary policy. 
To obtain a comprehensive view of monetary policy-related interest group activity 
throughout the European monetary area, basically this question needs to be asked for 
each member state individually, as the policy contexts within which interest groups 
used to deal with monetary policy differed in many respects prior to monetary 
unification. Such differences include variations in the institutional and decision-
making structures in the member states, especially with respect to their central banks, 
insofar as these existed at all647. Similarly, monetary developments and the 
performance of the monetary systems in the individual member states vary 
considerably on a historical review. Further, industrial and financial structures in the 
member states exhibit substantial differences, suggesting varying degrees of exposure 
to monetary developments for enterprises. Finally, structures, resources and activities 
by the national interest association infrastructures through which domestic enterprises’ 
interests are channelled and articulated vis-à-vis policy makers differ. Given these 
national distinctions, a complete picture of monetary policy-related activities by 
interest groups in trade and industry in the euro area requires an analysis of all twelve 
national policy contexts. 
More importantly, monetary policy – by establishing a single currency area and a 
single monetary policy – has, in the first place, become an EU-level policy issue. A 
full understanding of interest groups’ activities on monetary policy in the euro area 
therefore also necessitates an examination of the institutional, issue and group contexts 
at EU level. To be sure, a final evaluation of the new environment will need to wait for 
a while, given that the caesura from EMU lies only a few years back. Nevertheless, 
initial evidence from the qualitative interviews conducted in the course of the present 
study yields a number of indicative preliminary results pointing towards where the 
future equilibrium of communication between Eurosystem central banks and the 
647 Luxembourg did not establish a fully-fledged central bank as a separate institution until 1998. Prior 
to that the circulation of money and certain other operational monetary functions were overseen by 
the Institut Monétaire Luxembourgeois, founded in 1983. Due to the limitations of its operational 
functions, the latter was not considered a central bank proper (Palmer (2001), pp. 26-27).
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private sector may be located. As the following sections suggest, the problems 
confronting interest groups differ considerably, depending on whether they operate at 
national or at EU level.
The following sections take an initial step in these two directions. First, with respect to 
changes in the communication of interests at national level we present reactions by 
representatives of interest groups in Germany to the changes in the policy environment 
resulting from the transition to monetary union. Second, we analyse the basic 
parameters of interest groups’ work at EU level on the single monetary policy. The 
most important result of this analysis, as argued below, is that at both national and EU 
level communication between interest groups on the one hand and monetary policy 
makers in their new positions and roles on the other is still evolving, suggesting that a 
long-run equilibrium – like the one identified in the case study on Germany – has not 
yet been reached in the EMU context. The observations made below therefore 
necessarily reflect preliminary trends in the evolution of perceptions and channels of 
communication. 
The evidence presented below648 is derived from two sources. First, most of the 
respondents from the sample of interviewees at German interest groups and at the 
Bundesbank referred to EMU and other major EU policy developments in their 
responses. The following section presents a summary of the factors related to EU 
economic and monetary affairs based on these statements. Subsequently, evidence 
from experts at EU level will be discussed with the aim of gaining a preliminary 
picture of the long-term consequences for interest group behaviour of shifting 
monetary and exchange rate policy authority to the EU level. 
III.3.1 Impact on national level: evidence from Germany
In the course of the interviews conducted in the context of this study, several 
respondents from the sample of interest group representatives in Germany also 
commented on the impact of the new institutional, issue, and group environment on 
their monetary policy activities after accession to EMU. The respondents’ reactions 
flag three developments in response to the caesura of the single currency. First, 
although generally stable over time, some perceptions of monetary affairs as a policy 
issue have changed. Second, patterns and channels of communication with the central 
bank have started to adjust to the new institutional environment. Finally, the process of 
648 Both the reactions by German and EU-level respondents are presented in qualitative terms, as the 
impact of EMU as such was not part of the quantitative analysis. EU-level respondents were 
consulted on the core propositions identified above. Given the relatively small number of 
respondents, a detailed quantitative analysis was found to be inappropriate. Average and median 
quantified answers are reproduced in the annex as memorandum items.
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adjustment has not yet been completed, so that patterns of communication have 
remained in a state of flux. 
According to the respondents at business associations in Germany, perceptions of 
monetary affairs as a policy issue have generally been very stable over time. Thus, the 
assessment of the institutional arrangements under which monetary decisions were 
taken until 1998, including the backing of central bank autonomy, the perceptions of 
the accessibility of the Bundesbank and its independence from external political or 
expertise-related support enjoyed considerable continuity over the past decades. 
Following introduction of the single currency a number of important perceptions 
identified above have remained unchanged. Most importantly, according to the 
respondents central bank independence and the objective of maintaining a stable 
monetary environment continue to be trade and industry representatives’ basic 
priorities with regard to monetary policy in general. In fact, most representatives 
characterised their own associations, and the German business community in general, 
as highly committed protagonists of a monetary order similar to that of the 
Bundesbank, both in the years preceding entry into the third stage of EMU and 
thereafter. Similarly, the assessment of the potential contributions interest associations 
can make to the policy process, especially in the form of political support, information, 
and expertise, has largely remained unchanged since 1999. 
At the same time, most respondents confirmed that the new policy framework affected 
their perceptions of the institutional, issue, and group environments. In terms of the 
general assessment of interest group activities in the field of monetary policy, the 
majority of respondents commenting on the impact of EMU observed that the net 
benefits from communicating interests with respect to monetary policy had declined 
compared to pre-1999. As to the reasons for this view, respondents referred to both 
lower expected benefits and higher expected costs. 
The institutional context was judged the most important factor in deterioration of the 
cost-benefit ratio. Respondents pointed to the modest voting power of individual 
national central banks, including the Bundesbank, in monetary decision making within 
the Eurosystem. That national central banks were not supposed to vote as 
representatives of their national economies was identified as another hurdle for the 
potential assertion of specific interests. Business representatives on the Bundesbank's 
regional Advisory Boards in particular considered the increased remoteness of 
monetary decision making from their own position as an obstacle to effective interest 
group work. Some respondents clearly stated that after the 2002 Bundesbank reform 
monetary policy was no longer a relevant issue for discussion at that level, even if a 
member of the bank's Executive Board participated in the meetings. Accordingly, 
discussions on monetary policy were considered useful only if the Bundesbank 
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president, as the sole policy maker actually involved in monetary decisions, 
participated in the Board meetings. 
At the same time, most respondents noted that the ECB had been provided with an 
extraordinary degree of independence from the political arena, an achievement they 
expressly welcomed. Some respondents nevertheless voiced concerns that the 
responsiveness of national central bankers from member states with a less pronounced 
"stability culture" might be higher than in Germany. A potential politicisation of 
monetary policy was regarded by these respondents as a serious, albeit rather unlikely, 
threat to euro area economic stability. 
With respect to the issue context, consensus existed that formulation of the ESCB's 
primary objective of maintaining price stability was necessary and appropriate. 
Similarly, none of the respondents reported systematic deviation in their assessment of 
the ECB's conduct of monetary policy in its first years vis-à-vis the Bundesbank’s 
performance. Many business representatives, however, expressed their concerns over 
the difficulties involved in formulating an optimal monetary policy for the entire euro 
area, given the structural and cyclical differences of the member economies. Noting 
that no serious tensions within the euro area had occurred since the introduction of the 
single currency, a number of respondents pointed out that internal economic 
imbalances could not be ruled out, and that the ECB had not yet been tested with 
respect to extreme economic conditions. It was mentioned that in principle an optimal 
euro area policy was not necessarily ideal for all member states. Given Germany’s 
structurally low rates of growth and inflation compared to those in many other member 
states, respondents stressed the risk of euro-area monetary policies being tighter on 
average than a stance optimised for Germany alone. In so far, many respondents 
reserved their judgement on the performance of the single monetary policy, while 
stating that in principle the potential for policy conflicts was higher than before the 
entry into EMU as far as interest groups were concerned.
By analogy with this concern, a number of respondents perceived the group context as 
having changed as well, referring to the high number of stakeholders watching the 
ECB in its decision making across the euro area and the greater heterogeneity of 
interests when compared to the constituent economies. As a result of the greater pool 
of interests and stakeholders striving for influence on the single monetary policy in the 
euro area, some respondents expected the benefits from political action to be even 
lower than with domestic monetary policy prior to 1999. 
Especially in response to the changes in the institutional and group contexts, an 
adjustment of patterns of communication between interest groups and the monetary 
authorities was considered useful in principle, especially by representatives at the 
federal level. Provided that the articulation of interests was sought in the first place, 
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the respondents commenting on the patterns of communication said EU peak 
associations now represented important interlocutors for contacts with the ECB. 
Interest aggregation at the EU level was therefore singled out by some federal-level 
respondents as a vital instrument for effective representation of interests vis-à-vis the 
ECB. At the same time, maintaining contacts with the Bundesbank, as one of the 
participants in monetary decision making at ECB level, was considered an equally 
important objective. 
With regard to the latter point, it was emphasised that direct contacts with the ECB by 
national-level interest associations were considered difficult to establish. The ECB was 
said to be understood to have a particular preference for contacts with EU peak 
associations, so as to obtain as aggregated a picture of the state of the economy as 
possible. In addition, experts at the ECB pointed out that it was interested in obtaining 
a balanced view. Particular national perspectives were not considered relevant for the 
formulation of a euro area-wide monetary policy. As a result, contacts between 
national associations and the ECB have so far been restricted to selective individual 
meetings at the request of single associations. These meetings are understood to have 
been concerned with matters not related to monetary policy in the narrow sense. 
Business representatives at the Bundesbank's Advisory Councils, in contrast, took a 
more passive view, recognising the diminished role of this specific channel of 
communication and pointing to the fact that there were no alternative channels with 
realistic potential for input into the policymaking process at the regional level. Some 
respondents at Advisory Board level remarked that given the trans-national dimension 
of a single European monetary policy, regional input may, in fact, no longer be useful 
for policy makers or meaningful for interest groups. 
Finally, the responses suggest that the process of adjusting communication to the new 
framework conditions is not yet complete. Especially among members of the regional 
Advisory Boards, uncertainty was reported as to their future role. Although the new 
legal basis was recognised as depriving the Boards of their monetary policy mandate 
and limiting discussion to the remit of the Regional Offices, the Bundesbank's decision 
to have a member of the bank's Advisory Board participate in each Board meeting has 
raised hopes that the scope of discussions may nevertheless remain broad and relevant 
to monetary issues. At the federal level, in contrast, change has focused on whether 
and how the ECB can be addressed directly, and how interests in monetary policy and 
their articulation should be balanced between the existing channels at the federal level 
and via the relevant EU peak associations. 
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III.3.2 Perceptions and activities by EU business associations
The work of EU-level business associations on monetary issues has become an 
important element in the overall activity of interest groups from trade and industry in 
this policy field, as both the logic of the new decision making framework under EMU 
as such and national business associations’ assessments suggest. This raises two 
questions. First, what perception do the relevant peak EU associations have of the 
institutional, issue, and group contexts? In other words, we need to analyse whether 
and to what extent EU associations approach monetary policy in different ways from 
their national counterparts, i.e. German business associations in the current context. 
Second, we must clarify how EU associations cope with the new issue and new 
institutional environment, and how they aggregate and communicate potential 
monetary policy-related interests to the relevant decision makers. 
To answer these questions, decision makers and experts at major EU business 
associations were asked about their perceptions of monetary affairs in the euro area 
and their activities in this field of policymaking. Following the same selection criteria 
as in the above case of Germany, the EU-level sample of stakeholders was composed 
of representatives from
– the peak EU business associations in trade and industry, including industry649, 
chambers of commerce650, the retail, wholesale, and foreign trade651, and skilled 
crafts652, and
– interest associations from those sectors in the EU economy identified above as 
being particularly exposed to interest and exchange rate developments, including 
the export653, construction654, automotive655, chemical656, mechanical engineering 
and electronics657 sectors. 
649 Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe, UNICE.
650 The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Eurochambres.
651 EuroCommerce.
652 European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, UEAPME.
653 The Foreign Trade Association, FTA.
654 European Construction Industry Federation, FIEC.
655 European Automobile Manufacturers Association, ACEA.
656 European Chemical Industry Council, CEFIC.
657 Liaison Group of the European Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic and Metalworking Industries, 
Orgalime.
338
The number of decision makers and experts at EU business associations interviewed 
between June 2003 and January 2004 totalled nine. Two experts at the ECB were also 
addressed. The composition of the sub-sample is shown in table 12658. 
Like their counterparts in Germany, EU interest-group representatives were first asked 
for their perception of monetary policy as an issue within their sphere of activities. As 
the following section shows, some indicative differences in the assessments of the two 
samples were observed, suggesting that in practice significant differences in the 
preferences of EU interest associations from those of their member associations in the 
EMU states cannot be ruled out. Second, the respondents were asked about their 
activities on monetary matters in practice. The results, as presented in the following, 
show that direct communication – the primary channel used by German interest groups 
with respect to the Bundesbank – is comparatively limited at Community level, with 
non-action or indirect interest representation occupying a stronger position. In contrast 
to the analysis of the evidence gained on Germany, EU-level evidence is primarily 
analysed in qualitative terms only, as the small size of the sub-sample renders a 
detailed quantitative examination inappropriate.
III.3.2.1 EU-level perceptions of monetary policy as a policy issue
With the single European monetary policy defined by the ECB, interest groups have a 
substantial incentive to represent their views directly to the ECB at the Community 
level. Peak business associations at EU level play a particularly important role in this 
regard, as they offer the opportunity of representing joint, EU-wide positions on 
policies of interest common to their members and affiliates. As a result, European 
business associations potentially play an influential role when it comes to aggregating 
and articulating monetary policy interests for enterprises in trade and industry. The 
question necessarily arises as to how monetary policy is approached by EU business 
associations in the new operational setting of EMU, and whether this approach differs 
from that observed at the national level, i.e. from the behaviour of German business 
associations in the case in point. 
Evidence from the responses by the nine EU interest group representatives indicates 
that, while important common tendencies exist, certain differences in assessment can 
be identified compared to their German counterparts. Table 14 lists the numerical 
equivalents of the responses from EU business associations in direct comparison to 
those at the German counterparts discussed above659.
658 See p. 248. In addition, one high-ranking official at the EU Commission close to the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue was consulted.
659 Given the comparatively low number of respondents – nine in total, with some questions not 
answered by every respondent – the numerical values are presented here as rough indicators for the 
339
As to the general assessment of interest group activity on monetary policy, the 
proposition that interests were not communicated very intensively was strongly 
confirmed by the respondents. While cross-sector peak associations reported some, 
albeit mostly very moderate, activity, representatives of sector-specific groups stated 
that they took practically no interest in monetary affairs and did not undertake any 
significant activity in this area. Compared with other policy fields, monetary affairs-
related activity was consequently rated by all respondents as less or much less 
intensive. The potential net benefits associated with such activity were – without 
exception – considered either low or very low. 
EU and German interest group responses on central propositions, numerical summary
Table 14
Context Proposition Total Federal Regional Total
Intensity of communication of interests 4.21 4.42 4.00 4.56
Intensity of communication, compared with other policy fields 4.71 4.83 4.58 4.67
Benefits of communicating interests with respect to monetary policy 3.00 3.25 2.75 2.89
Accessibility of central banks 2.77 2.60 2.92 3.00
Political independence as an obstacle to communication of interests 2.63 2.50 2.75 2.75
Central bank dependence on external political support 3.55 3.60 3.50 3.67
Central bank dependence on external expertise and information 3.58 3.67 3.50 3.57
Interest of central bank policy makers in interest group views 2.82 3.00 2.67 3.25
Interest group agreement with objectives of monetary policy 1.33 1.33 1.33 2.00
Interest group agreement with conduct of monetary policy 4.13 3.92 4.33 3.71
Economic effects of monetary policy 3.08 3.08 3.08 3.57
Determination of size of economic impact of monetay policy 3.96 3.92 4.00 4.29
Formation of strong preferences with respect to monetary policy 3.63 3.83 3.42 4.25
Monetary policy no priority issue on economic policy agenda 3.42 3.58 3.25 4.00
Interest group resources, economic or political pressure 3.91 4.00 3.82 4.00
Interest group resources, information and expertise 3.35 3.42 3.27 3.89G
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In their general assessment, respondents specifically referred to the extremely low 
impact of monetary policy on enterprises in general and on their respective members 
in particular, especially considering the large number of more pressing issues that 
associations are expected to tackle. As a result, the gross benefits of seeking to 
influence monetary developments were regarded by all respondents as minute. 
Responses also focused on the institutional hurdles to effectively influencing monetary 
policy, with central bank independence discouraging interest group activity. 
Respondents emphasised that in the case of the ECB a particularly strong form of 
institutional autonomy had been put in place, going even beyond the levels of 
independence previously practised in the member states. At the same time, a majority 
of respondents pointed out that their assessment hinged on experience with ECB 
monetary policy conducted in the opening years of the single currency. The 
overall mapping of views, but do not lend themselves to further statistical analysis. Indicative 
average and mean numerical values for the responses obtained for the EU sub-sample are also 
presented as memorandum items in the statistical annex. See pp. 390 to 406. Table 14 presents 
average values only, for illustrative reasons.
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conclusions from this experience were stressed as being preliminary, considering the 
ECB’s relatively short period of operation and the fact that its policies had not yet 
been subjected to serious economic and monetary tensions. Consequently, respondents 
did not rule out the possibility of their organisations becoming more active in this field 
of policymaking if and when it assumed greater urgency in future. 
In comparison to their counterparts at German interest associations, EU-level group 
representatives therefore arrive at a very similar general assessment, strongly 
confirming the propositions that communication of monetary policy-related interests is 
low, especially compared to activities in other policy fields. However, they do take a 
slightly more optimistic view of the potential overall benefits of interest group work in 
this area. 
Asked for their specific assessment of the institutional context, EU interest group 
representatives judged the ECB as on the whole rather inaccessible, citing its political 
independence as the most important reason for this. The latter was viewed by most 
respondents as an obstacle to effective interest mediation, even though most of them 
stressed that in principle independence was not perceived as constraining the 
articulation of preferences as such. Like many of their German counterparts, interest 
groups were considered free to express their views, and it was up to monetary policy 
makers to decide whether and to what extent these views shape their judgment. At the 
same time, there was broad agreement that the ECB was not dependent on external 
political support, expertise, or information in the pursuit of its activities. In conformity 
with this judgement, ECB policy makers were, on average, considered only slightly 
interested in the private sector’s views on their policies. 
A direct comparison with the results obtained for federal-level interest group 
representatives in Germany with respect to the Bundesbank suggests that on average 
the ECB is viewed as slightly more inaccessible than the Bundesbank, even though the 
numerical value for the typical response is identical in both cases660. At the same time, 
the replies on the proposition that political independence works as an obstacle to 
effective interest representation show that at EU level interest groups feel slightly less 
affected by this institutional feature than their colleagues in Germany, even though the 
degree of independence the ECB enjoys is generally considered greater than in the 
case of the Bundesbank. Analysis of the detailed responses hints at a more pragmatic 
approach by EU-level representatives as the most likely explanation of this difference. 
While many respondents in Germany pointed out that central bank independence 
necessitated a certain auto-limitation on the part of interest groups insofar as criticism 
of Bundesbank policies, especially in public, could be interpreted as an attempt to 
660 For detailed comparative statistical results on the assessment of the institutional context, see 
pp. 393-397.
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infringe the bank's independence, EU lobbyists did not consider this effect very 
important in their assessment. This interpretation is supported by the finding that EU 
interest representatives had less of a problem communicating their views on monetary 
policies through the media than their colleagues in Germany. Most of the EU-level 
respondents insisted that any activity on their part would impair the bank's political 
autonomy neither theoretically nor practically. In the assessment of the significance of 
central bank dependence in terms of external political support, expertise or 
information, no major differences can be identified between German and EU-level 
respondents. However, the interest that ECB policy makers take in interest group 
views on monetary and exchange rate policy was clearly judged more critically by EU 
respondents than by their counterparts in Germany, suggesting that the ECB’s lack of 
accessibility is seen as being influenced by behavioural rather than institutional 
factors. 
With respect to the issue context, overall agreement with the ECB's policy objectives 
and conduct was confirmed as an important reason for low interest group activity on 
monetary policy in general. EU business representatives reported broad agreement 
with the overall objectives of monetary policy as defined for the ESCB. The 
formulation of the bank's primary objective of maintaining price stability is generally 
welcomed and regarded as appropriate. At the same time, it is worth noting that 
agreement with monetary objectives was slightly lower than in Germany, signalling 
possibly higher potential for conflict with the central bank. Some respondents, 
however, expressed concerns that policy makers paid too little attention both legally 
and in practice to the secondary objectives of monetary policy, i.e. those pertaining to 
support for the general economic policies in the Community. More precisely, the view 
was expressed that monetary policy should also be designed to be conducive to growth 
and stimulate economic activity, especially at times of economic downturns. 
Individual respondents characterised this as a real problem reflected in the bank's 
performance record, while others considered it at least a potential challenge. 
In terms of agreement with the ECB's day-to-day policy measures, all respondents said 
differences were rare. The majority, however, pointed out that this overall assessment 
for the euro area as a whole was not shared completely by all of their member 
associations in the member states. Thus, some respondents referred to repeated 
discussions with their member associations on assessment of the ECB's policies, from 
which marked differences in the evaluation of these policies across member states 
emerged, reflecting the fundamental difficulties in formulating a single euro-area 
monetary policy in the face of considerable structural and cyclical differences in the 
constituent economies. 
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In addition to this overall agreement with the priorities and course of policymaking, 
the lack of salience and urgency of monetary affairs as a policy issue was endorsed by 
all respondents as a second issue-related reason for low interest group activity. In 
general, monetary developments were regarded by business representatives as having a 
very weak or even negligible impact on their member or affiliated enterprises’ 
business performance, even though precise determination of the magnitude of this 
impact – especially aggregated across the euro area – was considered very difficult. 
Interest group representatives reported clear feed-back from their member 
organisations – even if only by default – that monetary policy was generally 
considered a non-issue because of its minimal direct impact on enterprises. As in the 
case of respondents in Germany, however, it became evident that specification of the 
policy impact was considered too resource-consuming, underlining that interest 
representatives and their constituents do not actually know the precise magnitude of 
the impact. In conformity with this, preferences with respect to day-to-day monetary 
decisions were regarded by all respondents as either weak or very weak. As already 
pointed out, a majority of respondents emphasised that this assessment was regarded 
as preliminary, considering the ECB’s relatively short track record and the fact that its 
policies had not yet been subjected to serious economic and monetary tensions. As a 
result, respondents did not rule out that monetary conditions could develop in the 
future in such a way as to make EU-level interest associations consider them 
increasingly pressing. Such a scenario was, however, generally deemed rather 
unlikely. 
Finally, EU interest group representatives took a strong view on the relevance of 
monetary policy compared with other policy issues. All respondents judged monetary 
policy a highly irrelevant policy issue with an extremely low position on their list of 
policy priorities. In this context, respondents emphasised that the Community 
institutions were highly active legislators and regulators, especially with respect to the 
EU internal market, consumer protection and environmental issues. This was said to 
result in very tight political agendas containing numerous issues with immediate and 
substantial effects on enterprises in the member states. Given the low and diffuse 
impact of monetary and exchange rate policies, as well as the fact that no major policy 
controversies had reached the public agenda in general so far, monetary issues had 
received very little attention among stakeholders in trade and industry. 
Comparing these reactions on the issue context with the responses from German 
interest representatives reveals a number of significant differences in assessment661. 
Most importantly, EU-level interest representatives agree – with the average numerical 
661 For detailed comparative statistical results on assessment of the institutional context, see pp. 398-
403.
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equivalent of responses at 2.00 – significantly less with the overall objectives of 
monetary policy than their counterparts in Germany, where the numerical value is 
1.33. This is corroborated by comparing typical answers, for which the median value 
at EU-level was 2.00 against 1.00 in Germany. This illustrates that on average 
European experts and decision makers were more critical of the negligible importance 
allocated by the Treaty and by monetary policy makers to supporting general 
economic policies in practice. While agreeing that maintaining price stability should 
be the priority objective, some respondents considered existing provisions and 
practices too narrowly focused on this, referring to the United States and the policies 
of the Federal Reserve Board as an example of a more pragmatic approach, aimed at 
both monetary stability as well as a policy environment conducive to economic 
growth. Second, the salience of monetary policy was considered much lower by EU 
respondents than by experts in Germany, with numerical values for the responses on 
the proposition that monetary policy was not perceived to have a significant impact on 
the corporate sector at 3.57 in the former and 3.08 in the latter case. This suggests that 
the gross benefits expected to accrue from political action on monetary issues is rated 
markedly lower at EU level than in Germany, so that incentives for EU business 
associations to become active in this policy area must be regarded as comparatively 
low. In the same vein, EU business representatives rate the strength of group 
preferences and the importance of monetary policy on the political agenda much lower 
than their colleagues in Germany. This means there are two discernible trends working 
in opposite directions. While there is evidence of greater potential for disagreement 
with the ECB's monetary policy, the overall importance of the bank's activities, and 
hence the potential for disagreement as such, is considered appreciably lower. So far, 
the former trend has not yet been so strong as to outweigh the latter. 
As to the group context, EU respondents confirmed the proposition that interest groups 
possess the relevant information or expertise to contribute to the discourse with the 
central bank, or the means of exerting political pressure of any kind on monetary 
policy makers. It is noteworthy that EU-level business representatives were 
significantly more sceptical of their ability to feed expertise or information into the 
policy process than their German counterparts. Although emphasising their routine in 
terms of EU-wide data collection and analysis, most group representatives pointed out
that relevant statistical information, such as surveys on business expectations, 
investment behaviour and planning, or views on monetary or exchange rate conditions 
had not been systematically collected until the late 1990s. A substantial lead on the 
ECB in this regard did not therefore exist in practice. 
To summarise, top EU business associations approach monetary policy in a very 
similar way to associations in Germany: Interest group activity on monetary issues is 
very low owing to the insignificance of monetary developments for their constituents, 
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the institutional difficulties in effectively representing interests vis-à-vis policy 
makers, and the limitations on the groups' resources of relevance to this policy area. 
Overall, EU groups are even more sceptical than their German counterparts about the 
expected net benefits of becoming active in the policy area, the relevance of monetary 
conditions for their members, and their own ability to make a meaningful contribution 
to policy discussions. 
III.3.2.2 Communication of interests in practice
This sceptical assessment of the benefits and costs of interest intermediation on 
monetary and exchange rate issues by EU interest group representatives – very much 
as in Germany – does not mean that monetary policy-related interests, insofar as they 
exist, are not communicated to the relevant decision makers. Interest group activity 
with regard to monetary policy is comparatively low, but the issue is being tackled in 
practice, characterised by three major trends. First, some associations, especially peak 
cross-sectoral groups, are in the process of building up systematic coverage of 
monetary issues. Second, many associations, especially those representing specific 
sectoral interests, have remained inactive in this policy field and have no plans to the 
contrary. Third, communication with the monetary authorities at Community level is 
largely limited to the Macroeconomic Dialogue, with other channels playing a clearly 
minor role. 
As to the coverage of monetary policy-related issues, responses from experts at EU 
business associations show that systematic patterns of communication with ECB 
policy makers are still in the process of establishment. Although most associations 
devoted significant resources in the 1990s to analysis and promotion of the single 
currency, this work was primarily focused on the period prior to the third stage of 
EMU, and to questions pertaining to the fundamental set-up of the single monetary 
policy and related policy processes such as the coordination of fiscal policies in the 
member states via the Stability and Growth Pact. In addition, member associations and 
affiliated enterprises were kept informed on the legislative and other preparatory work 
towards the establishment of monetary union. 
In contrast, evaluating monetary conditions in the euro area, aggregating and 
communicating the views of the business associations and their members entered EU 
interest groups’ political agendas only once the single monetary framework had 
become operational in early 1999. As a result, monetary policy represents a 
comparatively new issue on EU business associations’ political agendas. Not all 
associations, however, have responded to the emergence of the new policy issue by 
ensuring systematic coverage of monetary issues. Based on the assessments of 
monetary affairs as a policy issue presented above, many business associations have 
345
decided not to get involved in monetary affairs in the first place. This is particularly 
true of sector-specific associations, whose representatives pointed to the generally low 
perceived impact of monetary policy on their member enterprises, as well as to the fact 
that monetary decision makers were, by definition, not concerned with particular 
interests within the euro area. 
One important factor supporting the decision not to become active on monetary issues 
was said by three large industry organisations to be the reluctance of member 
associations at the national level to appropriate the necessary resources. The 
respondents stated that the question of whether to pursue systematic work on monetary 
questions was indeed raised within the associations in the context of discussion on 
EMU. In practice, national member associations often proved unwilling to contribute 
the necessary resources, given that many of them had never been involved in monetary 
questions at member-state level when national central banks were still in charge of 
domestic monetary policy. This logic was reported not only from sector-specific 
associations. One large cross-sectoral association was reportedly denied the additional 
resources necessary to cover monetary issues systematically, with the result that this 
association does not deal with that policy field at all. All the same, all respondents 
underlined that they would not rule out stepping up activities on monetary affairs on a 
case-by-case basis if monetary or exchange rates developed in such a way as to make 
them a matter of urgency to their constituencies. 
Other large cross-sectoral business associations have become active on monetary 
policy, although respondents emphasised that work was still in a formative stage in a 
number of respects. Most importantly, some associations have reacted to the new 
policy issue by granting new mandates and additional resources to the internal units 
concerned with beefing up the relevant economic and monetary expertise and the 
necessary databases. In addition, coordination with member associations has been 
launched with a view to aggregating preferences with respect to monetary affairs 
across the member states. Reaching joint positions on ECB policies with member 
associations at national level was described by representatives from two major cross-
sectoral associations as a considerable problem because of strongly diverging 
assessments on monetary and exchange rate conditions. 
As to the means of communicating interests to monetary policy makers, EU business 
representatives’ responses exhibit two important parallels to reactions by their 
counterparts at business associations in Germany. First, almost all respondents 
suggested that political work with regard to monetary policy and the ECB did not 
constitute lobbying in the narrow sense of the term, i.e. was not aimed at promoting 
interest group clienteles’ limited, particularised interests. Rather, there was a 
consensus that the single monetary policy should be dedicated exclusively to the euro 
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area as a whole, and that policy makers were neither willing to consider nor dependent 
upon region- or sector-specific assessments of economic and monetary conditions. As 
a result, communication with monetary policy makers was generally characterised as 
an informed exchange of information and views on overall economic and monetary 
conditions which, so the respondents said, differed from conventional lobbying 
activities in other policy areas inasmuch as it was not driven by narrow group interests. 
Conversely, respondents at the ECB described communication with business 
associations as factual and informed, and devoid of demands or pressure. 
Second, a majority of respondents expressed a strict preference for direct contacts with 
monetary policy makers. Unlike Germany, however, this preference appears to rest 
more strongly on general, efficiency-related considerations. Concerns that publicly 
expressing policy positions on monetary policy or voicing criticism of the ECB could 
undermine the bank's institutional independence were not expressed as decidedly by 
business representatives at EU level as by their German counterparts. In contrast, at 
EU level the view prevails that interest groups are, in principle, free to express their 
preferences, and that it is up to monetary policy makers to ensure that their decisions 
are taken autonomously. In so far, public articulation of interests was regarded as 
neither violating the principle of central bank independence nor as damaging the 
groups' own credibility in endorsing that independence. In as far as this view applies, a 
certain auto-limitation on the part of interest groups with respect to communicating 
policy preferences to the central bank, as observed in the case of Germany, cannot be 
identified at EU level, or is of negligible relevance. Communication with monetary 
decision makers at Community level is largely limited to contacts between the major 
EU business associations and the ECB in the context of the EU's Macroeconomic 
Dialogue. As the only formalised communication forum in which both the ECB and 
representatives of the private sector participate, the Dialogue, in principle and 
abstracting from the limiting factors observed earlier, represents an important 
opportunity for interest groups to engage in a direct exchange of views with the ECB. 
In practice, the private sector’s participation in the Macroeconomic Dialogue is limited 
to those interest associations officially recognised by the Commission as social 
partners. In the case of associations representing private-sector employers, these are 
UNICE and UEAPME662. Direct formal access to communication with the ECB is 
consequently highly restricted, considering the large number of business associations 
there are at EU level. This underscores that the Dialogue was not designed as an 
advisory body with general private-sector involvement. Instead, its focus is determined 
662 Besides UNICE and UEAPME, the social partners invited to participate in the Dialogue are CEEP 
and the European Trade Union Confederation, ETUC. CEEP, the European Centre of Enterprises 
with Public Participation and of Enterprises with General Economic Interest, represents public-
sector employers in the EU, and was, as such, not included in the present analysis. 
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by statute as the coordination of economic policies between the Council, the member 
states, the Commission and the ECB, in the context of which the social partners 
participate by virtue of their involvement in wage, labour market and employment 
policies in the member states663. 
In conformity with these framework conditions, the Macroeconomic Dialogue has 
been characterised by interest group representatives as an important forum for 
increasing the transparency of policy positions among the participants on the major 
topics covered in the course of discussions. With fiscal and labour market policies 
taking precedence, however, monetary policy was confirmed as playing no significant 
role in the discussions, and was reported not to have been raised actively by business 
representatives as an issue of concern so far. Reflecting the relatively slight perceived 
impact of monetary developments and overall agreement with the objectives and 
course of monetary policy, other issues covered in the meetings were deemed more 
important for the Dialogue's aims than monetary policy developments. 
Nonetheless, the extended discussions were said to be appreciated for their 
confidential and informal character. The Macroeconomic Dialogue was perceived as 
offering ample opportunity to communicate interest group views on a broad range of
policy issues, with the distinction between technical and political-level meetings 
offering contacts at both levels. As such, it was judged an important channel for 
representing positions on monetary issues should this become necessary. Conversely, 
reactions from the ECB suggest that monetary policy makers appreciate the Dialogue 
as increasing the transparency of policy coordination in the Community, especially 
since the single policy represents a relatively novel process and a regular exchange of 
views with the social partners was therefore seen as particularly conducive to assessing 
economic developments in the euro area. Finally, participants in the Dialogue 
emphasised that given the limited number of meetings held so far, it was too early to 
reach a final judgement on its operation or effectiveness as a channel for 
communicating policy views. 
Apart from the Macroeconomic Dialogue, business representatives said they did not 
use any other formal or semi-formal channels of communication with the ECB or the
national central banks. This also extended to the Monetary Dialogue between the ECB 
and the European Parliament, which was considered inadequate for the mediation of 
specific concerns, given that monetary policy makers were considered largely 
insulated from pressure from other political bodies. Instead, some respondents reported 
663 This view, based on the provisions of the Dialogue's mandate, has been confirmed in practice, as 
observed by Heise (2002), pp. 9-11, who reports initial evidence from the discussions in the 
Dialogue showing it to be centred on member-state governments’ approaches to economic and 
employment policy. 
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that their associations took direct recourse to informal contacts with experts or 
decision makers at the ECB, even though such contexts were generally characterised 
as very rare. More commonly, a number of EU business associations forward annual 
reports, special reports or surveys to the ECB featuring assessments of general 
economic or sector-specific business conditions, information on business expectations 
among association members and policy recommendations of relevance to the 
assessment of monetary conditions by the central bank. 
Finally, as with the findings on Germany, indirect channels of communication play a 
negligible role in the transmission of business interests to the ECB. Only one 
respondent reported making the occasional comment on monetary and exchange rate 
developments or policy decisions when approached by the media. Other respondents 
took no significant recourse to the media. EU interest associations do not appear to 
avoid public pronouncements on principle, saying instead that there was generally no 
reason to comment. As already pointed out, this constitutes a marked difference to the 
approach taken by many interest associations in Germany, where explicit public 
demands of the Bundesbank were treated with considerable caution. 
Very much as in Germany, again, indirect political action through other political 
institutions and bodies such as the Council and Commission, is regarded by all 
respondents as ineffective, if not indeed counterproductive. This also applies to the 
European Parliament which – via quarterly reporting by the President of the ECB to 
the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee – also enjoys direct formal access to 
ECB decision makers. In theory, this can be regarded as a potential indirect interest 
communication channel. In practice, however, indirect communication via other 
political institutions is recognised by business associations as highly problematic 
insofar as the ECB is explicitly independent of these bodies, so that potential attempts 
on their part to influence central bank polices are regarded as at least futile, if not 
illegitimate. All respondents fear attempts to use such indirect channels have 
considerable potential to damage private interest groups’ reputations – both among 
ECB policy makers and the wider public. None of the business respondents therefore 
reported lobbying activities vis-à-vis members of the European Parliament aimed at 
influencing monetary or exchange rate policy so far. Instead, business representatives 
were said to be more interested in other macroeconomic framework conditions, such 
as member states’ ability to fulfil their obligations under the Stability and Growth Pact 
or make progress on the Lisbon agenda commitments towards greater economic 
competitiveness, i.e. in policy developments critically and negatively influencing 
economic framework conditions for trade and industry.
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III.3.3 Interim conclusions
The launch of the single currency has been a unique project in the economic and 
political development of the EU, based on the establishment of an entirely new 
institutional and procedural framework for monetary decision making in the 
Community. Naturally, this caesura has changed the way in which private-sector 
interests with respect to monetary policy are aggregated and communicated to the 
relevant decision makers, as the results of the survey among twelve experts on 
monetary and exchange rate affairs from EU business associations, the ECB and the 
European Commission suggest. 
– Most importantly, monetary policy has become a European policy issue falling 
within the remit of EU-level business associations. The major cross-sectoral 
interest associations have responded to this new issue by stepping up their work on 
broad macroeconomic developments and policies, and by devoting additional 
resources to generating monetary expertise and information. The evidence 
suggests, however, that this process of adjustment is not particularly forceful, with 
the insignificance of the policy issue and the overall agreement with monetary 
policy as the most important arguments put forward by EU-level representatives 
themselves and their member associations at national level for not devoting greater 
energy to monetary affairs. 
– At the same time, the chances of influencing monetary decision making by the 
ECB, were such influence actually sought, are extremely limited – even more so 
than with the Bundesbank. The ECB enjoys an unparalleled degree of political 
autonomy, and has recourse to substantial resources within its own institution as 
well as the national central banks in the Eurosystem. The probability of the private 
sector’s being able to make original contributions to the policy debate is 
consequently very slight. In addition, formal access to the ECB at Community 
level is limited to the Macroeconomic Dialogue – a policy process open to only 
two major associations, and not primarily conceived as a forum for exchanging 
views on monetary and exchange rate affairs. 
– Patterns of communication are, however, still evolving. The evidence suggests that 
EU business associations have not yet reached a final solution on how to deal with 
monetary issues and the ECB. In parallel, national associations’ communication 
with central banks at national level continues, even though the individual marginal 
impact on monetary decisions has fallen substantially following the shift in 
decision making power to the EU level. In the case of the Bundesbank, this 
development has been enhanced by the removal of monetary affairs from the 
regional Advisory Boards’ agendas, cutting them off without formal replacement 
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as a channel for discussing monetary policy with representatives of the private 
sector. 
– Even though a new communication equilibrium has not yet been found by the 
stakeholders involved, the final outcome of the adjustment process is in many 
respects predetermined by the overall assessment of monetary policy as a policy 
issue – which at EU level is very similar to that obtained from respondents in 
Germany. Given the broad consensus on monetary policy objectives, and provided 
ECB policy makers do not alter their strategy, business associations and their 
members regard the need for activity in this policy field as minute compared to 
other areas of policymaking. Disagreement with monetary policy decisions is 
preferably communicated in a direct, un-political, factual, and non-prescriptive 
manner, best characterised as an informed, expertise-oriented dialogue geared 
towards the general good – at least at a declaratory level.
– However, EU business associations’ perceptions vary from respondents in 
Germany in a number of important respects, indicating that the style of 
communication of monetary policy-related interests at EU level differs perceptibly 
from that vis-à-vis the Bundesbank. Monetary policy is approached with 
considerable caution and sensitivity by German interest groups, reflecting their 
specific historical experience with the damaging impact of monetary instability as 
well as their appreciation of the Bundesbank's post-war achievements. Although 
aware of the sensitivities associated with establishing a credible monetary policy, 
EU interest group representatives deal with this issue in a more pragmatic manner, 
stressing that monetary policy does not differ essentially from other fields of 
policymaking. As a result, monetary policy is likely to be commented on by EU 
business representatives in a more critical manner – if differences in assessment 
arise – than in Germany, not least including open criticism in the wider public. 
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Concluding remarks
Summary 
The preceding analysis investigated private interest groups’ behaviour towards 
monetary policy makers and central banks, exploring the extent to which they seek to 
influence monetary policy and their motivations for doing so or not. Where evidence 
of interest group activity with respect to monetary decisions was found, the study 
identified the ways in which groups communicate with policy makers. 
Considering the importance of monetary policies for an economy as a whole and 
individual firms and households in particular, the low level of interest group activity 
observed in practice appears puzzling at first sight. However, the theoretical analysis 
above suggests that there may, in fact, be good reasons for interest group activity to 
keep a low profile with regard to monetary policymaking. 
In order to explain the conundrum, a micro-behavioural approach has been suggested 
with the aim of investigating the basic incentives for individuals and interest groups in 
the private sector to take political action on monetary questions or to refrain from 
doing so. The decision whether to take political action or not has been presented as a 
cost-benefit analysis, weighing the expected benefits of identifying, aggregating and 
mediating individual and group interests against the potential costs. The determinants 
of costs and benefits have been analysed with respect to the issue, institutional, and 
group contexts from which they originate.
The major theoretical findings with respect to monetary policy as a policy issue can be 
summarised as in the form of the following core propositions: 
General context
– In general, interests with respect to monetary policy are not communicated very 
intensively.
– In general, communication of interests with respect to monetary policy is 
significantly lower than in other policy fields.
– Mediating interests with respect to monetary policy does not yield sufficient 
benefits relative to the associated costs.
Institutional context
– Central banks are perceived as comparatively inaccessible to interests from the 
private sector.
– Political independence is an obstacle for the mediation of private-sector interests 
to the central bank.
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– Given their institutional, material and expertise-based resources, central banks are 
not dependent on external political support in order to carry out their monetary 
policy assignment.
– Given their focus on aggregated economic indicators and their access to the 
relevant statistical resources, central banks are not dependent on external 
information on monetary conditions and monetary policy in order to carry out their 
monetary policy assignment.
– Given central banks’ independence in terms of political material, and expertise-
related resources and their focus on aggregated economic indicators, central bank 
policy makers are not interested in private-sector interest groups’ views on 
monetary policy.
Issue context
– Individual firms or interest associations agree with the objectives and overall 
conduct of monetary policy.
– Interest groups may not always agree with the central bank’s monetary policy 
decisions.
– Monetary policy is not perceived to have a significant effect on individual firms or 
interest associations.
– The magnitude of the impact of monetary policy on individual firms or interest 
associations is difficult to determine.
– Owing to the comparatively low and differential impact of monetary policy on 
individual enterprises, interest associations find it difficult to form strong 
preferences with respect to the day-to-day conduct of monetary policy.
– Given the low perceived impact of monetary developments and the importance of 
other policy fields, interest groups do not perceive monetary policy as a priority 
issue on the economic policy agenda.
– Heterogeneity of interests relating to monetary affairs within existing interest 
groups weakens the formation of strong policy positions in the business sector.
Interest group context
– Interest associations and their members do not have at their disposal the means of 
exerting economic or political pressure on the central bank.
– Individual firms or interest associations do not have at their disposal exclusive 
information that they can contribute to the discourse with the central bank.
To investigate the validity of these propositions, a case study has been presented on 
the relations between interest groups and the Bundesbank in Germany as well as on the 
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potential impact of introduction of the single European currency and establishment of 
the ECB, applying these propositions as the central criteria for analysis. The case study 
encompasses a detailed literature-based analysis of the institutional, issue and group 
contexts in Germany and at EU level, complemented by qualitative interviews with a 
total of 58 decision makers and experts at peak, sectoral, and regional interest groups, 
as well as at the Bundesbank and the ECB, in the course of which the core 
propositions of this study were discussed.
The analysis of the institutional, issue and group contexts of business interest group 
activity on monetary policy in Germany and at EU level demonstrates that the task 
environment within which business associations and their members formulate and 
express their preferences with respect to monetary and exchange rate policy differs 
considerably from that observed in many other policy areas. 
With respect to the institutional context, it was observed that the conduct of monetary 
policy in Germany was embedded in a well-defined institutional and procedural 
framework. Communication of interests was found to be facilitated in principle by the
fact that monetary decisions are isolated from other policy areas and delegated to one 
single expert institution, the central bank. This also applies to exchange rate policies as 
long as no exchange rate agreements are concluded at an intergovernmental level. 
At the same time, communication of interests is hampered by the special status of the 
Bundesbank as an institution independent of political influence, a principle 
safeguarded in institutional and personnel respects. This independence largely 
obstructs indirect influence via the surrounding political framework, especially via the 
government or parliament, and also reflects on potential direct relations with the 
Bundesbank. In addition, the Bundesbank was found to be largely self-sufficient in 
terms of resources, also with respect to material, informational and personnel 
resources. As a result of the high level of experience and expertise, in essence the bank 
does not rely on external input in the form of policy advice and information.
Due to its federal structure, the Bundesbank itself pre-1999 and thereafter the 
Bundesbank as part of the ESCB theoretically offers a multitude of institutional points 
of access for interest groups. Formal and semi-formal access, however, is limited in 
scope and restricted to an advisory role relatively far detached from the nucleus of 
decision making. The remoteness of these potential avenues has increased with the 
2002 Bundesbank reform.
The insulating properties of the institutional framework also reflect on the behavioural 
patterns of Bundesbank decision makers, who regard their political independence as an 
essential condition for the proper pursuit of their primary objective. This is the 
dominating motivation behind their decisions, strengthened by strict, although not 
absolute, self-imposed policy rules.
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Overall, this institutional framework may have discouraging effects on interest groups 
trying to communicate their monetary policy interests.
The issue context, in turn, is dominated by historically rooted anti-inflationary 
sentiment among the German population at large and in the business sector in 
particular. This coincides with the Bundesbank's objectives. As to the primary purpose 
of monetary policy, therefore, there is strong agreement between monetary policy 
makers and the business sector.
With respect to this primary purpose, the Bundesbank – and since 1999 the ECB –
have delivered a remarkably positive performance, keeping inflation low by historical 
and international standards and effectively countering surges in wages and prices.
The transmission of monetary decisions into the economy has been accompanied by 
significant changes in the interest rate environment for businesses over the past 
decades. However, the impact of these changes has been small on average. This is due 
first to the low share of interest expenditure in German enterprises’ total costs and 
income, and second to the low level and the stability of real interest rates. 
A similar picture emerges with the impact of exchange rate developments, where the
distorting effects have been weakened by the historical stabilisation and – eventually –
elimination of exchange rates with the other EMU member states, Germany's most 
important trading partners. Stabilisation, although far less pronounced, has also been 
achieved with respect to the major non-EMU exchange rates.
Despite these general trends and structures weakening the involvement of business 
interests with monetary and exchange rate affairs, there are sectors particularly 
exposed to interest and exchange rate developments. These include the transport, 
construction, and retail sectors, where corporate financing and demand from end-
customers are particularly sensitive to interest rates. Similarly, the automotive, 
mechanical engineering, chemical and electronics sectors are particularly involved in 
foreign trade. In addition, small and medium-sized enterprises are likely to be more 
exposed to changes in interest rates and can less easily access derivatives markets to 
hedge against interest and exchange rate risks. 
Issue involvement is additionally weakened by the fact that monetary and exchange 
rate-related policy issues have, in the past years, been dominated by a whole range of 
other economic policy issues on the political agenda. Only in periods of strong 
international and domestic monetary and exchange rate pressures – and increasingly 
less so since the 1980s – has monetary policy assumed a significant position on the 
economic policy agenda.
As to the interest-group context, the aggregation and expression of interests in 
monetary and exchange rate issues is achieved through the existing infrastructure of 
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business associations and their peak associations. Given its insignificance in terms of 
impact and urgency, monetary policy has not aroused sufficient attention to provoke 
the formation of dedicated cause groups. Germany's peak business associations are 
characterised by a wide and heterogeneous membership in terms of the size of the 
enterprises represented and their sectoral affiliation. This heterogeneity hampers the 
efficient aggregation of interests with regard to monetary and exchange rate policy. 
Downstream interest associations – especially the sector-specific organisations – are 
likely to find it easier to formulate common positions. Their importance, however, 
may be severely limited by the Bundesbank’s strong economy-wide outlook, in which 
partial interests are relevant only inasmuch as they are conducive to reaching 
conclusions on monetary conditions in the economy as a whole. Given the 
Bundesbank's strong institutional status and the logic of monetary policy, the scope for 
exerting political or economic pressure on monetary policy makers is negligible. 
Nevertheless, German business associations possess substantial resources in terms of 
both financial and human capital and generate abundant original information of use in 
discourse with policy makers.
In the light of these findings, the perception of the institutional, issue, and interest 
group contexts was discussed with 46 decision makers and experts on monetary and 
exchange rate affairs from German business associations and the Bundesbank. The 
empirical evidence thus obtained does in fact confirm the core propositions of this 
study. 
Interest group activity on monetary and exchange rate affairs is low, especially when 
compared with other policy areas, because the anticipated benefits do not justify the 
costs associated with more intensive activity.
Institutional accessibility is one of two major explanatory variables for low interest 
group activity. Political independence and ample endowment with material resources 
and expertise in its field of policymaking contribute greatly to the fact that the 
Bundesbank does not need to rely on political support or information from the private 
sector, and effectively insulate the bank from external influence. This is recognised by 
interest group representatives and enters their cost-benefit analysis on political action 
in this policy area.
The second major explanatory variable is the coincidence of major policy objectives 
between the private sector on the one hand and the Bundesbank and ECB on the other, 
coupled with a high measure of agreement with the monetary authorities’ policies in 
general. Most of the time monetary policy thus becomes a non-issue as far as trade and 
industry associations are concerned. 
Even if monetary and exchange rate developments become more urgent across 
economic cycles, their direct and indirect impact – where identifiable at all – is 
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considered very low compared with that of other economic policies. As a consequence, 
preferences with respect to monetary and exchange rate policies are comparatively low 
in intensity. Despite the considerable impact of monetary policy on the economy as a 
whole, it is not a priority issue on business associations’ political agenda. 
It became apparent that the heterogeneity of interests does not play as great a role in 
inhibiting interest group activity on monetary affairs as suggested in theory. 
Preferences are perceived in a general manner and in most cases not necessarily 
considered contradictory. 
Finally, the responses by decision makers and experts in Germany suggest that interest 
groups do not lobby monetary policy makers in the same way they approach decision 
makers in other conventional policy areas. The style of communication is rather un-
political, factual, and non-prescriptive, taking the form of an informed, expertise-
oriented dialogue geared towards the general good – at least at a declaratory level. The 
preferred channels of communication with the Bundesbank are direct in nature, with 
the Advisory Boards and the economists’ roundtable as the formal and semi-formal 
forums respectively. Communication via the media is an important tool, but one used 
prudently in order to avoid the public perception that business associations interfere 
with the monetary authorities’ policymaking and independence.
As from 1999, monetary policy sovereignty was transferred to the Community level by 
the EU member states participating in the third stage of EMU, with monetary decisions 
taken by the ECB. For the communication of interests, introduction of the single 
European currency marks an important caesura, changing the way in which private-
sector interests in monetary policy are aggregated and communicated to the relevant 
decision makers, as the results of the survey among twelve experts on monetary and 
exchange rate affairs from EU business associations, the ECB and the European 
Commission suggest. 
Most importantly, monetary policy has become a European policy issue falling within 
the remit of EU-level business associations. The major cross-sectoral interest 
associations have responded to this new issue by stepping up their work on broad 
macroeconomic developments and policies and devoting additional resources to 
generating monetary expertise and information. The evidence suggests, however, that 
this process of adjustment is not particularly forceful, with the insignificance of the 
policy issue and the overall agreement with monetary policy as the most important 
arguments put forward by EU-level representatives themselves, as well as by their 
member associations at national level, for not devoting greater energy to monetary 
affairs. 
At the same time, the chances of influencing monetary decision making by the ECB, 
were such influence actually sought, are limited in the extreme – even more so than in 
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the case of the Bundesbank pre-1999. The ECB enjoys an unparalleled degree of 
political autonomy and has recourse to substantial resources within its own institution 
as well as the national central banks in the Eurosystem. The probability of the private 
sector’s being able to make original contributions to the policy debate is consequently 
very low. In addition, formal access to the ECB at Community level is limited to the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue – a policy process open only to two major associations, and 
not primarily conceived as a forum for exchanging views on monetary and exchange 
rate affairs. 
Patterns of communication are still evolving, however. The evidence suggests that EU 
business associations have not yet reached a final solution on how to deal with 
monetary issues and the ECB. In parallel, national associations’ communication with 
central banks at national level continues, even though the individual marginal impact 
on monetary decisions has fallen dramatically with the ECB’s assumption of 
responsibility. In the case of the Bundesbank, this has been enhanced by the removal 
of monetary affairs from the regional Advisory Boards’ agendas, cutting them off 
without formal replacement as a channel for discussing monetary policy with 
representatives of the private sector. 
Even though a new communication equilibrium has not yet been found by the 
stakeholders involved, the final outcome of the adjustment process is in many respects 
predetermined by the overall assessment of monetary policy as a policy issue – which 
at EU level is very similar to that obtained from respondents in Germany. Given the 
broad consensus on monetary policy objectives, and provided ECB policy makers do 
not alter their strategy, business associations and their members regard the need for 
activity in this policy field as minute compared to other areas of policymaking. 
Disagreement with monetary policy decisions is preferably communicated in a direct, 
un-political, factual, and non-prescriptive manner, best characterised as an informed, 
expertise-oriented dialogue geared towards the general good – at least at a declaratory 
level.
However, EU business associations’ perceptions vary from respondents in Germany in 
a number of important respects, indicating that the style of communication of 
monetary policy-related interests at EU level differs perceptibly from that vis-à-vis the 
Bundesbank. Monetary policy is approached with considerable caution and sensitivity 
by German interest groups, reflecting their specific historical experience with the 
damaging impact of monetary instability as well as their appreciation of the 
Bundesbank's post-war achievements. Although aware of the sensitivities associated 
with establishing a credible monetary policy, EU interest-group representatives deal 
with this issue in a more pragmatic manner, stressing that monetary policy does not 
differ essentially from other fields of policymaking. As a result, monetary policy is 
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likely to be commented on by EU business representatives in a more critical manner –
if differences in assessment arise – than in Germany, not least including open criticism 
in the wider public. 
Conclusions
Motivated by the puzzle that interest groups take little interest in monetary and 
exchange rate issues even though their overall economic impact on enterprises is 
macro-economically comparable to that of other policy areas, the findings in this study 
suggest that the reason for this superficial discrepancy is rational rather than 
inconsistent behaviour on the part of interest groups. Monetary policy is an area of 
economic policymaking in which business associations take a very low profile, and 
they are perceived as having good reasons to do so. 
Is monetary policy consequently a specific policy issue for interest groups? Certainly, 
interest groups are not dealing with a policy issue sui generis. The framework 
conditions for interest group activity are not specific in a qualitative respect. Thus, the 
political independence of institutions and decision makers is a mechanism 
implemented in one or the other form and intensity in an increasing number of policy 
fields – such as competition policy or financial market regulation and supervision. 
Even in its very pronounced form as observed in the cases of the Bundesbank and 
ECB, it merely serves to limit policy makers’ responsiveness and accessibility to 
outside stimuli or even pressure. Even so, it cannot eradicate the major actors’ 
interdependence, let alone the communication between them, given that the complete 
political insulation of such authorities is impossible to realise, whether in theory or in 
practice. 
Equally, the low immediate impact of monetary developments and policy measures as 
subjectively perceived by the interest groups addressed here is far from an unusual 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, enterprises and their interest representatives have a 
remarkably low perception of the impact of monetary stimuli, given the potential 
aggregate economic impact as calculated by monetary economists, and considering 
that the monetary stimuli applied in these studies are regularly observed in monetary 
practice. The diffuseness of the transmission of monetary stimuli obviously constitutes 
an important explanatory variable in this context. More importantly, however, in line 
with the argumentation by central banks a vast majority of interest representatives hold 
that monetary and exchange rate policy cannot and should not be designed on the basis 
of the atomistic or myopic interests of partial groups in society, but rather with a view 
to the long-term benefits for the economy and society as a whole. In this interpretation, 
interest group intervention to promote partial interests is viewed by a majority of trade 
and industry representatives as at best illegitimate, and at worst counterproductive. In 
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addition, business representatives seem to find solace in the logic of monetary cycles, 
discounting the fact that high interest rates will sooner or later turn into low rates, and 
that losses in competitiveness from a strong external value of the currency may before 
long turn into a boost for competitiveness once the currency has weakened again. In 
the monetary realm, policy measures with a negative impact on enterprises are likely 
to be followed with some certainty by more positive decisions. This contrasts quite 
markedly with other fields of policymaking, as accentuated by one respondent, who 
emphasised that unlike interest rates, he had rarely seen tax rates go down.
Similarly, monetary policy may not be the only area in which interest associations do 
not feel in a strong position to contribute original information or policy positions 
adding value for policy makers. Whenever policy makers place particular emphasis on 
the significance of a given decision for the general welfare, arguments motivated by 
partial interests are likely to fade into the background. 
Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that monetary policy represents an extraordinary 
policy issue for interest groups, even in a quantitative sense only, combining a number 
of institutional, issue, and group related specificities. Most importantly, the central 
banks investigated here enjoy an extraordinary degree of political autonomy, largely 
unequalled by other bodies within the respective polities or by other central banks in 
an international comparison. More generally, independent central banks do assume 
extraordinary institutional positions within their respective political systems. As such, 
they almost necessarily pose a special challenge for interest groups trying to approach 
monetary policy makers.
Second, it is quite unusual for business associations to agree as strongly with the 
overall objectives and policy measures implemented as they do with monetary affairs 
in Germany, and also at EU level. In the first place, this consensus results from good 
policymaking, in the opinion of the interest groups addressed, both with respect to the 
structure of the monetary systems and the way in which monetary policy makers run 
them. Second, it reflects the strong congruence in objectives associated with monetary 
policy by interest groups and those set for monetary decision makers. Finally, the 
strong agreement observed here bears witness to an extraordinary confidence on the 
part of private-sector participants in the capability of the monetary authorities and their 
decision makers. Based on good historical experience and at times on metaphysics, 
central banks enjoy an outstandingly positive reputation among private-sector 
commentators. 
Finally, and closely connected with the previous point, central banks are the centre of 
competence for monetary affairs in their respective economies, and are recognised as 
such by business. Central bank decision making power, especially with the 
Bundesbank and ECB, is combined with considerable competence in their sphere of 
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policymaking. Given far-reaching political neutrality, a high level of expertise and the 
extensive sources of data and statistics needed for the assessment of monetary 
conditions and the definition of suitable policy measures, representatives from trade 
and industry generally accept central bank decisions, even if the measures may not 
always be entirely consistent with their own preferences. From the perspective of 
political science, this partly reflects a substantial asymmetry between the relevant 
expertise in this field of policymaking commanded by the central banks, as opposed to 
that commanded by interest groups, with the latter at a clear disadvantage to the 
former. This is unusual compared with many other areas of economic policymaking, 
where business and business associations claim superior competence vis-à-vis policy 
makers, as in instances of market regulation or labour market policy. 
In the light of these specificities, the question arises as to the extent to which interest 
groups’ and monetary policy makers’ perceptions and behaviour and the structures of 
communication between the two sides are subject to change. Based on the evidence 
presented above, two major sources of change are conceivable. Most importantly, the 
constantly low level of interest group activity on monetary affairs stems largely from 
the minute impact of monetary developments and policy measures as perceived by 
enterprises and their interest representatives. Logic dictates that interest group activity 
might be much brisker if this impact ever happened to be substantially greater, 
especially in a negative sense. And indeed, very few of the respondents addressed in 
the course of this study left any doubt on this point. The stability of the equilibrium in 
communication between interest groups and the two central banks investigated here 
therefore critically depends on the occurrence of policy shocks, especially external in 
nature, and monetary policy makers’ ability to meet these challenges successfully, i.e. 
in a way consistent with their primary objective of maintaining price stability. 
Second, stability in relations between business associations and central banks hinges 
on the institutional framework in which monetary policymaking is embedded. With the 
establishment of the ESCB and ECB mid-1998 and the introduction of the single 
European currency at the beginning of 1999, this institutional framework was altered 
fundamentally. Notwithstanding this fundamental caesura, the major change from the 
perspective of interest groups in Germany occurred with the shift in decision making 
to the Community level. The modalities of the new monetary system, however, were 
quite familiar to German spectators in as far as major elements, such as the 
independence of the ECB, its objectives, or its instruments and their formulation in the 
legal basis of the ESCB, were very much comparable to those of the Bundesbank. 
That said, the new institutional structure does call for a new, Community-level 
approach to monetary issues and adjustment to the relevant communication structures. 
With institutional work at Community level completed before 1999, and a substantial 
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amount of expertise, routine and reputation gained during the first years of operation 
of the Eurosystem, the interplay of the ECB and national central banks on the one hand 
and private-sector interest groups on the other has not yet found a new equilibrium, as 
the preceding analysis suggests. In many respects, interest group communication with 
policy makers in the field is still adjusting to the new institutional framework, new 
policy processes and the role played by the ECB and national central banks. Moreover, 
the approaches to monetary and exchange rate policy have been reported as differing 
markedly – an insight confirmed not least by the reaction of EU-level interest group 
and central bank representatives in the course of this study. A truly European approach 
to euro area monetary policymaking has yet to emerge, with national perspectives on 
ECB policy prevailing for the time being. Nonetheless, the major EU-level business 
associations have started to become active in this area of policymaking. Such an 
approach would enable EU interest groups to communicate with the ECB at eye-level. 
On the other hand, to be effective it would necessitate a more stringent aggregation of 
relevant interests across member or associated groups in the member states. 
At the same time, national associations remain active. In the case of Germany, this is 
chiefly true of federal associations, which maintain any previous contacts with the 
Bundesbank while participating in the process of interest aggregation and 
communication within their respective EU peak associations. In contrast, regional 
associations, or more precisely the members of the Bundesbank's regional Advisory 
Boards, find themselves in a more awkward situation. For more than forty years, 
Board members enjoyed a privileged position, namely direct access to the members of 
the Bundesbank's highest decision making body on a quarterly basis, with the mandate 
to consult on monetary affairs and other issues of common concern or interest. This 
privilege was a somewhat puzzling arrangement. Considering that monetary policy 
makers are expected to take an aggregate, economy-wide view in their policy 
decisions and in many cases reject particularised interests in this policy area for this 
very reason, it may be considered unfortunate that the Bundesbank's only advisory 
body was – of all the constellations theoretically conceivable – composed of regional 
interest group representatives. While consistent with the idea of preventing the 
Bundesbank from being exposed to powerful political or other influences and with the 
concept of a devolutionary structure of the bank, the positions of interest 
representatives in a regionally organised advisory structure were likely to be the 
farthest removed from an aggregated, economy-wide view. This structure and 
composition was determined in the Bundesbank Act and therefore beyond the control 
of the Bundesbank and its policy makers. At the same time, none of them in fact 
considered the structure of the Advisory Boards inappropriate. 
Under their new mandate, the Advisory Boards have retained their structure and 
composition, but their monetary raison d'être has been removed. Although the 
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Bundesbank has been busy maintaining a high-ranking status for the Boards, a 
substantial incentive for participating in their deliberations has disappeared. It 
therefore remains to be seen how far it will be possible for the Bundesbank and the 
members to continue with the Advisory Boards as a consultative body on monetary 
issues, even if only on an informal basis. 
This gives rise to the question what the new equilibrium of communication between 
central banks and interest groups in the euro area will look like in the long run. Most 
importantly, it remains to be seen whether a unique EU-level discourse between 
European business associations and the ECB will evolve. For the time being, the 
Community's Macroeconomic Dialogue represents the only, extremely limited, 
channel of communication in this regard. As to the direction of development, two 
countervailing forces are at work. On the one hand, the ECB's monetary policy in 
many ways represents the only truly single policy process in the Community, as such 
strongly calling for a truly Community-level form of communication with the private 
sector. On the other hand, the ECB's monetary policy in many ways represents the 
only single policy process in the Community – the most important interrelated areas of 
economic policymaking, such as fiscal and labour market policy, essentially remain in 
the hands of the member states. In addition, the national central banks in the 
Eurosystem continue to play a decisive role in the ECB's decision making process and 
in the communication of its policy measures. As result, public discourse on monetary 
policy continues to be influenced by strong centrifugal tendencies. Whichever of these 
two tendencies eventually turns out to be the stronger, the long-term structures of 
communication will need to integrate both Community-level and national elements in 
order to correspond to the quasi-federal structure of decision making within the 
Eurosystem. 
Implications for research
This study contributes to the existing body of economic and political research in two 
directions. Most importantly, it complements the literature dealing with the political 
pressures on central banks, especially from private-sector interest groups. Systematic 
research into this subject was originally launched by Havrilesky, examining the 
influence of interest groups in the United States on decisions by the Federal Reserve 
Board. Recently, his approach has been developed further and applied to interest 
groups in Germany. The major insight of these studies is that, overall, the quantitative 
influence of private-sector interests on monetary decisions is very low. Insofar as a 
correlation was possible to identify, it ultimately remained unclear whether this was in 
response to political pressure from the private sector, or simply a coincidence of 
assessments and policy conclusions on the two sides. 
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While these studies investigated the ultimate impact of interest group activity on 
monetary decisions, the present contribution examined the extent to which such 
activity unfolded in the first place, how it is pursued, and why. Combining these 
elements yields a consistent picture, at least for non-financial business associations in 
Germany: Monetary policy decisions are subject to very little influence by private-
sector interests, not only because central banks do not rely on private-sector views or 
support, but also because interest group objectives and positions on monetary policy 
largely coincide with those of the central bank. Even when disagreement arises, it is 
unlikely to be of a fundamental nature, and articulation of the relevant interests is 
reserved and cautious. 
Scope and limitations of the analysis
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In pursuing this approach, this analysis has naturally remained limited. It has applied 
one method of many to investigate the political relations between interest groups and 
central banks. From the universe of interest groups, only those representing trade and 
industry have been analysed. Only Germany and the EU were investigated. Chart 113
tries to capture schematically the small area covered here – highlighted by a grey 
background –, and the large number of relationships omitted.
Beyond the analysis presented here, the topics could conceivably be approached from 
various different angles. 
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– The most important extension of the present study would be to investigate interest 
groups other than trade and industry associations, which may have preference 
structures and approaches towards political action other than those encountered 
here. This applies to trade unions in particular, which – according to many experts 
addressed in this study – appear to be more critical of and active on monetary 
policy than their industry counterparts, albeit not necessarily with greater success. 
Similarly, the financial sector represents a promising object of analysis, 
considering that it is more intricately connected to monetary and exchange rate 
issues and can more easily match the central bank's expertise on the related policy 
questions, thus overcoming one of the most important hurdles to interest 
communication in this policy area identified above.
– Second, it would be useful to gain a comparative perspective from other countries 
and historical instances in which the relations between interest groups and central 
banks may be different from those observed here. Given the enormous 
significance of the coincidence of central bank and interest group preferences with 
respect to monetary policy identified here, the most important question is whether 
the behaviour of interest groups differs from that observed in Germany and the 
euro area in economies with at times extreme monetary or exchange rate 
development. In recent history, monetary policies in the UK in the 1970s and 
1980s, in Italy up to the mid-1990s, or in Greece and Portugal in the post-war era 
would lend themselves as interesting objects of analysis. Similarly, Japan could be 
an informative case with its recent deflationary experience. More accentuated 
examples could be found in emerging markets with recent experiences of high or 
even hyper-inflation, such as Argentina, Brazil, or Mexico. From an historical 
perspective, interest-group behaviour during the hyper-inflationary period of the 
late 1920s in Europe and the US should be a revealing object of analysis. Such 
analysis would certainly need to include Germany during that period. In as far as 
the institutional framework of monetary operations matters in terms of relations 
between interest groups and policy makers, systems with different institutional and 
procedural provisions are worthy of analysis. The most important example is 
likely to be Great Britain and the Bank of England, whose very brief history of 
political independence began in 1997, preceded by centuries of subjection to 
government decision making664. The US Federal Reserve Board represents an 
interesting case in point for other reasons. The Fed has had a comparatively strong 
tradition of seeking advice from the private sector, with the Fed's Federal Advisory 
Council, its Consumer Advisory Council, and its Thrift Institutions Advisory 
Council as the most important institutional channels. 
664 See Bank for International Settlements (1963), pp. 97-123.
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– Third, the picture can be complemented by a more thorough analysis of the 
channels and means of communication available to and used by interest groups. 
Most importantly, this study suggests that support by the wider public has been of 
great concern for the Bundesbank. More detailed qualitative and quantitative 
research into the use and behaviour of the public with respect to monetary policy 
may yield additional insights into the relations between interest groups and policy 
makers in this policy area. Similarly, indirect communication between interest 
groups and central banks through the political level deserve closer inspection. As 
shown above, industry groups consider politicians inadequate for promoting their 
cause. It remains to be investigated whether this is also true of other interest 
groups such as trade unions, given their potentially more critical attitude towards 
central bank policymaking. The question also arises on the extent to which 
politicians cite private interests when criticising monetary policy actions – either 
in support of or contradiction to their own interests.
– Finally, the set of questions guiding the present study can be extended. Most 
importantly, research can be pursued to investigate the extent to which monetary 
and exchange rate policy decisions are eventually influenced by private-sector 
interests. This question has been faded out in the present context given the focus of 
the analysis on interest groups’ behavioural patterns. For the study of political 
economics, however, the ultimate impact of such behaviour is a central concern.
Specifically with respect to the cases investigated here, what remains to be examined 
is whether this pattern of communication and influence taking will be carried over to 
the European level following introduction of the single currency. This study has 
presented some preliminary evidence, but a full appreciation of the effects of EMU on 
communication between interest groups in the euro area and the central banks of the 
Eurosystem in the age of Community-level monetary decision making certainly 
requires a longer time frame. To obtain a comprehensive picture, it will be useful to 
investigate the perceptions and behaviour of interest groups in this area of 
policymaking in the other EMU member states. Initially, we have seen that 
communication via the national central bank still plays a substantial role, and is set to 
do so for some time to come. Second, a study into the patterns of perception and 
communication in the member states may, in fact, yield outcomes significantly 
different from those obtained here, as Germany represents a unique object of analysis 
in important respects. German interest groups have been dealing with a central bank 
enjoying a comparatively great degree of political independence for a relatively long 
period of time. In addition, the perception of monetary developments and policy 
decisions in Germany is strongly influenced by historical experience with hyper-
inflation and unstable monetary systems not observed on that scale in other countries. 
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With respect to interest group behaviour in Germany, it may furthermore be useful to 
subject the perceptions and activities of other samples of associations to an analysis 
similar to this one. Interest groups from trade and industry have been found to exhibit 
a strong allegiance to the Bundesbank and to agree strongly with its objectives and 
policy decisions. The interviews conducted in the course of this study strongly suggest 
that this might not be the case for other interest groups. Most importantly, trade unions 
have been characterised as particularly critical of the Bundesbank's position within the 
political system as well as of its policies. In addition, Havrilesky and Maier point out 
that the correlation between monetary decisions and interest-group positions is 
particularly significant for interest associations in the financial sector. Thus, it may be 
worthwhile investigating to what extent, how, and how successfully trade unions take 
a critical position on monetary affairs, and whether and to what extent interests in the 
financial markets form something comparable to a policy network or policy 
community with the central bank. 
In addition to these implications for the study of interest groups and their behaviour in 
the monetary area, this study yields stimulating impulses for other fields of research. 
First, it underlines the importance of interest groups’ perceptions of their policy 
environment and the policy fields they are concerned with. This becomes evident 
when comparing the above assessments by interest group and central bank 
respondents. Despite the great degree of congruence, wide differences in assessment 
can be observed around the mean, e.g. with respect to institutional accessibility and 
interest groups’ ability to contribute expertise and information to the policy process. 
One explanation for these systematic differences may be that either side understates or 
overstates its views, for example with the aim of portraying greater interest in private-
sector views than is actually the case. A second explanation may be seen in a potential 
selection bias inasmuch as the sample investigated here may exhibit a certain bias 
towards respondents actually interested in relations between the private sector and 
central banks. However, it cannot be ruled out ex ante that systematic differences exist 
in interest groups’ and policy makers’ perceptions, reflecting a lack of knowledge 
about each others' positions and views. Further investigation of this hypothesis may 
clarify this point and, in as far as this lack of knowledge causes inefficiencies in the 
interplay between interest groups and policy makers, help improve the relevant policy 
processes. 
Second, the present findings lend strong support to the view that the institutional 
design of policy processes greatly influences relations between interest groups and 
policy makers. Most importantly, institutional independence has been found to limit 
interest group activity. At the same time, the precise impact of independence on 
interest group activity remains unclear, particularly when determining the dividing line 
between directly limiting effects such as legal constraints and interest groups’ self 
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restraint. Interest representatives in Germany are found to have tended to hold back 
with judgements on monetary affairs, due not least to the central bank’s status of 
independence, even though this applies to the private sector in a strictly legal 
interpretation. 
Part of this self-restraint can be traced back to the awkward position interest groups 
faced in argumentative terms at times when politicians criticised the Bundesbank for 
failing to provide monetary stimuli to economic growth. On the one hand, many 
entrepreneurs agree with this assessment at certain times. On the other hand, they 
consider such intervention by policy makers an illegitimate encroachment on the 
central bank's independence. As a result, business associations seem to have found 
themselves repeatedly in a situation in which they criticised politicians for their 
intervention, while tacitly agreeing with the basis of that intervention. In as far as this 
has been the case in the past, business associations can be regarded as strong lobbyists 
in the area of monetary policy, promoting the independence and objectives of the 
Bundesbank. Given such complex argumentative constellations in practice and the 
impact of institutional independence as perceived by interest groups, the precise 
effects of institutional provisions of this kind certainly deserve further academic 
attention. 
Finally, interest group activity in monetary affairs seems to be a promising field of 
political science research on the role of information as a source of influence for 
interest groups. Possession of group-specific information, e.g. on the positive or 
adverse effects of a planned policy measure on certain segments or actors in society, 
has been regarded as a strong asset for interest groups in communication with policy 
makers. By the same token, specialised associations are often recognised not only as 
representatives of their members, but also as experts in a certain area of policymaking 
whose input or support can lend additional credibility to arguments in the political 
arena. This logic applies in cases when policy makers are, on average, less well 
informed in a certain area of policymaking than interest groups. In monetary affairs, 
the reverse order generally applies, giving policy makers a substantial expertise and 
information lead over their counterparts in the private sector. The distribution, or more 
precisely the demand and supply of information and expertise between policy makers 
and interest groups therefore has a potentially significant impact on the way in which 
the two sides interact. Deeper scientific insights into this part of the relationship would 
certainly contribute to a better understanding of policy processes, especially those 
concerned with intricate policy issues. 
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Policy implications
Given the low level of interest-group activity in monetary and exchange rate policy-
making detected and explained here, we can ask whether and to what extent interest 
groups should do more in this respect. Assuming utilitarian decision making on the 
part of interest groups, all else being equal the answer to this question clearly has to be 
no. If – ideally – interest groups become active when, and only when, their 
constituents face an identifiable problem and when, and only when, the expected 
benefits of taking political action exceed the expected costs of doing so, then it is only 
rational for interest groups to leave monetary and exchange rate policy low on their 
political agendas in the circumstances observed here and on the assumption of limited 
resources. Save for isolated instances over the past three decades, monetary and 
exchange rate policies have had a miniscule direct, identifiable impact on enterprises 
in trade and industry, especially when compared to that of other public policy 
measures. Even if and when monetary developments were perceived to be of concern, 
interest groups typically found that short-term intervention could have substantial 
negative repercussions in the long run, and that the potential costs of influencing 
independent monetary policy makers could be significant – if, indeed, they stood a 
realistic chance of doing so at all. In so far, low interest group activity on monetary 
and exchange rate issues is logical and rational. 
Remarkably, many interest representatives consulted here seem to have overcome the 
time-consistency problem underlying attempts at politically isolating monetary 
decision making – at least at a declaratory level: The short-term benefits of more 
lenient monetary conditions were regarded by the vast majority of respondents as far 
outweighed by their long-term costs, encouraging them to defend and support hawkish 
central bank policies against their critics. If such far-sighted behaviour motivates 
interest group activity in this policy area, then the discrepancy between immediate 
policy effects, medium-term economic repercussions and long-term macroeconomic 
equilibrium is necessarily dissipated, and myopic rent-seeking is abandoned in favour 
of broad agreement with the policy objectives of the central banks analysed here. How 
stable this consensus necessarily is, must be left unanswered at this point.
The above negative answer to the question whether interest groups should become 
more active on monetary matters, can be put into perspective in two respects. First, the 
assumption of utilitarian behaviour can be weakened. If agency problems exist in the 
principal-agent relationship between enterprises and business associations, it may, 
under certain circumstances, be rational for interest groups to address monetary issues 
even though there is no point in such action in their members’ view. Second, the 
policy-related objectives or interest group or central bank behaviour may change. If 
the consensus identified here with respect to the objectives and targets of monetary 
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and exchange rate policy were to alter on either of the two sides, it may become 
rational for interest groups to intensify their activities in this policy area.
Beyond these fundamental considerations, the findings of the present study carry 
policy implications for policy makers at the European and the national levels as well as 
for general issues of interest group politics. In the euro area, relations between interest 
groups and central banks are undergoing a process of change, as already observed. 
Especially at Community level, stakeholders will need to work out how close a 
discourse between central bankers and interest groups is desired and deemed 
conducive on both sides. For one thing, the ECB will need to decide whether it wishes 
to continue relying, on a formal and semi-formal level, on the input gained through the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue – involving only two private-sector business associations –
and through the national central banks, or whether it wishes to work towards 
strengthening the discourse at Community level, for example by establishing a semi-
formal roundtable as the Bundesbank did. In the latter case, the concept of monetary 
policy as a truly European policy process could be strengthened, both within the 
Eurosystem and among the wider public, and a broad and aggregated view could be 
obtained from peak EU interest groups. Assuming that the contemporary wisdom of 
depoliticising monetary policy by, say, handing it over to independent central banks is 
an appropriate answer to the problems inherent in that policy process, this would, 
however, come at the expense of potentially politicising the debate on monetary 
policy, as many interest associations, a large number of which are potentially 
influential and might take the discussion into the wider public, would actually be 
prompted to formulate a monetary policy position. 
In Germany, too, communication between interest groups and the central bank is 
undergoing a process of change, especially with respect to the future role of the 
regional Advisory Boards. On the one hand, the Boards’ monetary policy mandate has 
been withdrawn. On the other, the Bundesbank has sought to preserve their status as 
far as possible by informal means. Their future role, however, remains unclear, 
particularly since monetary policy decisions taken at the Community level mean that 
regional perspectives have lost much of their relevance for the assessment and 
formulation of monetary policy. This argument casts doubt on the very raison d'être of 
these regional consultative bodies. In as far as this logic is deemed relevant, a more 
effective solution may lie in strengthening communication with the federal peak 
associations at national level, for instance by increasing the frequency of meetings by 
the roundtable of economists. Closely linked to this structural issue, there seems to be 
some uncertainty concerning the appropriate amount of communication. As already 
observed, no substantial evidence was found that either interest representatives or 
Bundesbank staff considered communication to be deficient. However, a significant 
gap in the assessment of whether the Bundesbank is interested in private sector views 
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and in how far it appreciates external information and expertise between the two sides 
emerged in the course of the research. In as much as this gap does not reflect either 
overstatement on the part of the respondents or a selection bias, Bundesbank policy 
makers and interest group representatives may find it useful to consider ways of 
optimising communication between the two sides. 
From a broader political perspective, the findings of this study suggest that 
establishing politically independent institutions is a viable means of keeping the 
relevant policy issues outside the arena of political debate. The findings also show, 
however, that this alone will not suffice in the long run. The example of monetary 
policy suggests that the Bundesbank's success as a widely recognised institution whose 
policy decisions meet with broad acceptance by the public at large critically rests on 
three additional factors. First, the objectives set for such an independent body at 
political level must be well defined and generally accepted. Second, policy makers in 
that body must pursue these objectives consistently and successfully. Third, the 
authority of that body can be strengthened if policy makers succeed in establishing far-
reaching expertise and competence in their field of policymaking within that body. 
Otherwise, a great number of respondents on both sides pointed out that an institution 
as independent as the Bundesbank would not be tenable in the long run within a 
democratic set-up. 
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Annex Research design and statistical results 
A.1 Approach
In order to gain a picture of German interest groups’ motivations and behaviour with 
respect to monetary affairs, empirical evidence has been collected in interviews with 
decision makers and experts from interest associations as well as from the Bundesbank 
and the ECB, investigating the perception of monetary and exchange rate 
developments and policies as well as the factors promoting or hampering political 
activity. 
The approach rests on semi-structured, focused interviews with experts and decision 
makers in the policy field along a catalogue of questions designed to operationalise the 
key propositions. A set of core questions was identified665 and worded so that it could 
be put forward to all interviewees, i.e. to respondents from central banks on the one 
hand, and from corporations or interest associations on the other. 
Additional questions were raised on a case-by-case basis to allow for detailed follow-
up discussions and a more focused approach towards individual experts or decision 
makers’ specific perceptions. All the questions were formulated as open questions, 
allowing respondents to answer freely and individually and to elaborate where deemed 
appropriate. Further, questions were drafted and interviews conducted666 in line with 
the present standards in qualitative social science research. 
A.2 Scope
Like the study itself, the empirical research presented here focuses on Germany and 
the EU level667. Analysis of the relations between central banks and interest groups in 
Europe is principally complicated by the institutional caesura of European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and introduction of the single European currency in 1999. Since then, 
monetary decisions for the euro area have been taken by the ECB. The latter therefore 
intuitively represents the most interesting object of analysis in the present context. 
However, patterns of communication on the part of interest groups at national and EU 
level are still adjusting to the new monetary regime, so that evidence from the EU 
665 For a complete list of the core questions, see p. 379 below.
666 See Hopf (2000), Hermanns (2000), Dieckmann (1997), pp. 410-418.
667 References to the institutional framework at EU level in this study are based on the legal provisions 
as laid down in the Treaty of Nice. Potential changes resulting from the Treaty revision in the 
context of the 2004 intergovernmental conference, and to be manifested in the forthcoming EU 
Constitution, are not included, as the Constitution had not been finally adopted at EU level by the 
time this study was completed. The draft text of the Constitution at that time, however, did not 
foresee any material changes to the provision relating to EMU, the ESCB, or the ECB.
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level alone may not be sufficiently stable to allow for authoritative conclusions on the 
behaviour of interest groups in this policy field. 
In order to obtain a firm picture, it is therefore useful to base the analysis of relations 
between interest groups and central banks on experience at the level of the member 
states and to examine the impact of EMU on these relations as a separate, subsequent 
event. For the present purpose, Germany and the relations between German interest 
groups and the Bundesbank were selected as the focus of analysis. The latter has been 
regarded as an important institutional predecessor of the European Central Bank, 
providing a wealth of experience on the interaction between policy makers and the 
private sector over more than four decades while maintaining a focus on recent 
perceptions and practices. 
A.3 Samples
This study is primarily concerned with the behaviour of business interests in the 
sectors of industry668 and trade669 towards monetary and exchange rate policy and 
central banks. To gain a comprehensive picture, as well as to compare the perception-
based results, empirical evidence has been collected among both central banks and 
interest groups. 
A.3.1 Central banks
In the case of Germany, evidence on the central bank view of the problem has been 
collected among experts and decision makers at the Bundesbank, including the 
Bundesbank headquarters in Frankfurt am Main and the constituent regional central 
banks, i.e. the Hauptverwaltungen or Landeszentralbanken670, which are directly 
involved in communication with the private sector. At EU level, experts at the ECB 
associated with the EU's Macroeconomic Dialogue and the communication of ECB 
policies to the public were interviewed. The sample includes members of central bank 
668 Commonly defined as a group of productive enterprises or organisations that produce or supply 
goods, services or sources of income. In economics, industries are customarily classified as the 
primary sector – forestry, fishing, mining, quarrying and the extraction of minerals; the secondary 
sector – manufacturing, energy-producing and construction industries; and the tertiary sector –
service industries not producing tangible goods. The term tertiary sector is commonly used 
interchangeably with the term trade sector (see e.g. Encyclopaedia Britannica).
669 Commonly defined as the sector in the economy that, while producing no tangible goods, provides 
services or intangible gains or generates wealth. Economic science commonly distinguishes 
between domestic and international trade activities (see e.g. Encyclopaedia Britannica).
670 Until the Bundesbank's latest institutional reform in April 2002, regional central banks were known 
as Landeszentralbanken, i.e. land central banks. In the course of the reform, the legal and 
institutional status of these regional entities was altered. Since May 2002, they have been referred 
to as Hauptverwaltungen, i.e. main administrative units. Further details are provided below.
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decision making bodies, senior management, as well as economists and 
communication specialists.
A.3.2 Interest groups
Given the wide variety of interests potentially represented even among business 
interest groups, it was necessary to limit the number and types of interests under 
scrutiny in order to obtain detailed results on monetary policy interest representatives’ 
perceptions and motivations. The selection made here is based on four considerations. 
– First, the sample of interest groups should be representative of the private sector 
economy as a whole in terms of exposure to monetary developments and the 
related policy decisions. As enterprises in trade and industry represent a large 
section of the private sector, their interest associations are an important object for 
analysis. Equally, the sample should not reflect highly specific interests. First, 
agriculture is explicitly not addressed, because this sector – with a share of only 
1% to 5% of output in most industrial economies – today represents only a very 
small and specific segment of the economy. More importantly, firms in the 
financial sector are not covered in this study. In addition to their own corporate 
refinancing and investment concerns, it is the very purpose of financial enterprises 
to deal with financial market developments and the associated risks. Monetary 
policy can have decisive influence on market developments. In addition, central 
banks often fulfil financial and prudential supervision functions complementary to 
and separate from monetary policy-related responsibilities. Supervisory activities 
naturally condition relations with enterprises subject to central bank oversight, i.e.
banks and other financial services providers, promoting compliant behaviour vis-
à-vis the supervisory authority. The possibility cannot be ruled out of such 
behavioural patterns resulting from the central bank's role as a financial supervisor 
spilling over into the behaviour of enterprises and their interest groups vis-à-vis 
the central bank with regard to monetary policy, thus blurring the behaviour that 
would probably otherwise be observed. Financial enterprises are therefore likely to 
have very specific preferences in this policy area, making them a very important 
stakeholder in the political arena, but also limiting the sector’s suitability as an 
object for analysis in the present context. 
– Second, interest groups in this analysis should be exposed to monetary or 
exchange rate developments in a significant way. Such exposure is likely to be 
highest for capital-intensive and trade-oriented sectors, again highlighting the 
importance of industry and trade as the most suitable objects for analysis. 
Specifically service-oriented sub-sectors, in contrast, are not covered explicitly for 
this reason.
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– Third, the interest groups addressed in the present context should be sufficiently 
resourced to actually have sufficient means of conveying their interests to policy
makers, provided such interests exist and are deemed worthy of pursuit, a criterion 
that business associations in trade and industry again fulfil. 
– Finally, the interest groups analysed here were selected so as to exhibit some 
degree of homogeneity in purpose, exposure, and interests so as to make the 
motivation behind monetary affairs and activities with respect to them directly 
comparable. Business associations in trade and industry were thus examined in 
isolation, leaving out other economic interest groups such as employer and 
employee organisations, whose objectives and exposure with regard to monetary 
policy are likely to be quite different from those of the associations selected. 
Specialised sectoral or regional business associations have been selectively included in 
the fieldwork, based on two criteria. Sectoral or regional groups or their 
representatives were addressed671
– if they were represented on a formal or semi-formal advisory body to the central 
bank or to a relevant policy committee – i.e. on one of the Bundesbank's Advisory 
Councils, or on its roundtable of economists – or 
– if their constituencies were economically particularly exposed to monetary or 
exchange rate developments.
Other sectoral or regional interest associations in trade and industry are not included in 
the analysis. In terms of content, this is unlikely to result in significant omissions, as 
these associations’ perceptions are likely to be proxied by the views expressed by the 
representatives interviewed. On average, the responses obtained from representatives 
of regional or sectoral groups, e.g. members sitting on a Bundesbank Advisory 
Council, should not deviate systematically from their equivalents not represented on 
such bodies672. In addition, all relevant regional or sectoral interest groups in trade and 
industry are constituents, members, or associates of the peak cross-sectoral 
associations covered in the analysis. 
671 Further details are presented in chapters III.2 and III.3.
672 The only substantial exception to this assumption is views expressed on the channels of 
communication used by interest groups to mediate their interests with respect to monetary policy. 
The criteria for the selection of interest groups applied here necessarily produce a selection bias in 
favour of groups with either formal or semi-formal contacts with central banks or with substantial 
exposure to monetary or exchange rate developments. This bias is taken into consideration in the 
analysis below.
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A.3.3 Structural composition of samples
A detailed breakdown of the sample is provided in table 15 below. Of the 57 
interviewees, 33 came from interest groups and 24 from central banks. The former can 
be decomposed into 24 respondents reporting on interest group activity in Germany, 
and 9 reporting on activity at EU level. The sample of German interest group 
representatives was evenly distributed between respondents from peak federal 
associations and members of the Bundesbank's regional Advisory Boards. Among the 
24 respondents at central banks, 22 came from the Bundesbank and 2 from the ECB. 
The Bundesbank sample included 7 respondents from the bank's Central Office and 15 
from its Regional Offices. 
Composition of sample of interviewees
Table 15
DE, EU
Federal peak 
associations
Regional level, 
Advisory Board DE total
EU peak 
associations EU total Sample total
Number 12 12 24 9 9 33
% of total 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 72.7 27.3 100.0
DE, EU
Bundesbank, 
Central Office
Bundesbank, 
Regional Offices DE total
ECB, Central 
Office EU total Sample total
Number 7 15 22 2 2 24
% of total 31.8 68.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
% of total 91.7 8.3 100.0
Sample total
Number 57
% of total 100.0
Sample total
Number 57
% of total 100.0
Retired
8
14.0
Acting
49
86.0
Experts
32
56.1
Decision makers
25
43.9
DE EU
Memorandum items
All respondents
DE EU
Business associations from trade and industry
Central bank
In total, the sample of interviewees comprised 25 decision makers, i.e. high-ranking 
central bank officials including acting board members and retired members of the 
Bundesbank's central bank council, and 32 experts working as economists, personal 
assistants or communication specialists involved in the preparation of monetary policy 
decisions and in cultivating and preparing external contacts. 49 respondents were 
acting decision makers or experts, while 8 were retired at the time of interviewing. 
Overall, the sample of 57 respondents comprises a large number of the relevant experts 
and decision makers in the entities specified, or their designated representatives, 
providing a strong empirical basis for the analysis presented below.
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A.3.4 Respondents in Germany
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the perceptions and attitudes among 
stakeholders in monetary decisions, and given the findings on the institutional, issue, 
and group contexts, a sample of interviewees was sought so as to reflect:
– the interests of trade and industry in the broadest possible sense,
– the interests of those sectors and groups in trade and industry particularly exposed 
to monetary and exchange rate developments,
– the views of those associations, groups, and individuals involved in formal and 
semi-formal contacts with the Bundesbank, and 
– the views of monetary policy makers affected by the activities of private-sector 
interest groups as a means of checking the extent to which assessments and 
expectations in the private sector were matched on the receiving end of the interest 
communication process. 
Consequently, the sample of interviewees was composed of decision makers and 
experts from
– the peak German business associations in trade and industry, including industry673,
chambers of commerce674, wholesale and foreign trade675, retail trade676, and 
skilled crafts677,
– interest associations of those sectors in the German economy identified above as 
particularly exposed to interest and exchange rate developments, including the 
export678, construction679, automotive680, chemical681, mechanical engineering682, 
and electronics683 sectors,
673 Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V., BDI.
674 Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, DIHK.
675 Bundesverband des Deutschen Groß- und Außenhandels e.V., BGA.
676 Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhandels, HDE.
677 Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks, ZDH.
678 Bundesverband des Deutschen Exporthandels e.V., BDEx.
679 Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie e.V., HDB.
680 Verband der Automobilindustrie e.V., VDA.
681 Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V., VCI.
682 Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau e.V., VDMA.
683 Zentralverband Elektrotechnik- und Elektronikindustrie e.V., ZVEI.
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– the associations represented on the roundtable of economic experts at the 
Bundesbank Central Office684, as well as those represented on the Advisory 
Boards of the Bundesbank Regional Offices685,
– the Bundesbank Central Office as well as its Regional Offices. Interviewees from 
the Central Office included current members of the Executive Board, former 
members of the Central Bank Council and former Bundesbank presidents, as well 
as expert staff from the bank's economics and communications departments. 
Respondents from the Regional Offices included acting presidents of the Regional 
Offices as well as former presidents of the Landeszentralbanken, or experts 
speaking on their behalf686. 
The number of decision makers and experts interviewed in Germany between 
November 2002 and January 2004 totalled 46, 24 of whom were representatives of 
business associations and 22 representatives from the Bundesbank. Twelve of the 24 
business representatives were selected from federal business associations, including 
peak associations as well as sectoral organisations. Twelve business representatives 
came from regional or local organisations represented on one of the nine Bundesbank 
Advisory Boards. The majority of respondents from peak federal associations were 
expert staff working at the headquarters of these associations, while the majority of 
representatives from regional interest associations were decision makers. 
Representatives from regional associations were approached for their membership on 
one of the Bundesbank Advisory Boards. Interviews were conducted directly with 
these members, who generally preside over the relevant regional association. In all, 
more than one-quarter of all 42 Advisory Board members from trade and industry 
were interviewed.
On the Bundesbank side, seven respondents at the Central Office and 15 respondents 
at the Regional Offices were interviewed. Respondents at the bank's Central Office 
were evenly distributed between decision maker and expert status. At the regional 
level, the number of interviewees at decision making level outnumbered that of expert-
level interviewees, reflecting the comparatively large number of former presidents of 
684 The roundtable is composed of representatives from the BDI, DIHK, HDE, ZDH, VDMA, HDB, 
VDA, and the VCI.
685 The sample included representatives of regional business associations sitting on the Advisory 
Boards of the Bundesbank's Regional Offices in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover, 
Leipzig, Mainz, and Munich. The Advisory Board members interviewed were representatives –
mainly presidents – of regional chambers of commerce, trade and crafts as well as of regional 
industry associations or individual enterprises. Three Advisory Board members were represented 
by their staff.
686 In total, the sample included acting or former decision makers or experts from the Bundesbank's 
Regional Offices in Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Leipzig, Mainz, Munich, Stuttgart, as 
well as the former Landeszentralbank in Bremen.
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the Landeszentralbanken, who – as ex officio members of the former Central Bank 
Council – were directly involved in monetary decision making prior to 1999687. In 
total, the number of retired Bundesbank staff amounted to eight – two former decision 
makers at the bank's Directorate and six former Landeszentralbank presidents.
The sample thus captures the major monetary policy stakeholders as well as a large 
number of the key individuals involved in current and recent past policymaking at 
decision making and expert level. In so far, the sample can be regarded as ample and 
very representative of the relevant policy community688.
A.3.5 Respondents at EU level
Following the same selection criteria as in the German sample, the EU-level sample of 
stakeholders was composed of representatives from:
– the peak EU business associations in trade and industry, including industry689, 
chambers of commerce690, retail, wholesale, and foreign trade691, and skilled 
crafts692, and
– interest associations from the sectors in the EU economy identified above as 
particularly exposed to interest and exchange rate developments, including the 
export693, construction694, automotive695, chemical696, mechanical engineering and 
electronics697 sectors. 
The number of decision makers and experts thus interviewed between June 2003 and 
January 2004 at EU business associations totalled nine. In addition, two experts at the 
687 Acting presidents of the Regional Offices no longer directly involved in monetary decision making 
have been categorised as experts rather than decision makers.
688 All the quantitative data presented below, including the coding and quantification of responses, are 
exclusively the result of evaluation of the qualitative answers. Interviewees were not asked to give 
their own quantitative assessments. Cases in which no answer or an inconclusive reply were given 
are not included in the calculations and illustrations. The same applies to cases in which a given 
question was not put to individual respondents owing to time constraints during the interview. For 
the sake of transparency, all graphical illustrations cite the number of responses included in the 
quantification.
689 Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe, UNICE.
690 The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Eurochambres.
691 EuroCommerce.
692 European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, UEAPME.
693 The Foreign Trade Association, FTA.
694 European Construction Industry Federation, FIEC.
695 European Automobile Manufacturers Association, ACEA.
696 European Chemical Industry Council, CEFIC.
697 Liaison Group of the European Mechanical, Electrical, Electronic and Metalworking Industries, 
Orgalime.
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ECB were addressed, as well as one expert on the EU's Macroeconomic Dialogue at 
the European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
EcFin. 
A.4 Questionnaire
Questions were designed to satisfy contemporary scientific standards as far as 
possible, including brevity, comprehensibility and precision. Ingratiation, double 
negations, normative concepts, suggestive questions and multiple dimensions were 
excluded. Indirect questions were avoided as far as possible698. The qualitative 
methods applied here are based on the techniques presented, among others, in Flick et 
al. 699.
The questionnaires were derived directly from the propositions established in the 
theoretical part of this study and organised in thematic blocks so as to ensure 
coherence in content and comprehensibility on the part of interviewees. To facilitate 
responses, the sequence of questions was arranged such that general, less complex 
questions would be used to introduce interviewees to the subject matter. The 
questionnaires were tested by means of a sequence of pre-tests, after each of which the 
contents, phrasing and sequencing of questions were revised where appropriate. More 
complex or controversial issues were raised in the second and third quarter of each 
interview. The final quarter of each interview was dedicated to specific follow-up 
questions. Interviews were designed to last for an average of one hour. 
Additional questions were raised on a case-by-case basis in order to allow for detailed 
follow-up discussions and a more focused approach towards individual experts’ or 
decision makers’ specific perceptions. All the questions were formulated as open 
questions, allowing respondents to answer freely and individually and to elaborate 
where deemed appropriate. Further, questions were drafted and interviews 
conducted700 in line with the present standards in qualitative social science research. 
All interviewees were provided with appropriate background information, i.e. a two-
page description of the research project as well as a curriculum vitae, before 
appointments were arranged.
698 For a list of criteria for qualitative interviews see Dieckmann (1997), pp. 410-414.
699 Flick et al. (2000), pp. 224-587, and Schnell et al. (1999).
700 See Hopf (2000), Hermanns (2000), Dieckmann (1997), pp. 410-418.
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A.4.1 General context
Proposition 1 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
intensively"
1
"Intensively" 2
"Moderately" 3
"Very 
moderately"
4
In general, interests with respect to 
monetary or exchange rate policy are 
not communicated very intensively to 
the relevant decision makers.
As addressed to interest groups:
"Do you or the organisation you represent, 
in general, mediate interests with respect to 
monetary or exchange rate policy?"
As addressed to central banks:
"Do interest associations, in general, 
mediate interests with respect to monetary 
or exchange rate policy?" "No" 5
Proposition 2 Question Categories Scale
"Much more 
intensively"
1
"More 
intensively"
2
"As 
intensively"
3
"Less 
intensively"
4
In general, communication of interests 
with respect to monetary or exchange 
rate policy is significantly lower than 
in other policy fields.
As addressed to interest groups:
"Do you or the organisation you represent, 
in general, mediate interests with respect to 
monetary or exchange rate policy to the 
same extent as with respect to other policy 
fields?"
As addressed to central banks:
"Do interest associations, in general, 
mediate interests with respect to monetary 
or exchange rate policy to the same extent 
as with respect to other policy fields?"
"Much less 
intensively"
5
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Proposition 3 Question Categories701 Scale
None
None
None
Mediating interests with respect to 
monetary or exchange rate policy does 
not yield sufficient benefits relative to 
the associated costs.
"Do you, in principle, consider mediating 
interests with respect to monetary or 
exchange rate policy to be worthwhile 
pursuing?"
None
A.4.2 Institutional context
Proposition 4 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
accessible"
1
"Rather 
accessible"
2
"Rather 
inaccessible"
3
Central banks are perceived as 
inaccessible to interests from the 
private sector, compared to other 
political bodies.
"Is the central bank – compared to other 
political bodies – viewed as accessible to 
interests from the corporate sector?"
"Very 
inaccessible"
4
Proposition 5 Question Categories Scale
"Strong 
obstacle"
1
"Obstacle" 2
"Weak 
obstacle"
3
Political independence is an obstacle 
for private interests in mediating their 
interests to the central bank.
"Is political independence of the central 
bank perceived as an obstacle to mediating 
corporate interests?"
"No obstacle" 4
701 Responses to this proposition are analysed in qualitative terms only. In practice, the majority of 
responses were found to be highly differentiated, qualifying the overall response, so that an 
unambiguous allocation of reactions to a set of categories of answers and a corresponding scale of 
numerical values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses.
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Proposition 6 Question Categories Scale
"Strong 
dependence"
1
"Moderate 
dependence"
2
"Weak 
dependence"
3
Given their institutional, material, and 
expertise-based resources, central 
banks are not dependent on external 
political support in order to fulfil their 
tasks in the field of monetary or 
exchange rate policy.
"Does the central bank depend on external 
political support in order to fulfil its tasks 
in the field of monetary or exchange rate 
policy?"
"No 
dependence"
4
Proposition 7 Question Categories Scale
"Strong 
dependence"
1
"Moderate 
dependence"
2
"Weak 
dependence"
3
Given their focus on aggregated 
economic indicators and their access 
to the relevant statistical resources, 
central banks are not dependent on 
external information with respect to 
monetary or exchange rate conditions 
and developments in order to fulfil 
their tasks in the field of monetary or 
exchange rate policy.
"Does the central bank depend on external 
information in order to fulfil its tasks in the 
field of monetary or exchange rate policy?"
"No 
dependence"
4
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Proposition 8 Question Categories Scale
"Highly 
interested"
1
"Interested" 2
"Slightly 
interested"
3
Given the independence of central 
banks in terms of political, material, 
and expertise-related resources as well 
as their focus on aggregated economic 
indicators, central bank policy makers 
are not interested in the views of 
private-sector interest groups on 
monetary or exchange rate policy.
"Are central bank representatives interested 
in the preferences of the corporate sector 
regarding monetary or exchange rate 
policy?"
"Not 
interested"
4
A.4.3 Issue context
Proposition 9 Question Categories Scale
"Agree 
strongly"
1
"Agree" 2
"Disagree" 3
Individual firms or interest 
associations agree with the objectives 
and the overall conduct of monetary 
or exchange rate policy.
"Do interest groups, in general, disagree 
with the overall objectives and the conduct 
of monetary or exchange rate policy?"
"Disagree 
strongly"
4
Proposition 10 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
frequently"
1
"Frequently" 2
"Rarely" 3
"Very rarely" 4
Interest groups rarely disagree with 
the monetary or exchange rate policy 
decisions of the central bank.
"Have interest groups encountered 
situations in the past in which they urgently 
disagreed with the conduct of monetary or 
exchange rate policy?"
"Never" 5
Proposition 11 Question Categories Scale
"Strong" 1
"Moderate" 2
"Weak" 3
Monetary or exchange rate policy is 
not perceived to have a significant 
effect on individual firms or interest 
associations.
"Is monetary or exchange rate policy 
perceived by the private sector to have an 
economic impact on individual 
corporations or interest groups?"
"Negligible" 4
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Proposition 12 Question Categories Scale
"Very 
precisely"
1
"Rather 
precisely"
2
"Rather 
vaguely"
3
"Very 
vaguely"
4
The magnitude of the impact of 
monetary or exchange rate policy on 
individual firms or interest 
associations is difficult to determine.
"Is it possible for individual enterprises or 
interest groups to determine the magnitude 
of the impact of monetary or exchange rate 
developments on them?"
"No" 5
Proposition 13 Question Categories Scale
"Very strong" 1
"Rather 
strong"
2
"Rather weak" 3
Owing to the comparatively low and 
varied impact of monetary or 
exchange rate policy on individual 
enterprises, interest associations find 
it difficult to form strong preferences 
with respect to the day-to-day conduct 
of monetary or exchange rate policy.
"Do interest groups have strong preferences 
with respect to the conduct of monetary or 
exchange rate policy?"
"Very weak" 4
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Proposition 14 Question Categories Scale
"Highly 
significant"
1
"Significant" 2
"Insignificant" 3
Given the low perceived impact of 
monetary or exchange rate 
developments and the importance of 
other policy fields, monetary or 
exchange rate policy is not perceived 
by interest groups as a priority issue 
on the economic policy agenda.
"Compared with other policy issues on the 
political and economic agenda, how 
significant an issue in general is monetary 
or exchange rate policy as far as interest 
groups and their members are concerned?"
"Highly 
insignificant"
4
A.4.4 Group context
Proposition 15 Question Categories702 Scale
None
None
None
Heterogeneity of interests related to 
monetary or exchange rate affairs 
within existing interest groups 
weakens the formation of strong 
policy positions in the business sector.
"To what extent does the heterogeneity of 
interests related to monetary or exchange 
rate affairs within existing interest groups 
weaken the formation of strong policy 
positions in the business sector?"
None
Proposition 16 Question Categories Scale
"Significant 
potential 
pressure"
1
"Moderate 
potential 
pressure"
2
"Insignificant 
potential 
pressure"
3
Interest associations and their 
members do not possess means of 
exerting economic or political 
pressure on the central bank.
"Do interest groups or their members 
possess means of exerting pressure on 
monetary policy makers?"
"No potential 
pressure"
4
702 Responses to this proposition are analysed in qualitative terms only. In practice, the majority of 
responses were found to be highly differentiated, qualifying the overall reaction, so that an 
unambiguous allocation of reactions to a set of categories of answers and a corresponding scale of 
numerical values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses.
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Proposition 17 Question Categories Scale
"Contribute 
greatly"
1
"Contribute" 2
"Contribute 
slightly"
3
Individual firms or interest 
associations do not possess relevant 
information exclusively available to 
them alone, which they can contribute 
to the discourse with the central bank.
"Can interest groups provide central banks 
with expertise or information of relevance 
to the conduct of monetary or exchange 
rate policy?"
"Cannot 
contribute"
4
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A.5 Evaluation
Following collection and transcription703 of the interviews, a combined qualitative and 
quantitative approach704 was adopted to evaluate responses. Answers to core questions 
were compared among all respondents and coded according to the method proposed by 
Schmidt705:
– In an initial step, coding categories were identified for each question. 
– Second, the answer categories were complemented by a scale of numerical values 
to enable quantification of the answers given by respondents.
– Subsequently, individual answers were coded and scaled on that basis.
– The resulting quantification was processed and evaluated mathematically.
– Where useful, insights gained from quantification were complemented by 
quotations or other qualitative elements from the interviews, with the aim of either 
explaining or elaborating on numerical results, or to identify behavioural or 
perceptional aspects that could not be explored by quantitative means.
Evaluation encompassed the aggregation of numerical values and calculation of 
statistical averages across the key strata of the samples, i.e. for interest group and 
central bank respondents as well as for regional or federal-level responses in the case 
of Germany. 
Calculation of arithmetic averages was selected as the most important indicator for 
aggregate responses, reflecting the total of all observations in the sample or its sub-
sets. In addition, median responses were calculated providing evidence on the typical 
responses delivered by interviewees. The median is considered a particularly robust 
indicator useful for evaluating small samples ranked along ordinary scales, especially 
in cases where single, extreme observations tend to have a substantial impact on the 
arithmetic average706. Median values are referred to in the above analysis in cases 
where substantial aberrations from the arithmetic average were observed. Mean and 
703 The methods applied in transcribing interviews were based on Kowal, O'Connell (2000).
704 Combining qualitative surveys with quantitative evaluation methods has been propagated as one 
means of improving evaluative objectivity in social science research (Dieckmann (1997), pp. 451-
455, also Kelle, Erzberger (2000)). However, there is a risk of blurring results at the interface 
between the two approach, namely when translating qualitative items for use in quantitative 
analysis by means of coding (Schmidt (2000)).
705 Schmidt (2000).
706 For comprehensive discussions of the various measures of the centres of distributions, see e.g. 
Wonnacott (1990), pp. 32-39, and Dieckmann (1997), pp. 555-663.
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median values for the entirety of the sample and its sub-sets on all propositions 
evaluated in a quantitative manner are presented below707.
Beyond these fundamental calculations, the response set does not lend itself to further 
statistical and econometric evaluation due to the small size of the sample – i.e. the 
limited number of respondents available in this policy area – and the relatively small 
number of individual statistical items collected in the course of the qualitative 
fieldwork as a result. Most importantly, regressions and the values yielded for 
correlation coefficients to identify interdependencies between the different 
institutional, issue, or group determinants tested here, were found to lack statistical 
robustness. This lack of robustness, however, is primarily the result of the small size of 
the sample, which does not allow for meaningful sophisticated statistical analysis. It 
does not imply that no correlations between the different variables exist, for example, 
or that such correlation could be detected if the sample included a sufficient number of 
items. 
To compensate for the fact that a meaningful sophisticated statistical analysis was 
discouraged by the small number of statistical items available, qualitative remarks 
made by the respondents and recorded in the course of the interviews are used in the 
above analysis to explain, illustrate and compare the basic statistical evidence. 
In addition, the responses on propositions 3 and 15 are analysed in qualitative terms 
only708. In practice, the majority of responses were found to be highly differentiated, 
tempering and qualifying the overall reaction, so that an unambiguous allocation of 
reactions to a set of categories of answers and to a corresponding scale of numerical 
values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses. 
Similarly, the respondents’ reactions to the follow-up questions pertaining to the ways 
and means of communicating interests in practice, i.e. the channels used for 
articulating interests in the area of monetary policy, are captured above in qualitative 
terms only. Again, a majority of responses were highly differentiated, discouraging 
quantification in a meaningful way, and rendering qualitative analysis the superior tool 
for investigation.
Coding and quantification are exclusively the result of evaluation of the qualitative 
answers. Interviewees were not asked to give their own quantitative assessments. 
Throughout the study, these quantitative results complement the qualitative material in 
707 See pp. 390 to 406.
708 See pp. 392 and 404 below.
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the form of quotations from interviewees709 or insights form other sources, such as 
related literature or archival material.
709 All interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. Accordingly, any quotations are reproduced 
in the present study anonymously. Authors and sources of quotations have been archived by the 
author of this study and will only be disclosed upon request and after explicit, written permission 
by the author of the relevant quotation.
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A.6 Summary statistical results
A.6.1 General context
Proposition 1 – summary statistics 
Table 16
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 46 4.07 4.00
24 4.21 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 4.42 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 4.00 5.00
22 3.91 4.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 3.57 4.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 15 4.07 4.00
Memorandum items
24 4.04 4.00
22 4.09 4.00
EU
All respondents 12 4.33 5.00
9 4.56 5.00
2 4.50 4.50
Memorandum items
1 5.00 5.00
11 4.27 5.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Very intensively 1
– Intensively 2
– Moderately 3
– Very moderately 4
– No 5
In general, interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy are not communicated very intensively 
to the relevant decision makers.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents among experts
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 2 – summary statistics 
Table 17
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 33 4.67 5.00
24 4.71 5.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 4.83 5.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 4.58 5.00
9 4.56 5.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 2 4.50 4.50
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 7 4.57 5.00
Memorandum items
16 4.69 5.00
17 4.65 5.00
EU
All respondents 10 4.70 5.00
9 4.67 5.00
1 5.00 5.00
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
9 4.78 5.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Much more intensively 1
– More intensively 2
– As intensively 3
– Less intensively 4
– Much less intensively 5
In general, communication of interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy is significantly 
lower than in other policy fields.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 3 – summary statistics710
Table 18
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 24 … …
24 … …
Interest groups, federal level 12 … …
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 … …
0 … …
Bundesbank, Central Office 0 … …
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 0 … …
Memorandum items
11 … …
13 … …
EU
All respondents 9 … …
9 … …
0 … …
Memorandum items
1 … …
8 … …
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– None None
– None None
– None None
– None None
Mediating interests with respect to monetary or exchange rate policy does not yield sufficient benefits 
relative to the associated costs.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
710 Responses to this proposition are analysed in qualitative terms only. In practice, the majority of 
responses were found to be highly differentiated, qualifying the overall response, so that an 
unambiguous allocation of reactions to a set of categories of answers and a corresponding scale of 
numerical values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses.
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A.6.2 Institutional context
Proposition 4 – summary statistics 
Table 19
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 41 2.63 3.00
22 2.77 3.00
Interest groups, federal level 10 2.60 3.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 2.92 2.50
19 2.47 2.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 6 1.83 2.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 13 2.77 3.00
Memorandum items
21 2.71 3.00
20 2.55 2.50
EU
All respondents 6 3.17 3.00
4 3.00 3.00
1 3.00 3.00
Memorandum items
0 … …
6 3.17 3.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Very accessible 1
– Rather accessible 2
– Rather inaccessible 3
– Very inaccessible 4
Central banks are perceived as inaccessible to interests from the private sector, compared to other political 
bodies.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 5 – summary statistics 
Table 20
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 43 2.70 3.00
24 2.63 2.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 2.50 2.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 2.75 2.00
19 2.79 3.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 6 3.50 4.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 13 2.46 3.00
Memorandum items
22 2.82 3.00
21 2.57 2.00
EU
All respondents 6 2.67 3.00
4 2.75 3.00
1 4.00 4.00
Memorandum items
0 … …
6 2.67 3.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Strong obstacle 1
– Obstacle 2
– Weak obstacle 3
– No 4
Political independence is an obstacle for private interests in mediating their interests to the central bank.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 6 – summary statistics 
Table 21
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 43 3.42 4.00
22 3.55 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 10 3.60 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 3.50 4.00
21 3.29 3.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 3.14 3.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 14 3.36 3.50
Memorandum items
23 3.57 4.00
20 3.25 3.00
EU
All respondents 9 3.67 4.00
6 3.67 4.00
2 3.50 3.50
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
8 3.63 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Strong dependence 1
– Moderate dependence 2
– Weak dependence 3
– No dependence 4
Given their institutional, material, and expertise-based resources, central banks are not dependent on 
external political support in order to fulfil their tasks in the field of monetary or exchange rate policy.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 7 – summary statistics 
Table 22
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 44 3.41 4.00
24 3.58 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.67 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 3.50 4.00
20 3.20 3.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 2.71 3.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 13 3.46 4.00
Memorandum items
23 3.43 4.00
21 3.38 4.00
EU
All respondents 10 3.60 4.00
7 3.57 4.00
2 3.50 3.50
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
9 3.56 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Strong dependence 1
– Moderate dependence 2
– Weak dependence 3
– No dependence 4
Given their focus on aggregated economic indicators and their access to the relevant statistical resources, 
central banks are not dependent on external information with respect to monetary or exchange rate 
conditions and developments in order to fulfil their tasks in the field of monetary or exchange rate policy.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 8 – summary statistics 
Table 23
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 43 2.58 2.00
22 2.82 3.00
Interest groups, federal level 10 3.00 3.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 2.67 3.00
21 2.33 2.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 2.14 2.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 14 2.43 2.00
Memorandum items
23 2.70 3.00
20 2.45 2.00
EU
All respondents 7 3.14 3.00
4 3.25 3.50
2 2.50 2.50
Memorandum items
0 … …
7 3.14 3.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Highly interested 1
– Interested 2
– Slightly interested 3
– Not interested 4
Given the independence of central banks in terms of political, material, and expertise-related resources as 
well as their focus on aggregated economic indicators, central bank policy makers are not interested in the 
views of private-sector interest groups on monetary or exchange rate policy.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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A.6.3 Issue context
Proposition 9 – summary statistics 
Table 24
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 43 1.47 1.00
24 1.33 1.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 1.33 1.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 1.33 1.00
19 1.63 2.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 6 1.50 1.50
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 13 1.69 2.00
Memorandum items
23 1.57 2.00
20 1.35 1.00
EU
All respondents 10 2.10 2.00
7 2.00 2.00
2 2.00 2.00
Memorandum items
1 2.00 2.00
9 2.11 2.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Agree strongly 1
– Agree 2
– Disagree 3
– Disagree strongly 4
Individual firms or interest associations agree with the objectives and the overall conduct of monetary or 
exchange rate policy.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 10 – summary statistics 
Table 25
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 45 3.96 4.00
24 4.13 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.92 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 4.33 4.00
21 3.76 4.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 3.86 4.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 14 3.71 3.50
Memorandum items
24 4.13 4.00
21 3.76 4.00
EU
All respondents 9 3.56 4.00
7 3.71 4.00
1 4.00 4.00
Memorandum items
1 3.00 3.00
8 3.63 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Very frequently 1
– Frequently 2
– Rarely 3
– Very rarely 4
– Never 5
Interest groups rarely disagree with the monetary or exchange rate policy decisions of the central bank.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 11 – summary statistics 
Table 26
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 42 2.93 3.00
24 3.08 3.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.08 3.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 3.08 3.00
18 2.72 3.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 6 2.83 3.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 12 2.67 3.00
Memorandum items
22 2.77 3.00
20 3.10 3.00
EU
All respondents 10 3.40 3.00
7 3.57 4.00
2 3.00 3.00
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
9 3.33 3.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Strong 1
– Moderate 2
– Weak 3
– Negligible 4
Monetary or exchange rate policy is not perceived to have a significant effect on individual firms or interest 
associations.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 12 – summary statistics 
Table 27
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 38 3.84 4.00
24 3.96 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.92 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 4.00 4.00
14 3.64 4.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 3 3.67 4.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 11 3.64 4.00
Memorandum items
19 3.63 4.00
19 4.05 4.00
EU
All respondents 8 4.25 4.00
7 4.29 4.00
1 4.00 4.00
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
7 4.29 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Very precisely 1
– Rather precisely 2
– Rather vaguely 3
– Very vaguely 4
– No  5
The magnitude of the impact of monetary or exchange rate policy on individual firms or interest 
associations is difficult to determine.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 13 – summary statistics 
Table 28
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 41 3.29 3.00
24 3.38 3.50
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.25 3.50
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 3.50 3.00
17 3.18 3.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 5 2.80 3.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 12 3.33 3.00
Memorandum items
21 3.38 3.00
20 3.20 3.00
EU
All respondents 11 3.73 4.00
8 4.25 4.00
2 3.00 3.00
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
10 3.70 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Very strong 1
– Rather strong 2
– Rather weak 3
– Very weak 4
Owing to the comparatively low and varied impact of monetary or exchange rate policy on individual 
enterprises, interest associations find it difficult to form strong preferences with respect to the day-to-day 
conduct of monetary or exchange rate policy.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 14 – summary statistics 
Table 29
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 42 3.45 4.00
24 3.42 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.58 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 3.25 4.00
18 3.50 3.50
Bundesbank, Central Office 6 3.50 3.50
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 12 3.50 3.50
Memorandum items
21 3.52 4.00
21 3.38 3.00
EU
All respondents 10 4.00 4.00
8 4.00 4.00
1 4.00 4.00
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
9 4.00 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Highly significant 1
– Significant 2
– Insignificant 3
– Highly insignificant 4
Given the low perceived impact of monetary or exchange rate developments and the importance of other 
policy fields, monetary or exchange rate policy is not perceived by interest groups as a priority issue on the 
economic policy agenda.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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A.6.4 Group context
Proposition 15 – summary statistics711
Table 30
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 41 … …
24 … …
Interest groups, federal level 12 … …
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 12 … …
17 … …
Bundesbank, Central Office 5 … …
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 12 … …
Memorandum items
21 … …
20 … …
EU
All respondents 11 … …
8 … …
2 … …
Memorandum items
1 … …
10 … …
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– None None
– None None
– None None
– None None
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Heterogeneity of interests related to monetary or exchange rate affairs within existing interest groups 
weakens the formation of strong policy positions in the business sector.
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
711 Responses to this proposition are analysed in qualitative terms only. In practice, the majority of 
responses were found to be highly differentiated, qualifying the overall response, so that an 
unambiguous allocation of reactions to a set of categories of answers and a corresponding scale of 
numerical values was found to be inappropriate, potentially not doing justice to the level of 
differentiation of the responses.
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Proposition 16 – summary statistics 
Table 31
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 44 3.84 4.00
23 3.91 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 4.00 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 11 3.82 4.00
21 3.76 4.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 3.86 4.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 14 3.71 4.00
Memorandum items
23 3.83 4.00
21 3.86 4.00
EU
All respondents 11 4.00 4.00
8 4.00 4.00
2 4.00 4.00
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
10 4.00 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Significant potential pressure 1
– Moderate potential pressure 2
– Insignificant potential pressure 3
– No potential pressure 4
Interest associations and their members do not possess means of exerting economic or political pressure on 
the central bank.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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Proposition 17 – summary statistics 
Table 32
Number of 
respondents
Average 
response
Median 
response
DE
All respondents 44 3.07 3.00
23 3.35 4.00
Interest groups, federal level 12 3.42 4.00
Interest groups, Advisory Board members 11 3.27 4.00
21 2.76 3.00
Bundesbank, Central Office 7 2.29 2.00
Bundesbank, Regional Offices 14 3.00 3.00
Memorandum items
23 3.04 3.00
21 3.10 3.00
EU
All respondents 11 3.82 4.00
9 3.89 4.00
2 3.50 3.50
Memorandum items
1 4.00 4.00
10 3.80 4.00
Proposition
–
Categories Scale
– Contribute greatly 1
– Contribute 2
– Contribute slightly 3
– Cannot contribute 4
Individual firms or interest associations do not possess relevant information exclusively available to them 
alone, which they can contribute to the discourse with the central bank.
Sample
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
Respondents among experts
Respondents among experts
Respondents from interest groups
Respondents from central bank
Respondents among decision makers
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